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CHURCH, RELIGION AND SECULARIZATION IN THE THEOLOGY OF 
CHRISTIAN RADICALISM, 1960-69. 
Critical Perspectives from the Sociology of Religion. 
by 
John A. Williams. 
ABSTRACT. 
This thesis is a study of the proposals for theological 
reformulation and church renewal made during the episode of 
radical "secular" the.ology during the nineteen-sixties. 
The. radicals sought an articulation of the Gospel, and its 
expression through the Church, which would respond to, and 
engage with, contemporary secular social and cultural 
conditions. Secularity demanded an understanding of faith and 
theology in concrete social and historical, empirically 
graspable terms. 
Any "secular'' approach to theology must be answerable to 
the critique of the sociology of religion as the discipline 
which explicitly treats the concrete social embodiments of 
religious meaning, and the cultural expression and 
dissemination of religious ideas. 
Accordingly, critical tools from the sociology of religion 
are developed for analysing the theology of Christian 
Radicalism. An understanding; of the nature of religion as a 
social reality is applied to the radicals' ideas about 
"religion less" approaches to theism and the meaning of the· 
Gospel. The debate about secularization provides critical 
insight into radical proposals for the affirmation of 
secularity and a secular role for the Church. Sociological 
analysis of the forms of religious institutionalization and 
mode.s of commitment is applied to the call for an undogmatic, 
critical, operative faith. 
The critique helps to explain Christian Radicalism's 
relative lack of influence upon subsequent church life. The 
radicals were not attuned to the dialectical nature of 
Christianity's and the Church's presence within society and 
culture, regulating the relationship between legitimation and 
criticism of the prevailing order, affirmation and denial of 
modernity, and orientations to the past and its traditions and 
to the future, openness and promise. 
The thesis reaffirms the importance of the issues tackled 
by the radicals for contemporary church life, and urges the 
churches to. take them up with the benefit of the sociological 
sophistication lacked by the protagonists of twenty years ago. 
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CHURCH. RELlG ION AND SECULAR..IZ.ATION IN THE THEOLQGY__QE 
QIR lSTIAN RADICAL ISM, 1960-69. 
The Introduction to thL; thesi:=; i:=; designed to perform 
i nd isate how ~he =;, trw::ture •Jn fold:-; i ;1 the body of the wor 1\. 
l"hls thesis :s concerned with the theological issues 
controversial debates affecting the 
·::hurche:=:. dur-ing the nin"'+:een--::ixtics. The nost prominently 
Robim:;on 's book Honest to God. Ther-e were, however, a variety 
of other which togethe:-
theological ~p~sode, which +:his thesis treats under the general 
mean::; an English phenomenon, thesis 
concentrates mainly upon the debates as they touched the lives 
of the chuu:hes in England, vrith ra.rticular ref•~rence to tho:> 
Church of England. 
tne j_·:;sue~::; invol ... /f~~ in Chri::;-t:~c:.n !~'adicali~::.rn were often 
in c·~rtain such a:~. "rel igionless 
ChrL::.tiani ty", "secular theology" and "tl"1e death of God". In 
particular, t: he :deas put £ orward i.r: ?onhoeffer ':::, Let ter:3 and 
Pap<"r:;;; from Pri:3on former:! t~e mo:=; 1: frcc'r:pJently cited ::::.ource of 
influence or inspiration. This sourc<=• 1)oints to a m:3.jor concern 
of Christian Radicalism, which is that of a quest far the 
concreteness of the Christian message. 
l)ut simply, traditional of theologi•2al 
doctt-ines c:.nd traditional under:3taw:lin;:;::::. of the Gospel \'Jere 
9 
theologians as increa:3ingly secular. It wa:c; becoming more and 
more difficult to state intelligibly ju:3t what the propositions 
of religion a.nd theology were really about- how. in fact, they 
touched the secular :3ocial existew:e of an a::=.::;;umed "modern 
man". 
Side by side with this problem over theological do·~trines 
equ~_lly with the 
performance of the ~hurches. They too app~ared to share in the 
hcing suffered bv tte ideas thev existed to promote. Insofar as 
the Churo::h vw::;; the place to which a man mi3ht 'C!:o-:pect to turn, 
pr i1na facie, in orc1er to ::oee something of the •::oncrete, 
empirical and historical realization of theological meaning, the 
likelihood was that his expectations w~u~d be disappointed. 
This thesis regards the twin concern for theological 
reformulation and th•~ :structural reorg.::nization of the Churr::;h, 
viewed .35 intimately related component·~ in an overa.ll 
prozramrn~ of n~form, of 
Christian Radicalism. For this reason, we have sought to 
develop a •::ri tical perspective on the id~a::=. proposed by the 
variou:::; .::ontributors to the movement which gives full weight 
to this dual inter~st. 
We wish to take a fresh look at the episod~ of Christian 
Radicalism from our vantage point of som~ twenty y~ar3 on, in 
order to uncover some reasons for its relative failure to 
fulfil its hopes in the area of pastoral .:1nd evangelistic 
·C!ffect upon the iive:::; of the chun~he:o;, o.nd to rea:::;:::;,~:.;::; the 
areas in which its fruits might still be reaped. 
The critical p~rspective proposed in this thesis is drawn 
from work in the sociology of religion. This is because this is 
the sub-discipline of both sociology and religious studies 
which explicitly pays attention to th~ social and cultural 
embodiment·::; of theological m,~aning, to religion in:::;oL:tr as it 
10 
is a social reality, and thus to the empirically available 
dimensions of the subject-matter of theology. 
Like Christian Radicalism, sociology of religion treats 
theological ideas and institutional expressions- in particular, 
though not exclusively, the churches- as intimately related. 
Any claim to be proposing a "secular", that is, an empirically 
accessible understanding of theology and a corresponding 
restructuring of chuu::h life, must be prepared to meet the 
critique which the :3ociology of religion bring:3 to it. This, 
then, is t~1e :::;ource of the critical stimulu:o:; employed in this 
thesis. 
Part One of the thesis lays the groundwork for the 
investigation by dealing with the fundamental materials which 
form the main co-or-dinates within which all the en:::;ui.ng more 
specific discussions will move. 
Chapter I stake:'> out more precisely the ground we intend 
to cover und•':r- our headin.~ of "Christian Radicali:::;m", including 
our justifi.~ation for the choice of this name. It al:::;o 
introduce:;; the three main sets of que:::;tions raised by the 
movement, towards which our critique stimulated by the 
sociology of religion i:::; directed. These are, briefly: (i) the 
pos:3ibility of producing a secular approach to the meaning of 
theism v1hich is not dependent upon religious forms of 
representation for its intelligibility; (ii) the possibility of 
providing a theological affirmation of the secularization 
process and of reconceiving the Church's mission accordingly; 
(iii) the possibility of developing a critical form of faith 
which is open, creative and not tied to dogmatic formulae and 
believed solely on authority. 
Chapter II discusses the issues raised by our decision to 
employ sociological concepts as critical tools in the service 
of theology. VIe provide some bco.ckground to the inter-
disciplinary relationship between theology and sociology, and 
set out details of both the tradition of sociological work <the 
W'eberian> .:md the model of theological activity which, in our 
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view, provide the most fruitful possibilities of interaction. We 
show how sociological understanding brings out the limitations 
and constraints involved in any attempt to achieve secular 
social embodiment of the ideas contained in the Christian 
vision, the substance of the tradition which is the 
theologian's raw material. 
In Chapter III we indicate the relevance of Bonhoeffer to 
the whole enterprise, in particular the way in which his m:n 
quest for "concreteness" involved him in both an ongoing 
concern fm- ecclesiology and an interest in the sociological 
perspe.:::ti·Je. 
Part Two devoted to the development of our 
sociological tool:~, corresponding to the three main areas of 
questions outlined in Chapter I. 
Chapter IV presents material on the nature and social 
functions of religion, as the basis for a critka.l anzdysis of 
proposals for "religionlessness". We set forth a view of 
r·eligion a.s a cultural system expressing an orientation to the 
tran:3cendent, which has the dialectical affect of legitimating 
and stabilizing the world of the individual or the social group 
by anchoring it in a sacred order, yet also calli':)it into 
question by means of the summons to become the more perfect 
fulfilment of that order which it as yet only incompletely 
represent:3. 
Chapter V examines the debate about secularization, with a 
view to laying bare the ambiguities of the process and the 
double evaluation possible for the churches. We offer as 
leading themes for the analysis of secularization the processes 
of differentiation and religious disengagement in the social 
structure, and the desacralization and pluralistic 
fragmentation of culture, the effects of which upon the 
churches must influence any attempt to construct a viable 
response in theology and church life. 
Chapter VI discusses the different types of religious 
membership and modes of faith-commitment or "ways of being 
12 
religious", as a basis for analysis of the radicals' demand for 
a critically open form of faith. 'We employ in particular the 
seminal distinctions between church and sect types of religious 
institution, and communal and associational styles of 
religiosity, as tools for under-standing the ways in whkh the 
inner di:=>positions of faith carried in the religious tradition 
come to institutional expression and achieve social and 
cultural continuity. 
P.:1rt Three of the thesis contains the substance of the 
theological analysis we wish to offer, making use of the 
critical perspectives drawn from the sociology of religion. 
ln Chapter VI I we supply a historical Sitz im Leben by 
de:=:;cribing a representative selection of material drawn from 
the debates and controversies affecting the churches during the 
period under review, and showing how the key questions were 
present in them, both explicitly and implicitly. 
we then devote six chapters to our analysis of the main 
theological themes of Christian Radicalism. In each case, one 
of the three major sets of questions is to the fore, and hence 
also the sociological critique appropriate to it from Part Two: 
broadly the point of view of Chapter IV is applied in Chapters 
VIII and IX, of Chapter V in X and XI, and of Chapter VI in XII 
and X I I I. 
Chapter VIII examines attempts to produce secular 
approaches to theism, beginning from Robinson's Honest to God. 
The shortcoming of such programmes are revealed in the light 
of our view of the nature and social functions of religion and 
in particular the dialectical conception of transcendence. 'We 
argue that the prior commitment to "religionlessness" prevented 
the radicals from seeing how the meaning of theistic talk 
emerges from the actual practices of the religious cultural 
system, within and out of which God is confessed. 
Chapter IX argues that the problems of transcendental 
theism cannot be by-passed by concentrating upon the human 
t igure of Jesus, as in the case of van Buren's The Secular 
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Meaning of the Gospel. But some clues to the meaning of 
confessing God in this way may be found in examining the 
social reality of the Church as it is understood to represent 
the continuation of Jesus' presence and work in the world. 
Chapter X discusses radical theology's attempt to provide 
a Christian justification of secularization, typified by Cox's 
The Secular Cit~. We find that the Church must retain leverage 
for challenging ·~et-tain aspects of the process, rather than 
opting for whole:c;ah~ affirmation. The marginalized social 
position of a highly differentiated religious sector provides a 
basis for such a stance. 
This same social situation leads us in Chapter Xl to 
criticise programmes for recasting the Church's mission along 
secular lines, as in the thinking of the World Council of 
Churches. The Church's secular-social engagements must be 
undertaken in a. spirit which reflects the distinctively 
religious orientation to transcendence, something which a 
religiously specialized Church might achieve. 
Chapter XII treats the question of how religious believers 
live out faith in the concrete social context, and canvasses 
the prospects for the realization of a critically open, non-
dogmatic form of faith, as exemplified in the work of Ronald 
Gregor Smith. We argue for the need for attunement to the 
dialectical relationship of traditional continuity and critical 
openness in the different modes of religious commitment, and 
suggest how these might be embodied in the various levels of 
the social presentation of the Church. 
Finally, we give attention in Chapter XIII to the 
radicals' demand for faith to develop a mature ethic, not based 
upon rules and dependence on authority. Once again, we doubt 
the feasibility of such an ethic being universalized among the 
whole Christian community, but argue for a dialectical 
relationship between traditional morality and that which 
transcends it, given expression in the religious group. 
14 
Part Four of the thesis gathers together our conclusions. 
In line with the dual attention of the work to theoretical 
thought and practical realization in the life of the Church, we 
present these in two concluding chapters. 
Chapter XIV summarizes the theoretical positions 
developed in the course of the thesis, chapter by chapter. In 
brief, these are held together by an emphasis on the need to 
give du.~ weight to the dialectical ten:3ion between the 
traditional and the radically new, between orientations to past 
and future, between the legitimation of the revailing order and 
the promise of its super:3ession in a radic.'>l alternative. This 
tension i:3 generated by the very presence of the Christian 
religious tradition within a socio-cultural context, and 
acquaintance with the relevant sociological 1naterials could 
have attuned the Christian radicals more adequately to it. 
However, we wish to affirm afresh the importance of the 
questions raised by Christian Radicalism for the future 
prospects of faith and the churches in the secularized nations. 
Therefor-e, in Chapter XV, we indica.te how the questions have 
recurred in certain controversial issues facing the churches 
more recently. VIe warn against dismissing the "sixties ferment" 
<especially in the Church of England) as a temporary 
aberration, thankfully since forgotten, and use the lessons of 
the sixties to sketch out the requirements for any Church 
desiring to think realistically about the concrete, empirical 
expression of the Gospel truth it carries. 
The title of this last chapter, "Towards an Empirical 
Ecclesiology?", is deliberately tentative: it expresses our 
conviction that in this area the fruits of the sixties' debates 
could yet be reaped, given an adequate sociological 
sophistication. 
15 
PART ONE: PRELIMINARY MATERIALS. 
GHAEIER 1: CHRISTIAN RADICALISM: AN EPISODE IN THE THEOLOGY 
OF THE SIXTIES. 
1. The Cultural Context. 
This thesis addresses itself to certain theological events 
taking place in the very recent past. To go back only two 
decades, to the nineteen-sixties, may seem a surprising project 
for a theological thesis, given the two thousand years of 
Christian theology available for investigation. But, in theology 
and the Church as elsewhere, people already speak of the 
sixties almost as they would about "the iHddle Age:::." or "the 
Victorian era", as a kind of past historical period in their 
own right. Catch-phrases like "the swinging Sixties" and "the 
permissive society" have become a universal shorthand for an 
age reckoned to be somehow very distant from our own. Vlithin 
the churches, "sixties theology" is commonly recalled with a 
kind of affectionate but wry smile: a novelty, :tad or 
ecr::;entri•:::i ty, a temporat-y aberration from the mainstream of 
th•O!ological concern. 
A characteristic feature of the decade was the growing 
tension between two contrasting cultural trends. On the one 
hand, there was the celebration of modernity, encouraged 
especially in the 'West by the sense of grand achievement in 
the rebuilding of society after the Second 'World 'War. In 
Britain, there was the proud boast of a 'Welfare State and the 
promise of general living standards undreamt of in the days of 
war and depression. 
Harold MacMillan's word about "never having had it so 
good", uttered in the latter part of the fifties, was to seem a 
fateful slogan; later, the remark of that other Harold, now Lord 
'Wilson, about the "white heat of this revolution" encapsulated 
the politically optimistic mood. Wilson's election as Prime 
1Hni:3ter the year following the occasion of this remark was 
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presented as the advent of a new, liberal and progressive age 
for the people. The barometer of pop culture plainly testified 
to the trend in the phenomenon of the "Mersey Sound" as the 
vehicle of a new, brash and youthful venture in populist 
creativity. 
But the celebration of modernity was very soon 
accompanied by the contrapuntal theme of its discontents. 
Su::;picion grew that the technological age might also pr-ove to 
be the one~dimensional age as far- as the human prospect was 
concerned. The dream of a. planned society threatened to turn 
into a nightmare of enforced artificiality, consumer 
regimentation and di::;r-espect for freedom. Second and third~ 
generation progressive .:;.nd liberal thinker-s qu•~stioned whether 
the technological miracle could be achieved without radically 
disturbing the power-structur-e::; .:md author! ty patterns of the 
existing society. 
The counter~culture of protest, so much a striking feature 
of the sixties, represented the offspring of modernity refusing 
to gloss over the disturbing questions to which that modernity 
by which they had been formed gave rise. Across the spectrum 
from student violence in Paris to hippies in San Francisco 
singing "All you need is love", question marks were stubbornly 
raised against the meaning and values of modernity. Pop culture 
again indicates the state of play: the Beatles, once working 
class rock-and~roll heroes, moved on to psychedelia, pot and 
the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, and eventually to disillusionment 
and acrimonious split in 1970. 
These, needless to say, are very sketchy intxoductory 
remarks, and the broader cultural background they hint at will 
not feature explicitly to any great extent in the further 
development of this thesis. However, they point to a persistent 
anrl crucial duality, a kind of massive geological fault running 
through the decade under examination, which we shall find 
reflected also in its religious life. 
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This is the drive to affirm and to celebrate aspects of 
the modern age in almost eschatological terms as the threshold 
of a Promised Land, which i:=> then offset by a retrenchment, 
and a desire to discover in what transmuted form certain 
articles from the old world might be carried across the 
frontier, to make the new capable of being lived in. 
Thus, in the first plauc~, it se•~ms that the ne~1 age has no 
need of the outmoded religion of the old, with it::=> hope of 
other-worldly compensatlon·s for- life in a world conceived of 
as unchan~TiW< and 
I_) (__1 irredeemably unjust. But equally, it finds 
itself embarking on a religious quest, by way of Eastern 
my:o,tici:=>m, or the "counterfeit infinity" (Roszak, 1970; 
Guinness, 19731 of hallucinogenic di-ugs, or the fascination of 
the occult, lest the technological homeland turn out to be a 
species of iron cage. 
Again, the new technocratic man celebrates the rational 
autonomy of every sphere of life, but his sons, instead of 
taking up meekly their own scientific ::;pecialisms, begin to 
fear the compartmentalization of discrete technical expertises 
as a threat to human communication and a sinister way in to 
manipulative control. 
Thirdly, there is a deep-seated uncertainty about the 
"traditions of the fathers": is the modern man to accept 
without question the dogmatic authority of his scientific 
mentors? If not, and he opts instead for a search for fre:3h 
patterns of self-expression, authenticity and freedom, where 
are the lines to be drawn, and what are the limits, if any, to 
his onslaught upon boundary and taboo? CB. Martin, 1981.)' 
These questions lie parallel to the specific issues for 
theology and the churches which form the basic structure of 
our analysis of Christian Radicalism: the question of whether 
relip;ion can be rlispensed l'tith for intelligible secular talk of 
God, the possibility of a thorough theological affirmation of 
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the modern secular world, and the search for a faith which is 
open, creative and not dogmatically-bound. 
The general cultural backdrop to these questions goes 
some way towards accounting for :=.orne of the more eccentric 
aspects of the phenomenon of Christian Radicalism. We refer to 
such im3tances as the publication of articles by death-of-God 
theologi.'l.n William Hamil ton in Playboy; the involvement of 
Bishop fames Pike in the occult; Harvey Co~:· celebration of a 
multi-media Euchari::=.t as an avant-garde "happening"; John 
RobinsrJn 's producing snappy littl•c. articles for the Dailv 
Mirror; or the efforts of H.A.Williams and others to express 
permissive attitudes to sexual morality in the popular media at 
what seemed like every available opportunity. 
Such events as these make it all too easy to draw 
cartoon-like caricatures of "sixties theology"", lending :3upport 
to conservative opinion within the churches which regards the 
episode a:=. best dead and buried. We hope that our analysis, 
while certainly critical. will show that the churches ca_nnot 
afford to ignore the issues being raised by the would-be 
radical theologies of the sixties, any more than society at 
large can disregard the hold which that decade exercises over 
the contemporary imagination. 
2. rihy "Christian Radicalism"? 
The theology we aim to examine in this thesis does not 
amount to a coherent "school", or an entirely unitary movement, 
but constitutes rather a mood or style, with a cluster of 
common features characterizing a variety of contemporaneous 
theologi•=:al events. Therefor-e, we require a conveniently broad, 
general heading under which to gather our material. 
Within the English context, there can be no better place 
to look for such a heading than in the controversy over the 
impuct of Rubinson's Honest to God, for with its unprecedented 
sales and a:3tonishing level of public discussion, this book as 
a theological event far outweighed any other in coming to 
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symbolize a whole incipient mood. Writing in this context upon 
the prospects for renewal in the churches, one of the most 
perceptive commentators upon the controversy, David Edwards, 
then Managing Director of the SCM Press, said: 
My belief is t.ha t the !'equ i l'ed movement has noll' be•JUn to 
appea1·, .. Essentially this deeper movement results from a 
desi1·e to honour and to hear the secular modern world, 
The Church must l1sten to the world before it attempts to 
interpret the world's own spiritual experience-
expe,·iei1Ce which the world al1·eady enjoys, but which it 
may not ac~nowledge as 111 any sense Christian, Here, the 
whole en>ph~s!s !S •}11 the Chu1·ch as mankind's set•vant, At. 
the centre is a vision of Christ as the man alongside his 
fello11•-rnen, speak1ng to them of a God they are alrea•jy 
be•Jinnin>;J to know, In order that the Church may help the 
world to see God through Christ, some Christians are 
qu1te ready for a 111holesale revision of the Church's 
doctrines and customs, worship and work, organization and 
architecture, morals and politics, and are ready to 
declat·e themselves in favour of change even when they do 
not see e:(actly ll'het·e the process of change will end, If 
I had to put a label on this movement, as the 
Evangelicals or the Anglo-Catholics were labelled in 
the!!' days, would call it. Christian Ra•jicalism, 
rEdwat·ds and Robinson, 196:3;20-21,) 
This passage, with its talk of revising both theological 
formulations and the Church's organizational life in the 
interests of a discovery of theological meaning in the secular 
arena, and its willingness to contemplate a casting adrift from 
all traditional authorities and stabilities in the process, 
captures well the mood we are to analyse. 
\~hen Alec Vidler was looking for a title for his final 
1964 Robertson Lecture, in which he wanted to deal with the 
latest theological fashions in order to bring up to date his 
survey of twentieth-century trends, he opted for Edwards' 
phrase, Christian Radicalism. <Vidler, 1965:101-22.) We have 
followed him in his choice, mindful of the alternatives which 
were freely used by other commentators at the time. 
ln particular-, the term "radicalism" avoids the 
pretentious o:;lai.rn to be re-creating a historical phenomenon of 
massive pivotal significance and complex social and political 
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motivation which is inherent in the term "new Reformation" 
<Lloyd, 1964:7; Edwards, 1964; Robinson, 1965.) Further, it is 
les:3 parochial than such epithets as "Cambridge theology", or 
"South Bank Religion", two diverse phenomena held together by 
the involvement of Robinson in each.' 
Positively, the idea behind the tenn 
Radi·~alism" is that de:3·~ribed by Robinson hims·~lf in B. radio 
broadcast <1963\c.l; cf.Robinson, 1'~80 . .l Choosing to n~ganl 
himself as a radical, Robinson distinguished this from both the 
"reformist" and the "revolutionary". The fir::;t ot these. 
basically a safe party man, believe:=; that a little tinirerinc; 
with the theological or ecclesiastical system will save it, 
wherea:3 the second is a pariah outsider committed to 
overthrowing the system altogether. 
But the radical is a critical, committed insider. Just 
because he is committed, engase. from within, he is compelled 
literally to get at the roots <radix> of what the system 
stands for and serves- out of love for it, he wants to see it 
transformed to serve its true ends. 
For Robinson, then, and we have cho:3en to follow him for 
the purposes of the thesi:=;, radicalism vtas thoroughly 
compatible with a devotion to the Church and a respect for 
theological tradition. The term "Christian Radical ism" is taken 
implying a desire, in changing social and cultural 
circumstances in which religion is bound up as all else, to get 
at the root of what the Christian Gospel and Church are really 
all about, and to preserve, repristinate and communkate that ·· 1 
The materials included under our general heading of 
"Chri:=;tian Radicalism" may be summed up as these: 
i. The upsurge of semi-popular attempts to convey the 
meaning of Chr lsLlan faith and the Gospel to "modern, secular 
man" which began with the Honest to God controversy. 
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ii. More serious and substantial attempts to construct a 
theology of the secular, represented in Br-itain chiefly by 
Ronald Gregor Smith. 
iii. The contribution of the American :=>a-called "death of 
God" :=>chool, a misnomer- foe the heterogeneous writings of 
William Hamilton, Thomas Altizer- and Paul van Buren. 
iv. The efforts of a generation of committed clergy and 
laity to introduce fre::;h thinking into Chur<:\1 lif·~ at parish 
level, seen especially in the experiments in the Diocese of 
Southwark during Robinson's time as Bishop of Woolwich. 
v. The theological celebration::; of modernity best 
represented by Cox' The SPcular City and the ensuing debate. 
?i. The beginning:=> of "'- political theology and an 
accompanying "servant" eccle:3iology ::;een in the thinking of the 
'w'ocld Council of Churches. 
vii. The ethical writings capable of ::;urnmary under the 
popular head of "the new morality", and b.:;.sed mainly upon a 
situationist position. 
Our task at this point is to i.ndicate the way in 1vhich 
Chri::;tian Radicalism persistently demonstrated an interlocking 
concern for theological reformulation and Church 
reorganization, which lends itself to the sociologically-
informed method of critique we are adopting in the thesis. 
3. Ke_y Questions for Theology and Church. 
Discussions about church 'structur~s·, .. hav~ been 
Cl'iticise•j fo1· theil' str~ss on e:(ternal, OI'•;Janizational 
forms. R~-structuring would not answ~r the pres~nt cr1s1s 
of the churches, nor woul•j it help the badly needed 
r~storation of faith itself, According to these 
arguments, the crisis in the church~s is ideological, 
Even if this were true ... it would be shol'tsi,Jhted to 
i•JnOl'e the entanglement between hi th, ideolo•JY, on the 
one hand and the particular organizational forms by which 
these are institutional iz~d on the •)thJ>r. IThtJil•], 
l9n: ltn. l 
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Here a sophisticated sociologist states explicitly what was 
sensed, if not always articulated clearly, by the radical 
Christians of a decade earlier. 
The Editor of the Anglican monthly Prism, by that time 
the liveliest organ of the radical mood, wrote in April 1965: 
Thel'e is a difference between the attitude that takes an 
o!'ganization as given, but wants to tinker with the 
mach1nel"f to make tt mo!'e effective or pro•juct!Ye, and 
the att1 tlJde that questions the wh•)le natlJre and purpose 
of the or·~aniz:ation, but sees that it s+,ill has sorr1elhin•] 
vital at the heart of Jt, that calls for a totally fresh 
means of expression, 
This is a typical recognition that whereas the problems of the 
Church in modern society will not be met by institutional 
renovation .'llone, the tackling of the centra.l theological issw?s 
will not suffice unless they spill over into the concrete 
"mean:3 of expression." This spilling-over~ will be evident in 
each one of the theological chapters of Part Three of the 
thesis. 
Bishop Robinson himself observed the same du~lity in 
"Titin15 firstly Honest to God, in which tb~? re.tormulation of 
orthodox doctrines in a manner intelligible to "modern, secular 
man" was to the fore, and following it up with The New 
Reformation? in which he argued for a restructuring of the 
Church and its missionary task in order to engage with the 
needs of modern society. As a further example of this insight 
made rather less directly, we may quote the words of R.J.Page: 
[There isl a significant,,, lay group, part1a.lly 1nside 
and partially outside the Church, for whom theolo~jical 
ideas continue t.J have meaning, These indi vi•juals appear 
to find many of the traditional patterns of 
Ol'']anizational life trivial ... they He likely t.•J find 
much of the language and thought-forms 1n which 
Christianity has been expressed meaningless,, .they are 
inclined to regard the essence of Christianity as service 
to othe1·s,,, Many of them have turned away from the 
institutional Church because they no longer find the 
t1·aditional 'answers' helpful, iPa,~e, l%S;ll7-8, 
.~~ois min&,)"' 
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Christian Radicalism exhibits a preoccupation with 
certain issues expressed now in the form of theoretical 
theological questions, now in that of a concern with Church 
life and organization. This will be documented in much more 
detail in Chapter VII, but briefly the issues are these: 
Fir:3tly, an alienation from the Gospel was believed to 
have been brought about by its statement in terms of a concept 
of transcendence no longer relevant or intelligible to the 
modern mind. God was repr-esented as an objectively existing 
being, :3omehow wholly other than the world and y·~t everywher-e 
present to it. The subject-matter of theology appeared to h~ve 
little to do with the day-to-day life of the ordinary man. 
Corresponding to this was the religiousness of the iife 
of the Church: that is, it was seen by the outsider as a 
mysterious kind of club dedica.ted to esoteric spiritual 
pursuits and cut off from the real world. The radicals wanted 
to bring theology and Church back into touch with secular, 
empirical realities, a desire summed up under the slogan of 
"religionlessness". 
tied 
fi~. i th 
Secondly, the Christian message was felt to have become 
to a damaging concept of "other-worldliness". Christian 
was commit ted to a notion of two war lds or orders of 
reality, of which the unseen, eternal and spiritual had the 
priority, bringing about an undervaluing or even a denigration 
of thi:3 material world. This circumstance had set the Church 
on a course of carping criticism of, and at least implicit 
opposition to, all the manifestations of modernity which were 
so markedly transforming the material lot of modern people. 
Correspondingly, in its organizational life the Church had 
incre.3.:3ingly lost touch with the distinctive patterns, rhythms 
and structures of secular life. The radicals wanted to reverse 
the apparent negative stance of Christian theology towards 
modernity, and prove the change through a far-reaching 
reordering of the Church's pastoral and mission priorities. 
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Thirdly, there was a sense that both the Chur-ch's 
traditional doctrinal apparatus and its institutional form were 
only serving to erect needless barriers in the way of people's 
responding to the Gospel of Christ. Doctrinally, through 
insisting on credal and dogmatic statements forged in the heat 
of bygone controversies as the test of genuine faith, the 
Church wa:3 guilty of "making up heavy burdens and piling them 
on men ':3 shou ld•.~rs. '"'· 
with 
Possibly wor:3e still, through an 
its own internal affairs, and 
unhealthy preoccupation 
the weddedness of its 
hierarchical structures to the social status qu~ it was 
"shutting the door of the Kingdom of Heaven in men's faces".'' 
The radicals wanted to see a Church that could "travel light" 
in respect of both doctrine and organization, offering a faith 
that could direct and transform secular living, rather than a. 
set of creeds to be clung to in defiance of it. 
These, then, are the key questions for theology and Church 
addressed by the participants in the episode of Christian 
Radicalism. It remain:3 to point out briefly, in this opening 
chapter, that both the Church-reforming and the theological 
aspects of the episode were open to, and to some extent fell 
victim to, an unhealthy one-sidedness. 
Thus, for example, the matter of Church organization and 
mission readily degenerated into pragmatic, piecemeal and non-
theologically based reforms, whereas debate about the doctrinal 
issues raised in a book like Honest to God tended, even in its 
own time, to vanish into academic abstraction without reference 
to Rob~nson's stated apologetic reasons for writing it. 'We 
aim, through the importation of the sociological perspective 
into our critique, to avoid this falling apart of what, for the 
sake of the Gospel and the good of the Church, must be kept 
inseparably together. 
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To spell out more clearly what we mean by "importing the 
sociological perspective into our critique" i:3 the task of the 
next chapter.'' 
NOTES. 
\, DiscussiOns of the counter-cultural movertents of the sixties are found in Roszak 
11970), Guinness (1973), L,Paul (1973:246-64), B,Martin 11981), Roszak and Guinness 
b•)th pay attention to the attempt to mount a critique of modernity from within its 
o~n premises marked by Marcuse's One Dimensional Man, Guinness thinks that the 
failures of both optimistic liberal humanism and the radical counter-culture to 
pl'•Jvide an alternative to the ei'Osion of the Western Christian culture leit a rtaJor 
cultural vacuun1 in th~ Seventies. For hi111, Christianity is the "Third Way", but the 
radical theologies of the sixties, instead of grasping this, merely succeeded in 
apeing one :Jr fhe other of the f~iled categories. Bernice Martin regards the counter-
culture and its w1der influence via the "e:!pressive professions" (artists teachers, 
clergy) as l~r·jely an "onslaught on boundaries and taboos of all kindsn (51), an 
'expressive revolution", She sees a variety of this in the l'adical theol•Jgtans' 
@agerness to abolish the boundary bet~een "sacred" and 'secular'. The ambiguous 
atlempt first to celebrate the meaning of modernity and then to escape its potential 
limitations on the human is clearly shown in these analyses. 
2. See for example this passage in Holloway (1972;47-8): "The whole decade flashes 
W'oss my fllnd like some lunatic kaleidoscope; the Rector of Wool~ich pushing a 
beauty queen through the streets in a wheelbarrow; Malcolm Boyd going on TV to 
announce with passionate solemnity that Jesus Christ like all men, had a penis; 
Canon Montefiore of Cambridge electrifying the 'llorld press by say1ng that Jesus 
Christ could have been a homosexual; an up-to-date harvest festival in the South of 
England in ~hich the liturgy had been written b)' the vicar, ending ~ith the following 
responsory: 'Are ~e happy? You bet your life 'lle're happy!' ... Ah, the 60sl" 
3, In America, the expression •radical theology• referred more narro~ly to the 
heterogeneous collection of ~ritings artificial1y co111bined by the ~,edia into the 
'death of God theology• (Altizer and Hamilton, 1968; Cooper, 1968.) For the111, 
'Christian Radicalis~· as we are defining it included much that ~as not true 
radicalism at all, precisely because of its desire to operate within the Church. Thus 
Ham1l ton: "the theologian does not and can not qo to church, he IS not Interested, he 
ts alienated, .. he r.ust live outside" (Hamilton, !968;96-7; cf, Miller, 1%7.) 
4. We are aware that our use of the term "radica!is111" could be criticised on the 
grounds that it suggests properly a political engagement which many of the 
theologians we are studying did not possess. We are trying to expound our overall 
argument without overtly po1itical dimensions, but there wiTl certainly be points at 
wh1ch a political interpretation of circu111stances is invited, 
5, This twofold pattern can be traced in many other places in the material, Thus 
van den Heuvel (1967:24); "the fruits of Bonhoeffer's Initial contribution are best 
felt in two realms of the Church: its theology and its structures," R,P,McBrien 
(1969) opens a book on the post-Vatican II Church with ho chapters, 'The Secular 
"eaning of the Gospel' and '1he Secular Mission of the Church'. Holloway ( 1972) has 
sir&ilarly 'The Surrender of Theology' and 'The Surrender of the Church'; and Bowden 
( 1977), evaluating the effects of the sixties' ferment, or the lack of them, in the 
Church of ten years later, has chapters echo1ng Robinson, entitled 'Honest to God' 
and 'Whatever happened to the New Reformation?' 
6, Matthew 23:4. 
7, Matthew 23:13, 
B. Something should be added here about Vatican II, which was responsible for 
producing the most substantial, systematic and far-reaching docu111ents on the Church 
to emerge during the sixties, This thesis pays no direct attention to the 
ecclesiology of v-atican II, and this omission should be accounted for. Firstly, it 
would have been quite impossible to incorporate so vast an issue as Vatican II 
without considerably modifying the whole plan of the thesis, Secondly, by far the 
greater part of Chnstian Radicalism was a Protestant phenomenon, whtch IS not to 
deny that there were many very astute Roman Catholic comments upon it (e.g, Ryan, 
1964; McBrien, 1966 and 1969; Adolfs, 1967; McCabe, in Edwards and Robinson, 1963: 
165-180), Thirdly, discussion of the Vatican II docuraents was so detailed within 
Roman circles that it was only quite late in the decade that thev were really thrown 
open to wide1; ecclesiological discussion, And lastly, Catholicism's own self-
confessed "radicalism•, that of the "Catholic Ne~ Left" (Wider, 1966; Woollard, 
1972;45-53) which itself entered into dialogue ~ith Vatican II, ~as moving in a very 
dtfferent philosophical universe from that of the theologians ~e are treating here, 
and aimed to challenge the theological secularizers. 
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CHAPTER I I: SOCIOLOGY AND THEOLOGY: TOWARDS A MODEL FOR 
CO-OPE RAT ION , 
This chapter discusses the theoretical and methodological 
problems raised by the proposal to introduce sociological 
perspectives as a stimulus to the criticism of theological 
ideas. We wish to justify the use we shall be making of 
sociological material:=3 in the course of the thesis with 
reference to certain principles governing the interaction of 
the disciplines. This m•?ans that this chapter will put forward 
a view of the enterpri;:;e of theology which makes it possible 
to speak of sociological insights as being relevant to it, and, 
on the other side, a dL:;cussion of traditions in sociology 
designed to show which is most favourable towards fruitful co-
operation. 
Briefly, we understand theology as critical reflection 
upon the Christian tradition in the light of its continual 
interaction with social and cultural contexts via the lives, 
beliefs and practices of religious believers. The sociological 
tradition most favourable to dialogue is that deriving from the 
work of Max Weber. It should be kept in mind that this chapter 
is concerned with the interdisciplinary issue, and not with 
sociological theories of religion as such: these form the 
subject of Chapter IV. The chapter begins with a survey of the 
sociological tradition designed to show the difficulties 
involved in any proposal to relate it constructively to the 
tasks of theology. 
1. The Sociology of Religion in the Sociological Tradition. 
i. Comte, Durkheim and the Refinement of Epiphenomenalism. 
The science of sociology was the child of the strictest 
type of rational empiricism to prn<:PPd from the Enlightenment. 
Yet, it also announced a radical challenge to the confident 
prediction of the demise of religion that accompanied 
scientific secularism. For the fascination of all the early 
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sociologists with the phenomenon of religion is plain. As 
Robert Nisbet writes: 
No other sin•]le concept IS as suggestive of the unique 
role held by sociology among the social sciences in the 
nineteenth cent.ui'Y, or as reflective of its underlyin•] 
premises ab•:;ut. the nature of 01an and society, as the 
concept. of the saued. !Nisbet, 1967:221,) 
Thus Augw:ote Comte, usually regarded as the "father" of 
sociology a.·:; a s~lf-consciou:=>ly elaborated :=>eparate scientific 
discipline, did no+. follm·1 '=>uc.b as Voltaire in celebrating the 
demise of r2ligion at the hands of the liberating rational 
spirit. 
Comte, in his PositivP Philosophy of 1853, argued that 
positive ::;cience, with sociology as its controlling discipline, 
must displace all religious or metaphysical superstition as the 
foundation for- both individual and ::;ocial thinking and action. 
He envisaged sociology uncovering the universal laws governing 
social evolution, freeing man from bondage to either material 
or intellectual determinism and enabling him to control his 
social environment and plan his future. He referred to the most 
primitive stage of mankind's development as the "theological, 
or fictitious." 
Yet in his Positive Polity, his blueprint for the planned, 
scientific society included exhaustive proposals for a religion 
of Positivism, complete with liturgy, sacraments, calendar of 
Saints' Day::; and priests in vestments. Comte insisted on the 
abiding necessity of religion as a means of social integration, 
of renderin~ human a:=>socia.tions durable, and of enacting moral 
consensus. That is: 
Fa1· ir•)O\ be1ng a mere bundle of beliefs, subject, as the 
Enlightenment had thought, to the exterminative action of 
education and science, religion is ineradicably built 
into the very nature of mental and social life. (Nisbet, 
op. cit : 226. ! 
The classic::: breakthrough in expounding this "ineradicable" 
nature u.L reiig1on was of course made by Durkheirn, who sought 
to transcend the limits of pure positivism by refusing to 
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regard religion as obsolescent, nor to treat it as self-
evidently false <Bellah, 1970 Ca)). 
Durkheim wrote that "there is something 
survive all the 
eternal in 
religion which is destined to particular 
symbols in which religious thought has successively enveloped 
itself" (1915:427). In attempting to spell out the precise 
content of that "something eternal", he set in motion a 
development in sociology which has helped to create immense 
problems in the way of any rapprochement of the discipline 
with theology. 
The problems arise fr~om the fact that Durkheim 's approach 
is no longer merely epiphenomenalist and reductive. Theologians 
had been able to respond to this earlier style by simply 
declaring sociology mistaken 
"mechanistic" view of humanity 
and opposing its 
(e.g.Slater, 1911). 
apparent 
Durkheim, 
however, was not so easily disposed of. His method proceeds 
from two crucial notions, that of the "social fact" and that of 
the functional unity of every society. 
A social fact, firstly, is a societal phenomenon conceived 
as objectively existing and capable of exerting constraint upon 
the individual members of the society. <Durkheim, 1938). 
Religion, as a social fact, or as a whole collection of such 
facts, is something which is simply there, comprising certain 
rites and institutions, customs and groupings, and as such 
available for sociological scrutiny independently of 
individuals' personal interpretations of it or dispositions 
towards it. Durkheim, in his desire to be sociological in the 
very strictest sense, systematically excludes attention to 
individual experience and constructions of meaning as an 
illegitimate psychologizing of sociology's proper domain. 
Secondly, Durkheim envisages sociological explanation in 
terms of the contribution of social facts towards the total 
functioning of the society in question as a harmonious system. 
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Thus, as is well known, the social fact of religion is treated 
as a society's means of objectifying and ascribing sacred 
status to its own corporateness and cohesiveness, "society" 
itself being something of which the whole exceeds the sum of 
the parts: 
Thel'e can be no society 111hich does not feel the need of 
upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the 
collective sentiments and the collective ideas 111hich make 
its unity and its pe1·sonality, iDu1·kheim, 1915:427,! 
These emphases of Durkheim opened the way to a double 
development in sociology which profoundly affected the main 
lines of the sociology of religion, lowering its status as a 
sub-discipline and reducing the prospects of collaboration with 
theology. 
ii. The Great Divide: Grand Theory and Abstracted 
Empiricism. 
The "great divide" to which we refer is that criticised so 
sharply by C.Wright Mills in his The Sociological Imagination, 
between "grand theoryn and "abstracted empiricism". Applied to 
religion, the options look like this: on the one hand, 
functional theory, as elaborated in the greatest of detail by 
Talcott Parsons, seizes upon Durkheim's dictum that every 
society must possess both an overall functional unity and a 
means of giving symbolic expression to this. The notion of 
religion is transmuted into that of whatever forms the most 
general stratum of symbolic legitimations overlaying the entire 
social system, the ultimate court of appeal of consensual 
values, that which holds everything together. 
This brand of the sociology of religion begins to look 
like the apotheosis of all theology- in its comprehensiveness 
and generality, it makes Christian theology look inexcusably 
parochial and particular. When the conclusions Durkheim drew 
from the study of a small-scale aboriginal society are simply 
carried over into thP study of complex modern societies or 
generalized into universal theories of what religion must be 
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and do, theology and sociology just look like rivals in the 
business of comprehensive meta-empirical explanation. 
But, on the other hand, Durkheim 's proposal to carry out 
sociological analysis without reference to the question of 
personal, subjective constructs of meaning has encouraged that 
brand of "hard-nosed empiricism" in sociology which comes 
close to eschewing the responsibility for theory altogether. In 
much modern sociology the disproportion between minutely 
detailed empirical investigation and very slender theoretical 
conclusions has become a byword among critics of the subject's 
claim to true scientific credentials. In the area of religion, 
even the churches have been enthusiastic about taking up 
sociometrical and demographic studies, surveys, questionnaires 
and so on, which yield "factual information" but leave theology 
and the Gospel mercifully untouched. 
During the period following the seminal work of the 
classical sociologists, theoretical work in religion was 
subsumed more and mare into the generalized constructions of 
grand theory. Little distinctiveness of religion, as that about 
which theology specifically reflects, remained. At the same 
time, practical research was likely to treat religion as one 
among many of the manifestations in a society liable to 
statistical measurement, but nat a particularly important one. 
The heuristic value of such research remained small; religion 
itself was largely assumed to be on the wane as a social 
influence, and sociologists would have been amused at the 
suggestion that the labours of theologians could in any way be 
served by theirs.' 
The paucity of creative and theoretically fruitful 
material under the head of the sociology of religion was being 
pointed out by a number of commentators in the fifties rmrl 
early sixties ('Ward, 1961:18-24; Birnbaum, 1956; Simey, 1963; 
Brothers, 1963; Banks, 1967.) David Martin <1966(a)) described 
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the situation as "a case of status deprivation" for the sub-
discipline: "to study religion is like studying a residual 
penumbra ... tbe proper place for religion is a footnote." 
Sociologists had found it difficult to shake off the historical 
unilateralism they bad inherited from Comte and the "creeping 
epiphenomenalism" that was a lurking threat in the Durkheimian 
tradition. These are the reasons why the approach we are 
proposing here owes to more to that other major line of 
development, which runs from the work of Weber (and from Marx 
before him, with certain qualifications)~. 
iii. Weber. 
Weber's work contains the seeds of all the main 
theoretical issues which concern sociologists 
this day <Hill, 1973.) The relatively low 
of religion to 
profile of the 
Weberian perspective in the dominant stream of sociology in 
Britain and America from the twenties to the fifties was an 
important factor in the empirical-theoretical split we have 
been discussing <O'Dea, 1970; Budd, 1973; Robertson, 1978:243-
57>. We wish to set out three features of Weber's method which, 
>v-hen applied to religion, present important potential points of 
contact with the approach of a critical theology. 
Firstly, Weber insists upon seeking to understand the 
subjective meaning religious beliefs and actions hold for the 
agents. "Sociology", he wrote in his Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization, "is a science which attempts the 
interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to 
arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects." 
Demonstrable statistical uniformities do not constitute valid 
sociological generalizations, still less laws, unless "they can 
be regarded as manifestations of the understandable subjective 
meaning of a course of social action." 
It is not enough for the sociologist to give an analysis 
of the functions performed by religious beliefs and practices 
for the society as a whole, viewed as a complete and integral 
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system. Even identical external circumstances can be both 
experienced and interpreted very differently by different 
persons. The sociologist can cast light upon the meaning which 
believers confer upon the world through the use they make of 
the items of religious belief and practice given to them in 
their particular tradition. The theologian needs to pay 
attention to this in his reflection upon the coming-to-
expression of the Gospel in specific contexts. 
Secondly, and here is the nub of the vast body of 
literature generated by Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, ideas themselves, religious ones included, 
are capable in certain circumstances of acting as motive 
forces in social change. This is not a reversal of social or 
material determinism in favour of an assertion of the priority 
of ideas as independent variables. Rather, the interplay of 
ideas and material forces and interests is complex 
fascinating: the sociologist aims to find out under 
conditions certain ideas were able (and so might be 
and 
what 
able 
again) to grip the imagination and the subjective understanding 
of whole cultures in such a way as radically to change them, 
materially as well as intellectually. 
In this process, the sociologist must always be alert to 
the likelihood of ironies occurring in the historical 
developments. The road from theological ideas to eventual 
social consequences is a very long and winding one, and the 
consequences may sometimes appear to contradict they very 
ideas which gave rise to them. Weber's is a very highly 
sophh;ticated thesis, attempting . to trace the possible 
trajectories of initiating ideas through the mutations and 
constraints of a host of changing historical and sociological 
variables. However, nothing less will do justice to the 
questions attendant upon investigating the contemporary 
realization of theological meanings, which the radical 
theologians were aiming to achieve. 
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Thirdly, there is the device employed by Weber for 
producing substantive theoretical content out of the intricate 
mass of empirical and historical detail: the ideal type. In his 
writing on scientific method, Objectivity, Weber defined this 
as follows: 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of 
one or more points of vie111 and by the synthesis of a 
great many diffuse, discrete, mo1·e or less present and 
occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, 111hich 
are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasised 
vie111points into a unified analytical construct, In its 
conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found 
empi1·ically any111he1•e in 1·eality,,, 
The ideal-type is an attempt to analyse historically 
unique configurations or their individual components by 
means of genetic concepts, 
The concept of the ideal type stresses the imaginative, 
inductive component in the sociologist's theoretical method. It 
brings scientific objectivityinto line with artistic creativity, 
in projecting a "way of seeing" which leads to fresh 
understanding of intractable historical complexity. 
For the theologian, types will be helpful as the middle 
term between the raw materials of the tradition in which the 
Gospel comes to him, and the problem of specific contextual 
application. The type extracts from the mass of possibilities a 
single trajectory with the distinguishing features proper to it, 
"all other things being equal". Although all other things never 
are equal, the variables do show certain frequent patterns of 
recurrence, so that a small number of types may suffice to 
help the theologian to see what the possible realizations are 
of a particular theological idea in the situation he is 
contemplating. 
We shall examine further the relevance of this 
sociological method to our view of the theological enterprise 
later in the chapter. At this point, however, we want to take 
up, in the light of the elements of the sociological tradition 
uu tlined so far, the matter of specific conceptions of the 
relation between the disciplines. We shall do this by citing a 
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number of "samples" of different understandings of the 
"division of labour" in which all the typical problems are 
brought to light. 
2. Problems of the Division of Labour. 
i. The Social Gospel: theology reduced to sociology. 
The liberal Social Gospel forms an example of a theology 
which, by attaching itself unambiguously to a meliorist 
doctrine of social evolution, could welcome the prospects for a 
collaboration with a sociology which itself regarded the 
present age as the pinnacle of human progress. Walter 
Rauschenbusch wrote in his Christianity and the Social Crisis: 
The Kingdom of God, at every stage of human development, 
tends towards a social order which will best guarantee to 
all personalities their freest and highest 
development, , , [i tJ is not a concept nor an ide a 1 mere 1 y, 
but an historical force, It is a vital and organizing 
concept now at work in humanity, 
The simple equation of the application of the Gospel with 
present processes of social change will clearly not do in view 
of the complexity of the Weberian analysis. We shall have 
occasion later to criticise cases where Christian Radicalism 
tried to employ sociological insight as a kind of direct"guide 
to what God is doing in the world" <Little and Younger, in 
Callahan, 1966: 69-75, 77-81; Clements, 1972; Woollard, 1972; 
infra, chs. X & XI.). The charge that sociology is reductionist 
with regard to religious meaning cannot be answered simply by 
identifying such meaning with certain "subconscious social 
presuppositions" <as Mathews, 1912), somehow "at work" in 
society. 
ii. "Christian Sociology": the hegemony of theology. 
The Anglican "Christendom" Group, which traced its 
heritage back to the Christian Socialism of the previous 
century, used the term "Christian Sociology" to describe its 
work in the nineteen-thirties. Figures associated with the 
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group included T.S.Eliot, Maurice Reckitt, V.A.Demant and 'William 
Temple; a Summer School of Sociology was instigated at Oxford 
from 1925, and a journal, Christendom: a Journal of Christian 
Sociology, first appeared in 1931. Demant, in his 1933 
publication God, Man and Society- an Introduction to Christian 
Sociology, defined the movement in this way: 
Sociology is the objective and dispassionate study of 
society,. ,There is no specifically Christian method of 
doing this, But insofar as we undertake it for the 
pUl'pose of judging in the light of Christian standards 
the quality of the behaviour to which the social 
structure predisposes men and also claim to elucidate and 
evaluate the forces which make up that structure 1n the 
light of the Christian doctrine of human nature and of 
the purpose of God, then we can validly speak of a 
Christian sociology (~M~~a!is MiRe), 
Demant goes some way here towards accepting that 
"sociology" must be allowed to proceed on its own terms as an 
empirical discipline. But on closer inspection a confusion of 
categories appears, when he goes on to claim for theology the 
ability to "elucidate" the forces which go to make up social 
structures, with the aid of certain Christian doctrines. In 
other words, theology really retains the upper hand all the 
time. Demant thinks that a proper understanding of "human 
nature" and "the purposes of God" would be sufficient to alter 
"social forces." 
There is, therefore, a retreat from the concrete into 
idealistic theological prescription. Sociology is conceived as 
doing all the spadework, perhaps, but it is theology which 
comes in afterwords to take the credit for producing the 
goods. The problem has been given decisive analysis by 
D.L.Kunby <1958), who argues that judgments drawn directly from 
theology cannot be applied, without more ado, to particular 
social instances as though the theological judgments themselves 
were based upon empirical evidence. "There is no easy bridge 
from the kind of insights afforded by Christian metasociology 
to the facts of everyday life" <ltl:unby, op.cit:53.) 
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"Christian Sociology", in effect, is not really sociology 
at all but a form of Christian social philosophy. It shows 
particularly clearly that there is no room for dialogue between 
sociology and theology just as long as theology is conceived 
as coming to the discussion free from social conditioning, 
armed with specific prescriptions and propositions having the 
status of untouchable revelation."' The Catholic priests who 
first developed the method of pastoral study known as 
"religious sociology" were well aware that theology does not 
simply dictate a sociological pattern, and attempted to ensure 
that the two disciplines were kept methodologically quite 
separate. 
iii. "Sociologie Religieuse": keeping the disciplines 
distinct. 
Religious sociology represented, to some degree, a mutual 
agreement to keep theology out of sociology, and vice versa, on 
the basis of an assumed competence of its practitioners in 
both .'1 Empirical sociology was regarded as offering to the 
Church a set of tools of pastoral utility. These might reveal 
severe long-standing difficulties in the way of the effective 
promulgation of Christianity in certain types of social 
environment. They did not, however, seem to encroach so 
dangerously upon theology's proper terri tory as a reductionist 
sociology had done. 
This was a matter of some importance for the first 
clerical practitioners of religious sociology, given the 
prominent tradition of anti-clericalism and militant secularism 
in their native France. The Catholic ethos of the movement 
actually created a situation in which priests with genuinely 
specialist sociological training could exhibit a surprising 
degree of scientific detachment, almost to the point of 
appearing to be prepared to explain away all variations in 
religious practice by wholly extrinsic factors of class, 
occupational status, political commitment, historical tradition 
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and so on, while retaining unimpaired, as belonging to an 
altogether different frame of reference, a completely orthodox 
theological position. 5 
The question for us is whether such a position remains 
viable without the peculiarly self-confident and self-contained 
institutional and theological base for operations provided by 
Roman Catholicism. In his Introduction to the first English 
edition of Fernand Boulard 's pathfinding Introduction to 
Religious Sociology, Michael Jackson of the Sheffield Industrial 
Mission wrote: 
In England the tension between the theologian and the 
sociologist is likely to appear more stl·ongly than in 
France, where most religious sociology is done within the 
context of the French Church, It is a tension between two 
sets of concepts. Karl Mannheirn discussed it in his 
influential book, Diagnosis Qf Our Time. He wrote, 
'Sociology in its historical origins is a secularized, 
perhaps the most secularized, approach to the problem of 
human life, It tries to understand 'the whole range of 
human behaviour and evaluations as problems of individual 
and grc1up adjustment'. Theology cannot be C•)ntent with 
this,, ,t1annheirn argued that the tension must be heJ.::l, 
Sociolo•JY must go as far as its method takes it in the 
study of religion, At the same time, the essentially 
ambiguous nature of the Church and of religious practice 
must be recogmzed, If the tension is held and the 
1 irni tat ions of sociology seen, then the resulting use of 
sociology will be fruitful. The correct handling of 
religious sociology depends on the directing role of 
theology CBoulard, 1960:xvii; ·iAipt:liiiiiii AliRe,) 
In this passage the old problems raise their heads all 
over again. Religious sociology cannot maintain its strict 
compartmentalization of expertises unless it is content to 
remain little more than a prosaic kind of ecclesiastical 
sociography. Insofar as it claims to explain anything, it comes 
up against the problems of epiphenomenalism and reductionism: 
just wherein lies the distinctive and irreducible contribution 
of theology to the enterprise? Jackson wants to solve this by 
reasserting a "directing role" for theology, but this does not 
re~lly cohere with his implied approval of Mannheim. 
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For when, in the work cited, Mannheim offers to the 
theologian a concept of the disclosure of God's truth by means 
of "concrete paradigms" embedded in social contexts, he permits 
the sociologist to intrude rather further upon the theologian's 
domain than Jackson suggests. In fact, his recommendation 
that the theologian search for such paradigms approaches an 
understanding of Weberian ideal types as a vehicle of 
theological understanding. 
The "ambiguity" of which Jackson speaks is an important 
perception, but not quite in the way Jackson expresses it. 
Elsewhere he writes that 
, , , the1·e are aspects of the Church's life which sociology 
cannot penetrate, The Church is more than a social, 
historical institution, it is the Body of Christ, This 
ambiguity of the Church's nature sets certain limits upon 
religious sociology (8oulard, op,cit:xi,l 
This puts the matter in terms of a traditional retreat into 
theological protectionism -i.e.the idea that sociology cannot 
get at the true essence of the Church, which is theologically 
guarded and spiritually discerned (cf .Poulat, 1967: "the 
invocation of the supernatural serves as a kind of diplomatic 
bag"- i.e. sociology may not inspect the contents). But we 
should want to put it otherwise. It is not so much that there 
is somehow "more to the Church" than sociological analysis can 
see; it is rather than there is always more to an image such 
as "Body of Christ" than attains to socio-cultural realization 
at any given time or in any given place. 
By the time Jackson was writing his "Introduction to an 
Introduction" for an English readership, continental religious 
sociology was already realizing that the safe division of 
labour envisaged by its founders could not survive the 
broadening of the discipline beyond the bounds of Catholic 
pastoral studies. The journal Social Compass, for example, was 
quietly trying to drop the use of the term "sociologie 
religieuse", with its strong suggestion of concealed 
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commitments on the part of its practitioners. Two examples of 
writing in the English context will indicate how refinements to 
the conception of religious sociology were being considered. 
The first, typically from a Catholic quarter, is Conor K. 
Ward's study of a Liverpool parish, Priests and People. 
Although the body of the work restricts its attention to 
narrowly circumscribed empirical issues, and its explicit 
conclusions are modest, Ward does offer, in a chapter headed 
"Prospect", some pointers to a further advance: 
The truths remain unchanged and contemporary man can 
learn much from the br i 11 iant syntheses of the past, but 
the concrete conditions of each era present features 
unique in some respects, and on the social plane each era 
requires its own integration with the message of the 
Gospel, In the quest for such a synthesis in our time, 
the sociologist and the theolo·~ian complement each 
othe1·,,, 
Theological exposition of an ideal can be supplemented by 
empirical description of the ascertainable results of 
religious communion in its va1•ying degrees and different 
realizations,, ,It is possible that the theological ideal 
is ra1·ely, if ever, reaiized,,(Ward, 1961:128-9; 
@Aif:)Rasis AliRe,) 
Here Ward hints at a conception of theology as dealing in 
ideals, a general vision for man and society issuing from a 
particular understanding of religious belief and practice, 
whereas sociology deals with the actual extent of realization 
of the ideal possible in varying social and cultural contexts. 
The other example is the pioneering study of the Bishop 
of Middleton, E.R.Wickharn, Church and People in an Industrial 
~. which together with Wickham's further work was deeply 
influential in the development of innovative models of pastoral 
and evangelistic ministry in the Sheffield Industrial Mission. 
Wickham insists that, in contrast to the ideas of Christian 
Sociology about the priority of the doctrinally-given 
understandings of "human nature" and the world, the meanings 
of such doctrines as Fall and Redemption can only be 
ascertained with reference to the concrete social contexts 
which are the "domain" of their application <Wickham, 1964:68). 
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He sees the claim of theology to be "prophetic" as 
inescapably bound up with sociology, for the element of 
prophecy does not come in declaring to the world a word from 
outside, of unconditional force, but precisely in the use of 
sociological analysis to enliven and give fresh application to 
the familiar theological materials: 
For sociology,,, studies the development, the nature and 
the laws of society; and p1·ophecy,,,' is the reading of 
the present through a pNfound discerment of the past, 
and a J'ealization of the possibilities, even the 
cel'tainties that lie ahead, in the light of our handling 
of the p1·esent,' The very wo1'd that the Church speaks to 
the wol'l•j, the1·efore, through which she seeks to speak 
God's Word, is inseparable from unde1•standings that, if 
theological, are also sociological in kind, <Wickham, 
op, cit: 7 0-71 , ) 
Wickham speaks of "prophecy" where we should be content 
simply to use the word "theology". In so doing, he points to 
the important task of "reading the past", in which an insight 
into sociological constraints and regularities is essential, 
coupled with an orientation to the future in terms of 
"possibilities, even certainties". These we see as given pre-
eminently in the Christian tradition, and this critical 
mediation between past and future is a distinctive pattern of 
theological reflection. However, this is to run on ahead 
somewhat at this point; and before we come to the more recent 
constructive models for the interdisciplinary relationship, we 
have to look at one more approach which, in deliberate reaction 
against the optimism of religious sociology, seemed to raise a 
still more intractable set of problems. 
iv. Berger and the Sociology of Knowledge: Sociological 
Imperialism? 
The options of a merger between the disciplines, or a 
strict separation, or the bid for hegemony on the part of 
theology, can be complemented by that of a similar bid by the 
other side. Peter Berger, with his colleague Thomas Luckmann, 
mounted in the early sixties a hard-hitting critique of the 
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whole "religious sociology" approach as the basis for a future 
sociology of religion <Berger and Luckmann, 1963; see also 
Luckmann, 1967: ch.l.) 
Berger and Luckmann took up the point already discussed 
above, concerning the retreat of sociology from the larger 
theoretical questions about religion and society into narrowly 
sociographical and statistical studies. In particular, they 
argued that a concentration upon institutional, church-centred 
patterns of religiosity, such as that found in religious 
sociology, was inadequate to the task of understanding the 
social significance and function of religion in a situation 
where <as almost all over Europe, though not in America) 
official religious practice was becoming very much a minority 
option. 
Berger and Luckmann 's proposed means of rehabilitating 
the sociology of religion as a theoretical discipline was to 
relocate it within the domain of the sociology of knowledge. 
This itself was understood more broadly than in Mannheim 's 
original conception. For them, it was not only an account of 
how ideologies and world-views are carried by different social 
strata, but a theory of the whole human enterprise of 
interpreting the world by means of the construction of systems 
of meaning. The "social construction of reality" involves men 
and women in a dialectical process of projection and response 
to that which was projected, now perceived as objectively given 
<Berger and Luckmann, 1967). 
Berger applied the general theory to the specific case of 
religion in his The Social Reality of Religion, and it is here 
that the damaging contentions arise. For the problem now is 
not so much the familiar one of reductionism, which theology 
has been inclined to counter on the grounds that it is simply 
inadequate to the evidence; it is a matter of a radical 
relativism, in which theology itself as much as any other set 
of human ideas or claim to knowledge is treated as just 
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another function of the universal human activity of meaning-
projection, which is therefore entirely context-dependent.6 
There are, however, a number of reasons why we feel 
justified in denying that Berger's bid for sociological 
imperialism is as irresistible as it first appears to be. 
Firstly, in his own earlier work <Berger, 1961 (a) & (b)) Berger 
took up a somewhat neo-Orthodox position with regard to the 
distinction between "religion" and "Christian faith". 
Sociology's task was seen as the debunking of religious 
pretensions and ecclesiastical absurdities, since religion as a 
social product was subject to all manner of corruptions and 
alienati ve functions from which the inner reality of radical 
faith had to be sharply distinguished. 
Berger's later development ought undoubtedly to be seen 
as part of a process of shaking off this neo-Orthodox past, as 
he came to doubt that faith itself could be so readily 
preserved as a commodity immune from relativizing analysis; 
and as such, there are elements of over-reaction about it. 7 
Secondly, Berger himself has delineated the relationship 
between sociology and theology in terms mare favourable than 
the bare theory might suggest <Berger, 1973:181-90.) In this 
essay, originally published separately in 1967, Berger defends 
the strictly sociological methodology of treating religion, and 
therefore theology tao, as a human projection. At the same 
time, he argues that this need nat preclude the theologian 
from supposing that 
the anthropological ground of these projections may 
itself be the reflection of a reality that includes both 
~orld and man, so that man's ejaculations of meaning into 
the universe ultimately point to an all-embracing 
meaning in which he himself is grounded, (Berger, op,cit: 
183; for a critique see Pannenberg, 1974,) 
Berger even avers that, as far as their mast basic 
concerns and procedures go, sociology and theology belong to 
"discrepant and mutually immune frames of reference", a 
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statement which comes close to re-affirming a standpoint of 
safe compartmentalization. However, it is not so simple as 
this. The procedure of "relativizing the relativizers", by which 
the theologian turns the tables on the sociologist by claiming 
that his sociologically-constructed view of man and the world 
is no more entitled to the claim of absoluteness than is his 
theological one, still leaves theology with certain requirements 
to meet. 
Theologians must obviously not make ostensibly empirical 
statements which are subject to disconfirmation by sociological 
research <Berger, op.cit:184). But more than this, sociology 
will not be content to be treated as an ancillary discipline to 
pastoral studies. For the theologian may come to reflect that 
, , ,he \lias not born as a theologian, that he existed as a 
pe1·son in a particular socio-historical situation before 
he ever began to do theology- in sum, that he himself, if 
not his theology, is illuminated by the lighting 
appa1·atus of the sociologist, (ibid,) 
Theology is not sealed off from the social context, and the 
type of theology which emerges at any time will undoubtedly be 
in some measure a response to the cultural environment. But the 
question we have to raise is just what the theologian is 
entitled to treat as his methodological baseline, in the sense 
of that which is his datum, the frame of his entire work, 
within which to cease to operate would be to secede from his 
proper metier altogether. 
Our third ground for rejecting the imperialist pretensions 
of Berger's sociology is found in his own projected answer to 
this question. Setting aside a crude fundamentalism which 
simply atte1npts to deny the incursions of relativity upon 
theology, together with its mare subtle nea-Orthodax farm and 
the existential relocation of faith in the recesses of a 
sociolu~ically untouchable subjectivity, Berger proposes a 
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return to what he calls "the spirit of classical Protestant 
liberalism" (ibid:l88.) This does not, of course, entail a 
return to the conclusions of that movement. It means, rather 
.. ,a step-by-step re-evaluation of the traditional 
affirmations in terms of [the theologian's] own cognitive 
criteria (which need not necessarily be those of a 
putative 'modern c•)nsciousness' ... ) 
It is, above all, a spirit of intellectual courage which 
is equally removed from the cognitive retrenchment of 
Orthodoxy and the cognitive timidity of what passes for 
nee-Liberalism today (ibid:188-9,) 
The important point here is that Berger proposes that the 
theologian engage in a dialogue with the tradition, a process 
in which sociology has a vital, critically stimulating role to 
play. In a more recent work <1980) Berger has followed up his 
commendation of liberalism by speaking of its inductive method 
of doing theology. This is based upon the conviction that 
ultimately what underlies the tradition is a formative, 
definitive experience; and that, as Troeltsch saw and 
struggled over, no historical-social manifestations finally and 
assuredly capture and make permanent the founding experience. 
But to share in the tradition which is its fruit is, Berger 
says, to be able to afford the "mellowness" of liberality. 
It is therefore odd that the immediate product of Berger's 
advocacy of this dialogue with the tradition in The Social 
Reality of Religion was the follow-up work A Rumour of Angels, 
for in this Berger fails to make theological use of his own 
cultural theory (cf. Lindbeck, 1984:20.) He does not approach 
religion as a cultural system, carrying its tradition in the 
form of a nexus of beliefs, rites, stories and social 
embodiments, and suggest examining how these items of the 
tradition serves the believer as an interpretation of his world 
or a motivation for action in it. 
Instead, he produces thp programme of seeking out 
signals of transcendence" in secular experience, a kind of 
sketch for a new natural theology. VI hen he then speaks of 
"confronting the traditions", "in search of whatever signals 
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of transcendence may have been sedimented in them" <Berger, 
1970:104) Berger remains unprepared to grant the theologian 
the right to treat the tradition as his datum . 
Ve have now looked at four possible ways of relating 
theology and sociology: a merger of the two, strict 
compartmentalization and a bid for hegemony on the part of 
each over the other. All four possibilities raise for the 
theologian in their particular ways the recurrent problems of 
reductionism <epiphenomenalism), determinism and relativism. 
But we have already suggested that the Veberian tradition in 
sociology holds out further potential. 
Since the shaking-up of the dialogue brought about by 
Berger, which in itself probably generated more heat than light 
in view of the ambiguities of his position, advances have been 
made which depend upon the introduction of a rather different 
approach. Vithin a Veberian sociological tradition, the question 
of how theology should be understood in order that 
sociological considerations might be relevant to it at all has 
been pursued. It is in this context that we present our own 
position in the final part of this chapter. 
~'· Contemporary Advances. 
i. From Gill to Blackfriars. 
In Britain it was Robin Gill who took up, in three works 
<1975, 1978, & 1981), the task of clarifying for both sides, 
but especially for theologians, the issues involved in relations 
between theology and sociology. It is significant that Gill's 
The Social Context of Theology, despite its aims being 
relatively modest, came to a theological readership, at least, 
as something of a new departure. Berger, it has been said, had 
succeeded in "bewitching" the sociology of religion for a 
decade; if so, he had certainly placed an effective moratorium 
on any easy interdisciplinary advance. Gill wanted to clear the 
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ground, dis pel some confusion and make moderate proposals 
about the principles upon which future dialogue might proceed. 
Gill's first step was to urge that both theologians and 
sociologists accept the other's right to employ what be called 
.O>n "os if" methodology. Sociologi::;t'=· must proceed as if there 
were a sufficient sociological explanation of all religious 
phenomena, since sociology is by definition that discipline 
which studies the world by the methodological isolation of the 
:=>O•=:ial factor. 
Similarly, theology is entitled to operate as it the basic 
Gospel material .:1.nd the Christian tradition v1ere fundamentally 
valid, since l~=> the:3e which form the theologian 'c=. rav·i 
ma.terial and methodological baseline. <It is not theology as 
:=>uch but the philosophy of religion which doe,:; not make this 
initial presupposition.) If both sides could admit this much, 
Gill believed, chargec=. by theologians that sociology "left no 
room for the Holy Spirit", and the suspicions of sociologi:::;ts 
that theologians were "r:;omrn it ted" and therefore 
unscientifically biased, could be put aside. 
However, having said this, Gill went on to speak more 
specifically to the theologian of what he must recognize if he 
expected to be taken seriously by sociology. He mus:.t accept 
that all theology L; necessarily done in a social context. The 
theologian is making conscious choices about how to interpret 
hi::; context and to develop his theology in dialogue with it. 
But this is not all: the theologian is himself also a product 
of his cultural c:ontext. He does not come to his theological 
problems free from pre-understanding and built-in preference'3 
and attitudes. Thus theology itself h;, at one level, amenable 
to being understood in "social construct" terms. 
We have, therefore, to develop a model of the theologian 
as involv·~d, as participating in a social and cultural world, 
and therefore as committed to the dialectical process of 
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reflecting upon and criticising that world in the light of his 
tradition, and vice versa. For the tradition with which the 
theologian works is only av;:;ilable to him at all as part of a 
<:::ultural "package", and Y'~+ it is given to him within the 
Church's life the r-esource :for interpreting and-
importantly- transcending that "package". 
Granted t:hL=; dialect;kol proces:oo, Gill insisted on the 
t'Jo:=;:o:;ibillty that theology :ni:::;ht a.lsc 3.t times prove soci.::~lly 
·o,~gnifkant, U1at L:c., act a·=; an independent variable within 
·;o::iety. The Weberi3n back~round to all of this is clear 
enough. However, it is not GiLl's immediate application of his 
idea::;, in hi::; fir:=;\: two book::o, to the Honest to God debate 
which intere::=.t us here.''' The develoDment of his position in 
terms of the type CJf tbeo~OE;)' whi•::h •:ould build upon U!is. 
:=;ociological model of diale·:::·ti·:::al involvement came in an es::;:;ay 
prepared for the Oxfor-d Blackfriars Symposium which brought 
together .::~ 3roup of theologi:ms. and sor::iologists in 1980 to 
try to adva.nc'=' the interdi::o,·=iplinary cau:3•~. Gill's essay <1980) 
is reproduced in a longer version as c~apter 6 of Prophecy and 
Eraxis. It sums up well th<~ r:'revalent attitude of the symposium 
towards the theological ta:=.k, in its proposals for what Gill 
•::all:=; a "praxis theology." 
The woni "praxis" refers to a compound activity in which 
Cin this easel roligious pr-~ctice in the sense of participation 
in the life of a community of faith, and critical reflection on 
both the religious tradition and the world in the light of such 
on:~;CJing practice. are ·hound up togeth·~r. According to Gill, a 
praxL; theology might u:o;e "sociological techniques and 
theorie::;:; ... to arbitrate on the validity of particular theological 
positions and notions." 
Ju:st a_::;, in the :->ast:, theology has had to become 
answerable to historical and philosophical criticism, so now it 
must expect to have to re·c;~··:.nd to the scrutiny of sociology. 
The basis for this is the re.::o8nition that theological ideas 
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and concepts cannot be tested as to their meaning save with 
regard to the social formations and attitudes with which they 
are accompanied in particular contexts. 
Gill's proposal, as he explicitly remarks, follows the 
Marxist refusal of the dichotomy in Western philosophy between 
ideas and behaviour, or a supposedly "value-free" cognitive 
content and a commitment to action. (Claims of sociology to be 
"value-free" repre:3ent a distortion of the meaning of the term 
in Weber's usage.) It warns us to be wary of the distinction 
between "pure" and "applied" in theology. It implies that the 
role of sociology for the theologian, as well of that of 
supplying factual, empirical material and raising critical 
questions about theological pronouncements based on 
purportedly, but inaccurate, factual premises, will be to 
describe, as it were from the outside, the social forms and 
configurations, dynamics and pressures, relationships and 
tensions, which are the product of, and indeed the realized 
meaning of, theological statements about God, man and the 
world. 
Gill himself has not applied his suggestive ideas to any 
great extent in his own analyses of the Church's social role.'-'' 
David Martin has, however, made a substantial contribution to 
understanding how the process works. Before we come to this, 
we may indicate how two of the other Blackfriars contributors 
helped further in the development of this important approach 
to theology. 
J .Orme Mills depicts the theologian as "go-between": 
The theologian .. ,aims to articulate a 'comprehensive 
sense' of reality, but in a different way from the social 
theorist, Consciously or unconsciously he sets out to do 
it by acting i!S 'go-between'- as a creativ~ interpreter-
between, on the one hand, the wider society and its 
culture, and, on the other hand, the life-giving, 
meaning-determining communication (for the Christian, the 
'gospel') simultaneously motivating and preserved by the 
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believing worshipping group to which he is linked, Each 
is seen as deepening understanding of the other ... The 
tension that the theologian has to cope with is unique 
only because the essence of the 'life-giving, meaning-
determining communication' that it his task to articulate 
in the categories of the 'wider society' is seen by the 
'believing, worshipping group' not as a creation of the 
group itself but as 'wholly given', and it is this 
'givenness' that characterises the communication (Mills, 
1980:8-9; emphasis mine), 
We should note here the recognition of the dual role played by 
the tradition upon which the theologian reflects. On the one 
hand, because it is handed down by the worshipping group as 
part of a whole cultural package, it has to be understood in 
relation to its context and its past. The theologian has to 
interpret how and why he came to be who and where he is, as a 
member of a religious tradition and a wider society. The 
relationships set up in the past between tradition and context 
may well be subtle and even ironic, and the theologian must 
seek to understand them. 
But then, because he is committed to treating the idea.s 
within the tradition as coming from beyond him, as 
determinative of what is finally to be, as distinct from the 
limited and provisional nature of the prevailing state of 
affairs, he has also to tackle the question of how the 
tradition may be deployed to realise the future- of how, so to 
speak, "more light and truth" may yet "break forth" from it. 
Another contributor, Timothy Radcliffe, in an essay 
entitled "Relativizing the Relativizers", describes theology as 
"creative praxis": "Theology is an encounter of Church and 
world in which the meaning of the Gospel becomes articulate as 
an illumination of the world" <quoting Cornelius Ernst). This 
mediatory role of theology means that it is not properly 
conceived as one more discipline or methodology alongside 
others, one more source of interpretative information about the 
world. Theology on its own adds nothins at ctll; its proper 
place is working with the disciplines like sociology which 
seek to understand man in his social context. 
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It is always a matter of "theology and" rather than 
"theology or''. There is a place for the critical praxis of 
theology wherever Christians seek to employ the distinctive 
insights of any secular discipline in the service of applying 
the Gospel. 
ii. The Contribution of David Martin. 
As a sociologist in the \ieberian tradition with clear 
commitments and interests in the area of religion and theology, 
Martin's credentials are particularly suited to the approach we 
are putting forward. In the current context, his special 
contribution is to have captured the interaction of theological 
and sociological factors in the unfolding story of religious 
social reality in a dynamic, historical and dialectical way. 
Martin shares, to begin with, two basic principles with 
Mills' position in the passage quoted above. These are, firstly, 
that theology is concerned to aim at comprehensive 
interpretation 
categories of 
of human situations, i.e. to provide overall 
understanding which at the same time give 
maximum coverage to the particulars of experience. 
Secondly, Martin supports the view that what makes the 
theologian's standpoint unique is the conviction that the "set" 
or "frame" into which he gathers up his interpretation is 
itself something given, there, objectively present; not merely 
constructed out of the available social materials, but able to 
stand over them and prescribe a final, normative possibility 
<Martin, 1980 (b) :47). 
The 
connecting 
suggested 
Christian tradition offers one way of tracing a 
thread through the labyrinth of interpretations 
by the potentially chaotic mass of circumstances 
amidst which individlli'l_ls and groups must live and move (cf. 
Bowker, 1973). It "carves an arc out of the spectrum of 
possibilities". In so doing, and over time, it creates certain 
social patterns and tensions, structures and forms, which the 
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sociologist of religion seeks to understand. Martin's original 
way of characterizing these arrangements is to speak of a 
"thea-logic" and a "socio-logic", which tur-ns the question of 
the relation between two academic disciplines into a matter of 
dynamic socio-historical developments. 
The thea-logic is composed, as to its actual cultural 
manifestations and means of transmission, of a "stock" or 
"repertoire" of images. These are the constituents of the 
Christian tradition: Cross, Virgin, Brotherhood, Holy City, 
Servant, and so on. Each image may be regarded as a little 
capsule of explosive, inserted into the social structure, 
capable under favourable conditions of exerting powerful force 
for radical change (Martin, 1980 (a) :15 and passim). In this way 
Martin rejects reductionism and retains for theological ideas 
the right to claim a reality sui generis; it subsists in the 
area of vision, possibility and promise, and it is socio-
culturally set forth in the form of what Martin calls a "code", 
via image and symbol. 
But the drive of all such images for concrete historical 
realization encounters "social resistance" <op.cit:71ff). As 
Martin puts it in the Symposium essay: 
[The theologian's task is] to brood upon the paradox of a 
plenitude and power which can only express 1tself 
creatively within strict limitations and rules, and which 
only achieves fulness in relation to that which is not 
itself (Mal'tin, 1980(b):47J, 
The socio-logic uncovers all manner of constraints and costs 
governing the bid of the Christian vision for embodiment. This 
recognition entails for Martin a judicious attitude towards the 
issue of determinism: 
Evet·y system says: these things must be and these things 
need not be, Indeed, the rnos t potent systems suggest how 
men may collude creatively with necessity,, ,Sociology 
does not require us to accept Lnat every opt1on is 
already pre-empted by the antecedent concatenation of 
cit·curnstances, Indeed, my own view is that options are 
real just because they are vet·y circumscribed, IJe can 
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choose precisely because the range of possibilities is 
constricted (ibid;49-50), 
In this light, every social and cultural form achieved by 
an originating theological idea appears as the fruit of a 
struggle, a temporary, partial and probably fragile victory 
gained at considerable cost in the face of daunting odds. 
Sociology analyses and outlines the conditions under which the 
normative vision carried by the Christian code may achieve 
various forms of partial realization. 
I am saying how the ontol•)O:Jical reality is embodied and 
how the theolo•Jical norm is made effective, The 
embodiment may be padial, the norm may not be fully 
realized,. ,We have to e>:pose the soci•)-Joqic informing a 
symbol-system, and consider what li•Jht that can throw 
upon the form and development of the theo-loqic 
(ibid:58), 
The theme of Martin's The Breaking of the Image is the 
successive mutations and distortions undergone by several 
specific Christian images in the historical course of this kind 
of dynamic process. It is a dialectical process because both 
images and context, both thea-logic and socio-logic, affect and 
are affected by the other. But the pull of forces can be such 
that an image ceases to represent its original radical ideal. 
The alliances and collusions entered into by the religious 
images on account of social constraint are capable of leading 
to their being bought out by the cultural context, forced to 
conform to prevailing structures and patterns and so 
apparently made of no effect and emptied of their ability to be 
socially significant. 
But Martin insists on a double evaluation of this. It may 
threaten harm to the very kernel of the Gospel ideals; and yet, 
it is only by entering into these risky cultural alliances that 
the religious ideas are ensured the probability of survival, by 
seeing to it that they are carried through the generations in 
the clothing of tradition. And as long as they are so carried, 
they retain their "charge", a latent or dormant potential which 
can be re-activated. Theology only goes on at all, or should, 
in full awareness of the pains and djscomforts of this 
dialectic. 
Martin does not maintain in his work the distinction we 
have made between the religious tradition and theology as the 
process of critical reflection on it. But putting his insights 
together with those of Gill and the theological contributors to 
the Blackfriars symposium, who do make the distinction, 
provides us with a viable model for a dialogue between the 
disciplines. One reservation remains before we go on to sum up 
our position. 
Martin's recent work has met with a hesitant reception 
from both sides of the interdisciplinary fence. Some 
sociologists have tended to regard him as having deserted 
sociology altogether in favour of theology, whereas some 
theologians are suspicious of a type of writing which (as in 
The Breaking of the Image) appears to deal with theological 
themes without employing the familiar tools and "jargon" of 
that discipline. 
It 1·.-·:> possible that Martin's marginalization in both 
disciplines indicates that this way forward in the dialogue is 
only feasible along a fairly narrow front, i.e. where the 
sociology of religion is interested in theological ideas and 
theology is concerned about how they are expressed in the life 
of the Church. Obviously this is far from the whole of what a 
fully-fledged dialogue would have to involve. On the wider 
issues, there are many questions yet to be answered' 0 , but the 
"narrow front" where the approach we have been discussing is 
appropriate is, after all, the front upon which this thesis is 
located. 
iii. Conclusions. 
This thesis introduces sociological perspectives into the 
critical analysis of theological ideas. Since this procedure is 
fraught with methodological and theoretical dangers, we have 
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tried in this chapter to give quite extensive treatment to bow 
we hope to deal with them. In particular, we see the 
constructive interaction of the disciplines as entailing a 
particular tradition of sociological work and a corresponding 
model of theology. 
The sociological tradition followed in the thesis is that 
deriving from the vmrk: of Weber. This is because we find here 
a due attention to the meanings religious beliefs and practices 
hold for the individual agents involved, coupled with a 
sufficiently sophisticated account of the dialectical 
interaction between ideas and material factors of the social 
context. We have indicated earlier in the chapter why we do not 
consider the other major sociological tradition, stemming from 
the work of Durkheim, to offer such fruitful possibilities to 
theology. 
Within the Weberian tradition, we are adopting the 
approach to the behaviour of the Christian religion in :::;ocial 
and cultural context which we find in the work of David 
Martin. This supports a dialectical view of the relationship 
between the logic of a body of theological ideas, in terms of 
vision, possibility and promise, and that of social patterns, 
structures and relations in terms of constraint, cost and 
necessity. 
A particular model 
this sociological method. 
of theological work corresponds to 
It has been proposed by Robin Gill 
and other contributors to recent dialogue between theologians 
and sociologists, and proceeds from the recognition that the 
theologian operates with a religious tradition as his datum, a 
tradition which itself shapes him and in which he is involved, 
and which at the same time is handed on within an overall 
cultural package in which the tradition has been involved in a 
complex set of two-way relationships with the social context. 
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The theology to which sociological considerations are 
relevant is therefore a theology which attempts a critical 
explication of the contents of the religious tradition, and of 
the social and cultural context, in the light of the interface 
between the two in which the theologian, in virtue of his own 
participation in the life of the community of faith, is caught 
up.'' 
Sociological insights can stimulate theology towards a 
sharper understanding of the tradition in terms of the 
relationship of present to past, by uncovering the alliances 
between religious and ideas and social context which have led 
to the current situation of religious and cultural life. 
Then, when theology goes on to try to discover how the 
tradition may be activated to bring about a new relation of 
present to future, sociology can again sharpen the enterprise 
by pointing to the constraints and costs to which such 
advances will be subject. 
This is the way in which we intend to employ sociological 
perspectives in our analysis of the theology of Christian 
Radicalism. It will be the task of Part Two of the thesis to 
develop the specific sociological tools to be used in the third 
and main Part. 
Before going on to do this, one further component to the 
basic "frame" remains for Part One. This is the place of 
Bonhoeffer in the issues raised by Christian Radicalism; for 
Bonhoeffer, to put it in Martin's terms, was certainly 
concerned to discover the relationship between a thea-logic and 
a contemporary socio-logic, and in this way he provides a link 
between the topics of our first two chapters. 
NOTES, 
l, It <~ould be false to irtply a total neglect of religion in the sociology of the 
twenties to the fifties, In America, the lunds' studies on 'Middletown" and Liston 
Pope's Millhands and Preachers were notable inter-war exceptions, In Britain in the 
fifties came W,M,Willms' 6osforth·the Socjglogy 0! an English Yillag~>, M,Stacey's 
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f+&W+K.LIUJr.-a~...-IW¥1i>f--1h~~""+--'~'-'----'f-l"""'~· and W . S . F . Pi c k e ring' s unpub I i shed Ph . D 
thesis, · c · · 
~~ all giv1ng substan ul at ention to re ig1ous 11 e, Neverthe ess Gerhard 
Lensk1 was ~le (o present his The Religious Factor in 1961 as in the nature of a 
pioneering attempt to apply Weberian ~ethods to discovering the relationships between 
religious beliefs and attitudes in other areas of social li1e, 
2, ~e have not distinguished the Marxist as a third distinctive tradition in 
sociology, Apart from mere limitation of scope we have kept to just two major 
traditions because we think it misleading that 'weber and Marx have so often been 
presented as holding opposing views about the priority of either ideas or material 
factors in promoting social change, We think it preferable to regard both as 
representing a dynamic, dialecttcal and historical tradition of sociological 
analysis, as distinct from a more static structural-functional type, In this way it 
can be seen how, outside specifically Marxist contexts, Marxian ideas have often been 
received via the Weberian modifications of thenl, This appears at various points in 
our account of the task of theology, 
3, The opti~istic ease of Christian Soctology's application of theological principles 
b) social issues shows ho'i far English theology was from getting attuned to the 
Barthian movement which was sweeping Europe, It ts noteworthy that renewed interest 
in the relevance of sociology onfy arose among Protestant theologians with the 
eventual decline of dialectical theology, with those most interested in sociology 
frequently former Barthians themselves, 
4, The pioneer of the move~ent French Professor of Canon La~R Gabriel LeBras, 
produced his initial article, 'Statistique et Histoire Religieuse, Pour un Examen 
dltaill( et pour une Explicati•)n Historique de 1 'Etat du Catholicisme dans les 
Diverses Regions de Ia France', as early as 1931, His collaborator Fernand Boulard 
brought out his first Religious Map of Rural france in 1947, but no English 
translation of his work appeared until 1960, The English churches ~ere slow to 
realize, in the post-War mood of national optimism, that England was every bit as 
much "pays de mission" as France, 
5, This ability to compartmentalize looks too much like professional schizophrenia to 
Protestant eyes and raised doubts among non-Catholic theologians about bow readily 
religious sociology might be transplanted into Protestant soil, No Protestant could 
matcf\, for example, the startling variety of the voluminou, works of that scourge of 
the American journals, Father Andrew Greeley, 
6, Berger's sociology of rno~ledge perspective has been described as the "fiery 
brook" through which all theology Must now pass in its ~uest for an authoritative 
truth-claim, The pun on Feuerbach is not entirely justified1 however, for whereas Feuerbach's inversion of Hegel to claim that the so-called "dtvine spirit" is really 
none other than the ideal projection of human nature lin The Essence of Christianity) 
enabled Marx, in criticising Feuerbach, to go a step further and argue for the 
economic-material base to ideas of that "nature", Berger's position, in relativizing 
everything, both "arx and theology included, ends by leaving everything as it is, 
7, The pervasive role of humour in Berger's work also leads us to take his 
"methodolo9ical atheism" with a pinch of salt, The point is that sociology's 
"debunking attitude deflates the pretensions of all humanly devised systems and 
makes their claim to be treated absolutely seriously look comic; "This will lead to a 
posture vis-a-vis society of the latter as essentially a comedy, in which men parade 
up and down with their gaudy costumes, change hats and titles, hit each other with 
the sticks they have or the ones they can persuade their fellow-actors to believe in' 
<Berger, 1966:1851, Hamnett (19741 takes Berger to task for going to great lengths to 
display his •atheism• before doing a draa1at!c about-turn, all carefully planned, of 
course- the conjuror performs a dazzling feat of "look no hands" before triumphantly 
producing the ace from up his sleeve and declaring himself a believer after all! 
B, In chapter 6 of The Social Context of Theology, Gill looks at the interpretations 
of secularization offered by Robinson 119631, Mascall 11965Jd Ramsey (19691, Newbigin ( 19661 and Barry (19691. He finds in them a conon ten ency to make uncritical 
assumptions about the nature of modern society, and a general failure to acquaint 
themselves with substantial sociological work on the subject, but he does not examine 
their theological recommendations in this light, In chapter 5 of Theology and Social 
Structure he looks at the Honest to God debate for evidence of the possible social 
significance of theology, but only advances examples of non-theological factors 
assisting the book's impact, 
9, Gill's account of the social function of the churches in Prophecy and Pra;sis is 
that the~ llliY. help to •embed key general values or principles int•) society• 
lop,cit;L4), This reflects the interest in ethical issues which has occupied him 
since that tirte (his Textbook go Cbrislian Ethjcs was recently published by T,&T, 
Clarki, and belongs to an interpretation of secularization as "transposition", which 
looks for the refigious origins of supposedly secular values in society (cf, Gill, 
19841, Both this point and that in note 8 above lead us to the view that there is 
more in the theoretical ideas put forward by Gill than he has actually made use of 
hi~tself. 
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10, I understand that a ntore recent 11eeting of the group, t1hich took the Garden of 
Eden narratives of Genesis 1-3 as its subject-matter, exferienced difficulty in 
advancing the dialogue once the earlier narrow "front" o co-operation was left 
behind, 
11, There are obvious affinities between this position and the method of Liberation 
Theology, Segundo ( 1977: 75ft,) speaks of theology as the "second step•, t~here the 
first ts commitment, He means that theology cannot be brought pure and unconditioned 
to a social situation and applied to it; rather) the theologian begins by being 
involved in that situation and for111ing certain Judgments about t~hat is good ana 
desirable in it, In Gutierrez' wor~. "theology comes after": its resources 
facilitate and direct critical reflection, from the Christian traditiont on what is 
already under way, Of course, for Segundo "commitment" means politica commitment, 
and the notorious difficulty of applying the specific recoMmendations of the 
Liberationist approach to a vastly different socio-political milieu has led us to 
develop our ROS!lion ll'ithout direct dependence on the Latin An1erican theologians, 
However, see Davis (19B0;23ff.l for a suggestive account of how 'original theology", 
which is done in the ve1·y act of (often pre-reflex.ive) Christian living, worshipp1ng 1 
serving, needs to be related to "scientific theology•h theology as a 1ormalized ana 
themattc discipline, through the praxis of a critical t eology, 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PLACE OF BONHOEFFER. 
1. Bonhoeffer and the Radical Theologians. 
The name of Bonhoeffer supplies a link between the 
concerns raised in the two preceding chapters. Firstly, his is 
the theological influence most markedly present and most 
frequently acknowledged behind the ideas of Christian 
Radicalism. 
Secondly, his work represents a pioneering attempt to 
come to grips with those aspects of the task of theology for 
which, as we have tried to show in the previous chapter, 
sociological perspectives can prove both critical and 
constructive. This is quite explicit in his early doctoral 
thesis, Sanctorum Communio, but implicit in his whole oeuvre, 
as we shall argue shortly. 
But as a beginning we must briefly indicate the scope of 
his importance for the radicalism of the sixties. These remarks 
are designed only to single out the features of Bonhoeffer's 
work which were of particular relevance to the radicals, and to 
indicate why this is especially significant from the point of 
view of this thesis. They are not meant to provide a 
comprehensive overview of his theology.' 
Acknowledgement of Bonhoeffer as influence and 
inspiration is, as we have said, frequent. Paul van Buren 
prefaces The Secular M_eaning of the Gospel with Auden's poem, 
Friday's Child, which is headed "In memory of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, martyred at Flossenburg, April 9th, 1945." He opens 
his introductory chapter with Bonhoeffer's words, "Honesty 
demands that we must live in the world as if there were no 
God"; and he claims that his own wor-k is an attempt to develop 
the "nonreligious interpretation of Biblical concepts" for which 
Bonhoeifer called, in answering the question, "How can the 
Christian who is himself a secular man understand his faith in 
a secular way?" <van Buren, 196:3:2.) 
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Harvey Cox progresses only to the second page of his 
Introduction to The Secular City before he writes: 
Secularization,,, is what Dietrich Bonhoeffer in 1944 
called 'man's coming of age,' To some, Bonhoeffer's words 
still sound shocking, but they l'eally should not, He was 
merely venturing a tardy theological interpretation of 
what had already been noticed by poets and novelists, 
sociologists and philosophers for decades, <Cox, 
1968:16') 
He reverts to Bonhoeffer's question, "How do we speak in a 
secular fashion of God?" in chapter 11 of his book, where he 
observes that it is among other things a sociological question. 
John Robinson alludes to Bonhoeffer's Letters and Papers 
from Prison on p.23 of Honest to God as the second of three 
pieces of writing, the ideas in which had proved seminal for 
hi:::; thinking: 
I first encountered extl·acts from these in The EctJmenical 
Review for January 1952,, ,One felt at once that the 
Church was not yet ready for what Bonhoeffer was giving 
us as his last will an•j testament,,,that God is 
deliberately calling us to a fo1·m of Christianity that 
does not depend on the premise of religion, 2 
The aspects of Bonhoeffer's work which proved to be most 
suggestive have been set out briefly in an essay by William 
Hamilton <1968:118-123.) According to him, Bonhoeffer is 
"communicating to many young Protestants today because his are 
the only theological words written in the recent past that can 
help us understand the new era into which we are moving." The 
words in question are found, Hamilton says, partly in 
Bonhoeffer's Ethics, but chiefly in the Letters and Papers from 
hison.. The three central ideas are: 
i. The coming-of-age of the world and the positive 
evaluation of the process of secularization. 
ii. The plea for a religionless Christianity, and the 
positive evaluation of the rejection of religion by the modern 
world. 
iii. The notion of being "challenged to participate in the 
sufferings of God at the hands of a godless world." This last 
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idea may be filled out with the secular Christological 
understanding of faith as a way of being in the world that 
conforms to the pattern of the presence of Christ as the "man 
for others".(cf.Richard, 1967:13.) 
Three of Bonhoeffer's phrases which became leading 
slogans of Christian Radicalism, "world come of age", 
"religionless Christianity" and "man for others", provide us 
thus with a framework around which to organise our own 
remarks. They also correspond, closely in the case of the first 
two and more loosely in the third, to the issues we have 
already stated to be the major concerns of the sixties' 
radicalism: the problems of a secular approach to the reality 
of God, the theological affirmation of secularization and the 
reconceptualizing of the commitment of faith. 
It is not strictly relevant, in outlining the influence of 
Bonhoeffer on the radicals' thinking, to ask whether their 
interpretation of him was always sound. Certainly, in drawing 
their inspiration almost exclusively from the fragmentary and 
enigmatic prison letters, they were well aware that they were 
not attempting a balanced evaluation of Bonhoeffer's life's 
work, brief though it was. VIe do not, therefore, propose to 
treat directly the question of whether Bonhoeffer was misused, 
as critics of the radicals were very ready to argue."' However, 
we do intend to point to certain features of Bonhoeffer's work 
which the radicals may not have perceived, because they were 
unacquainted with his earliest writings, and which throw 
valuable light on why his later work seemed to speak so 
illuminatingly to their own concerns. 
2. Bonhoeffer and the Sociological Nature of the Church. 
Bonhoeffer's doctoral thesis Sanctorum Corumuu.iu, 
presented to the Berlin theological faculty in 1927 when he 
was only 21, did not appear in an English translation until 
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1963, i.e. not until interest in Bonhoeffer had been stimulated 
by the publication of the prison letters. At the time of its 
publication in 1930, the work found no ready audience. Its 
concern to conduct a dogmatic enquiry into the sociological 
nature of the Church appeared to blur the distinctions marked 
out by the divide between Barth and Troel tsch- the way of 
historical relativism 
socioloBical entity in 
revelationism of the 
in the study of 
the latter case, 
dogmatic method 
the 
and 
of 
Church 
the 
the 
as a 
radical 
former. 
Furthermore, the work was experimental in that Bonhoeffer was 
trying to move away from the essentialist perspectives of 
Liberal Protestantism which he had learnt at Berlin from 
Harnack.~' 
Bonhoeffer's friend and prison correspondent during his 
last months, Eberhard Bethge, has summed up Bonhoeffer's 
concern in the early period as "the quest for the concreteness 
of the message." <Bethge, 1967.) He clarifies this in two 
propositions: "Concreteness is the attribute of revelation 
itself", and "Only the message which becomes a specific 
concrete word is the eterna.l word of authority." That is, it is 
not merely the "application" of the message which deals in the 
concrete, but the very form and substance of it. The dogmatic 
terms, such as grace, justification, reconciliation, may be 
regarded as social facts. Thus the recent studies of Dumas and 
Ott both single out "rea.l ity" as the controlling idea of 
Bonhoeffer's theology. 
Phillips has shown in ~Form of Christ in the World 
how Bonhoeffer's thought revolved around the dual foci of the 
authentic shape and style of the experience of Christ, and the 
social nature and function of the Church. For the Church is 
what is empirically available to us objectively, as the 
institution with a prima facie clajm to represent Christ ue£ore 
the world. 
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Likewise it is the Gospel image of the man Jesus which is 
subjectively present to give some concrete, humanly graspable 
form to the Gospel message. Martin Marty points to 
Bonhoeffer's question, "What is Christianity, or indeed who is 
Christ, for us today?" as his leading problem, and he notes 
that his way of approaching it remained constant from his 
initial location of these characteristic problems of theology 
within the sociological setting of the Church <Marty, 1963.) 
This concern fm- concrete social form helps to explain 
Bonhoeffer's dismissal of "religion", insofar as it seeks to 
offer inwardly-oriented, psychologizing or individualistic 
answers to his theological questions. For Christ does not come 
to meet my need and to make me self-sufficient. Rather <in 
traditional Lutheran terms) in being pro me and also "for 
others" in weakness and suffering, he lifts the issue of 
justification, salvation and wholeness on to the level of 
community and mutuality. Once more, ecclesiology is implied in 
Chris to logy. <Ehrlich, 1969.) 
So, in Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer sought to enlist 
the aid of sociology in coming to grips with these questions. 
He insisted upon a definition of the Church as "Christ existing 
as the Church." He attempted to elucidate the theological 
meaning of such a statement by means of concepts drawn from 
Hegelian idealism <the Hegelian "right"), personalist philosophy 
and the formalistic school of sociology associated especially 
with Ferdinand Toennies and Georg Simmel. 
Briefly, he argued that man is essentially a social being, 
and the category of the personal is only realized in the 
mutuality of relationships: in community. The normative form of 
human personhood would hp found only in the divine community, 
marked by a particular quality of relationship. Here he 
imported the concept of "collective person" to characterize the 
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community, which as a moral, supra-personal entity in itself 
possessed an "objecive spirit". 
These notions could readily be theologized into line with 
the doctrines of the Person of Christ and of the Hal y Spirit 
as their perfect and normative form. The "essential Church", 
then, was the normative and ideal form of human community. In 
such a community of persons, the experienced reality of God 
was to be found- a claim already damaging to traditional 
metaphysics. Fm- as Bonhoeffer put it boldly in his second 
book, Act and Being, "einen Gott, den es 'gibt', gibt es nicht." 
Peter Berger (1963) has pointed out the defects in 
Bonhoeffer's use of sociology to substantiate his case. 
Sociological development has made his espousal of Toennies, 
Simmel and just one aspect of Durkheim (collective spirit), to 
the exclusion of Marx and Weber, look very unwise. Today, we 
should be inclined to class Bonhoeffer's "sociology" as "social 
philosophy", despite his attempt to distinguish the two. 
Phillips has criticised Bonhoeffer for trying to describe "the 
visible and unique form which revelation assumes among the 
secular structures of society" <1968:49) in an unhistorical, 
non-dialectical way, simply translating a presumed theological 
norm into the alternative language of social philosophy. 
Berger agrees in finding the theological contribution 
somewhat imperialistic, and goes on to criticise the "Hegelian 
and pre-Marxian" concept of "objective spirit". He suggests 
that to argue as Bonhoeffer does for a "collective person" idea 
of human community and then to say, on a priori theological 
grounds, that this has in practice been broken by sin, is to 
treat Hegelian anthropology as though it were a kind of 
sociology of the pre-Fall period! Bonhoeffer has been too eager 
to reify his sociological concepts, which as Berger says are 
only analytical constructs, into same sort of representation of 
reality. He rejects liberal theological essentialism, but adopts 
a sociological kind instead. 
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However, the last sections of Sanctorum Communio do take 
up questions which are obscured rather than clarified by the 
faulty methodology of the bulk of the work. One of the most 
important of these concerns Bonhoeffer's awareness of the 
discrepancy between the empirical Church and the ideal 
community he has described. He is anxious to account for this 
without retreating into what Harvey Cox has called the "gaseous 
spiritualism" of a doctrine of the "invisible Church" <Callahan, 
1966:210.) He writes: 
The Church is the p1·esence of Christ, as Christ is the 
presence of God,, ,The Kingdom of Christ or the Church 
is .. ,present to us in concrete historical form, and 
present in such a way that it must reckon with having 
many nominal members, It is p1·esent, in •)ther words, as a 
national church (1/olkskirche) and not as a 'gathered' 
church (freiwilligkeitskirche,) (Bonhoeffer, 1963:151; 
emphasis mine,) 
Vherein lies the middle term of union between the 
gathered sanctorum communio and the corpus permixtum of the 
Volkskirche? For Bonhoeffer, in the Vord which takes priority 
in any case over the Church, which constitutes the Church and 
which the Church bears and preaches. "The sanctorum communio 
sustains the others ... in whom the possibility of becoming 
'effective' members of the Church is dormant ... by virtue of the 
Vord" <ibid:l52). 
We must neither regard the mere fact of the Church's 
sociological form as equivalent to sin, nor treat it as a kind 
of apparition of a purely ideal, unreal Church never to exist 
in this world. For even as Christ entered history, so has God 
willed the historical form of the Church's life. "No matter how 
dubious its empirical form may be, it remains the Church so 
long as Christ is present in his Vord" <ibid:146). To the 
extent that the Vord is realized, made concretely present in 
the Church's forms and service, the empirical Church as 
VoH.skirche will be "pressing forward" into the essential 
Church of the sanctorum communio. 
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Bonhoeffer admits that a time could come when the given 
form of the Volkskirche might no longer be capable of pressing 
forward in this way; and then, such practices as infant 
baptism, which can only be meaningful within a conception of 
the community in which some exist and profess for and on 
behalf of others, might have to cease.''· Bonhoeffer observes 
here a situation which is consonant with the idea of the 
sociological expression of theological meanings found in Martin 
and discussed in the previous chapter: that the Church is 
always at once both in part the authentic expression of the 
idea (image) from which it springs, and in part threatens to 
contradict it. 
In his lectures, Bethge goes on to trace the development 
of Bonhoeffer's quest for concreteness through all his major 
worh:;. He sees the outcome of the search beginning to emerge 
in a thoroughgoing "theology of the natural", an endorsement of 
the worldliness of the world as the arena in which God's 
reality in the form of the presence of Christ might appear. 
Bethge is even prepared to view the seemingly much more 
world-denying The Cost of Discipleship and Life Together as 
stages of the same development. Here, the concrete form of 
faith appears as a costly and sacrificial service in 
commitment to a Christ demanding exclusive allegiance. Then, 
this taking seriously of one's vocation under Christ for the 
sake of ultimate things leads readily on to a fresh vision of 
the totality of Christ's Lordship in the penultimate things 
also, and indeed over those of no religion at all."· The scope 
of application of the search for Christological concreteness 
broadens out from the specific communion of saints to the 
whole of society. 
And so finally arise the questions of the prison letter of 
April 30th, 1944: 
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----------------------
In what way are we 'religionless-secular' Christians, in 
what 111ay are 111e the ek-klesia, those 111ho are called 
forth, not regarding ourselves from a religious point of 
view as specially favoured, but rather as belonging 
wholly to the world? In that case Christ is no longer an 
object of reli,Jion, but something quite different, really 
the Lord of the wo!'l,j, But what does that mean? What is 
the place of worship and prayer in a religionless 
situation? Does the sect'et discipline, or alternatively 
the difference,, ,between penultimate and ultimate, take 
on a new importance here? 
3. The Relevance of the Najar Themes of the Prison Letters. 
i. "World come of Age." 
We have devoted some time to this background terri tory 
which was rarely traversed by the radicals who made most use 
of Bonhoeffer, because it helps us to see why his prison 
utterances should have seemed to strike the right note, and it 
provides additional explication of the approach to the secular 
theology we are taking in this thesis. We can now deal quite 
briefly with the three leading themes indicated in the 
"slogans" introduced at the beginning of the chapter, and show 
the place they hold in our later detailed theological 
discussions. 
Only in the L~ers and Papers from Prison does the 
subject of secularization appear explicitly. As the concept of 
the world's coming-of-age, it is compounded with Bonhoeffer's 
already established Christocentric emphasis to produce the new 
ideas so .:;haracterist ic of the letter:3 <W .Hamil ton, 1962; and 
cf. Metz, 1969). The crucial passage comes in the letter of June 
8th, 1944: 
The movement that began about the thirteenth 
centu1·y,,. towa1·ds the autonomy of man (in which I should 
include the discovery of the laws by which the 111orld 
lives and deals with itself in science, social and 
political matters, art, ethics and religion) has in our 
time reached a certain completion, Man has learnt to deal 
with himself in ai i questions of importance without 
recourse to the working hypothesis called 'God',, .As in 
the scientific field, so in human affairs generally, 
67 
'God' is being pushed more and more out of life, losing 
more and more ground,,, 
Bonhoeffer traces the trend towards the autonomy of man 
and the world through the thought of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, 
Montaigne, Machiavelli, Grotius and Descartes, to Spinoza, Kant, 
F ichte and Hegel, and in so doing makes two points clear. 
Firstly, the "autonomy" of man-in-the-world has nothing to do 
with "maturity" in any ethical or morally approbative sense. 
These are intended as matter-of-fact judgments about the 
nature and mode of man's being-in-the-world and his self-
under:o;tanding. They do not imply he has "grmm up" in the 
manner of the more extreme nineteenth-century meliorist type 
of rationalism. It is, in any case, strictly speaking the world 
which is said to be of age <muendig) rather than man. 
Secondly, Bonhoeffer's real interest in developing the 
idea focuses on the question of God, and is not basically 
anthropological at all. James Mark has located the core of the 
concept of coming-of-age in the abolition of the "working 
hypothesis" of God <Mark, 1962). The acquisition of knowledge 
by scientific methods requires, as far as possible, the 
elimination of unverifiable postulates as bases for its 
procedures. As long as God is conceived of in such a way, he 
is doomed to be ever on the retreat into the ever-diminishing 
gaps in knowledge. Bonhoeffer wants to halt this process 
before it is too late, by reconsidering what it means to speak 
of the presence and activity of God at all. 
This is clear from Bonhoeffer's conviction that the 
maturity of the world is given in Christian faith, and can only 
be properly understood in relation to it. As R.Gregor Smith 
puts it, "Faith is not the scaffolding by which we have been 
able to rise to this height, which may then be knocked away, 
leaving the structure of the world in solitary power nver 
itself" (Smith, 1966:180). The true understanding of 
:::;ecularization and the true understanding faith has of God's 
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way of being in the world belong together. Bonhoeffer wrote on 
July 16th, 1944: 
G•Jd himself compels us to recognise this. So our coming 
of age leads us to a true recognition of our situation 
before God, God gives us to know that we must live as men 
'iho manage their 1 i ves without God .. The God who 1 ets •Js 
live in the world without the working h)'pothesis of God 
is the God before whom we are ever standing. 
Secularization means for Bonhoeffer that reason and 
science, man unaided, can in principle explain all things, can 
be self-sufficient. There is no special department, no enclave 
of life, which can be reserved for God, as a kind of base from 
which the Church might continue its opposition to the progress 
of secularization. God is not identifiable in a particular place 
or practice; and this fact, which at first appears to mean the 
disappearance or demise of God, points instead to a new way of 
perceiving all of reality and the world as with God, under God 
and before God. 
But this cannot make sense unless the message of the 
Gospel is a concrete one. It will not do to use the abstract 
noun "concreteness" as the basis for a vague idea of all 
reality as somehow in an undifferentiated fashion the arena of 
God's presence and activity. There still has to be some sort of 
break in the seamless web of the world which can give a point 
of departure for any talk of God whatsoever. 
So it is that to affirm secularization as leaving no room 
for any special department of life where God is to be found 
paradoxically raises in acute form all over again the question 
of what the Church, insofar as it continues to exist as a 
distinct body of people, can be for. The question of "gathered 
Church" and "national Church" is sublimated into that of 
"minority practising religious group" and "secular presence of 
Christ". 
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The problems which arise out of Bonhoeffer's beginning of 
an attempt to come to terms with secularization theologically 
in a positive way develop much more fully in the more 
extensive theological responses to secularization we shall be 
looking at in Chapters X and XI in Part Three. In order to 
examine them in a way which fastens critically upon the claim 
to "concreteness", we shall introduce perspectives from the 
sociological treatment of the secularization process. 
ii. "Religionless Christianity." 
Bonhoeffer's rejection of religion now becomes 
intelligible, inasmuch as religion is irredeemably tied to this 
no lon~er feasible concept of God. We need to deduce this from 
Bonhoeffer's use of the term "religion", since he nowhere 
defines it explicitly. On April 30th, 1944, he wrote: 
The time ~hen people could be told everything by means of 
~ords, ~hether theological or pious, is over, and so is 
the time of in~ardness and conscience- and that means the 
time of l'eligion in •Jeneral [emphasis mine],, ,Our ~hole 
nineteen-hundred-year-old Christian preaching and 
theology rest on the l'eligious a priori of mankind,, ,But 
if one day it becomes clear that this a priori does not 
exist at all,, ,and if therefore man becomes radically 
religionless,, ,-what does that mean for 
'Christianity'?,,, 
Religious people speak of God ~hen human knowledge,, ,has 
come to an end, or when human resources fail- in fact it 
is always the deus ex machina that they br in•J on to the 
scene, either for the apparent solution of insoluble 
p1·oblems, or as stren•Jth in human failure- always, that 
is to say, exploiting human weakness or human boundaries, 
And, on May 5th: 
What does it mean to 'inte1·pret in a religious sense'? I 
think it means to speak on the one hand metaphysically, 
and on the other hand individualistically, 
From these quotations emerge a variety of ways in which 
Bonhoeffer thinks of religion as a mode of relationship 
between the human and the divine. We can set them out so as 
clearly to show their relevance to the interests of the 
radicals. 7 
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i. Religion means "being told everything", i.e. the 
individual is the passive recipient of a body of teachings and 
traditions. But contemporary culture casts doubt on the value 
of "just believing". Insofar as religion means submission to 
authority it appears to deny the possibility of growth into an 
authentic expression of faith under modern conditions. 
ii. Religion locates God in the inward spiritual 
experience of the individual, in the "soul", as to his 
subjective presence. But modern thinking makes exceedingly 
problematic the notion of a specific recess of the human make-
up wherein God is pre-eminently known, and which has its own 
distinct type of experience. 
iii. Religion, on the other hand, 
metaphysical "beyond" or "other world" as 
places God in a 
to his objective 
existence, and this inevitably makes him appear remote or 
irrelevant to secular ways of thinking. 
iv. Religion assumes that there is a basic human 
religiosity which is permanent and universal, so that if this 
appears to be declining, it looks as though the Gospel has been 
defeated and God has failed; but this surely cannot be so. 
v. Religion encourages a "God of the gaps" mentality by 
invoking God at the points of special human need or ignorance. 
But it cannot be right that the relationship between man and 
God :3hould be inoperative when man is confident, contented or 
in possession of a high view of human capabilities. 
All of this amounts to more than just a reaction against 
the pietism of Bonhoeffer 's background. Moreover, it is not 
merely a reproduction of Barth's 
Barth argued that religion is 
revelation, because it represents 
righteous presumption of man to 
polemic against religion. 
irreconcilably opposed to 
the idolatrous and self-
reach God.'"' Nevertheless 
religion must and will persist, either as wilful unbelief or as 
brought under judgment and continually relativized under the 
transcendent power of revealed faith. 
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But Bonhoeffer's approach makes such questions beside the 
point. For it is no longer a question of what man attempts to 
achieve j n himself being confronted by what God declares from 
beyond him. It is a matter of finding a logic for speaking of 
God's pre::;ence vri th man and the world under the conditions of 
modern culture. The "se•:::ret di:o;(;ipline" of religious practice 
envisaged by Bonhoeffer cannot he fitted into the framework of 
ThP rejection of religion i:s (;onsonant with the desire of 
Chrh;ti.an Radi•:::a1L:;m to bring the meaning of a.ll the,Jlogical 
•:::oncepts v;ithin the horizon of tbi·; one v10rld reality. Within 
that one reality, moreover, theological meaning is to be 
located upon the plane of the outwardly visible, the empirical 
and social, rather th.3.n in the inner life of individuals. This 
alone, Bonhoeffer believed, could do justice to the type of man 
he saw emerging from the rational-scientific era. 
In suc!t a "'.it.uBtion, it become:; a.ll the more important to 
enquin~ into the !:>la·>~ and role of the small minority who do 
continu·~ -t:o practise l-eli~;ion under the form of the di.sciplina 
arcani. The continuing importance attached to this by 
Bonhoeffer gives no support to the argument of some 
conservative critics of the radicals, to the effect that 
Bonhoeff,-=:r the devout Christian remained a religious man <in 
his t8rms) malgr~ lui. An exception among such critio:::s was 
right to point out that 
[E:onho,-.ffer) 1s saying that for some people at any rate, 
those \1/ho n>anifest the l'ight q';alities of life, 110 
rel19i >:>n a.t all i.s necessary, God has evident! y brought 
t.hem into this kind of life, The Church cannot presume 
no\11 to lay other demands on them, asking that they become 
reli']iN<S !Morris, 1964:25), 
How far was Bonhoeffer justified in his speculations 
about religionles:;ne:.;~=;, r~nrl if he was, to 1-rhat extent ·,..;Guld tho:: 
attempts of the radical theologians to follow up his ideas and 
build on them be likely to bring about the kind of reshaping 
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of the Christian presence in the world he expected to see? In 
order to give critical attention to the radicals' proposals for 
secular approaches to the reality of God we shall be examining 
how sociology has treated the nature and functions of religion 
insofar as it is an inescapable social reality. 
iii. "Man for Others". 
Bonhoeffer summed up the projected theological 
reconstruction he did not live to carry out in the "Outline for 
a Book" he enclosed with the letter of August 3rd, 1944. Here, 
he described the Christological form of secular faith: 
Encounter with Jesus Chr1sl, The experience that a 
il'ansformation of all human life is ·~iven in the fact 
that 'Jesus is there only for othe1·s', His 'being there 
fot· othet·s' is the expe1·ience of transcen•jence .. ,Faith is 
partie ipation in this being of .Jesus (incarnation, cross 
and resur1•ection), Our relation to God 1s not a 
'religious relationship to the highest, most powerful and 
best Being imaginable- that is not authentic 
transcendence- but our relation fo God is a new life in 
'existence for others', through participation 1n the 
being of Jesus, The t1·anscendental is not infinite and 
IJnattainable tasks, but the neighbour who is in reach in 
any given situation, God in human form-,,, 'the man for 
•)thers', and the ref ore the Crucified, the man who 1 i ves 
out of the transcendent, 
"Man for others" is not a slogan of Christology alone, but a 
proposal for a secular doctrine of God and a historical form 
of transcendence. It describes a mode of being in the world. 
And insofar as this is intended to be concrete and empirically 
discernible, it lies open to scrutiny under the category of 
sociological form <thi,::; is a continuity between Bonhoeffer's 
earliest and last works). Hence it also lends itself to an 
ecclesiology: 
The Church is the Chut·ch only when it exists for others, 
To make a start, it should give away all its property to 
those in need, The cler·~Y must live solely .:>n the free-
will offerings of their congregations, or possibly engage 
in some secular calling, The Church must share in the 
secular problems of ordinary life, not dominating, but 
helpin•J and serving, it must teii men of every caiiing 
~Rhat it means to live in Christ, to e;<ist for others, 
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The concepts of Man and Church for others prescribe a 
pattern by which Christian presence in the world may be 
identified which builds upon the theological notions of God's 
absence from a world come of age and the consequent need for a 
religionless form of faith. It is not therefore either a 
triumphal or a comfortable prospect for the Church. The 
affirmation of secularization is by no means a serene and 
self-evident declaration of the active pre:3ence of God in all 
that now makes up the modern world. Tho:.:3e who practise the 
secret discipline of religion are a minority whose perception 
of the divine stamp upon their secular lives is achieved with 
pain and a sense of struggle, even as it was for Christ. 
So, on July 18th 1944 Bonhoeffer wrote that "Man is 
challenged to participate in the sufferings of God at the hands 
of a godless world ... He must live a 'worldly' life and so 
participate in the sufferings of God." Three days later he 
added: 
The Christian is not a ho111o religiosus, but a man, pure 
and simple, just as .Jesus was a man,,, it is only by 
living completely in this world that one learns to 
believe,, ,This is what I mean by worldliness- taking life 
in one's stride, with all its duties and problems, its 
successes and failures, its experiences and helplessness, 
It is in such a life that we throw ourselves utterly into 
the arms of Go•j and participate in his sufferings in the 
world and watch with Christ in Gethsemane, 
The concept of "for others" completes, as far as 
Bonhoeffer was able to complete it, the positive side of the 
programme implied by his reconstruction. It looks for a radical 
reconceptualization of the nature and content of Christian 
faith as the ground of a particular way of understanding and 
living one's secular commitments. 
The theologians of Christian Radicalism wanted to see 
such a change, wherever faith seemed to them to be 
characterized mainly by attachment to traditions, doctrines and 
moral rules prescribed by authority. Since we have seen that 
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any new conception of the commitment of faith must have its 
sociological dimension, our examination of how the radicals 
approached the issue, in Chapters XII and XIII, will be 
informed by a study of how sociology has understood the modes 
of religious commitment and belonging in the faith-community. 
This presentation of how the questions raised by 
Christian Radicalism appeared in Bonhoeffer brings to an end 
this first and preliminary part of the thesis. The materials 
laid out in it delineate the contours of what follows. 
In sum, we have stated what we mean by Christian 
Radicalism and what the main questions raised by it are. 
VIe have explained how, methodologically, we propose to 
use sociological materials as critical tools for the analysis 
of these questions. 
Finally, we have indicated how Bonhoeffer's seminal work 
united similar theological concerns with an interest in the 
sociological dimensions of dealing with them. 
The task of Part Two will be to set out the sociological 
instruments themselves. 
NOTES, 
1, Detailed works on B.onhoeffer include J,O,G~dsey 1 The Theology of Dietrich ~f~~~IUerB 1960; J ,A,Ph1ll!ps, Jhe !ffr of Chw;t 1n the WorJd, 1968; A,. Dumas, 
onhoeffer-Theologun o R ty, 1971; H,Ott, Reahty and Fa1th·Ihe 
Theological legacy of Qietrjch Bonhoeffer, 1966, There are also the collections: The. 
Place of Bonhoeffer, ed, ~.Marty, 1963; and World Come of ~e, ed, R,G,Smith, 1967. 
2, Other examples might be added, Smith (1966;175-8 l devotes a chapter to 
Bonhoeffer, Van den Heuvel (1967; ch, 1) takes his cue from several lengthy quotations 
from the prison letters, C,W,Williams (1966:54-611 also points to Bonhoeffer's 
influence on the theology •)f secularization, And W,Harailton says of his The New 
Essence of Christianity (12, n, 11: "My essay as a whole is deeply indebted to 
Bonhoeffer, and may be taken as a theological response to the coming-of-age of the 
world as he has analysed it,• 
3, For eY.ample, Richardson (1966;20-21 I dismisses the idea of •religionlessness' as 
based on a mistranslation of religi~1nslM1 stemn1ing from English unfamiliarity with German pietism, Barry (1969:791 is quick to point out that Bonhoeffer was "a deeply. 
religious Christian", ~orrison (1966;251 indicates that Bonhoeffer quoted Matthew 
18;3 in the selfsame conteY.t as that in which he spoke of livin9 in the. world etsi 
deus non daretur- yet the Gospel verse 1s about becorung as little chlldren, not 
being Mature, grown-up or coMe-of-a~e, 
4, Thus, even in the Letters andfpers from Prison, his rejection of Bultunn is 
based on the claiM that he •goes of into the typical liberal reduction process- the 
'11ythological' eleraents of Christianity are dropped, and Christianity is reduced t•J 
its 'essence' •. 
S, Bonhoeffer argues that infant baptism would be meaningless in a situation where 
GeAJeinschaft had given way totally to 6es~Jlschaft as the mode of social 
organization, For then, membership could only be on an individual, voluntaristic 
basis, It is an important question whether this change has actually occurred; Martin (19791 explores the relevance of this to baptism, The Archbishop of York bas recently 
echoed Bonboeffer's view of the lloUsNrche!Freit'illigkeitskirche theme: "A gro1Jp 
which chooses as part of its Christian commitment to accept a measure of 
responsibility for those it sees as being outside of itself, has a possible means of 
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retaining its own sense of identity, and of avoiding the perils of exclusiveness" 
<Habgood, 1983: 90). 
6, The distinction of penultimate and ultimate things, in place of the more 
traditional this-worldly and other-worldly, is a strong motif in Bonhoeffer's illill. 
The penultimate things have value in themselves as the realit~ of the world in which 
the process of •conformation to Christ" is taking place. •The Church is nothing but a 
sectton of humanity in which Christ has really taken form." Ethics is thus treated as 
Christologirallr, concrete, but the historical variabilitr of what this 11eans is taken 
into account: 'Christ does not dispense with human rea ity for the sake of an idea 
which demands realization at the expense of the real." 
7. We have made our own analysis here in order to bring out the relevant points. 
Among other accounts, W,Hamilton (1962) singles out as elements in the rejection of 
religion, the decline of "longing for the eternal" and the "other world", the 
rejection of the idea that man needs the notion of God in order to complete his 
world-view, and the refusal to major on "boundary situations" as the place where God 
becomes known. K.Hanlilton (1966<al;71ff. l points to religion as dealing in 
generalize,j understandings of God as a meeter of needs (i,e,not Christologically 
specific), Hordern (1968;121 l speaks of the end of the sacred-secular disttnction 
which confined religion to the sacred sphere the C•)ncern for "personal salvation" 
and inner piety, and the God-of-the-gaps metaph~sic. R.G.Smith (1%6;177) suMs up the 
issue by appr•)ving the conclusion of Ebeling ( ord and Faith, 148ff. l that "religion 
for Bonhoeffer means an attitude which regards man's life as somehow completed by the 
addition of God," 
8, "The two primitive and as it were normal forms of reli ion are, .. the conception of 
the deity and the fulfiifier.t of the law" ( · , l/2;315). These two 
features presuppose that man possesses some i ea o Go and is conscious of his need 
of him and of how he might contrive to supply it, viz. by keeping the law. "His need 
is not in the least like the neediness of the believer, who wtth e18pty heart and 
hands finds himself thrown back entirely upon the revelation of God. • 
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PART TWO: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION. 
CHAPTER IV: THE NATURE AND SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF RELIGION. 
In this chapter we set out an approach to the question of 
the place and role of religious life within society based upon 
sociological theory about religion. Beginning from whatever is 
to hand in society that is commonly accepted as "religion", we 
identify the religious by its substantive content rather than 
by its function. We view religion as a cultural system which 
gives expression, through rites and symbols, beliefs and 
practices and conventions, to an orientation towards the 
transcendent. Such an orientation regulates a dialectical 
process which both stabilises and legitimates the world-order 
of the religious group, and yet induces critical dissatisfaction 
with it, and thus motivates action for change. All of this will 
be spelled out in detail in the presentation which follows. 
1. Religion and the Radicals. 
The Church is primarily a religious organization, and the 
Ch1·istian Gospel caters for the religious needs of man. 
It is the job of the Church to preach, to pray, to sing 
hymns and to encourage and develop the pious feelings of 
its members,, ,Religion is not concerned with the whole of 
life, but with a part of life,, ,What can be done to make 
the Church more religious?.,, We must,,, inCl'ease our 
emphasis upon the Church as a religious organization with 
a limited pu1·pose (David Nicholls, in Prism, quoted in 
Robinson, 196:3(a):l:34), 
John Robinson reports that he could hardly believe his 
eyes when he read this passage. The question of religion was 
high on the agenda of Christian Radicalism from the beginning, 
stimulated directly by Bonhoeffer, indirectly by Barth, as we 
indicated in the previous chapter. The entire question cannot 
be adequately understood without examining the issues into 
which the sociology of religion gives us access, namely those 
of the nature and functions of religion as an actual social 
reality. We shall have to take quite seriously the possibility 
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that there is more truth in Nicholls' observations above than 
Robinson thought conceivable. 
Before embarking upon a sociological account of religion, 
however, we shall keep the theological context alive by 
illustrating briefly the relevance of the question for the 
radical theologians. This is simply by way of a reminder of 
the reasons for undertaking the sociological discussion which 
follows, and in which we shall for some time be leaving the 
directly theological treatment behind. 
Bonhoeffer's Letters and Papers from Prison were 
published by the SCM Press in 1953, when Ronald Gregor Smith 
was Editor. His own book, The New Man: Christianity and .Man's 
Coming of Age, which appeared in 1956, was one of the first 
works in English to give serious treatment to Bonhoeffer's 
ideas about a religionless Christianity. Although the book 
received little attention at the time, it was later 
acknowledged by A lee V idler <1965: 109) as an important 
precursor of Christian Radicalism. By 1969, after Gregor 
Smith's early death, his publishers Collins felt it worthwhile 
to incorporate the bulk of the early book with other material 
into the posthumous collection, The Free .Man. Interest had 
clearly mounted very considerably in the intervening years of 
the sixties. 
Vidler himself first took his cue from Bonhoeffer in his 
essay on "Hal y War ldliness", given as a paper to the Church 
Union School of Sociology at Oxford in June 1956 and published 
in his Essays in Liberality in 1957. He reverted to the theme 
in his contribution to Soundings, "Religion and the National 
Church", where he linked Bonhoeffer's plea to some much earlier 
words of F .D.Maurice: "Religion against God. This is the heresy 
of the age ... We have been dosing people with religion when what 
they want is not this but the living God." It is a significant 
feature of the radical mood, which fits well with the interest 
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of Bonhoeffer, that Vidler's consideration of religionlessness 
led him into a discussion of the contemporary Church <cf. 
Daniel Jenkins, 1962). 
To return to Robinson, "Must Christianity be religious?" 
was one of the three key questions that Honest to God set out 
to explore. The Bishop's amazement at the words of Nicholls 
above is complemented by his approving quotation of the very 
different testimony of John Wren-Lewis <Robinson, op.cit:42), 
who had come to Christian faith precisely when he discovered 
that it was not the "religion" he had always equated with 
superstition (see infra.'200-201, 219-220). 
Robinson approached the matter again more explicitly in 
the context of secularization <Edwards and Robinson, 1963:268-
75), when he took up the statement of J.C.Hoekendijk that 
"Christianity is a secular movement" which requires 
"dereligionizing". He wrote: 
Men and women are coming to commitment to Christ as t.he 
clue to life not because they are specially drawn by 
'religi•in', nor because he meets them as the answer to 
their 'religious' needs. Indeed, they are not 
particularly interested in reli•Ji•in, let alone in the 
Church as a religious club. 
These remarks should be just sufficient to keep us in 
mind of the theological debates which are our underlying topic, 
as we now turn to sociology. One further passage from R.Gregor 
Smith, quoted here without comment, will help to sharpen up the 
questions: 
Christianity as a faith is always in conflict with 
Christianity as a religion .. ,Christian faith includes 
within itself the permanent protest against its own 
reli•]ious forms and expressions, In this important sense 
Christianity understands itself as being more than a 
religion, as including within itself the negation of 
reli•Jion, though pet·manently destined to carry religion 
alon•J with itself, that is, to give form an•j e:<:pression 
to its own faith in some kind of concord with trad1t1onal 
and social expectations (Smith, 1969: Ch,2l, 
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2. Religion: The Definitional Question. 
i. Two Preliminary Points. 
At the opening of his The Sociology of Religion., Max 
\rleber wrote: 
To ojefine 'religion' I to sa·r what it is, is Mt possible 
at the start of a presentation .. ,Del 1ni lion can be 
attempted, if at all, •)nly at the concltJsion of the 
study, The essence of religion is not even our concel'n, 
as we make it our task to study the conditions and 
effects of a particular type of social behaviour ... The 
external courses of religious behaviour a1·e so diverse 
that an understanding of this behaviour can only be 
achieved from the viewpoint of the subjective 
experiences, ideas and purposes of the individuals 
concerned- in short, from the viewpoint of the religious 
behaviour's 'meaning'. 
But \rleber never reached the conclusion of his study- and 
indeed, given his method, it is doubtful whether he ever could 
have done. Nevertheless, in the absence of a preliminary 
definition, \rleber clearly bad some kind of criterion which 
determined for him the object of his study of religion: what 
was to "count"? If we are to avoid the confusions which 
resulted from the tendency of the radical theologians to talk 
about religionlessness without setting out analytically what 
they understood by "religion", we too must establish a baseline, 
as \rleber did without regarding it as a "definition". There are 
two important points about the establishment of such a 
starting-point. 
The first is that aut~ approach to religion should begin 
from what is there: that is, we treat as religion, as far as 
possible, whatever society- that is, our society- treats in 
common-sense terms as "religion". This principle follows the 
general view of method in the social sciences advanced by 
Alfred Schutz in his G.Qncept and Theory Formation in the 
Social Sciences, in which he sought to draw out some 
implications of the IVeberian concept of Verstehen or subjective 
understanding. 
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Schutz argued that the conceptual constructs of these 
sciences were in the nature of second-order abstractions from 
common-sense ideas, just because the sociologist's 
observational field was a complex of relationships already 
holding meaning for the actors involved. This approach has 
been supported in other discussions of method from within a 
Weberian standpoint <Budd, 1973:10, 84; Dobbelaere and Lauwers, 
1973). 
The second point is that we should be prepared to accept 
that, to some degree, the very conceptual category of "religion" 
may have arisen in, and properly belong to, a Western .Judaeo-
Christian context. Schutz states that any understanding of a 
social phenomenon, including therefore a religious one, can 
only proceed from our own involvement with it at the pre-
theoretical level, either by direct participation or by simply 
being a product of the same culture which preduced it. Our 
analytical concepts can only be developed out of our own way 
categorizing experience, and in so doing we may quite 
properly use conceptual distinctions which may not be made in 
the same way within other cultures (Goody, 1961). Therefore, in 
the case of religion, any procedural option about what is to 
"count" carries the risk of an ideological bias, by purporting 
to know in advance what religion "really is", but this need not 
vitiate the enquiry as long as the enquirer is aware of it 
<Dobbelaere and Lauwers, art.cit). 
So then, insofar as "the category 'religion' is one which 
has arisen in socio-cultural contexts where the .Judaeo-
Christian tradition has predominated", it refers to "a situation 
in which there is a particular type of ambivalence as to the 
relationship between this material world and another 'world"' 
<Robertson, 1970:43, 4'1). It depends upon the acknowledgement 
of a possible state of affairs which is "how things ought to 
be", which is other than "how things are". Strictly speaking, 
"religion" as a Western and strongly Christian category need 
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not form part of the intersubjective, everyday self-
understanding of "primitive societies" at all. 
What we have said so far allows us to specify both a 
limitation and a certain breadth to what is included in our 
understanding of religion. The limitation is that we do not 
need to claim to be producing a universal and completely 
general religious theory. We can justly claim that, in the 
interests of developing an understanding of religion under 
contemporary Western cultural conditions, our approach 
interprets religion in a way which applies pre-eminently to 
Christianity. This also means that we can justify a certain 
concentration upon the churches, which to the popular common-
sense view represent both religion and Christianity par 
excellence, in terms of official institutional expression. 
But conversely, we can also claim that not only Church-
religion is covered by our approach, since "religion" is widely 
considered in society to cover rather more than what goes on 
in the churches. In other words, we can accommodate the 
current emphasis of the sociology of religion on folk-religion, 
and associated non-official manifestations of religion, that 
which Towler has called "common religion": 
... those beliefs and practices of an overtly religious 
nature which are not subject to continued control by the 
churches and whose significance and importance wi 11 not 
usually be recognized by the churches (Towler and 
Chafllbel'lain, 1968; see also T•Jwler, 1980).' 
The sociology of religion has probably had to over-react 
against a former unjustified limitation of its attention to 
"church-oriented religiosity" <Luckmann, 1967), so that now the 
impression is occasionally given that the churches have no 
particular claim to be in any special way the socio-cultural 
repository of religion. We reject any such suggestion, but 
maintain that there is no absolute qualitative difference 
between religion as formally practised in the churches and the 
religiosity found outside them. Non-official religion is not 
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necessarily non-institutional; that is, it still conforms to 
conventional, externalized patterns. The importance of 
sociological attention to folk-religion is that it isolates a 
continuing sub-stratum of religion, common to church and non-
church religious culture alike, which theological approaches to 
the life of the Church often omit from consideration. 
ii. Types of Definition: Functional and Substantive. 
Robertson Cl970:34-47) has distinguished three related 
twofold classifications of definitions of religion. They may be 
nominal or real, inclusive or exclusive, functional or 
substantive. Real definitions are formulated with reference to 
certain features observed to be common to cultural phenomena 
generally recognized as religious. Nominal definitions, on the 
other hand, are more or less arbitrary, constructed in order to 
locate religion within the sociologist's overall socio-cultural 
theory. 
Nominal definitions tend to be inclusive in scope, either 
to provide the "~~;rand theorizer" with ample evidence for his 
view that the social system must have a place for religion as 
its most general level of value-consensus and integration, or 
else to give to the "abstracted empiricist" a rough-and-ready 
guide to which phenomena he wishes to study, in the absence of 
any great interest in theory. The typical case of a phenomenon 
which a nominal definition might include as religious is 
Communism. On the other hand, the typical case of a "religion" 
which might not fit into a Western-based real definition is 
Buddhism. Because of the view of the definitional baseline 
taken in the preceding section, we believe that the dangers of 
over-exclusiveness inherent in real definitions are 
considerably less than those of over-inclusiveness in nominal 
ones. 
The most fundamental dis tim.: t.i.uu, however, lies between 
functional and substantive approaches to religion. Functional 
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definitions are most often nominal and inclusive, and 
substantive ones real and exclusive. The former identify the 
religious phenomenon by what it does- the function it 
performs- within the social system. The latter seek to specify 
certain intrinsic properties a phenomenon must possess in 
order to count as religious- i.e.to define religion by what it 
is. 
The cla:3sis definition of religion formulated by Durkheim 
incorporates elements of both types, and therefore serves as 
the best illustration of the distinction, and starting-point 
for the discussion of the implications of each. According to 
Durkheim, a religion is 
,,,a unified set of beliefs and 
sacred things, that is to say, 
forbidden- beliefs and practices 
sin,]le moral community called a 
adhe1·e to them, 
practices relative to 
things set apart and 
1t1hich unite into one 
Church all those who 
Durkheim 's definition is a model of clarity. It sets aut what 
he believes religion consists of, namely both beliefs and 
practices, united by a common orientation to the sacred, which 
he then briefly defines in a small parenthesis. This is the 
substantive part of the definition. It then states the function 
such beliefs and practices perform, which is to do with the 
integration of a social group around a powerful moral 
consensus that gives it a corporate identity. By calling this a 
"Church", he lastly suggests a further substantive criterion for 
religion, that of public assembly. The analytical fruitfulness 
of Durkheim's definition has not been surpassed, and the core 
material of the definition still sets the contours of the 
discussion. 
Since we shall be devoting most of our attention in due 
course to elaborating a substantive approach to religion, we 
shall proceed now to Prwmerate the shortcomings of a 
functional one in attempting to comprehend the place and role 
of religion in contemporary society. 
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ii. Objections to Religious Functionalism. 
The social function which is most commonly made to serve 
as the definition of religion is that of symbolically 
expressing, and so contributing to the achievement of, social 
integration and cohesion. The first problem raised by this 
approach is that it both reduces the field of functions which 
religion might be considered capable of performing, and at the 
same time widens that of what might be treated as "religion" 
on account of its actually fulfilling such a function. 
The ambiguity of this can be seen in this passage from 
A.R.Radcliffe-Brown, a leading functionalist in British social 
anthropology. It should be. borne in mind that Radcliffe- Brown 
is writing in this article about religion: 
An orderly social life amongst human beings depends upon 
the presence in the minds of the members of a society of 
certain sentiments which conhol the behaviou1' of the 
individual in his relation to others. Rites can be seen 
to be the regulated symbolic expression of certain 
sentiments. Rites can therefore be shown to have a 
specific social function when, and to the extent that, 
they have for their effect to regulate, maintain and 
ti'ansrni t from one •Jeneration to another sentiments on 
which the constitution of the society depends (Radcliffe-
Brown, 1945; emphasis minel, 
In this passage, the term "rites" has replaced the "religion" of 
the article's title. This is only made possible by the process 
of making the Durkheimian view of the function of religion into 
the whole definition of it. The possible scope of meaning of 
religion is limited to society alone, as it is assumed that 
somehow religion's "proper" function is always to do with the 
integration and cohesion of society. If certain rites can be 
identified which appear to do this, they can be equated with 
religion simply on this account. Yle land up in the position 
where any kind of "functional equivalent" of religion, 
regnrc:lless af its content, ideological ur practical, must be 
allowed to be religion, on account of its social function. 
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What is overlooked is that the overarching system of 
ritual and belief which serves the cohesion of a small-scale 
and pre-modern society, which is unreflectingly accepted by all 
its members, may no longer be at all what "t-eligion" implies, 
at least in any common interpretation, in the modern 'West. 
Secondly, once the issue 
to ask, what do people need 
possess stability, order 
is formulated in such a way as 
in order for their society to 
and cohesion, psychologizing 
approaches are invited. For example, J.M.Yinger <1963> defines 
religion o.s "a set of beliefs and practices by means of which 
a group of people struggles with the ultimate problems of 
human existence''. 
The reasoning behind this runs as follows: societies must 
hold together- this depends on a degree of consensus- at the 
very least there must be agreement about the really important 
questions- these are the ones men cannot answer by purely 
empirical means, like the meaning of life and the problem of 
evil- therefore they are answered by supra-empirical concepts, 
symbolically expressed- and any such system is "religion". 
By this means the question of religion, in terms of what 
society at large thinks is religion, can effectively be 
bracketed: the churches may even be functionally irrelevant to 
the issue. This recasting of the question in terms of certain 
unchanging constituents of the human psyche not only renders 
"religion" highly elusive, but also makes talk of 
"secularization" more or less of a red herring. Yinger, for 
example, prefers simply to speak of "religious change". 
There are still more reasons for doubting the value of a 
functionalist way in to the analysis of religion. A third is 
the distinction between "latent" and "manifest" functions made 
by Robert Merton (1957). The function of religion in producing 
and maintaining social cohesion is very largely a latent one: 
the actual practitioners of religion consider themselves to be 
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engaged (for example) in the worship of God, or in the offering 
of sacrifice, with quite other purposes in mind. 
The functionalist approach here implies that the latent 
function is somehow more "true" than the man if est one, and this 
in turn suggests the idea that if the latent function could be 
made manifest, i.e. if in future religious worship could be 
devised with the express intention of celebrating national 
solidarity or united moral purpose, the old manifest function 
might fall away and all participants concur in the greater 
worth and rationality of the new interpretation. 
But this is a very improbable scenario. For there is built 
in to the common apprehension of religion the idea that 
deliberately to foster the aims of worship somehow causes it 
to lose its authenticity. Religious activity has to be conceived 
as self- justifying, as an end in itself, if those who engage in 
it are to regard it as genuine. There is a kind of irreducible, 
if indefinable, surplus of meaning about 
which makes all attempts to understand 
religious 
them in 
activities 
terms of 
secondary or latent effects seem inadequate and superficial. 
Even in totally non-Christian cultural contexts, many 
cultures distinguish between "true believers" and those who 
merely practise religion by observing the appropriate rituals 
as a matter of custom, perhaps because of the social benefits 
which accrue to them by so doing <Horton, 1960). There is a 
critical "break" between religion and all its discernible latent 
functions; on the one hand, religion can undoubtedly occasion 
social conflict and promote values or ideals which are not 
consonant with those of society at large, while on the other 
hand the consensual values and aims of a society may be 
subscribed to upon what certainly does not look like a 
r~=>ligious basis. 
Functional approaches to religion are, then, too liable to 
betray a conservative bias. They can emphasise both the claim 
87 
of the status quo to represent "the best of all possible 
worlds", and the practical impossibility- doubtless comforting 
to some theologians!- of religion's demise. They cannot 
distinguish religion from its surrogates or functional 
equivalents CO'Dea, 1966:17; Budd, 1973:46-52). 
Finally, functional 
readily to the interests 
definitions 
of those 
lend themselves 
who wish to avoid 
too 
the 
question of transcendence. For the purposes of research, 
religion is placed on a par with other phenomena which seem to 
have certain social functions in common, and thus what. is 
specifically "religious" about religion is systematically 
excluded <Berger, 197 4 >. But we shall not make very much 
progress without attempting to define just that. The study of 
the functions of religion will make more sense if it comes 
after the attempt to isolate what it is, substantively, which 
makes religion religious. 
3. The Substantive Content of Religion. 
Reverting to Durkheim's definition invites us to consider 
the substantive content of religion thus: "a unified set of 
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to 
say, things set apart and forbidden". Our discussion will take 
the form of an examination of a variety of ways, including 
Durkheim's own, in which the "sacred things" might be 
understood. 
The central theme running through these alternatives is 
that religion be seen primarily in terms of an orientation or 
disposition towards an object which is conceived as being not 
of this world, but transcending it. More will be added later 
about the meaning of "transcendence". 
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i. "Spiritual Beings", God and the Divine. 
"Belief in spiritual beings" was the famous "minimal 
definition" of religion offered by the founding father of 
social anthropology E.B.Tylor in his Primitive Culture of 1871.~ 
The attraction of this approach, as well as its simplicity, is 
that it appears to reflect the popular intuition that "religion" 
and "God" belong inseparably together <along with "Church", we 
should add). But Tylor only employed the expression in the 
conviction that the belief concerned was pre-scientific and 
erroneous: to put it bluntly, that there were no such beings. 
There are great obstacles in the way of understanding the 
meaning of religion for believers if an analytical baseline is 
adopted which carries with it the immediate assumption that 
the believers' understanding is, in fact, mistaken. 
The most serious attempt to revive Tyler's definition in 
modern times, that of :Kelford J .Spiro (1966), exhibits this 
difficulty. Spiro concludes from anthropological evidence that 
"the belief in superhuman beings and their power to assist or 
to harm man approaches universal distribution" (art .cit :94), and 
offers the definition of religion as "an institution consisting 
of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated 
superhuman beings" Cibid:96). Herein Spiro shows more than a 
hint of the scientific confidence of the early social 
scientists that religion is now on the wane, so that a 
definition can freely be adopted which is not in itself 
sociologically intelligible; the sociologist is not expected to 
have to interpret religion as himself a practitioner of it. So 
the essentially question-begging and non-rational phrase, 
"superhuman beings", can be left in. 
But for the 
sociologist> who is 
contemporary 
both an 
person 
observer 
<including the 
and a would-be 
participant in religious life, the notion of "superhuman beings" 
is just part of the problem. It was precisely the possibility 
of a secular approach to the understanding of God which the 
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radical theologians were concerned to canvass. In other words, 
as a means of objectifying the religious universe the concept 
of superhuman or divine beings poses more questions than it 
answers. As a pair of concepts which clearly belong together 
in the everyday apprehension, "religion" and "God" appear as 
elements in the one question at issue, and not as question and 
answer respectively. This is why we cannot without further ado 
take the substantive content of the religious orientation 
simply as God or the divine. 
ii. The Sacred Object. 
Durkheim 's own account of that towards which religious 
belief and activity is oriented enlisted the concept of the 
sacred as "things set apart and forbidden". This was intended 
to be a strictly sociological account, arrived at out of a 
study of the ritual worship and celebrations of the Australian 
Arunta tribe, researches into whose culture and society 
provided Durkheim with the primary evidence for his theory. 
Religious activities address themselves to symbolic objects, 
things which may possess no intrinsically unnatural or unusual 
qualities in themselves, but are rather deemed sacred by the 
societies in question.=~' 
Durkheim 's strict sociological method debarred him from 
psychologizing his concepts, and the most he was prepared to 
say about the subjective attitude towards the sacred was that 
it consisted of "respect". By this he meant not so much an 
experience of awe or reverence in the presence of the object as 
a propriety of treatment of it. The gap between sacred and 
profane was a "logical chasm" rather than anything objectively 
discernible. Whatever was sacred was treated as "other"; a cult 
was formed around it; symbolic death and rebirth were often 
required in order to pass across the chasm into communion with 
it. Through such ritual processes the social group brought to 
expression the conviction that reality is rightly comprehended 
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in terms of social order, which is supra-personal, absolute, 
not dependent upon individual choice. 
Durkheim's opinion that a supposedly simple and primitive 
form of religion would display most clearly the essence of 
what religion is really all about has been discredited with the 
decline of evolutionary views of culture. "Primitive" 
today is not necessarily the same thing as "early" 
nor is "early" religion equivalent to "essential" 
religion 
religion, 
religion. 
Durkheim's understanding of the sacred object is too inflexible 
a tool, on its own, to do justice to the range of religious 
phenomena known to us today. On the other hand, the 
characterization of the sacred in terms of the "logically 
other", and as a familiar thing upon which is bestowed a 
quality which renders 
important insight to 
it unfamiliar and compelling, 
which we shall adhere in the 
development of our point of view. 
iii. The Holy in Experience. 
is an 
further 
The counterbalance to Durkheim 's reluctance to consider 
individual experience in his sociological theory is found in 
the approach to religion which sees its distinctive content as 
centred upon an experiential encounter with the holy and the 
human response (cf.Mensching, 1947; Vlach, 1951). This is the 
theory given classic expression from the theological side in 
Otto's The Idea of the Holy (although "idea" gives a 
misleadingly intellectualist translation of the phenomenon of 
das Heilige>. 
Following Otto but in the service of sociology, Mensching 
identifies the holy by the contrasting and complementary 
experiences of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans: the object 
of the experience both causes shuddering and fearful 
hesitation, and yet draws irresistibly on. The "lofty value" of 
the object suggests what is most desirable and perfect for 
human well-being, but in so doing also induces in the 
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individual or the group a profound dissatisfaction with their 
own lack of holiness- they and it are radically different as 
well as intimately attracted. 4 
Berger also takes up this dialectical quality of the holy 
which attracts and repels <1974; 1980: ch.2). He borrows from 
Schutz the idea of "finite provinces of meaning", states of 
experience in which the taken-for-granted reality of everyday 
life is called into question by juxtaposition with another 
reality, of immense significance, by compari::;on with which the 
t:veryday itself appears as a mere "finite province". The 
characteristic experience of religion is an orientation in 
which the world of normal experience is made to appear 
relative and incomplete, but also potentially extraordinary and 
richer than usually perceived. Berger considers that this state 
of affairs is dangerous and precarious: the "alternative world" 
of the holy cannot be let loose among us, as it were, all at 
once. This is why religion, which is our only way of catching a 
glimpse of such a transfigured reality, paradoxically also 
behaves as a way of keeping it from us and us from it. 
There is a strong tendency for interpretations of religion 
based on the "holy" to suggest that authentic religious 
experience is properly abnormal, ecstatic experience. Since the 
more intense spiritual experiences are only the prerogative of 
the few at any given time, it would be dangerous to define the 
ideal of religion with reference to the charismatic experience 
of a small minority. Much routine and faithful religious 
practice, as commonly understood, would thereby be devalued or 
rendered even more problematic. Consequently, we think it 
better to pursue the dialectical elements in the idea of the 
holy in relation to an interpretation which places less stress 
on experience as such: and this is the approach which sees the 
distincti·Je orientation of religion as residing in an "other 
world", or a "sacred cosmos". 
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i v. The Sacred Cosmos. 
Berger defines religion in this way: 
Religion is a human attitude that conceives of the cosmos 
(including the supernatural) as a sacred order (1980:431, 
And again: 
Religion is the human enterprise by which a sacred 
cosmos is established (1973:34), 
Within the human process of the social construction of 
meaningful reality, religious reality is constructed by 
objectifying the idea of the ultimate order, ground and 
rationale which accounts for the way the world appears in the 
social experience of the individual or group. In religion, a 
world-order is conceived which is determinative, normative, and 
explanatory of the experienced world. This conception is 
objectified: it appears effectively as "another world", a sacred 
order of existence upon which this reality depends for its 
continuity, stability and meaning. 
The sacred order as an objectified world assume:3 a unique 
aura of facticity: religious people maintain that only this 
order constitutes the "really real". This aspect is captured in 
the definition of religion given by Clifford Geertz: 
, , ,a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, 
pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men 
by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and clothing these conceptions with SIJC~~ an 
au1·a •)f factuality that the moods and motivations seem 
uniquely realistic <Geertz, 1966; i~p~asis mine), 
We agree with Geertz that no belief can count a r-·::0 religious 
unless it has reference to this "general order" conceived as 
possessing a unique and determinative reality. But the 
postulation and, in the terms of religious life, the confession 
of such an "other world" brings with it certain cha_racteristic 
problems. It can function both negatively and positively for 
the be 1 iever. 
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On the negative side, Berger 
alienation typically induced by 
has made 
religion 
much of 
when 
the 
the 
objectification of the sacred cosmos turns into reification 
( Versaechlicbung gives way to Verdinglichung). Then the 
religious ideation creates the impression that the human agent 
stands in a powerless and passive relation towards an 
inexorable and unchangeable givenness, a cosmic determination 
and legitimation of how the world is and to which he or she 
can only submit in "blind faith". But this is "bad faith", 
bringing men into bondage to what, sociologically regarded, is 
their own construction. Religion, as Berger put it in his 
earlier work The Precarious Vision, "ratifies the O.K. world", 
and thereby creates alienation, since the "real world" is not, 
after all, "O.K.". 
But this is the inevitable risk involved in the process of 
religious objectification which is necessary, in the first 
instance, to assure the believer that there is order in the 
world, and that action taken within the constraints of social 
reality can be treated as purposive and worthwhile."' The other 
side of the story is rather different. 
Fallding defines the supernatural as "any influence for 
which empirical proof is not given in nature but by which men 
nevertheless acknowledge themselves constrained" <1974:20). 
This element of constraint is the crucial point here. In what 
way does the sacred or "supernatural" order constrain? The 
answer is, by presenting itself as an ideal, or normative, or 
fulfilled order for the world. The relationship between the 
experienced world and the sacred cosmos is one of similarity 
and difference: similarity, in terms of affinities between the 
social experience of the religious group and the type of sacred 
world their religion posits; but difference, insofar as the 
other world is free from the contcauictions, inadequacies and 
discontents which taint all present social experience. 
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In this way, the sacred cosmos can exercise constraint in 
the form of a morally compelling imperative <Fallding, op.ci t). 
It prescribes a socially agreed "constitution", an agenda for 
what is socially desirable; and this ideal is presumed to be 
what is pre-eminently, indefeasibly real. Once again, this very 
facticity can contribute, where religious faith is largely pre-
reflective and uncritically held, to a dangerous alienation 
when it is assumed that there is an inevitable "just is-ness" 
about the prevailing relationship between the other world and 
this world. This danger is typically seen in the assumption 
that while "this world" is a vale of tears and a mass of sin, 
the "next world", after death, will right all wrongs and 
perfectly redress the balance. 
v. The Transcendent. 
The concept which most generally sums up and expresses 
the ideas contained in these various models of the distinctive 
object of the religious orientation is that of the transcendent. 
Cultural features count as religious if they are anchored in, or 
directed towards, the acknowledgement of an order of reality, 
or a realm of being, which is not this empirically available, 
everyday order, but is nevertheless sufficiently congruent with 
it to act as a constraining ideal upon social perception and to 
urge commitment to realizing ·it. A religion both affirms the 
social group's construction of reality by locating it within a 
meaningful order, and provides a normative vision for coping 
with aspects of that reality which present a threat to such 
affirmations of meaning. 
The person who, in his or her construction of the world, 
operates from the basis of a religious faith, displays an 
orientation or disposition towards the transcendent, the 
objective content of which is best described as "another 
world", conceived as a changed, ultimately perfected version of 
this world, and acting as a constraining and compelling ideal 
or vision over it. 
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In general terms, that which transcends bears a double 
relation of affirmation and negation to that which is 
transcended. To transcend something is to elevate it or 
sublimate it beyond its best exemplifications of itself, to do 
away with it, not by rejection and casting aside, but by 
lifting up and transfiguration. 6 The transcendent is always 
other, but never wholly other, for that would rob it of any 
possible correspondence with the experienced world. 
The fundamental experience or disposition of religion, the 
orientation to the transcendent, finds cultural expression in 
an intricate, historically conditioned and shifting network of 
symbol-systems, rites and social forms. Participation in this 
rich symbolic life within a given religious culture, which 
occurs publicly and corporately as worship, develops and 
nourishes the orientation to the transcendent which supplies 
the mainspring for the social group's rationally construed and 
purposive involvement in this empirical world. 
vi. The Dimensions of Religion. 
The foregoing summary leads to one further consideration 
about the content of a substantive view of religion. In terms 
of empirically available social facts, the orientation to the 
transcendent is present in the form of a cultural system 
<Geertz, art.cit; cf.Lindbeck, 1980; Slater, 1979). The 
discernible and analysable forms of the presence of religion 
within a society are best set out as a variety of cultural 
"dimensions". 
Thus Joachim Vlach distinguishes three modes of expression 
of religious experience. <He follows Otto in placing a 
distinctive and powerful experience at the heart of the 
religious phenomenon; we should wish to reduce emphasis on the 
mystical or charismatic charact.Pr of this, and speak inslead, 
as we have done, of a "disposition" or "orientation".) The three 
modes are the theoretical, consisting of myths or stories and 
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the more formally elaborated religious doctines; the practical, 
consisting of ritual activities and prescribed forms of ethical 
behaviour; and the strictly sociological, comprising different 
forms of religious community and association. <Wach, 1947). 
Ylach 's analysis simply develops further what was already 
implicit in Durkheim's definition of religion, which specified 
beliefs, pracbces and a "mor3l community called a Church" as 
the components of a religious cultural system. Other proposals 
for classifying the dimensions tend to follow broadly similar 
lines <Fallding, 1974; Smart, 1971; Slater, 1979). But to say 
that, when we seek to understand the place and role of religion 
in contemporary society, we are examining a cultural complex of 
beliefs and stories, rites and deeds, and forms of social 
grouping, all having reference to a notion of the transcendent, 
involves us in being careful not to treat any one of these 
elements as "the real thing" in preference to another. 
In this way, inarticulate faith is disadvantaged by 
emphasis on the doctrinal dimension; ethically-conceived 
religion may be undervalued by concentration upon the 
requirements of ritual or sacramental practice; insistence upon 
one type of religious belonging may cause insensitivity to the 
agent's own sense of another- and so on. The sociological study 
of religion has to suspend certain distinctions which the 
churches are accustomed to take for granted; as David Clark 
writes of the inhabitants of the North Yorkshire fishing 
village of Staithes: 
No-one,, ,C•)nceives of the religious realm in terms of 
folk and official elements; the individual is merely born 
into a social setting in which a rich variety of 
religious beliefs and practices are in existence, inside 
and outside the churches (Clark, 1982;166), 
It is apparent that we have not been able to exclude from 
this discussion of the substantive sociological content of 
religion some reference to the social functions it performs. 
Having earlier set out objections to the specification of 
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functions as the initial definitional baseline for the study of 
religion, we may now return to the question of functions in the 
light of the substantive approach here set forward. 
4. The Social Functions o[ Religion. 
Religion, by its 1·eference to a beyond and its beliefs 
conce1·ning man's relationship to that beyond, provides a 
supl'a-empirical view of a lar•jer total reality. In the 
context. of that •·eality, the disappointments and 
frustrations inflicted on mankind by uncertainty and 
impossibility, and by the institutionalized order of 
human society, may be seen as meaningful in some ultimate 
sense, and this n1akes acceptance of and adjustment to 
them possible, Moreover, by showin•;J the norms and rules 
of society to be pad, of a lai'•;Jel' supraempirical ethical 
Ol'de1·, or,jained and sanctified by religious belief and 
practice, religion contributes to their enforcement when 
adherence to them contradicts the wishes and interests of 
those a.ffected, Relig1on answers the problem of meanin•;J, 
It sanctifies the norms •)f the established social order 
at what we have called the 'b1·eaking points', by 
p1·ovidin•] a 91'ound for the beliefs and orientations of 
men in a view of real! ty that t1·anscends the en1pirical 
here-and-now of daily experience (O'Dea, 1966:6-7), 
In this passage, Thomas O'Dea. incorporates, within a view 
of the substantive content of religion broadly similar to that 
presented here, the tv1o major traditions of the social 
functions of religion. These are the Durkheimian, centred upon 
the notions of social ord·~r, integration and cohesion, and the 
W'eberian, centred on the problem of meaning. 
i. The Durkheimian Tradition: Cohesion and Integration. 
We have already drawn the main outlines of this typical 
functionalist perspective in presenting our objections to its 
use as a definitional base. One of America's leading functional 
theorists of the post-war years, Kingsley Davis, argued in his 
Human Society that all societies need to maintain agreement on 
certain key ideas and attitudes among their members, relating 
to moral values, normative order, explanations of social 
phenomena like status and class, and so on. 
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Absence of consensus on any of these would threaten 
social stability and heighten tension and conflict. Societies 
uphold the required agreement by deriving these ideas from 
ultimate ends, by reference to another world: certain symbols 
and rituals, by being dubbed sacred by the society, thereby 
come to exercise a compelling hold upon its members and thus 
facilitate their acquiescence in the social order as an 
objectively given system. 
The conservative ideological bias of this is apparent, 
caught as it is in a pair of twin assumptions: firstly, that 
every social phenomenon must be functional, i.e. serve the ends 
of the system as a whole; and secondly, that religion in 
particular has an overarching general role to play in ensuring 
that the whole system can be functionally integrated, by 
providing metaphysical anchorage for it. This way of analysing 
religion's integrating and legitimating functions lies wide 
open to the negative twist given to it by Berger. He writes: 
Religion legitimates social institutions by bestowing 
upon them an ultimately valid ontological status, that 
is, by locating them within a saued and cosmic frame of 
reference <Bet·ger, 1973:42l. 
But he goes on to say that this process causes the 
institutions concerned to confront men as "inexorable 
facticities" depriving them of the power of choice: 
Religion mystifies institutions by explaining them as 
·~iven over and beyond their empit'ical existence in the 
history of a society (ibid:97l, 
Berger here rightly points aut that as long as an attempt is 
made to conceive of society as a single functional system, in 
which religion is the ultimate sanction of legitimacy, the 
much-needed stability and order are bought at the cost of 
alienation of persons and ossification of religious contents. 
But thet·e is another side to the integrative function. For 
modern societies are not simple functional unities. It is 
increasingly impossible to apply any of the criteria or 
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functions of religion to an entire society <Berger, 1980:17). 
Religious orientations are rather the province of certain 
groups within societies, although the membership of the groups 
may overlap. The orientations may be measured in terms of 
adhesion to a particular religion, or to a denomination, or to 
neither; or in terms of a form of religiosity, such as "folk"-
communal, "personal"-private, and so on, which may occur within 
or without an organized form of religion. 
In such circumstances, it is the function of religion in 
sealing and supporting the identity of the religious group 
rather than of the whole society which comes to the fore. That 
is to say, who and what we are, and what our distinctive 
construction of the world is, and our consequent values and 
motivations for action, can be defined over against others. 
Amid a flux of relative and unstable social circumstances, 
"identity" provides a fixed point; it "freezes" a particular 
frame of the world in a rapidly moving sequence of possible 
frames which threaten to throw the individual into disarray. 
Hans Mol writes: 
Ident1 ty on the pet·sonal level is the stable niche that 
rAan occupies in a potentially chaotic environn1ent which 
he is therefore prepared vigorously to defend, Similarly, 
on the social level, a stable aggregate of basic and 
commonly held beliefs, patterns and values maintains 
itself over against the p•)tential threat •)f the 
envit'onment and its members (Mol, 1976;65), 
This identity is a fragile frame, which may be 
constructed around a number of foci: the self, sexuality, an 
ethnic group, a sect or cult, or a universal religion or secular 
commitment. Religion as the "sacralization of identity" can 
stabilize or "fix" any of these identities, at the level of the 
individual, social group or trans-national community. In this 
process, objectification appears as a necessary. and positive 
feature; lt tells a group that they can have confidence in 
their understanding of who they are and what their role in the 
100 
world is to be, because it is objectively, ultimately grounded. 
In this way, the sacred cosmos can exercise constraint in the 
form of a morally compelling imperative (fallding, op.ci t). It 
prescribes a socially agreed "constitution", an agenda for the 
normative social order and the action of individuals within it. 
This recasting of the integrative function of religion in 
a modern culturally pluralistic context leaves open the 
possibility that religion may yet be socially critical. The 
religious group may regard the resources of their tradition, 
around which their identity is defined and through which their 
cohesion is celebrated and upheld, as sacralizing a 
construction of the world which is radically different from 
that of their everyday experience. A massive assurance and 
stability on their part may co-exist with considerable 
conflictual tension i11 their society as a whole. The question 
of the extent to which this understanding of how religion's 
sacred cosmos may function is applicable to contemporary 
cultural conditions and affects the life of the churches is, of 
course, the question of secularization, which is the topic of 
the next chapter. 
ii. The W'eberian Tradition: Theodicy and Meaning. 
As we made clear in Chapter Two, Weber believed that 
religious ideas and impulses were potentially independent and 
socially significant forces which, by causing those who held 
them to see and interpret the world in a particular way, 
induced patterns of activity which could enter into complex 
interactions with socio-economic structures. 
Religious ideas function to produce their distinctive 
interpretation of the world by offering compounds and 
structures of meaning in the face of life-situations which 
mi~rht u-- make human confideuce in the rationality and 
worthwhileness of the world subject to doubt or even collapse. 
W'eber used the theological term "theodicy" to refer to this 
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religious function: not so much a justification of the ways of 
God before men, as a means of vindicating the claim that 
social existence is meaningful. 
A problem of meaning arises for the human actor because 
realities do not conform to expectations <Weber, 1965:138ff; 
Berger, 1973:61ff) 0 Berger puts it, the sacred cosmos is 
perpetually threatened by chaos. The threat is brought by a 
number of contexts of experience, a:3 O'Dea <1966:5) has spelt 
them out. 
The "uncertainty context" represents the observation that 
"the best laid schemes o' mice an' men gang aft a-gley" 
<Burns>- all human ventures are liable to unexpected 
disappointment, calling into question the supposed rationality 
that lay behind their planning. 
The "impossibility context" simply states that you cannot 
always do what you want, and possibly that you can never do it 
precisely as you want. Human endeavour is met, if not by the 
limits of suffering or coercion, at any rate always by the 
boundary of mortality. 
Finally, there is the context of scarcity: the 
requirements of order in society have led to a differential 
distribution of goods and resources, and too often people's 
aims are thwarted, not by personal powerlessness as such, but 
by sheer lack of material wherewithal to fulfil them. 
All of these contingencies can put the notion of a final 
undergirding order and rationale to the world under severe 
strain. Weber argued that religious ideas provided 
rationalizations which would stave off the threat and restore 
the balance necessary to allow individuals to go on living in 
the world without despair. 
There were at least four typPs of "thcodicy"; the promise 
of compensations in this world; a similar promise for the 
world beyond death; the doctrine of a thoroughgoing dualism, 
with the principle:3 of good and evil forever engaged in a 
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deadly struggle in this world; and the doctrine of karma, which 
posits the resolution of all conflict and uncertainty in a 
universal balance attained at the end. Weber left open for 
specific investigation the range of consequences, for example 
in terms of social activism or quietism, which differing 
theodicies might have in varying socio-economic contexts. 
Not surprisingly, in view of our presentation so fa.r, the 
interpretation of religion as an answer to problems of meaning 
invites evaluation in two ways. For, on the one hand, the 
promise of compensations may be regarded as spurious, with 
religion functioning as "mere ideology" to prevent people from 
perceiving and responding to the real causes of powerlessness 
and scarcity. This is the Marxist view, of course, although 
Marx allowed that religion was also a protest against 
suffering, even while those who protested in this way could be 
effectively prevented, by the very means of their protest, from 
taking measures to alleviate it. The insight of Marx into the 
ideological function of religion is a true perception of how 
the risk and the cost involved in religion's performing a 
necessary social function is always that of becoming 
dysfunctional, and thus denying its own best nature. 
In other words, solutions to problems of meaning are 
undoubtedly necessary, but equally undoubtedly dangerous. The 
danger is as we have just described it; but the positive 
possibility is this. Weber saw how religion was able to retain 
a leverage for social change precisely by exploiting the 
perceived gap or discrepancy between the war ld that is, the 
world of social experience, and the world presumed to supply 
the ground and explication of it. There was no simple 
congruence between the religion of a particular group and the 
social structure to which they were subject. The interpretation 
of circumstances offered by religion is sufficient! y "fitting" 
to serve the need for meaning in the generality of cases, but 
there is always a certain shortfall, a lack of "fit" which 
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religious people understand, not as a failing of logical or 
empirical adequacy in their religion, but as a failure of the 
world to conform to true reality. 
The function of religion in providing meaning, then, need 
not imply the mere provision of complete justification for the 
existing state of affairs, any more than the provision of 
social cohesion and integration necessarily means the support 
of the status quo. Indeed, especially for people who are not 
regularly involved in formal religious activity, appeal to 
religious ideas may indicate a strong element of question and 
struggle in their experience of normal life. As Towler says of 
folk religion: 
The fact that it survives is all the more significant in 
that it sti 11 seems to express the tl•anscendent element 
in personal e~:perience and bestow meaning on what would 
otherwise be perplexing (Towler, 1974;ch,8l, 
iii. Conclusions. 
'We have presented, in this chapter, an approach to 
religion based upon an attempt to define its substantive 
content, and only then to proceed to asking about the social 
functions it performs. The starting-point for any such 
definition is whatever is widely and generally accepted in the 
society around us as "religion". This allows us to treat what 
goes on in the churches as having a special claim to be 
"religion" par excellence, while requiring us also to look more 
widely into manifestations of unofficial or folk-religion. 
Religion has been defined substantively as a cultural 
system, embodied in myths and doctrines, ritual and ethical 
practice, and social groupings, which expresses an orientation 
to the transcendent. This is variously characterized as the 
sacred. the holy or the divine, but particularly in terms of a 
whole world-order, an "other world" conceived as the ultimate 
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basis for and legitimation of the order of the experienced 
social world of the group. 
Because this "sacred cosmos" or other world of religion 
appears as a fulfilled, perfected and normative or ideal 
version of this world, it not only grounds it in a metaphysical 
order, but also exercises a constraint over it. It comes as an 
imperative, summoning religious people to action to bring the 
world into conformity with its sacred counterpart. 
In the light of this, each of the main ways of analysing 
the social function of religion is susceptible to both positive 
and negative <dysfunctional) development in practice. This is 
an inevitable part of the dialectical process of the quest of 
religious ideas for social expression which we discussed in 
Chapter II. 
The appeal to religious legitimations as the source of 
social cohesion and integration can therefore induce alienation 
and a mauvaise foi which is simply reduced to passive 
acquiescence in the prevailing order. But religious ideas can 
also be the source of strength of purpose, unity of commitment 
and identity for individual groups within society. As such, the 
structural supports of their religious orientation can motivate 
such a group to critical action in the interest of the vision 
for society which their religious tradition holds. 
Similarly, the use of religious ideas to provide solutions 
for problems of meaning can explain away injustice and 
rationalize the intolerable. But this risk is inherent in the 
enterprise of providing through religion the assurances and 
explanatory structures necessary to instil confidence into 
people threatened by a fragile aml insecure world. The meanings 
carried in the religious tradition can also open up a critical 
gap between the world that is and the world that ought to be, 
and so motivate action born of restlessness and discontent. 
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The view of religion advanced in this chapter will supply 
the critical stimulus to our examination of the proposals of 
Christian Radicalism for a secular, non-religious approach to 
Christian talk of God in Chapter VIII. This chapter has for the 
most part tried to speak in general terms about religion, 
subject to the constraints of working within a Christian 
context, referred to at the beginning of the chapter. The next 
chapter looks at the modification::o to, and strains upon, this 
general understanding, consequent upon changes affecting 
religion in modern society: i.e.the debate about secularization. 
NOTES, 
I, The move away frora concentrating upon "church-oriented religiosity" not only into 
cults and sects, as in the work of ]ryan Wilson and more recen~y Ja~es Beckford, but 
also towards uncovering the inarticulate and latent religious dispositions governing 
a great deal of social belief and behavious at mass 1evel, is perhaps the most 
pervasive trend of all since the plea of Ber•Jer and Luckmann (J%3). David Clark 
states uncortproroisingly at the beginning of his study of folk religion in Staithes, 
Between Pulpit and lew: "On! y in recent years has sociology begun to show rnuch 
interest in religious life outside t.he institutional churches,, ,we must shed those 
blinkers which so firmly detract fror~ our view of religion and embark upon a study 
which does not confound the religious institution with the religious tout court." One 
of the broadest approaches of a11 is found in Edward Bailey's studies of "implicit 
religion", in which behaviour, wi~h its ritual 1 custom and convention, is studied in 
order to discern the under!y1ng commit11ents wnich shape and direct the choices and 
value judgments of individuals. (In detail in the unpublished Ph.D thesis, ~ 
Religion oJ a Secular Sodet1j' Bristol 1976; for a summary see "The IMplicit Religion 
of Contemp•lrary Society: an rientation and Plea for its Study", in Religion1 vol, 13I 1983:69-83,) However, in our view Bailey's work raises very serious Methooologica 
probleras in view •lf his definition of religion as "commitment" pure and simple. It 
seems to us that even attempts to tap relig1ous residues wider than folk-religion as 
it is usually understood require as a control on their efforts some more precise 
definition of what the indispensable religious content is, 
2, The enor11ously influential Golden [oygh of Sir Jar1es Fraze1' (1890) used the 
definition •propitiation of supernatural p!Jwers", Once again, it was only possible 
for such a ~finition to be employed on the clear assumpfion that, from a strictly 
scientific point of view, it represented a mista~:en bel!ef, Frazer argued that both 
religion and magic represented pre-scientific ways of manipulating the cosmos to 
obta1n the desired human ends: but whereas magic was crudely materi~istic and would 
die out with the advance of rationality, a place would still be found for a purified 
ethical religion, But Malinowski (Magjci Science and Reli%ion, 1925) later challenged 
the view that "primitive peoples" on y distinguished elween magic and relig1on 
within a generally unscientific 111entality, He argued that there were cases in wnich 
they appealed to neither magical nor religious means, but felt that purely •natural" 
or, in our terms, "scientific" causes would suffice to explain a situation or achieve 
an aim, Malinowski thereby t!Jok a step in the direction of allowing religion as a 
category sui generis to perform its own special functions, Against this 1t can be 
seen that Durkheim's approach t.o religi!Jn was already a very considerable advance 
over that prevailing in his time within the early anthropological tradition, 
3, Durkhei111 was trying to avoid approaching religi•ln as though it dealt principally 
in the abnorMal and the extraordinary, For this reason he rejected Spencer's 
definition, "the belief in the omnipresence of soraething which is inscrutable", 
Primitive societies, Du1·kheiAl, acknowledge "marvels" and "wonders" with due 
astonishment, but 1·eligion is not pria1arily or particularly to do with these- it 
accounts ~ore usually for the prevailing normal order of things, Of course, what 
should be added to this is the observation that to set apa1·t sacred objects as a 
Means of symbolizing the very qivenness and unconditional nature of the coMmon order 
is in itself to acknowledge £hat there is iitystery even in its normal taken-for-
grantedness, 
4, Interpretations of religion which focus on the distinctive experience which lies 
at .its centre are not the same thing as psychological inter)lretations, which find 
then classiC exponent 1n Freud, The ancestry IS rather 1n 1\ant and Schle1ermacher 
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(cf .Bowker, 1973:168), Kant sought to justify the sui generis nature of different 
ways of experiencing the world, viz. moral, a~sthetic, religious, each of which 
within its own logic carried its own a priori synthetic propositions, i,e,judgments 
stating matters of fact about the world, Kant's demonstration of the limil.s of 
Enlightenment rationalism from within its own premises provided the ground upon which 
Romanticism could develop its notions of alternative modes of knowledge than the 
scientific-rational, and Schleie1•macher took up the issue in the area of theology, 
The thread which runs frorn Kant via Schleierl'llacher and the Romantics eventually to 
both Weber and the religious phenohlenolo·~ists 1 ike Otto is more "tnOdern• than the 
strict positivist strana of rationalism in the nineteenth century, because of its 
willingness to take religion on its own terms as a distinctive mode of interpreting 
the world, One of the most attractive formulations of the issue was that of William 
James in his The Varieties of Religious Experience: concerned neither to dismiss 
religion by positivist reduction, nor to allow theologians to shield it from 
scientific investigation, he argued that the religious state of mind is best 
understood as a distinct disposition or affection which might characterize any other 
emotion or be applied to any object. There could be 1•eTigious awe, or religious 
gladness or rellgiouli zeal, or religious discontent., and so on, but there did not 
seem to be a state of mind Identifiable simply as "religious" without more ado, This 
can accommodate our view that 11hat is reli·~ious about. religion is the transcendent 
orientation built into it. As James wrote, a religious experience might be any 
experience insofar as it a~pealed to "such a priAial reality as the individual feels 
impelled to respond tl) sQlemnl y and gravely and neither br a curse nor a jest • 
(op,cit:39l, Religion will not accommodate either the sceptica je m'en fichisme of a 
Voltaire, nor a world-weary and grudging "acceptance of the universe• mentality (ibid:36,41), 
5, As Geertz writes: "If one were to essay a minimal definition of religion today it 
would perhaps not be Tylor's fal'!ous 'belief in spiritual beings' ... but rather what 
Salvador de Hadariaga has called 'the relatively modest dogma that God is not 111ad'" (Geertz, art,cit;13), 
6, This acc•Junt of the meaning of "to transcend" is indebted to that crux interpretu111 
for translators of Hegel, aufheben. 
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CHAPTER V; THE SECULARIZATION DEBATE. 
It is not very problenlatic to say that a church has a 
task in the transformation of society or at least must 
engage in efforts towards establishing a better 
world, .. But .. , it turns out to be highly problematic in 
actual practice, It would be e~<tremely helpful if the 
contrast between what seems a theological tl·uism by now 
and what happens in practice could be e~<plained in a 
satisfactory way,,, It seems,,, that sociological analysis 
can throw light on some of the implications <Thung, 
1976;77), 
No theory of the social nature a!ld functions of religion 
can survive without consideration of the characteristic 
constraints and influences brought to bear upon religious life 
by contextual factors of society and culture. The most 
important sociological paradigm for interpreting such factors 
within the contemporary 'Western situation is the concept of 
secularization. It is a "sensitizing concept" <Dobbelaere, 
1981:10); that is, it starts from common-sense impressions and 
suggests lines of investigation, general guidance about 
relevant empirical instances. As such, it requires careful 
analysis to determine more precisely how it is to be used. This· 
chapter approaches secularization by distinguishing between 
socio-structural and cultural processes, as applied both within 
society at large and to religious life in particular. The 
origins of the analysis lie in 'Weber's notions of the 
rationalization of society and the desacralization or 
disenchantment of culture. 
1. Secularization and the Radical Theologians. 
The Christian radicals understood themselves to be 
engaged in an attempt to reconceptualize the Christian 
proclamation and restructure the concrete social mode of its 
expression in a manner appropriate to the cultural forms of a 
"secular society". Advocates and critics a"like ot the radical 
theology accepted that a process of secularization was taking 
place. Amongst theologians, accustomed to viewing the world of 
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religion from the standpoint of church life, a felt sense of 
crisis affecting the churches was the primary impetus for the 
thinking about secularization which mushroomed in the sixties. 
John Robinson wrote of the task of finding a "new 
currency" for handling Christian truths in a modern war ld: 
The most distinctive fact about this world is that it is 
a secular world, Our whole assessment of the contenlporary 
situation is bound up with our judgment about the meaning 
of seculal'ization (Edwards and Robinson, 196:3;248), 
Harvey Cox' The Secular City is subtitled, Secularization 
and Urbanization in Theological Perspective. These processes 
are described on the opening pages as "two equally epochal 
movements"; and the first question addressed by the book is 
"What is secularization?" 
Van Buren twice sums up the theme of The Secular Meaning 
of the Gospel as "How may a Christian who is himself a secular 
man understand the Gospel in a secular way?" <1963 :xi v, 2). He 
states categorically, "Modern man is not 'out there' to be 
spoken to; he is within the being of every Christian trying to 
understand" (ibid),' 
Most of the theologians concerned, such as Cox, Ronald 
Gregor Smith and Albert van den Heuvel, formulated their 
definitions of secularization to correspond with a favourable 
theological interpretation of the process, deriving from the 
work of Friedrich Gogarten. Recourse to sociological material 
was sketchy and spasmodic, In the case of the British debate 
following Honest to God, most of Robinson's critics and 
defenders made assumptions about a secularization process 
which was adversely affecting the lives of the churches. Few, 
however, showed acquaintance with the important and in some 
respects parallel debate which was under way, certainly from 
the mid-sixties, within the sociology of religion in 
<Gill. 1975). 
Britain 
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Therefore, having provided a brief reminder of the 
theological issues which are the object of our critique, we now 
turn to an examination of that debate. 
2. Secularization: the Contours of the Debate. 
i. The Basic Thesis: Bryan Wilson. 
Within the sociology of religion in Britain, the issues in 
the secularization question were well laid out in what could be 
called the thesis and antithesis of the work of Bryan Wilson 
and David Martin in the sixties. We shall draw attention to the 
main difficulties of the concept, therefore, by way of a brief 
contrast of their positions, before going on in the next 
section of the chapter to propose our analysis of the 
secularization process."' 
\Tilson has for twenty years been the most consistently 
unrepentant proponent of a thoroughgoing secularization theory 
among leading sociologists of religion. His Religion in Secular 
Society: a Sociolggical Comment was the first major book-length 
study to attract attention beyond the bounds of his discipline. 
\Tilson's well-known definition of secularization, which he has 
not seen fit to modify, is "the process whereby religious 
thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance" 
<Wilson, 1969:14; cf.1982:149). \Tilson did not define religion 
in the early book, but has more recently stated that he means 
by it, substantively and quite minimally, "the invocation of the 
supernatural" (1982:159). 
It is important to notice what Wilson's definition of 
secularization does and does not do. It does address both the 
more subjectively cultural aspects of religion and its objective 
social expressions: it is not fair to accuse Wilson, as some 
critics have done, of being concerned only about "church" or 
institutional religion. 
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It does not merely equate secularization with "the decline 
of religion" 
affairs in 
in the sense of imagining an immiment state of 
which men simply no longer possess religious 
representations as part of their cultural apparatus. 
Rather, V ilson is concerned about the social significance 
of religion, and of its institutional and organizational forms. 
He is claiming that, with regard to other sectors of the social 
and cultural systems, religion is neither relevant nor 
influential. It does not materially affect the public structures 
or shared conventions, and thus is powerless to shape the 
social order or national cultural consciousness. The emergence 
of this state of affairs is what is meant by "secularization." 
\lilson's analysis, then, proceeds from the common-sense 
impression that religion is on the wane- that society is less 
religious than it used to be. We shall give much fuller 
treatment to how Wilson sees this decline in the social 
significance of religion taking place at the appropriate points 
in our analysis of secularization processes. As a collection 
of descriptions of those processes, all of which have resulted 
in problematic situations for the institutions of religion, 
Wilson's work remains unmatched in scope and lucidity. The 
criticisms of his thesis advanced by David Martin are not so 
much that he is wrong about the facts, as that he has been too 
ready to fit them into a single theory with an air of 
historical inevitability and irreversibility. Secularization is 
neither a one-dimensional nor a univocal process. 
ii. Elements of an Anti-Thesis: David Martin. 
In a still oft-quoted essay, Martin called for the 
elimination of the term "secularization" as "a tool of counter-
religious ideologies" <Martin, 1969:ch.l. For a critique see 
Pratt, 1970:5). However, he has subsequently produced his own 
General Theory of Secularization, which attempts to co-ordinate 
all the variable processes included under the umbrella term 
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"secularization". It would be uninteresting merely to argue over 
whether or not there is such a thing as secularization, since 
most of the argument would be a matter of definitions. What is 
more important is to be sensitive to the refinements necessary 
in trying to interpret the common-sense, baseline concept more 
adequately. 
Martin issues a number of important critical warnings. 
First, with regard to the apparently simple thesis of decline, 
he points out the hidden presuppositions about "true religion" 
which lurk there. For example, the High Middle Ages may be 
taken as the very zenith of the religious society, with the 
Reformation marking the onset of secularization. But a 
different evaluation of the essence of religion could result in 
treating medieval Christendom as the height, or depths, of the 
secularization of religion, with the Reformation as a great 
religious revival <Martin, 1969:54). 
For example, Wilson seems prepared to accept what Martin 
calls a "utopian" view of the Middle Ages as a kind of "golden 
age" of religion. He treats the evidence for a mass of magical, 
superstitious and pagan practices persisting throughout that 
time as reinforcing the view that religion permeated and 
saturated every stratum of social and cultural life. Yet, in the 
present day, similar evidence, i.e. of persisting folk-
religiosity, interest in magic and the occult, and the spread 
of cults and sects, is treated by him as evidence of 
secularization. 
Martin further warns against conventionalizing history, 
except for analytical convenience <Martin, 1973). That is, you 
cannot treat any of those convenient typologies, such as 
communal-associational, theological-metaphysical-scientific 
<Comte), tribal-town-technopolitan <Cox), as descriptions of 
historical actuality. They do not describe a simple, unilateral 
and unequivocal process by which all societies progress into 
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modernity. The idea of a progression from "religious" to 
"secular" in which the more of the latter means the less of the 
former is a similarly unacceptable scheme. 
Discussions of secularization, Martin insists, are 
inevitably bound up with the peculiar nature of Christianity, 
and the tensions it sets up with culture. Martin treats the 
dynamics of that relationship in the mutations undergone by 
Christian symbols and meanings as they encounter the 
resistances of successive socio-cultural contexts in ~ 
Dilemmas of Contemporary Religion and The Breaking of the 
~· We have already given an outline of his approach in 
Chapter II. 
The same point of view underlies the historical treatment 
of A____G~al Theory of Secularization. Here, Martin attempts, 
with something like a Weberian complexity, to study the 
patterns of secularization arising in the various western 
nations under the impact of such variables as the form of 
Church-State relationship resulting from the Reformation, the 
relation of religion to nationalism, and the rise of 
industrialization, scientific progress and urbanization. 
In England, therefore, there is no avoiding the peculiar 
historical position of the established Church in trying to 
understand not only the relationship between Church and 
society under contemporary conditions, but also the prevalent, 
non-articulated religious understandings of the people. Martin 
is saying that every statement about secularization carries 
with it a religious underside, which when turned up reveals an 
unsuspected subtlety about the continuing collusion of 
Christianity with culture; and in England, at least, the 
established Church is vital to understanding it. 
The secularization debate as carried on between Wilson 
and Martin demonstrates the subtleties which need to be taken 
into account in developing an adequately sophisticated 
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understanding of secularization. In the next section of the 
chapter, we present 
which attempts to 
an analysis of secularization 
reflect the persistent double 
processes 
evaluation 
encountered in the preceding account. But first, let us sum up 
the preliminary decisions which have to be made if it is to be 
clear what such an analysis is intended to do. 
iii. Prolegomena to a Secularization Analysis. 
Any attempt to classify the several processes which go to 
make up what is termed in toto "secularization" must declare 
certain basic presuppositions. The first of these is that a 
specific definition of religion must be assumed <cf.Robertson, 
1978 :258ff). In our case, the definition is a substantive one, 
regarding religion as a cultural system expressing an 
orientation to the transcendent. In fact, functional definitions 
of religion do not invite the consideration of contemporary 
religious change in terms of secularization at all, since they 
begin by assuming that, whatever outward appearances might 
suggest, religion is an ineradicable human need and will 
therefore be found, albeit in a transmuted form, even in the 
most secular environment <e.g. Greeley, 1970; cf.Glasner, 
1977:113). 
Secondly, a historical baseline is required. Secularization 
can variously be traced back to the Enlightenment, the 
Industrial Revolution, the New Testament or the Old, and so on. 
We believe that the clearest position is to treat 
secularization from a socio-structural point of view as being a 
running commentary on the break-up of Christendom. The gradual 
erosion and decline of institutional and cultural arrangements 
which took their rise in the conditions of the High Middle 
Ages is the connecting thread in the complex tale of 
secularization <Davis, 1980:32ff). This does not, of course, 
entai] simply regarding that .Medlevo.l period as 
quintessentially "religious". 
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The next criterion for arranging a classification is 
whether the socio-structural or cultural aspects of 
secularization are to the fore. The definition of secularization 
offered by Berger indicates this distinction: "the process by 
which sectors of society and culture are removed from the 
domination of religious institutions and symbols" (1973:113, 
emphasis mine). 
Structurally, secularization may be analysed in terms of 
changes in the overall social structure, or of unwilled effects 
upon religious institutions within the structure, or of the 
changes effected by such institutions in an attempt to respond. 
Culturally, secularization may likewise be analysed in 
terms of general cultural change, or of the impact of this upon 
religious culture, or of adaptations within the religious 
culture. These possibilities produce a six-fold analysis. 
3. An Analysis of Secularization Processes.:_,' 
i. Socio-structural Secularization: Institutional 
Differentiation and Rationalization of Society. 
This is the most general structural conception of 
secularization, which reaches back to Weber's analysis of 
rationalization. According to Weber, the spread of a "formal 
rationality" (Zweckrationalitaet, Weber, 1965:110; cf. Scharf, 
1970) in the organization of society results in non-affective, 
instrumental values dominating the decision-making processes 
and limited, short-term ends assuming greater importance than 
the solving of "ultimate" problems. Allied to rational 
organization is the strict division of institutional labour and 
precise specification of functions. 
The process of differentiation simply allows the claim 
of sectors of the social structure, or institutional sub-
systems of society, to be self-governing. They remain 
interdependent, certainly, but do not have to acknowledge any 
superimposed omnicompetent master-authority to arbitrate upon 
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their operations. Indeed, such omnicompetence becomes 
increasingly impossible, with the accumulation of distinctive 
expertise and specialist knowledge within each sector. Parsons, 
who gave the name "differentiation" to the process, finds it 
religiously neutral. It is a necessary part of the maturation 
of a social system in which each part is to find its proper 
function. 
The successive relinquishments of ecclesiastical control 
over the institutions of science, education, politics and social 
welfare are well-documented, and the process continues in the 
contemporary debates about religious education in schools and, 
with particular interest, the relaxation of restrictions upon 
Sunday trading. But the process cannot but be problematic for 
the religious institutions. For whereas Parsons, for example, 
bas argued that insofar as religious institutions lose their 
"peripheral functions" in favour of "core" ones, they are better 
fitted to accomplish their proper ends <Hill, 1973:239; Budd, 
1973:121-4), the fact is that specialization of function has 
not in the past been the way in which these "proper ends" have 
been understood. Rather, they have been conceived as general, 
overarching and unitive. 
In his analysis of rationalization in the institutional 
sub-systems of society, Wilson rejects the view that certain 
non-rational human needs- for theodicies, a sense of cosmic 
order, identity and 
structural locus of 
social belonging- require a 
fulfilment, as the object of 
socio-
public 
consensus. In a rational, technological society, these former 
"latent functions" of religion, which Wilson refers to as "the 
collective gratification of the emotions" <1969 :17), are simply 
taken over by a variety of rational-instrumental agencies, in 
virtue of which the functions in question simply become 
Dlanifest. Shorn of the breadth and uepth which the religious 
context gave them, they assume a deliberately limited range, as 
the objects of personal choice. 
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Thus, people no longer practise religion as a non-
reflective, socio-culturally given means of overcoming 
contingency by locating themselves in a higher order. Instead, 
they consciously choose, from time to time, to go to see a 
film, or to take a holiday, to "get away from it all", as an act 
of therapeutic escapism. In short, there is an industry for 
shelving, rather than solving, "ultimate problems" <Wilson, 
1982 :ch .2). 
The rationalized society is also unfavourable to the 
persistence of community. In Wilson's view, the transition from 
a communally-ordered society, in which duties and 
responsibilities were acknowledged between individuals on a 
personal basis, to a rational bureaucratic structure which 
prescribes obligations in accordance with office and status 
<Weber, 1965:333££.), is damaging to religion. The possibility 
of appeal to traditional, religiously inculcated values 
declines. The concept of moral order is eroded by pragmatic, 
utilitarian considerations. No longer can the solidarity and 
mutual respect of the members of a community be grounded in an 
order and an imperative which transcends the interests of any 
individual involved. 
Religion, the invocation of the supernatural, used to be 
the very "ideology of community" <Wilson, 1982:159), but no 
mare. "In the advanced societal system, the supernatural plays 
no part in the perceived, experienced and instituted order" 
(ibid:162). As a result, the nostalgia for community is 
widespread. For example, many people resent the "cold charity" 
or institutional care doled out by the welfare services, and 
seek instead to set up localised "community care" groups, which 
hope to rediscover a more personal and affective basis for 
mPPting human need. 
At this paint the discussion of rationalization shades off 
into the question of a continuing cultural role for religion. 
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This is to be expected, since we are dealing with complex 
processes analytically, and each piece of analysis artificially 
extracts and highlights one process which in reality occurs, in 
varying degrees, in combination with others. We continue here, 
then, with the socio-structural aspects, returning to the 
cultural questions later. 
ii. Disengagement and Marginalization of the Churches. 
The first and simplest of the arguments Wilson advances 
in support of the secularization process is the "decline 
thesis". The common-sense impression of the "man in the street" 
is that religion is on the wane. Accepting that sociological 
theory starts from such impressions, Wilson marshals the 
readily available barrage of statistics of institutional 
decline, which betoken a crisis for the churches as the 
twentieth century advances. 
Churchgoing is a decidedly minority option. The churches 
have relinquished the directing and regulative role they once 
performed in social welfare, education, leisure and politics, 
and retain only a semblance of power attached to the dignity 
of certain ceremonial occasions, together with a vastly reduced 
sphere of influence in family life, through rites of passage 
and the like. "The statistics of decline", however, explain 
nothing on their own, and so this aspect of secularization 
needs to be explicated further by means of a sociological 
model such as that provided by Berger (1973: ch.6). 
Berger describes the territories which have been 
evacuated by institutional religious control as "liberated" with 
regard to religion. These spheres, of politics and economics, 
the mainspring of Western industrial capitalism, constitute the 
heart of modern social systems, in that it is they that 
determine the actual materi.l'll conditions under which people 
lead their lives. Religious considerations, however, are only 
marginal to them now. The churches, in giving up any formal 
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control over them, have had to settle for a position of double 
marginality. 
In the first place, the churches find themselves concerned 
with the private margins of social life, for example the 
family, where the values espoused seem to have little 
application in a wider social context. In the second place, 
they are allocated a continuing function at the public margins, 
where certain state and civic occasions are dignified by forms 
of religious ceremonial, which to all intents and purposes look 
like no more than a rump, a ritualistic survival. "Religion 
manifests itself as public rhetoric and private virtue. In 
other words, in so far as religion is common it lacks 'reality', 
and in so far as it is 'real' it lacks commonality" CBerger, 
1973:138; cf.Williams, 1985). 
Berger regards this polarization as an inevitable 
concomitant of the processes of modernization; it results in an 
immense difficulty for the "plausibility structures", those 
institutional supports which serve to lend credibility to 
religious ideas. Nevertheless, Berger's view of religion as 
ultimately grounded in the ineffable experience of "otherness" 
causes him to remark that what may be bad for the churches' 
self-esteem may not be so bad for the transcendent power of 
religion. Enforced marginality may hold out hope for the 
vitality of ideas which owe their originality and 
attractiveness to the refusal to identify without reservation 
with any finite and fallible social system. 
iii. The Conformity of the Church. 
Shiner (1967) writes: "The religious group or the 
religiously informed society turns its attention from the 
supernatural and becomes more and more interested in 'this 
world"'. In the face of the progres:3ive rationalization of the 
world and its institutions, religious organizations may decide 
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to adopt increasingly professionally rationalized and 
instrumental means for attaining specifiable proximate ends. 
Religious teachings may also be reinterpreted to apply to non-
transcendent objectives. 
\Tilson treats thi:3 form of the churches' response to 
secularization with considerable scepticism. It is the way of 
conformity: churches altering their structures and their 
activities in ways which bear witness to the influence of 
rationalizing and privatizing motifs among them. In this way, 
Wilson is able to claim that the very phenomena the churches 
would point to as evidence of renewed life in the face of 
secularization mereJy count in favour of his overall thesis. 
Religion in Secular Society focused on the thriving nature of 
American church life, the growth of the Ecumenical Movement 
and the development of sects. 
In America, Wilson argued, religion itself had been 
internally secularized into a professionally specialized, 
rationally ordered industry. Church affiliation had assumed a 
strongly non-religious cultural meaning along ethnic or status 
group lines (cf.Her berg, 1967). 
Ecumenism was largely a case of weak organizations being 
willing to settle their differences and amalgamate in the 
interests of creating an appearance of strength and importance 
(cf. Berger, 1973:145-52). In this way the professional prestige 
of the clergy, whose social role had become questionable, could 
also be enhanced. 
The proliferation of sect:3 was to be expected in a 
pluralistic situation lacking a single overarching belief 
system. Small and exclusive groups could seek compensation for 
the social stabilities of which a secular society was depriving 
them, such as a close-knit, culturally cohesive community, or a 
va1 ieLy of non-rational, ecstatic experience. 
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Elsewhere, Wilson has interpreted such phenomena as the 
charismatic movement, liturgical renewal and pastoral reform 
similarly, as determined by aspects of the secularization 
thesis: the Church has to be "modernized", "democratized", 
"communalized" and so on <Wilson, 1976 :84ff) A But these views 
betray in Wilson himself a certain nostalgia for the traditions 
of an older society, which is liable to make his judgments on 
religion somewhat one-sided. To be rational in religion appears 
to be plainly mistaken in Wilson's view (see e.g. Wilson, 1965). 
There is little to add here about the evidences of such a 
pattern of secularization, except to say that they are more 
widespread in America than in Britain, which illustrates 
Martin's argument about internal factors affecting the 
likelihood of different secularization processes occurring in 
different nations. However, from the point of view of our 
definition of religion, "conformity" does become highly 
problematic, since it suggests that moves undertaken by the 
churches towards the renewal of religious life are liable to 
succeed at the risk of the loss of genuine religious contents. 
iv. Cultural Secularization: Desacralization and 
Disenchantment of the World. 
The theme of desacralization, again going back to Weber, 
is the broadest and most generally applicable interpretation of 
the secularization of culture. Weber perceived in the rise of 
attitudes of formal rationality, structurally embodied in the 
phenomenon of bureaucracy, and motivated by the conviction 
that the world is intrinsically capable of rational-empirical 
manipulation, the seeds of a "disenchantment" <Entzaeuberung> 
of the world. The concept of the sacred involved a disposition 
to view the world in terms of mystery, of otherness; not as 
something self-contained and self-explanatory, but an open 
system, pointillg beyond itself, and possibly permeated by 
supernatural powers <Acquaviva, 1979). Such a disposition was 
everywhere in decline in the emerging modern world. 
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Weber, like Wilson after him, was pessimistic about the 
prospects of a disenchanted society, inhabited by "specialists 
without spirit, sensualists without heart", imagining itself to 
have attained the pinnacle of civilisation while condemning 
many to dwell within an iron cage of unyielding rationality. 
What Weber called a "substantive" rationality, or a rational 
orientation to absolute values treasured for their own sake and 
not merely dictated by immediate empirical need 
( VertrationalitaeO could not readily be fostered in a 
desacralized situation. It was, ther-efore, a great irony that 
elements motivating the decline of the sacred could be found 
within the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition (cf.Berger, 
1973:116-130>. 
The theme of the desacralization of culture strikes 
aconsistently pessimistic note among accounts of 
secularization. For the Christian tradition, by its ubiquitous 
and unavoidable presence at every juncture of cultural concern, 
even if intermingled with all mann~r of sub-Christian 
constituents in mass religion, nevertheless once provided the 
unifying frame and context for the intimation of the sacred-
that is, it prevented the attribution of ultimacy to the 
immediate givens of society and insisted on the subordination 
of the social order to something judging and surpassing it. 
Wilson describes what is happening in this way. In the 
rationalized society, institutional functions tend increasingly 
to be manifest, engineered to achieve specifiable ends. But a 
rationally-order-ed system is dependent in the end upon some 
schema of non-rational values and dispositions which serve to 
prevent people from merely lapsing into cynically a-moral 
abuse of the system. These, according to \V ilson, are the 
humanistic values of "disinterested goodwill", affective 
relations not limited to kinship groups and the like, public 
and individual honesty. Such dispositions were once inculcated, 
primarily, in the context of a religious world-view. 
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The decline of this role for the Christian "picture" is 
startling: the rudiments of the picture are no longer known, 
even as background cultural apparatus, to large sectors of the 
population'". Instead, a hotch-potch of half-formed ideas and 
principles tries to do service as some sort of ad hoc world-
view. The less well-educated and unreflective are likely to 
possess only the shreds and tatters of a part-secularist, part-
religious set of assumptions they pick up, hit or miss fashion, 
along the way. 
The purpose of religion, Wilson believes, has always been 
the provision of salvation, a concept which has varied in 
content with changing social contexts <Weber, 1965:84ff). In a 
situation of increasing discontent 
brought about by secularization, 
with the state of affairs 
the churches might just 
discover a limited, mainly private role again in offering a 
salvation from that discontent. 
v. Privatization and Pluralism of Religious Life. 
It is possible for the secularization of culture to give 
birth to its own distinctive forms of religious life, which 
spring up from below with the removal of official world-views 
imposed from above. But these forms will almost certainly be 
esoteric rather than popular, drawing upon the multiple sources 
of Eastern religions, mysticisms, psychotherapeutic techniques 
or the occult in order to provide an escape from the iron cage 
into an alternative world, the home base of leisure time and 
"private life". 
Thus Bellah <1970(b)) has envisaged the development of 
"modern religion" as an individualistic, humanistic orientation, 
concerned with self-discovery and "spiritual consciousness". 
Modern religion will operate with flexible sets of symbols in a 
spirit of "critical realism": the symbols are the very 
substance of the religious mode of interpreting the world and 
cannot be discarded in favour of some strictly secular, 
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empiricist point of view, but modern people are free to choose 
and develop their own symbols, to modify or discard them if 
they fail to assist them in taking responsibility for their 
fate in relation to the "ultimate conditions of existence". 
Luckmann <1967) has written that one of the peculiarities 
of modernity is that "the real self no longer lives in the real 
world", a judgment that fits well with the idea that modern 
religion will ent;ineer the passage out of the "real world" of 
rationality and proximate, instrumental ends, into the private 
world of the "true self". Since Luckmann regards reli3ion very 
broadly, as man's capacity to transcend his biological nature, 
he is able to propose a future "invisible religion" as a 
complete functional alternative to familiar institutional forms. 
But these privatized cultural systems are only available to the 
privileged, for whom the most pressing problems are those of 
personal "meaning" and the nurture of authentic selfhood. 
Things are otherwise with the majority. 
Martin has directed criticism at this type of analysis of 
contemporary religious life. An emphasis on the views and 
values of elite intellectual culture should not blind the 
cultural analyst, in his view, to the essential sameness 
through time of the religious undertow of non-e'li te culture, 
such as is to be found both inside and outside the churches. 
For England was never more than partially, or superficially, 
converted to Christianity, so that much of what is now classed 
as "secularization" may amount to what is happening to the 
Christian upper layer of religiosity now that its structural 
legitimations are crumbling. Martin puts it like this: 
It would seem that vast numbei'S of people work on the 
assumption of two basic principles; one is the rule of 
fate or chance, conceived as rooted in a kind of symmetry 
(such as that disasters occur in threes), and the other 
is a ·~wl'al balance', rooted in a universal homeostasis 
whe1·eby wi rk~>d deeds event•.Jall y catch up ·~i th those 111ho 
perpet1·ate them.,, 
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All such examples,, ,suggest that far from being secular 
our culture wobbles between a partial! y absorbed 
Christianity, biased towards comfort and the need for 
confidence, and beliefs in fate, luck and moral 
governance incongruously joined together <Martin, 
1967:76), 
In this respect, at least, modern religious culture is not 
particularly pluralistic. Contemporary folk-religiosity, which 
Martin rightly refuses to treat as if it were something quite 
other than "church religion", is remarkably uniform CMensching, 
1947). It is 
, , , a t·el igion of habit and the 5t..~tu5 quo, devoted not. to 
choice but to the community of generation, in particular 
the fan1ily, since this is now the locus of cultural 
inertias and the stronghold of the 'given' (Martin, 
1981)(b):12). 
On the one hand, just because this type of religion is no 
longer practising church religion, this does not mean it has 
became Wilson's deliberately-chosen, limited-range instrumental 
means of emotional gratification. 
On the other hand, although closely related to Christian 
faith, it is a paralysed, non-dialectical religion: it only 
upholds and legitimates the experienced world of those who 
hold to it, and contains no critical potential. 
The cultural privatization of religion presents another 
delicate set of ambiguities for the churches. For it is easy, 
as Wilson and Martin have agreed from their different points 
of view ,c for movements aimed at revitalizing the Christian 
proclamation to capitalize only upon these prevalent cultural 
preferences. They may end by sponsoring a vast Christian 
culture with its music, drama, community activities, youth 
projects and sa on, which stands towards the everyday world, 
not in a relation of transcendence, but as a religious 
alternative to everyday life. For those who enjoy the luxury of 
participation in it, it can be exciting and fulfilling; but in 
the 1neantirue, the alienation of the society found about from 
faith, and the dissipation of culture, go an unchecked. 
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vi. The Transposition of Religious Values. 
The final secularization process represents a more 
optimistic evaluation of desacralization, and suggests a new 
secular task for the churches. The culture is seen as 
assimilating or absorbing into itself formerly religious 
values and notions and transposing them into a secular key. 
That is, they become embedded in the culture in such a way 
that their point of reference is located within society seen as 
a self-contained and unitary system. No longer do the values 
concerned require the guardianship of religion to keep them 
alive or to provide them with their justification. Whereas 
specific religious institutions become differentiated and 
possibly marginalized, the ideals, values and ends they exist 
to promote take form in the surrounding culture in such a way 
that the culture is enriched but the ideas lose their 
recognisably religious form. 
It could, therefore, be the business of the churches still 
to nurture and institutionalize such values, as modern man's 
means of salvation from the corruption of his rational system: 
As yet, only at the margins and in the interstices, and 
principally in the domain of private life, has such 
religious endeavour been effective, in allowing some men, 
at least, to transcend the present discontents, and in 
producing, by way of the dissemination of dispositions of 
goodwi 11 and commitment, that salt of the earth that is 
necessal'Y to sustain the S•)Cial ordel' (l.rlilson, 1982:179), 
The churches have therefore acted, and might still act, as a 
kind of "transformer station" for introducing and establishing 
key general values and principles into society <Gill, 1981). In 
this line of analysis, the world can be judged to be more 
Christian than ever before <Parsons, 1963), whether or not 
many choose to practise an official religion. 
The continuing role of the churches is, however, 
problematic. For in the first place, it remains unclear to what 
extent the embedded values really are self-perpetuating, and to 
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what extent they still depend upon explicit religious support. 
It may be that some such values are no more than archaic 
"survivals" in modern society, which have so far managed to 
hold out against the onslaught of technical rationality, but 
will be doomed to disappear without a continuing religious 
vitality. 
In the second place, the transposition model needs to be 
alert to the lessons of the "Protestant Ethic" thesis: namely, 
that there is ample room for nice historical ironies upon the 
road from the religious idea to the secular transposition. 
Secularization as transposition pays scant respect to the 
~oncerns of churches for the "purity" of their ideas. 
Nevertheless, the fact that this is so suggests that the 
churches have not, after all, "worked themselves out of a job". 
The "embedding" process is never complete, and may always have 
to be started all over again; and here is a further hint that 
the expulsion of the churches from the centre of the social 
and cultural system may, in the end, be to their advantage. 
4. Towards a Dialectical Resolution. 
i. Is a Synthesis possible? 
Our analysi'3 of secularization contains 
heading both assertions and qualifications 
under every 
about the 
contemporary situation, both negative and positive evaluations 
and prospects. Returning to the contrasting positions of 
Wilson and Martin, do they in the end contradict one another? 
One sociologist who has argued that the various theses 
require and complement each other is Bryan S. Turner, in his 
recent Religion and Social Theory <1983), and the following 
remarks are stimulated by his proposals7 • 
Wilson, as we have already pointed out, is particularly 
concerned about the social significance of religion, that is to 
say, its importance at the public, institutional and structural 
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level of society. Despite his employment of a substantive 
definition of religion, his analysis of the past situation of 
the Church, by comparison with which present developments 
appear as decline and loss of influence, reflects strongly 
Durkheimian assumptions about the function of religion. Insofar 
as the ChrL:;tian religion is said to have formerly provided 
the overarching basis for societal cohesion and the repository 
of consensual values, it is the religion of the minority 
educated and ruling elites which is in view. Wilson, however, 
does not state this explicitly. 
Martin, on the other hand, pays much more attention to 
the "subterranean theologies" and religious substrata of non-
elites and the less educated. Whereas the map of religious 
development based mainly upon elite culture displays a pattern 
of declining influence and secularization, Martin's map shows a 
striking continuity and similarity through the ages. The mass 
of the people were partially Christianised, partially pagan, and 
still are. Insofar as their religion serves the ends of cultural 
integration and offers them a meaningful construction of the 
world, the meaning is a second-hand one, derived from the 
dominant cultural form of Christianity. Insofar as their 
religion performs a function proper to them, it is more likely 
to be one of comfort and compensation in the face of a 
prevailing order in which they are disadvantaged. 
What is happening under present conditions? The break-up 
of the Christendom situation deprives the rulers of society of 
the services of religious and ecclesiastical systems in the 
interests of social control. There is less likelihood of an 
official religious ideology as a legitimation of the world 
being unreflectingly accepted by the majority through a process 
of cultural percolation. But at the samf> time, mass religion 
becomes even more fragmented, confused and ineffectual than 
before. This is because the mediation of organised religion, 
which in the form of local churches once helped to intercede 
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between elite-cultural and mass-folk forms of Christianity, is 
all but lost. 
What the alternative viewpoints of Wilson and Martin 
indicate is characteristically paradoxical. The cultural 
compromise of Christianity represented by the "Christendom" 
system and its later developments risked turning the Gospel 
into a means of domination and of restraining change. Yet this 
same compromised religion turns out to have been important in 
maintaining a measur-e of creative Christian hope and faith at 
mass cultural levels. The churches have had their role in the 
secularization of Christianity through becoming assimilated to 
systems of social legitimation. But such assimilation has been 
the means by which Christian ideas have been made available to 
the mass of the people. 
ii. Conclusions. 
The processes of secularization display a whole range of 
double features which materially affect the possible responses 
of the churches to them. Firstly, every index of secularization 
is capable of being counteracted by corresponding evidences of 
religious continuity, and this alerts us to the fact that 
secularization is far from being a unitary and uni-directional 
phenomenon. 
Secondly, as to the past, secularization appears both as a 
complex of processes representing a move away from religion, 
and as in part the product of an ongoing collusion of the 
Christian religion with its historical context. The churches' 
judgment upon it must therefore overcome the simple 
dichotomous options of either deploring or welcoming. 
Thirdly, i'l.S to the present and the future, secularization 
presents in many respects a bleak and unpromising analysis of 
contemporary religious life and of the prospects of the 
churches. But it also suggests that the true seeds of hope may 
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lie in the more negative parts of the analysis, whereas serious 
reservations are raised about those aspects of contemporary 
religious life which the churches might be inclined to regard 
as the more hopeful. 
The position regarding the structural and cultural aspects 
of secularization may be summarized in this way. Within the 
social structure, institutional differentiation is resulting in 
a multiplicity of sub-systems, each with its own characteristic 
area of expertise and specific competence. The institutions of 
religion are involved in this process as a social fact. The 
question for the churches is whether they can face up to 
growing marginalization, accept it and then capitalize upon it 
with a properly understood specialization in their particular 
field, which is religion. 
Cultural secularization results in the fragmentation of 
world-views, increasing religious confusion and the spread of 
cynicism in the face of unremitting instrumental rationality. 
The contemporary cultural means of combating this serve only 
to shelve, rather than solve, the problems. But a religion 
which has become detached from the task of sacralizing the 
social order may be able to reclaim afresh the right to engage 
in cultural criticism. Under the conditions of secularization, 
the Christian tradition might supply the independent 
resources necessary in order 
transcendence, by means of 
surpass itself. 
This is the understanding 
to reintroduce the category of 
which a culture is called to 
which will be brought to bear 
upon our examination of the attempts of Christian Radicalism 
to draw up a positive theological programme in response to 
secularization. But our suggestions about a revitalized 
religious role arising out of a double-edged understanding of 
secularization, combining a determined realism about the 
problems of the situation with an affirmation of the 
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dialectical nature of hope, remain merely idealistic without 
consideration of the actual religious believers to whom we are 
ascribing this role. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the nature of 
membership within a religious group and participation in its 
life. VIe need to ask hm.,r n~ligious faith works, in terms of 
giving to believers a certain way of living and acting in the 
world. The sociological contours of religious commitment and 
membership are the subject of the next chapter. 
NOTES, 
1, See also Gregor S11ith (1966:138): "One thing is clear ... The tide of secularism has 
swept over the whole of the western world"; Macquarrie ( 1963: 13): "N•Jwadays theology 
has to be done in a secularized world"; Davis ( 1966:11 l: "Christians today are faced 
with two interrelated processes. The fast is secularization,,," Even Mascall (196.5) 
assumes that modern man is "secular", but objects that the task of the theologian is 
to Make him less so, 
2, Some sources for the discussion of secularization can be listed here, Bryan 
Wilson's 111ajor contributions are ReliQ.ion in Secular Society, 2nd edn,1969; 
Contemporar~ Transformations of Religion li976; Religion in Sociological Perspective m~; eb~t chm'o6re D~~i1 /a[;inib~ou~ik~~\;ruthei\~,~~i~~lof~6g.t i'W iB~l~;;:~iog( 
Contemporary Religion and A Generil t6e9i; of Sewiadzatiori, both \ 97·"=8 .... '--"C4.A.>""""'.....__..:.<.L. 
Processes of secularization and secularization theories are classified in Shiner{ 
'The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research', available as pp,460-73 o 
K,Th•Jmpson and J,Tunstall, eds.~., c ,, , 1971; Glasner, The. 
Sociol0gy of Secularization, 197t; Robertson, · · ·, 
Re1;gion, 1970, ~n~ Meaning and Change, 1978, the. closing c apter of. eachj· Hill, A. 
Souolo~ ol Hellgl.Q.D, 1973, chs, II, 12; Budd Sooolog1s~s and Re1Ig1on, 973;ch.7; 
Gill! Thie 'Soil~ial tqnt;q\ pi. TheioJ~iig~, 1975:112 (a flow-diagraml;and Dobbelaere, Secu_arL~hQ_~ i Mulu-!!.!.me!!.~lo!lL \,Q_~ept. 1981. 
Further individual theories are developed in Berger, The Social Rea lit~ of Religion, 
Penguin edn, 1973j Acquaviva, The Oedine of the Sacred in lndustpal )oc~1e41 T979, 
orig,pub, 1964· 0 Dea The Sociology of Religion, 1966; Gilbert, !he MaKi!L Q!. post-
Chnstian Britain, 19BO; and Falld1ng, The Sociology of Religion, 1974, ch, , 
3, See n,2 above for S•Jurces of classifications, We have not followed any of them 
exactly, but have tried instead to bring out the dialectical aspects of the relation 
between secularization and religious life, This is also done, though in rather a 
different way) by Fallding (1974:-:107-11), 
4, I especially recommend Wilson's po-faced description of the eucharistic 
'happening' masterminded by the newly un-secular Harvey Cox during the hippie era-
see Wilson( 1976:92-4, 
5, There IS an ignorance about the Christian reli·~ious tradition among otherwise 
well-educated people whom one might expect to be bette1· informed, regardless of 
whether or not they consider themselves believers, This comes out, for example, in 
the course of popular quiz programmes, where widely read people are often unable to 
answer quite sunple questions on religio•~s subjects, Similarly, a newspaper like The 
6uardian which aims to cater fo1· an Intellectual readership falls down badly on the 
quality of comment it is able- or feels necessary- to give to religious affairs, 
6, Wilson's dismissal of such phenomena of the contemporary churches as "charis11atic 
destructuration", "coMmunitarianism" and "eclectic mysticism" (especially in Wilson, 
1976) is very similar indeed to the treatment Martin gives to liturgiCal changes 
involving things like the Kiss of Peace, the restoration of the 'primitive" agape 
Real and the "cult. of spontaneity". See, e,n, (b,t ~~f The Brea~in~ of the ~magg and 
many other places In his wntlngs, such as t~e notorious PN Rei'Je~t 13, conta1n1ng the 
pal'! iamentary petition urging the compulsory retention of the Book of Common Prayer 
for worship 1n every parish ~ the Church of England, 
7, Turner's point of departure is his discussion of the Marxian "dominant ideology 
thesis", The relevant part of his argument is this: the Durkheimian view of religion 
as •social cement" is criticised for failing to •jive due weight to social confliCt, 
and assuming that the overarching reli·~ious le•~ltir~ation for the social order is 
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actually shared and acquiesced in by all members of a society, In fact, it represents 
the ideology of the ruling class. But Turner questions the view that the subject 
classes merely absorb the dominant ideology and so reflect in their religion the 
world-view imposed upon them as a means of social control, in the form of a "social 
opium". This, in its way, also amounts to a social cohesion view of religion, and 
fails to do justice to cases where religion functions to mobilize action against the 
dominant class, In fact, Turner argues, the masses have a •split consciousness": they 
have partially absorbed the dominant ideology, with relig1on supporting the st.;tus 
quo, but they also display signs of another type of re1igion which expresses an 
alternative function of protest. 
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CJlAETER VI: RELIGIOUS INSIITUTION~D ORIENTATIONS. 
The question of the r-enewal of reHgious life under the 
conditions of secularization comes horne to roost, so to speak, 
with the issue of actual religious congregations and individual 
religious persons. We have to ask in what ways religious faith, 
with its distinctive transcendent orientation, operates in 
practice within the institutional channels of the religious 
cultural system. A variety of styles of membership and 
commitment within the religious institution produce different 
orientations to the social world and modes of action in it. 
This chapter examines the analytical types of religious 
institutional involvement deriving from the two fundamental 
typological distinctions of church and sect, and communal and 
associational religiosity. It suggests how the resulting types 
may be deployed in relation to the conditions of secularization 
set out in the preceding chapter. 
1. Institutionalization and the Radical Theologians. 
Christian Radicalism displayed a mood of unease about the 
institutional Church. This can best be described as a felt 
sense of incongruity between the content and implications of 
Christian faith as the radical theologians were seeking to 
understand it, and the actual "style of life" (William 
Hamil ton's phrase) or mode of being-in-the-world which the 
available institutional forms of Christianity appeared to 
engender. The American death-of-God theologians represented an 
extremity of rejection of the relevance of the Church to their 
whole task of theological reconstruction CHamilton, 1968:23, 
96-7; Altizer, 1967:9-10). The vehemence of their rejection 
caused David Jenkins <1969) to suggest that the "deadliness of 
the Church" was the real circumstance behind the mistaken 
announcement of the death of God. 
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But for the less extreme, the problem was whether, and in 
what way, the authenticity of faith as the fundamental 
experience or disposition of religion could be maintained in 
the process of institutionalization. We shall come to 
definitions shortly; but here we simply wish to keep the 
theological background in mind. It is a background which 
repeatedly expresses reservations and qualifications about the 
institutional factor in religious life. As Cox writes, "The 
church is not in the first instance an institution. It is a 
people" 0968:137). But "a people" comes close to being an 
abstraction. More concretely, we might simply say that the 
Church is people, i.e. particular persons. 
Robinson puts the rhetorical question, "Is not the Church 
an archaic and well-protected institution for the preservation 
of something that is irrelevant and incredible?" <1965:13-14), 
In so doing, he doubtless expresses how he fears the Church 
may look to outsiders, and the word "institution" in this 
context is a loaded one. Colin Williams contrasts the motifs of 
the Church as "institution" and as "event" <the latter term 
being that favoured by Barth), and suggests that there is a 
tension here which is inherent in the whole idea of a Church 
persisting recognisably through time and changing contexts 
<Williams, 1969:28-9). 
There are large ecclesiological questions here which do 
not come within the scope of this thesis. But the one which we 
do have to take up is the problem of finding a religious social 
reality which can effectively nurture and embody a mature and 
creative relation of faith to the world. 
2. Religion and Institutionalization. 
The moat fruitful line uf analysis of the types of 
religious institution in the sociology of religion has been the 
distinction between church and sect, first introduced by Weber 
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but greatly elaborated by Troeltsch. We shall come in due 
course to a discussion of this typology, but we do not want to 
deal with it at once in this chapter. For most sociological 
discussion of the theme has proceeded directly from Troeltsch 
rather than Weber, partly because Troel tsch 's work was 
available in English translation so long before the relevant 
portion of 'Webet-'s writings. As a result, the original context 
of Weber's introduction of the typology has not always been 
fully recognised. That context is the emergence of the chut-ch 
as a means of ensuring the continuity of a religious tradition 
in such a way that it need no longer depend upon the spectal 
powers and gifts of pioneering individuals. 
Taking our cue from this context of 'Weber, we shall begin 
by examining the problems attendant upon the 
institutionalization of religion, because these provide the 
groundwork for any discussion of how faith may come to 
concrete social expression. 
i. Religion as Institution. 
Peter Berger defines an institution as follows: 
, . ,a distinctive comple:< of social actions,. ,a regulatory 
agency, channelling human actions in much the same ~ay as 
instincts channel animal behaviour (1966:1041, 
An institution is, in Durkheimian terms, a "social fact", 
possessing an objective existence over against the individual 
and the power of constraint upon his behaviour: 
In 
.. ,a changeable, but pe1'manent, p1·oduct of purposive 
social l'ole behaviour ~hich subjects the individ1;al to 
obligations, gives him formal authority and possess legal 
sanctions (Hasenhuettl, 19741, 
religion, as in other area:::, of social life, 
institutionalization occurs in order to give permanence, 
continuity and recognizability to an originating or fundamental 
experience or disposition. The faith which lies at the heart uf 
the Christian religion becomes channelled into external 
cultural forms which govern convention and pattern 
135 
expectations as to the character and content of that religion. 
Institutionalization permits the outside observer to identify 
Christianity as a cultural system. It provides a kind of code 
or shorthand which bypasses the need for fresh exposition on 
every occasion of what faith is about. Religious believers 
"know what to do" because of what is institutionally given and 
prescribed. 
Institutionalization is more than just formal 
organization, although it almost always includes it. Much folk-
religion, for example, has very little formal organization but 
is highly institutionalized: it prescribes very precisely what 
the ritual behavioural requirements are in particular 
situations, so that severe personal sanctions may be imposed 
upon anyone who fails to observe them. Institutionalization is 
largely pre-reflective and unplanned, and indeed, planned 
formal organization <or reorganization) in the Church may well 
fail if there is no grasp of the underlying institutional 
assumptions of the people involved. Institutionalization is 
inevitable, and there is no pristine purity of faith recoverable 
independently of it. 
ii. Weber and the Routinization of Charisma. 
Weber's theory routinization ( Veralltaeglichung) 
develops the question 
of 
of 
religion somewhat further 
institutionalization with regard to 
<Weber, 1965:324-35, 363-92). Weber 
sees new religious movements as coming to prominence under the 
impact of the charisma of the prophetic leader of the 
movement. 
"sacred", 
This charisma is a 
although conceived 
phenomenon 
by Weber 
particular persons rather than objects. It 
akin to Durkheim 's 
as attaching to 
is a property which 
elevates the one who is possessed by it above the common run 
of men and gives conviction and the power to elicit commitment 
to what he says. The hearer of charisma 1s uniquely able to 
introduce the transcendent into effective circulation among the 
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human community. From the very beginning, then, a division is 
introduced which is problematic for the continuing vitality of 
a ::--eligious movement: there is the charismatic figure, and 
there are the followers. 
When it becomes necessary to perpetuate the spirit of the 
religious movement beyond the death of the original 
charismatic leader and his circle of followers, into the next 
generation, the process of routinization begins. In particular, 
what is at stake is the provision of a set of guarantees that 
the religion will henceforth remain the same: that is, will 
continue to reflect and embody authentically the internal logic 
and "feel" of the originating faith-experience. i3ince the pure 
charisma exists only in statu nascendi, a potential crisis of 
authority occurs with the death of its bearer. 
Weber ::;ays that this crisis is typically resolved by t.be 
replacement of the indivudual and personal charismatic 
authority by "traditional" authority, "resting on an e::otablished 
belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the 
legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under 
them". Still further along the line of development, "legal-
rational" authority depends "on a belief in the 'legality' of 
patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to 
authority under such rules to issue commands."' 
The result is an increasing detachment of charisma from 
persons and relocation of it in prescribed offices. The purest 
type of legal-rational authority, according to Weber, is 
bureaucracy: and with this his account of institutionalization 
clearly comes into contact with the problem of secularization. 
The very measures which arise in protection of the identity of 
the religion and as a means of safeguarding its cultural 
tr ctnsmission and making it readily available to the people 
become a threat to its integrity. There is a whole set of 
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tensions built into the very concept of institutionalized 
religious belonging and commitment, which introduce ambiguities 
and variable patterns into the apparently simple notion of the 
expression of religious faith in its worldly context. 
Ui. ThL" Dilemmas of Institutionalization. 
Weber introduced the distinction of church and sect, as 
w.=:. have :3a id, in the context of routiniza.tion. The features 
1.,rhich he say:3 characterLce the emergence of a church actually 
suggest quite clearly a range of dilemmas inherent in the 
process. The four features ljsted by Weber are: the rise of a 
class of religious professionals, or priesthood; a universal 
claim, i.e. the religion becomes in principle open to all; fixed 
dogmas and rites which can be systematically taught; and a 
form of antecedent organization based upon the concept of the 
charisma of office. In an influential article, O'Dea <1961) has 
indicated the dilemmas which are made unavoidable by this 
combination of features. 
Firstly, the emerging distinction between clerical and lay 
practitioners of the religion helps to support another polarity 
observed by Weber, that between "virtuoso" and "mass" patterns 
of z-eligiosity. Within the religious cultural system, many lay 
people will simply assert their right to expect certain 
benefits from the institution into which they have been 
socialized, together with a "lukewarmness" about active 
commitment. On the ather hand, the clerical virtuoso belh~ver 
may came to carry on his occupation in pursuit of certain 
professional interests. In either case, lukewarmness or 
prefe:3:3ionalism, the continuing authenticity of faith is called 
into question. 
Secondly, the development of a range of fixed liturgical 
and dogmati•-=: symbols can produce the process described by 
Berger <1973: ch.4), in which "objectification" becomes 
"reification" and results in alienation. There is a loss of 
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transcendence; religious participation serves only to express 
and legitimize certain aspects of social solidarity and given 
order, including quite possibly relations of domination 
contradictory to the original thrust of the symbols concerned. 
Faith no longer engages in the dialectical process of affirming 
the meaning and value of the experienced order, only to deny it 
at the next stage in the name of that which surpasses it. The 
religious symbols are absolutized and become opaque and 
inflexible. 
Thirdly, an increasingly bureaucratic organization can 
become preoccupied with its own internal mechanisms. Office 
charisma can subtly cease to resemble charisma at all, and 
faith can be made of none effect by a trend towards 
institutional introversion and specialist cliqueishness. Under 
the conditions of religious privatization, this development can 
occur in such a way as to delude those involved into thinking 
that their busy-ness is an index of success. 
Fourthly, the formalization of dogmas and ethical rules as 
a convenient and necessary shorthand means of depicting the 
shape and content of faith in its cultural forms can lead to a 
cessation of religious growth in individual believers. 
Doctrines can come to act like amulets and incantations merely 
to protect the security of those who appeal to them, and moral 
rules may serve to by-pass all creative and painful ethical 
thinking in response to the complexity of actual issues. The 
religious group that sees itself as a beleaguered minority in 
society is especially susceptible to taking refuge in this 
conservative mutation of faith. 
Fifthly, the institutionalization of religion brings about 
alliances, collusions and compromises with the "parent culture". 
This bears a risk that particular religious attachments might 
prove advantageous to the survival of the prevailing social 
system, and coercive means of enforcing them may develop. 
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Although these may not be violent or inquisitorial in nature, 
they will nevertheless put faith under pressure, in such a way 
that religious organizations seek ways in which a select 
minority among their members can still bear witness to the 
critical transcendent dimension of faith, while justifying the 
temporary acquiescence of the majority in a degree of 
compromise on the grounds that the religious ideas depend upon 
some continuity of cultural embodiment for their survival. 
The cultural pl-omulgation of religion is thus a story of 
advance and regress, checks and balances, bargaining and 
control. The channels through which religion runs on its social 
course and which give to it a recognizable shape and direction 
also contain eddies and undercurrents which can sometimes 
belie the superficial flow. Religious people are gathered into 
particular groupings and try to give expression to their faith 
through the medium of particular t-eligious cultural systems 
which regularly act back upon the faith itself to neutralize, 
modify or indeed to challenge it. The forms of 
institutionalization have, however, been analyzed into certain 
dominant types, and these form the subject of the next section. 
3. Institutional Patterns and Religious Commitment. 
i. Church and Sect. 
We have placed the subject of church and sect-types of 
religious organization within the overall context of the 
emergence of institutional patterns of religious cultural 
transmission, in line with Weber's presentation. Weber broached 
the subject of the sect in the context of his discussion of 
reactions against the concept of "office charisma": the 
sectarian type of religious organization attempts to recapture 
the spirit of earlier movements by insisting afresh upon the 
demonstration of individual personal qualification, both for 
basic religious membership and for office. 
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In keeping with the heuristic nature of the ideal type we 
pointed out in Chapter II, Weber does not attempt to trace 
within Church history a single line of development of actual 
r-eligious organizations from sects to churches, or back again. 
It is not helpful to spend time trying to identify whether 
particular bodies count as churches, sects, or some alternative 
or intermediate type. 
The multiplication of sub-types was a process which 
occurred within the sociology of religion as successive writers 
attempted to improve upon the typology as they found it in 
Troeltsch/ With his historical perspective, Troeltsch was 
perhaps ambiguous about whether he was treating church and 
sect as analytical types or historical instances", but we wish 
to keep clearly to the former use. 
In this respect we follow the plea of Gustafson (1967), 
who urged that sociologists should recognize that the two 
fundamental criteria of Troeltsch's typology were those of 
whether the religious organization conceived of the "means of 
grace" as efficient objectively or subjectively \dependent on 
individual qualification), and whether membership was in 
principle universalist or particularist. We are enquiring, that 
is, into the style of religious membership and commitment 
appropriate to differing types of institutional form. 
The central passasge in Troel tsch <1931 :331-43) yields 
the following characterization. 
Church membership comes about by ritual incorporation and 
subsequent socialization into the cultural system of an 
antec(cdently existing religious organization. That is, the 
Church is anterior to personal faith. It guards and administers 
an array of institutional means to objective right :3tanding in 
the religion and personal participation in its benefits. These 
things are available in principle to everyone without regard to 
qualifications of character. As a result, church membership 
conceives faith as part and parcel of membership in the wider 
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society, and does not sense a strong tension with it. It allows 
special levels of commitment and seriousness to be reserved 
for certain minority groups within the organization. 
Sect membership depends upon voluntary commitment by 
previously and personally qualified individuals. That is, 
personal faith precedes the concept of the church: there is no 
antecedent organization. Sectarian membership entails the 
development of ritual forms solely as a reminder to the 
members of their special standing and qualifications, which 
sharply distinguish them from the world at large. All members 
are expected to aim at equal levels of commitment, through 
religious discipline and asceticism of personal secular life. 
Troeltsch also noted the likelihood of the church, as 
being an integral part of the secular order, be ins supportive 
of the ruling classes, whereas the sect, with its stance of 
opposition to the world, would be associated more with the 
lower classes. However, it is clear that when we emphasise in 
the typology the criteria of different forms of religious 
membership and commitment, this class distinction need not be 
inevitable. In circumstances where the religious disposition in 
general is regarded with hostility by the official, central 
institutions of society, a "church" style of religious 
commitment can become a powerful organ of protest, in view of 
the massive institutional givenness it represents, over against 
that of the prevailing system. 
Similarly, a sectarian type of membership can encourage a 
spiritual elitism which may prove highly attractive to ruling 
group::; within a society, who can add the value of special 
religious qualifications to the other features which already 
set them apart from the mass of the people. The conditions of 
secularization are especially favourable to this development. 
Bryan '\llilson ha:::; detailed the hospitable nature of modern 
cul.tural circumstances to sectarian growth, and his proposed 
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typologies of religious sects include very much more than the 
basic stereotype of the sect as the expression of religious 
protest by the materially disprivileged." According to Wilson, 
sectarianism bas now become universal in modern societies, and 
this is a point vie shall pick up in the concluding portion of 
this chapter. 
But WP want to set the church-sect axis of variation 
alongside another, which resembles it in obvious respects but 
presents significant differences. The criteria here are no 
longer those of styles of membership in the religious 
colle.~:tivi ty, but oi different religious orientations in 
themselves: that is, ways of being religious in the world. 
ii. Communal and Associational Religiosity. 
The typology of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft first 
proposed by Ferdinand Toennies C1955; orig.pub.l887) did not 
for a long time receive the attention it deserved within the 
E;ociology of religion. Toennies' typology was not of course 
wor-ked out specifically in a religious context, but attempted 
to elucidate two fundamental modes of human societal 
coexistence. 
Thu:3 Toennies wrote: "All intimate, private and exclusive 
living together is understood as life in Gemeinschatt. 
Gesellschaft is public life- it is the world itself." To the 
former belong the family, marriage, language, folkways and 
beliefs, the common ownership of "fields, forest and pasture"; 
to the latter, business, commerce, the sciences, the ownership 
of "joint stock". Whereas it is possible to fall into bad 
Gesellschaft, bad Gemeinschaft would be a contradiction in 
terms.··· 
Gemeinscbaft 1:'3 a bout the together uf human 
collectivities through affective values, intimacy of relations 
and mutual understanding. It implie; r~ommon conventions and 
143 
unspoken agreements which govern the union of potentially 
disparate or conflicting parties. It rests upon certain shared 
ideals, purposes and meanings which underlie and go beyond 
purely immediate empirical ends and value persons for 
intrinsic reasons rather than the attributes of achievement or 
status. 
Gesellschaft orders the social world by positions and 
offices; it does not distinguish between pel-sow; on affective 
grounds, but offers differential treatment on account of 
qualifications and standing. It expects clearly defined, 
explicit statement of objectives and rationales in all matters 
of co-operation between individuals or groups, but these are 
strictly limited in application to the projects in view, awl 
have no claim upon the private values and personal preferences 
of the individuals involved. 
With regard to religion, Toennies wrote: 
One becomes part of a 1·eligious Gemeinschaft; reli·~ious 
Gesellsch.~ften, like any other groups formed for •;Ji ven 
pw·poses, e~:ist only in so far as they, viewed fl'om 
without, take thei l' places among the institutions of a 
political body or as they represent conceptual elements 
of a theory; they do not touch upon the religious 
6en1einschaft as such (1955:37), 
This suggests a distinction between two forms of religiousness: 
in the one, there is a more or less unreflective or spontaneous 
sharing in a culture that is given- "one becomes part of" it. 
In the other, there is a deliberate entering upon a group 
programme with a definite aim in view, an attempt to put into 
practice "conceptual elements of a theory". The sociology of 
religion has shown a renewed interest in Toennies' typology in 
trying tu explore further these different modes of religious 
orientation. 
Having previously criticised the increasing subdivision of 
the church-sect typology, E .Goode <1968) wAnt nn t:o sugeest: 
that attention to "communal" and "associational" patterns of 
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religiosity might offer a greater purchase upon the social 
realities. Goode observed, for example, that contrary to the 
idea that sectarian religion is less r-itualistic and therefore 
less apt to stress the requirements of formal participation in 
religiow=; rites than church-type religion, most non-practising 
people who profes::;ed any religious belief at all tended to 
profess adherence to church-type rather than sectarian 
religious bodies. Again, whereas sectarian religion was 
supposed to appeal to lm'ler-class groups in society, working-
class people tended to show a high valuation of the ritual-
formal elements of religion more characteristic of churches. 
In order to explain these and other discrepancies, Goode 
argued that it was necessary to distinguish between formal 
religious participation and the salience of religious 
conventions and ways of thinking within the whole culture of a 
person or group. There were, he ,:;uggested, at least two 
distinct styles of religious involvement. One was oriented more 
towards what was strongly felt, shared and communally 
expressed within th•::; culture of a group, while the other was 
more concerned with segmented organizational participation, but 
did not necessarily carry any strong emotional investment. 
Goode added that this suggests that religion in a modern 
society is unlikely to function in a Durkheimian way, for 
official ritual participation may have little to do with any 
awesome or transcendent intimation of the sacred, while many 
who posses'"' a sense of the significance of religion lack the 
corporate involvement in it to unify them into a "moral 
community" around it. 
Goode's analysis took up and developed some of the points 
made earlier by Lenski <1961), who had employed the notions of 
communal awl a,o;;sociational religiosity as analytical 
distinctions in assessing the influence of religion upon 
people's attitudes in other areas of institutional life. Lenski 
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stressed that every religion produces its own communal sub-
culture, which has a membership and scope of influence far 
wider than the numbers of those who actually practise the 
r~eligion. 
Communal religiosity, which becomes inextricably bound up 
with an embracing culture, fosters a resilient but parochial 
view of life. It keeps conservative traditions going, and 
exercises a profound, implicit and unreflective socio-cultural 
influence simply by those who hold to it being who they are-
it is what they ar-e socialized into. This influence may be at 
work in contrary directions to policies being pursued 
explicitly by the churches in their attempt to influence the 
secular society (cf.Martin, 1966(b); Fichter, 1954). 
Such policies generally carry assumptions about the 
normative status of associational religiosity. That is. they 
envisage small groups of persons who regard one another as (in 
this case) "Christians" in a way they clearly do not consider 
others to be. Associational religiosity regards a high-profile 
religious practice, and the pursuit of distinctively religious 
activities, especially in leisure-time (Pickering, 1968), as the 
essence of religious commitment. When secular-social action is 
undertaken through the medium of associational religiosity, it 
has to be seen to be undertaken by the Church or other 
religious group as a matter of policy. 
As a pattern for the institutional canalizing of the 
energies of 
of faith 
faith, communal 
into conformity 
Associational religiosity, 
sterilization of faith 
"environmental pollution". 
religiosity risks the dissipation 
with the surrounding culture. 
on the other hand, risks the 
through over-protection from 
Communal religiosity can be held in bondage to the past, 
but associational religiosity can be rootless, dependent on the 
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dispositions of the changing group of individuals who choose 
to adhere to it. 
The former often fails to support a critical faith because 
it is too closely tied to the pre-reflective task of 
legitimating and stabilizing the community's world-view. But 
the l.atter also fails frequently, because it is purely 
idealistic, and appeals to religious theory as though the 
solution of social problems were merely a matter of its 
application. 
iii. Typological Conclusions. 
It is clear that the church type of religious organization 
bear:3 a special affinity to the communal type of religiosity, 
and the sect type to the associational. But the categories are 
not the same. In dealing with church and sect, we have 
emphasised the criteria and styles of membership within the 
religious collectivity. In the case of communal and 
associational, the stress lies upon the modes of religious 
functioning and orientation within the agent's social life as a 
whole.''· 
Vle have already said that modern conditions encourage the 
passage from church to sect-type religious organizations. 
Similarly, contemporary religiosity is more likely to be 
associational where it is readily identifiable. However, the 
picture is less simple than that, in two respects. Firstly, the 
contemporary churches are very keen on the concept of 
"community", implying a half-formed recognition that something 
has been lost when the associational mode becomes entirely 
dominant. 
Secondly, traditional working-class environments still 
persist in some places where an older style of communal order 
continues to carrv 
J 
with its cultural ctpparatus a set of 
religious ideas and conventions, even if fragmented, declining 
and subject to confusion. But the churches are most alienated 
147 
from the cultural milieux where vestiges of the "community" 
they seek are most likely to be found <Gilbert, 1980:91). 
Further possibilities emerge if the two typologies are put 
together to produce four possible types of overall 
in:3titutional 
are familiar 
religious orientation 7 . The two "dominant" 
enough from all that has gone before. 
types 
They 
involve, of course, a communal religiosity in a church-type 
frame, and an associational one in a sect-type. lw'hat we might 
call the two re:3ul ting "recessive" types deserve further 
mention. 
Th•.:! first would combine a sectarian frame with a 
communal type of religiosity. This possibility is of par-ticular 
relevance under the conditions of secularization, which are 
resulting in smaller, marginalized practising congregations. 
The way for such sociologically sectarian groups to capitalize 
on marginality could be to take re:3ponsi bili ty for the 
community in which they are set and its cultural life; that 1s, 
to refuse to limit their r-eligious specialism to the dearly 
demarcated associational sphere. 
The other possible type would involve bringing together a 
church type of membership 
In this case, the relevant 
with an associational religiosity. 
index of secularization is the 
process of cultural fragmentation 
whereas this is reflected in a move 
and privatization. For 
of religious life toward 
the associational end of the spectrum, a counterbalance to 
ineffective idealism could be afforded by the heightening of 
the religious institution's church-type features- its givenness, 
its traditions, its availability to all-comers. 
These are suggestions which will be taken up in more 
detail in our discussions of the actual proposals of Christian 
Radicalism about the practical life of the churches. But in 
sum, the cultural tradition which channels faith has always to 
be affirmed, in order- to give the movements of religiou:3 life a 
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secure foundation with lasting value; and it has always to be 
denied, in order to make room for what surpasses it. Faith has 
to be bound up with culture in order to be a living organism 
at all; but it bas to retain the leverage to stand aside and 
challenge it. 
This brings to a close the setting out of the sociological 
instruments which are to provide the critical stimulus to the 
discussion of the theological themes of Christian Radicalism 
which follow in Part Three of the thesis. 
VIe have presented, firstly, a view of religion itself as a 
cultural system expressing an orientation to transcendence as 
its core content. Such an orientation, by constructing an other 
world or sacred order conceived as perfected and normative, 
serves both to grant meaning and stability to the experienced 
social world of the religious group, and to criticise it by 
summoning it to become a more fulfilled realization of the 
ideal. The transcendent idea is carried in the images and 
symbols, rites and stories, ethical codes and organizational 
forms which are the outward and visible constituents of the 
religious cultural system. 
Secondly, we have traced the processes of secularization 
which render the maintenance of the transcendent orientation 
problematic under contemporary cultural conditions. Classes of 
secularization process can be analysed into the socio-
structural and the cultural. With the former, institutional 
differentiation and religious disengagement leave the churches 
as marginalized, increasingly specialized religious 
institutions. With the latter, desacralization reduces the 
overall culturally unifying role of religion, but privatization 
and pluralism are leading to a fragmentation of culture in 
which religion too is caught up, as religious options fnr the 
self are divorced from the "real world". 
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Finally, we have shown how the question of recovering the 
vitality of faith in such circumstances has to come to terms 
with the inevitable constraints of institutionalization. In that 
context we have presented two typologies: that of church and 
sect points to two distinctive styles of cultural expression of 
faith by membership within a religious collectivity, and that 
of communal and associational religiosity indicates two modes 
of exercising faith within the world. The juxtaposition of 
these models suggests ways of maintaining the transcendent 
dialectic of religion under present conditions. 
These concepts will now equip us for the task of 
analysing and criticising the attempts of Christian Radicalism 
to discover a viable way of presenting the Gospel and 
embodying it in the life of the Church under the conditions 
of modernity as the theologians of the sixties perceived them. 
NOTES. 
1. For a discussion in general sociological ter~s of the different types of 
organization deriving. froM Weber's, categories of authority, .see A,L,Stinchcombe, 
'Formal Or an1zations", In ed, N.~melser 1 Soc1ology, 1967:1b9-72, According to A,Etzioni (' ·? · , 1%4:58-61 J, churches figure towards the 'normative 
p•)Wer" end of a con inuum of types of rAeans of control exercised by organizations 
over their members, That is, power rests upon the prestige and esteem engendered by 
the authority, This is closest to Weber's "traditional authority', EtZloni argues 
that normative power tends to produce commitment in those exposed to it (by contrast, 
for example, with "coercive po111er", based on physical sanctions, 'ihich produces 
a 1 ienation). 
2, Thus Niebuhr (1929) added the deno~ination, deriving it from the sect at the point 
of its becoming socially established and no longer representative of the deprived, 
while Martin 0962) argued for the presence of the denomination as an independent 
third type, Becker (Systematic SocioloSy 1932) added the "ecclesia' in order to 
distinguish a former "church" under condions where no organization any longer made 
universal clai~s for itself. Yinger (1957l added the "established sect" in 
recognition of the fact that not all sects turn into denominations with ti~e. Yinger 
also introduced the "cult" to cover Troeltsch's third category of "mysticism", 111h1Ch 
he saw as particularly appropriate to the privatized relig1on of the modern age (and 
see Plautz, 1955), 
3, Troeltsch clearly favoured the sect as a more authentic expression of the 
primitive Gospel: 'There can,. ,be no dotJbt about the actual fact: the sects, with 
t-heir greater independence of the wol'!d, and their continual emphasis upon the 
origina1 ideals of Christianity, often represent in a very direct and characteristic 
way the essential iundat1ental ideas of Chnstian1ty'' rTroeltsch, 1931 :335) . 
.4. Wilson's empirically-based work on sects is in Sects and Society, 1961, Patterns 
9f SecM;H~W· 1967, and~~p·~;~~ ~jl;~~ 1971. The Mst m.entgeneral discus.sion 
IS In ' 1n SoClologt e , chs. 4 & 5, Rell91on 1n Secylar Soo»ty, 
chs, 11 b 2, and Contemrorary Transformations of Beligioniscuss sect develop111ent 
in relation to seculariza ion. On this see slso Gilbert, The Making of post-Christian 
e.r..ila.i.n.. Gl•)d and Stark (1965) contains their essay on the relat1onsh1p between the 
emergence of different types of religious organization and varying kinds of 
deprivations: i.e. it is not si~ole a matter of an affinitv between sects and 
material disadvantage, · ' 
5. Toennies' analysis becomes clearer when it is recalled that 6esellschaft in Ger11an 
means not only "society" but also "business" 1 "a company•. Sociologists have proposed 
uny other crite1·ia for "community" than tnat of closeness and affectivity of the 
relations of social coexistence, e,g, Maciver dod Page, Socjek an !ntrodyctory 
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Analysis, 1961:8, "The mark of a community is that one's life may be lived wholly 
t~ithtn it", a definition which actually excludes churches from being communities, 
They said "The bases of community are locality and community sentiment." By contrast 
Webber, Explorations into Urban Structure, 1964;109, wrote: "Communities comprise 
people with common interests who communicate 11ith each other•, excluding the 
territorial criterion altogether, 
6, The communal-associational typology is one of a number of related binary models of 
societal relations and involvements proposed in sociology. One of the earliest 11as 
Durkheim's concept of "mechanical" and organic" solidartty: in the former type, the 
given order is simply accepted as "how things are", whereas in the second, the social 
world is treated as a livtng and developing entity towards the maintenance of which 
Men ~at rdake individual, voluntary contritlutions, Mary Douglas (1974) employed the 
terms grid" and "group": the former refers to the salience of position rather than 
boundanes in the society's "cosfjology" or construction of the world, while the 
latter points to the importance of definin9 •us" by not being "theM". The latter 
type, she argues, favours highly ritualistic, sacramental forMs of religious 
observance •JVer against the expiicttly articulated, discrete propositional meanings 
characteristic of the former, Cf. further Turner (1970) on col/lmunitas and structure; 
Mol (1976) on identity and adaptation; and Reed (1978:69, 1$7-6]) for an extensive 
summary and synthesis describing the features of "communal and associatianal 
churches'. Turner 119831 makes use of Weber's distinction of mass and virtuoso 
religion as an expression of religion's twofold operation in the service of 
tradttional continuities on the one hand and elite ideologies on the other. 
7, Towler (1974: chs,6 & 71 advances a coraplicated typology of religious orientations 
which breaks do\lln the church-sect distinction into the criteria of other-worldly or 
this-worldly, and individualist ot· collectivist orientations, to produce four types 
~hich he compares with Bryan Wilson's typology of four types of sect, He then asks 
about the relation of each type to Glock and Stark's five "di~ensions" of 
religiosity, in order to produce a schema for plotting the direction of 
secuiarizatlon processes as they affect institutional religion, James Beckford has 
also been working recently on the refinement of models of religious orientation as a 
atore fruitful approach than that afforded by the old church-sect typology of 
organizations. We have had to offer a very much simplified typological model in order 
to keep the lines being pursued in the thesis sufficiently clear. 
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PART THREE: EXCURSIONQ_JN THE THEOLOGY OF 
CHRISTIAN RADICAL~ 
CHAPTER VII: SITZ IN LEBE.N: EPISODES IN THE LIFE OF THE_ 
CHURCH. 1960-69. 
1. Introduction and Prospect. 
Now that we have fully presented the :3ociological 
concepts ·which are to inform and stimulate our theological 
critique of Christian Radicalism, we are in a position to 
return in much more detail to the content of the movement as a 
recent historical episode in the life of the churches, as we 
introduced it in Chapter I. This chapter aims to provide a 
concrete setting in life for the theological discussions which 
follow, and to show how the issues to be discussed arise out 
of that setting. This is a necessary task in view of our model 
of theological activity as critical reflection arising at th.e 
interface between the religious tradition and the world. Vle 
want to illustrate how a whole series of debates, controversies 
and events in the church life of the sixties repeatedly threw 
up certain key questions, often implicitly, which cast fresh 
light on the issues the theologians involved were considering 
more explicitly. 
'vle are concentrating most closely, although not 
exclusively, on the English church situation. In the period 
under review, much of the most instructive material is to be 
found in the ephemera of passing controversies and public 
debates, rather than in theological treatises. We shall have 
recourse to the religious press, television and radio 
broadcasts and pulpit pronouncements, together with popular 
paperbacks and conference reports, for much of the 
documentation in this chapter. Christian Radi~Alism romprises a 
series of experiments, fashions and moods rather than a single 
co-ordinated movement, but it is hoped that a pr-e:3entation of 
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some of the more prominent theological and ecclesiastical 
"events" of the time will show a recognisable pattern of 
questions emerging. 
"Je have divided the material into three parts. The first 
documents the flowing together of a number of streams into the 
phenomenon of Chri.stian Radicali:3m early in the sixties. The 
second concentrates on the debate about Honest to God and its 
imm,:.d iate sequel. The third highlights a number of important 
contributions to the mood of radical reform in the churches in 
the course of the decade. Each section will present the 
documentation of relevant debates and events first, and we 
shall conclude with a drawing together of the theoretical 
issues arising out of them. 
2. Landmarks on the Way to Christian Radicalism. 
i. Theological Stirrings. 
In 1962 a group of Cambridge theologians under the 
editorship of Alec Vidler published a volume of essays entitled 
Soundings. This in itself was nothing unusual: in fact, Vidler 
explicitly acknowledged that the book stood in a distinguished 
line of similar collections by earlier Anglican divines', But 
Soundings was noteworthy for its chastened and tentative tone. 
Vidler wrote in the Introduction: 
The authors of this volume cannot persuade themselves 
that the tirne is ripe for maJor works of theolo·~ical 
const1·uction OJ' J'econstJ·uction, It is a time for 
ploU•jhin•J, n>:•t reaping,, ,our task is to try to see what 
the questiGns a1·e that we ought to be f ac in•J in the 
nineteen-sixties, 
Loolrin.:; back on the publication of the volume, Vidler later 
affirm•:!d: 
lie took the view that there was a •Jreat deal of fresh 
exploratory work to be done in the region of fund~mentals 
and that it would be misleading to disguise the fact that 
~e had no new theological construction to propose 
(IJ!dler, 1%S: 104), 
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The essayists certainly did address themselves to 
"fundamentals". But this tone was, in the circumstances of the 
time, quite surprising. The mood of the post-war Church of 
England under Archbishop Geoffrey Fisher seemed optimistic: 
"the Church is in good heart", he had said on his retirement. 
The success of the Parish Communion movement was changing the 
face of Sunday worship in the direction of more lay and family 
involvement. Congregations appeared to be holding up in size. 
The recovery of the nation from war and the inter-war years of 
depression was proceeding encouragingly. The Church was 
hopeful of being able to combine a welcome for social and 
scientific progress with a timely warning against moral 
decline, and so keep modernity Christian. 
But in the pages of Soundings, one could discern fears 
that the Church would be riding for a fall if its intellectual 
base proved inadequate to cope with the encroachments of 
moder-n cultural patterns upon the would-be believer. Howard 
Root wrote of a "pu3t-religious temper" in the world, and the 
need for intellectual integrity and a "preachable Gospel" in the 
Church. H.A.Williams suspected the Church of promoting a 
fundamental dishonesty in its religious life, and concealing 
from religious people the truth about both themselves and the 
world. John Habgood thought that the "truce" between religion 
and science was premature and insufficiently grounded. More 
broadly, in England at least, theological thinking bad never 
come to terms at all profoundly with the issues thrust upon 
Continental theology by Barth, Bultmann and their- respective 
succe:3sors. 
Vidler himself, in his contribution on "Religion and the 
National Church", drew upon Bonhoeffer's prison letters in 
outlining a form of secular faith which he believed a national 
chur-ch might exist to promote. He had already begun to explore 
these ideas in a paper given to the Church Union Summer School 
of Sociology (i.e "Chr-istian Sociology", see supra:32-4) at 
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Oxford in 1956, entitled "Holy Worldliness" <Vidler, 1957). 
These explorations reflected a fear that neither contemporary 
theology nor the churches were taking with full seriousness 
the impact which modern cultural conditions were having upon 
the institutions of religion. 
The t~ssayists were not alone in their fears. In 19'56 the 
Scottish theologian Ronald Gregor Smith had published perhaps 
the first piece of "secular theology" to appear in England, 
The New Man. It was explicitly inspired at various points by 
Tillich, Bultmann and Bonhoeffer, all three of whom were to 
appear later as the theological sources for the Bishop of 
Woolwich in Honest to God. In particular, Smith s"howed at this 
early stage a deep concern for how people might live as 
Chri:3tians under modern cultural conditions. He called for a 
"this-worldly transcendence" as the authentic form of the life 
of faith for contemporary man. He abhorred the idea of a 
Church "standing over the world with a whip" <1956 :68f.) to 
borwbeat people into a religious package, to be accepted vfi th 
take-it-or-leave-it finality. But in 1956 there was as yet 
little hearing for such ideas. 
Another radical thinker in advance of the event was 
E.R.Wickham, whom we encountered previously <supra:37-8) in 
connection with "religious sociology". Wickham, his 
work with the Sheffield Industrial Mission, was under no 
illusions about the real state of much contemporary church 
life. The closing sections of his Church and People in an. 
Industrial City (1957) made use of Tillich's idea.s about a 
"theonomou:3" culture. Wickham observed that the Church's long 
history of failure in the industrialised urban areas involved a 
fundamental misconception. A Church could not successfully 
infuse a Christian character into culture- i.e. produce 
theonomy while aL Lhe same time sacralizing a particular 
social order- i.e. assuming that some kind of theonomy already 
exh;ted. 
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One more small book which took up the ideas of Bonhoeffer 
was Daniel Jenkins' Beyond Religion (1962). Jenkins made plain 
the link between the purely theological implications of 
Bonhoeff-er's speculations and the question of the kind of body 
the Church is to be, as a concrete ::;ocial pr-esence, within a 
secular civilization. He acknowledged, at the start of the book, 
that "religionless Christianity" was "in danger of becoming a 
catc:h-phrase". This remark, coupled with the fact that hi:3 book 
appeared in the semi-popular "Religious Book Club" series put 
out by the SCM Press, bore witness to a gradual spilling over 
of these theological issues into a wider public. 
ii. Agitation for Church Reform. 
The second factor i.n the emergence of Christian 
Radicalism before Honest to God was an upsurge of criticism of 
the institutional Church. A strong reforming tradition had been 
in evidence for some time among a number of younger ch"rgy, 
many of whom had emerged from the post-war renewa.l of 
religious life at Oxford. Most of them belonged to the 
moderately Catholic tradition in the Church of England, and had 
been influenced by the liturgical movement, behind which lay 
the scholarly work of Gregory Dix and Gabriel Hebert. Their 
interests were represented by the Parish and People movement, 
which was led in the sixties by such figures a::; Trevor Beeson 
and Eric James. Several of the young Catholic reformers became 
curates or incumbents under the episcopacy of Mervyn Stockwood 
at Southwark in the early sixties. 
The work of these reforming clergy was characterized by a 
frustration with the ecclesia::;tical machinery which they had 
inherited, and a desire to see more flexible structures 
designed to enable the Church to engage with a changing world. 
They did not, in the early ::;tages, lean towards any kind of 
"secular theology". Rather, they interpreted the Gospel in terms 
of a fundamental opposition to the world, and wanted to see a 
more committed, more clearly delineated, if numerically smaller 
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Church. They tended to be impatient with folk-religion and 
nominal attachment, preferring to think in terms of a 
corporately committed Church existing for the world, in order 
to transform it~. 
The Anglican monthly journal Prism was at its foundation 
in 1957 very much the organ of the Catholic "ginger-group" 
among th<:> younger clergy. David Edwards wrote of it, "To 
contribute to Prism ... is to be typecast as an angry young man, 
although you may be a nun discussing the atonement" (Edwards 
and Robinson, 1963:21-2). Prism even discovered and encouraged 
its own enfants terribles, such as Roger Tennant, a former 
missionary priest in Korea whose trenchant style became a 
byword among "Prismatics", as the monthly's regular readers and 
contributors came to be known. 
Frism gathered up and expressed very crisply the mood of 
exasperated affection, commitment and impatience toward the 
Church which appeared, with varying emphases, in such books as 
the collection Essays in Anglican Self-Criticism 0958), David 
Edwards' Nat Angels but Anglicall.§. <1958), Nick Earle's What's 
Wrong with the Church? <1961> and Eric James' Odd Man Out 
<1962). As time went by it lost its Catholic theological and 
ecclesiological bias and became more and more involved in the 
promotion of the emerging radicalism, publishing for example a 
good deal of new material by such lay theologians as James 
Mark and John Wren-Lewis. Its irreverent and iconoclastic style 
made it into a popular ecclesiastical equivalent to the 
television "satire" boom of the early sixties. 
But the clientele of Prism remained very much a minority 
within the Church at large. The journalist Paul Ferris, whose 
The Church of England was a cool and timely analysis by an 
avowed outsider, described the more widespread popular image 
of the radicals, as their reputation mounted, in these terms: 
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There are convenient categories in which to put clergymen 
\jith uncomfortable ideas,, ,They can be written off as 
academics: not for them the hurly-burly of a tough parish 
in Bradford or Bristol, but co•)l cloisters and dangerous 
books by foreign theologians, from which they raise their 
heads only to appear on television- egged on by producers 
to compete with Evensong by broadcasting ruderies about 
the Church, Or they can be scooped up in a phrase- 'the 
Camb1·idge school of theolo•Jians', or, better still, 
'South Bank Religion' (Fel'l·is, 1964:9l, 
Ferris' remarks here refer to the increasing media attention 
being paid to the bearers of radical ideas and criticisms of 
the Church. Before lookins more •:::losely at this "media factor", 
we must add a further strand to the developing pattern of 
radicalism. 
iii. The New Morality. 
The one area in which, it was confidently assumed, the 
Church could continue to claim a special competence to give 
instruction and lay down principles with authority, was that of 
morality. Throughout the period of Christian Radicali:3m, 
reactions to clerical pronouncements em moral is:::;ues formed a 
kind of running commentary on the wider progres:3 and reception 
of what the radicals were attempting to do. Some examples of 
this will follow. 
Much attention was directed to the contributions of 
H.A.\Villiams to both Soundings and the 1963 Cambridge lecture 
series Objections to Christian Belief. In each of the:3e pieces 
Williams argued that the traditional way of Christian morality 
as apparently taught and required by the Church was repressive 
and not conducive to true moral growth. He was prepared to 
urge that, contrary to the traditional teachings, such things 
as extra-marital sexual activity could have redemptive 
consequences, by contributing to personal wholeness in love. 
\Villiam:3 said as much on television in October 1961, and 
triggered off a barrage of angry correspondence as a result. 
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Still earlier than this, John Robinson had become 
something of a cause cel~bre by giving evidence in favour of 
the publication of Lady Chatterley's Lover at the obscenity 
trial of October 1960. His remark that "what Lawrence is 
tr-ying to do is to portray the sex relationship as something 
essentially sacred ... as in a real sense an act of holy 
communion" was a 
most of those 
piece of "secular 
who heard of 
theology" far beyond what 
it could take. Several 
correspondents in the Press at the time attributed the Profumo 
s·:::andal at least in part to the morally deleterious effects of 
"Woolwic:h theology". 
The 1962 Reith Lectures by G.M.Carstairs, in which the 
assumption that chastity is a virtue necessary for social 
cohe::;ion was questioned, and the widely-disseminated report 
Toward a QuakPr View of Sex, were regarded by many as equally 
damaging. Pulpit pronouncements served to reinforce the 
impre::;sion that the clergy were deserting their role as the 
guardians of public mm-al::; in favour of dangerously liberal 
modern ideas. Robinson, for example, preached an impassioned 
sermon against the death penalty, in Canterbury Cathedral of 
all places, while Canon Douglas Rhymes of Southwark Cathedral 
used the pulpit there to deliver a denunciation of Christian 
prejudice against homosexuals. 
The traditional views which reacted to all this with 
widespread dismay can easily be documented from other issues. 
In June 1963, for example, the editor of the evangelical journal 
The Churchman wrote of the "sex-obsessed elucrubations" 
(sic/and "poisonous swill" of books like Lady Chatterley's 
~. with which people could "stuff their lower natures". He 
went on to deplore the introduction into schools of "godle::;s" 
text-books, containing contributions by the likes of Julian 
Huxley; and he noted ominously that the Bishop of Woolwich was 
known to have spoken approvingly of the latter. 
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In a different context, Monica Furlong records the 
occasion on which 
Methodist Circuit 
the entire membership of a Derbyshire 
successful satirical 
In tr i3ued by the 
petitioned 
review, 
unanimity 
the BBC 
That Was 
of the 
against the highly 
The Week That Was. 
move, Furlong asked: 
"Have ... all 900 of them ... ever protested en masse before'? About 
the H-Bornb perhaps, or about apartheid, or about hanging? So 
far· .3.s anyone knows, no" (Furlong, 1965:24-5>. 
Clearly, a wide guli of incomprehension was openinz up; 
and growing media attention was doing much to bring the gulf 
to light, but little towards bridging it. 
iv. The Media Factor. 
The emergence of all the constituents of the radical mood 
introduced so far was greatly furthered by the coverage of the 
media. During the early sixties, controversies concerning the 
churches, and indeed theology itself, were increasingly coming 
into the public domain. Theological cats were more frequently 
being let out of their safe academic bags into the floodlight 
glare of Press and television. Some of the broadcast statements 
about which complaints were received can be set down here in 
order to illustrate the prevalent mood. 
Speaking on the radio in April 1960, H.A.Williams ventured 
the view that faith does not mean "believing what you know 
isn't true". In the case of faith in the Resurrection, for 
example, he said that it meant "having such confidence in thi:3 
personal God that you can't believe that death is the end". Of 
the risen Jesus, Williams said: "The force of his presence upon 
hi:3 disciples was so terrific that they did in fact project it 
into a vision of himself." The fact that these ideas are 
commonplace in theological circles has to be juxtaposed with 
the whole array of assumptions underlying the ho:3tility vlith 
which they were received outside those circles. 
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That Williams got himself into trouble was perhaps not 
surprising. For well before the appearance of Honest to God he 
had told Paul Ferris, almost as a casual aside, that "everyone 
would agre~' that it was now quite orthodox to refer to God as 
"the ground of all being" <Ferris, op.cit:264-7 J. But even the 
new Archbishop of Canterbury, Michael Ramsey, incurred 
critic ism for saying in the Daily Nail that he "expected to 
meet some present day atheists in heaven". The editorial in the 
Church Times, in response, argued that if this were so, it 
would remove from many faithful priests the motive for 
evangelization and invalidate their labours. 
The decision of tl1e Cambridge Divinity Faculty to entitle 
its open lectures series for 1963 Objections to Christian 
Belief was calculated to attract attention. There was, again, a 
widespread astonishment that four theologians should agree to 
speak in public, ostensibly at least, about what counted 
against the faith they were employed to expound and teach. But. 
this safely academic venture was a modest exercise in 
"vulgarization" compared with other "media events" entered into 
by the churches during the same period. 
These included, for example, various attempts to get in 
touch with young people through the medium of pop culture. At 
Salisbury Cathedral a "Pop Evensong" was held, which produced 
the response from one critic: "It does not speak very highly 
for the standard of preaching nowadays if the only method of 
drawing people to Church is to pander to their worst 
instincts" <Church Times, 6.4.62). John Robinson went on lTV's 
youthful religious magazine Sunday Break to be quizzed by a 
group of critical teenagers; and the Archbishop of York, Donald 
Coggan, discussed God, sex and the younger generation with pop 
singer Adam Faith on the BBC <Coggan said, "Religion is so 
jolly relevant to this life"). Elsewhere, even the agnostic 
journalist and author of cult novel Absolute Beginners, Colin 
Macinnes, found himself in the unlikely po:::;ition of writing 
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about the Church and presenting his tentative religious views 
on television <Macinnes, 1963). 
The event we have chosen to illustrate the media factor 
in greater depth is an edition of BBC Television's serious 
religious di:::.cussion programme, Jtfeeting Point, which went out 
on November 4th, 1962. The programme featured Alec Vidler in 
conversation with Paul Ferris, but it was Vidler rather than 
the self-confessed outsider l'lho caused controversy by failing 
to assume the role of the Church's defender. Amongst Vidler 's 
remarks were the opinion that the Church ought not to 
concentrate so much on "religion", that open discussion ought 
to replace the sermon, and that he was "bored with parson:3" 
and thought the "clerical caste" ought to be abolished. He also 
maintained that "there's been so much suppression of real, deep 
thought and intellect, alertness and integrity in the Church." 
The Church Times reported on the programme under the 
headline, "Cambridge Priest's Attack. on Church":'. In response, a 
woman wrote to the paper thus: 
Those of us who a1·e st1·ug·~lin·~ to teach the young and 
uphold our Churchmanship in a matenalist world are not 
helped when her ordained ministers themselves deny all 
that we have received and learnt to hold most dear, 
Monica Furlong observed that this correspondent 
, , ,clearly has an heroic fantasy of herself battling 
against the wicked wo1·ld with a kind of Lady Bountiful 
sweetness, But is life like this? Is trying to be a 
Christian like this? (Furlong, 1965;29), 
There were calls for the Archbishops to set up an enquiry . + 1!1 •• o 
the content of religious broadcasting, an issue which in fact 
continued to cause spasmodic concern for several years. 
But another Church Times correspondent saw 
differently: 
would have thought them [the Archbishops] better 
occupied in finding out why so many of us stay at home on 
Sunday evening to watch l'feeting Point, Here at least we 
it 
162 
are saved from quaint hymns and endless sermons preached 
from 'six feet above public opinion' and with an 
assurance which many lay folk suspect (.] ,Richa1·ds, 
16' 11 ,62J' 
The Church Times left the last word to the Bishop of Woolwich, 
who wrote on December 7th to say that, far from these radical 
ideas being the product of a common-room, ivory tower 
mentality, it was only since he bad ceased to be 3 Cambridge 
don and had come face to face with the acute problems 
confronting Christian faith in the inner city that he had come 
to appreciate such thinking. He had, he said, written a book 
out of his experience, which was shortly forthcoming. 
v. Issue:s. 
We have singled out some theological stirrings, agitations 
for Church reform, moral pronouncements and heightened media 
attention to religious controversy as factors of a radical 
mood, in the emergence of which the publication of Honest to 
Q.Qd. came as something as a watershed. The theological issues 
latent in these early movements can be summarized at this 
point. 
Firstly, there was uncertainty about the continuing value 
of religion, as conventionally understood, as a vehicle for 
conveying the reality of God to contemporar-y men and women. 
Religious worship, in particular, appeared to be highly 
problematic. It was what the Church, to all intents and 
purposes, specialised in; yet it seemed a useless and 
irrelevant specialism. To put it at its briefest, "what goes on 
inside churches" was being called into que:stion. 
Secondly, there was a sense that the relationship of the 
Church to the modern world would have to come under review. It 
had been a case of the Church combining a judicious welcome of 
some aspects of progress with a habit o1 deploring others, 
notably in the moral :3phere. But now the is:sue was becoming 
sharper. If the vitality of faith was to be preserved at all, 
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the pressures were towards a more far-reaching adaptation to 
the modern world on the one hand, or a more vehement 
confrontation of it on the other. A polarization was beginning 
to appear between the parties recommending one or the other of 
these alternatives. 
Thirdly, questions were being raised about the 
authoritative status of the Church's dogmatic and moral 
teachings. It was being asked whether faithful Church 
membership was compatible with a spirit of critical, open 
enquiry towards these things. The gradual appearance of a gulf 
between certain purveyors of radical thinking and the religious 
public was forcing the issue: how, if at all, was theological 
questioning compatible with "simple faith"? 
Attention to all of these issues was being made more 
urgent by the factor of media coverage. However, one event 
served above all others to sharpen them all: and that, of 
course, was the publication of Honest to God in 1963. 
3. The Honest to God Debate. 
The debate about Honest to God has been extensively 
documented and discussed, some would say to the point of 
overkill. VIe do not wish simply to reproduce the familiar 
accounts here, but to isolate several related strands in the 
high-profile public controversy, in order to indicate the 
underlying theological questions they imply. 4 
It is noteworthy, as a preliminary point, that the two 
sections of the book which attracted most attention at the 
time were the opening chapters about changing the "image" of 
God from either "up there" or "out there" to a depth model, and 
later one on tt1e "new morality". Both of these had been 
preceded by media treatment: the former in Robinson's Observer 
article of March 17th 1963, entitled "Our Image of God Must 
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Go", and the latter through the Bishop's earlier involvement in 
the "Lady Chatterley" trial. And both God and morality are 
matters with which, in the popular esti:nation, religion and, 
a fortiori, bishops, ought most fervently to be defending. 
We shall examine the debate under the headings of three 
of the accusations most commonly levelled at Robinson during 
its course. 
i. "A Bishop shouldn't have written it". 
A sympathetic reviewer of the book, C.L.Mitton in the 
Expository Times, wrote that it was "fundamentally not an 
essay in unorthodox theology, but a venture in evangelism". 
Robinson was prepared to accept this: he said that he was 
"trying to help those who are on the fringe of the faith or 
quite outside it. This concern determines almost every line of 
what I wrote". The propriety of this aim, and of a bishop 
seeking to fulfil it in the way Robinson did, was differently 
evaluated in the two main organs of the Church Press. 
The editorial of the Church of England Newspaper pointed 
out that a reading of the book "should be accompanied by a 
recollection of the conspicuous failure of the Church of 
England as a whole to make Christianity meaningful to this 
generation". 
The Church Times, however, declared roundly: "It is not 
every day that a bishop goes on public record as apparently 
denying almost every Christian doctrine of the Church in which 
he holds office". 
Robinson, as we noted in Chapter I, chose to regard 
himself as a "radical", which for him meant a committed 
insider, dedicated to getting at the roots of what Gospel and 
Church are about and to fostering fresh growth from those 
roots in the present time. He believed that the idea of a 
"missionary bishop" was fully compatible with such a task 
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<Edwards and Robinson, 1963:240-1). Others disagreed, but for 
diametrically opposed reasons. 
Firstly, there were the critics who simply rejected the 
idea that a bishop should undertake this kind of exercise at 
all. Even the Archbishop of Canterbury expressed regret 
publicly before the Convocation of Canterbury on May 6th, 1963, 
that the bishop should have become so embroiled with the media 
in putting forward what inevitably looked like a damaging 
thesis. 
Less guardedly, an angry correspondent in the Church 
Times found it intolerable that a "junior bishop" should have 
written a "cheap paperback" of this sort. 
But other:c; doubted whether it was possible for Robinson 
to accomplish the task he had set himself, simply because he 
was a bishop, and hence identified with the religious 
establisbent. This was the view of Methodist John J .Vincent 
<1965:84££.), who saw little likelihood of the Church of 
England, let alone one of its bishops, turning into an agent of 
what be termed "radical discipleship". 
Similarly, in a radio broadcast in which Robinson and his 
wife Ruth took part in December 1963 with 'Werner and Lotte 
Pelz, Mrs.Pelz expressed anxiety lest people who were otherwise 
attracted by what Robinson was saying were put off by his 
appearing to be safeguarding himself within the Church.s 
The first group of critics, in our judgment, did not 
merely expect conservative conformity from their Church 
leaders. They testified to certain assumptions about the 
institutions of religion and the dispositions and demeanour 
proper to a bishop as the religious personality par excellence. 
They feared a sell-ollt. t.o secularity, ·..;hich woulu erode the 
particular dignity and mystery attaching to a bishop, a quality 
of detachment and difference which symbolized the over-
againstne:3s of religion towards ordinary life. Ultimately, the 
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proper modality of the presence of God amid human affairs was 
felt to be at stake. What Robinson did, in his courting of the 
popular media, and what he wrote, in terms of a "non-religious" 
style of faith, hung together perfectly, and damagingly, in the 
perception of these critics. 
The other group, not surprisingly in view of this, were 
those who were personally much more committed to 
"re1igionle:3sness". They suspected that a bishop could not but 
be "religious", and felt that Robin::;on 's keenness to remain a 
crith:;al insider gave the game away. This was very much the 
attitude of the participants in the American "death of God" 
debate, who were 
radical theology 
much less sanguine about the possibility of 
being done within the existing Church or 
religious framework (Miller, 1967; W.Hamilton, 1968 (b); Hordern, 
1 96.'\:142££; Ogletree, 1966: ch.l). 
The existence in America, as against Britain, of a 
super-ficially thriving church life with fast-growing 
congregations, no doubt contributed to the sense that the 
serious theologian must disassociate himself from all that. For 
the American churches displayed a kind of secularized religion 
which was not at all the same thing as the secular form of 
faith for which the theologian was striving. In England, by 
contrast, the most committed insider could regard himself as 
somewhat "eccentric" within the spread of cultural life as a 
whole. 
The argument about whether or not it was appropriate, or 
eveu possible, for a bishop to be a radical as Robinson 
understood it, raises therefore in our view a set of questions 
about the nature and social role of religion and religious 
institutions, related to the theological understanding of how 
God is present and may be known in h1Jrnnn experience of the 
world. 
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ii. "It gives in to secularism". 
A second area of contention over Honest to God was 
whether the Bishop was correct in his diagnosis of the 
situation, i.e. that "secularization" was rendering traditional 
forms of Gospel presentation and church life unintelligible and 
irrelevant; and, correspondingly, whether his proposed remedy 
of a fairly modest adaptation to the circumstances was well-
advised. 
A random glance at a single letters page of the Church 
Times at the height of the controversy <April 11th, 196.3> 
indicates the issues. One lady wrote to say that if the coming-
of-age of the world meant that such theologians as Augustine 
and Aquinas, Hooker, Lightfoot, Gore and Temple no longer had 
anything to say, then she would prefer to remain a "child". 
On the same lines, another correspondent suggested that 
it was impertinent to treat the great galaxy of past divines 
as no more than "rather brilliant teenagers" by comparison 
with modern man. 
A third produced a list of twentieth-century pastors and 
apologists who, it wa'3 argued, had all succeeded in getting 
through to "the common people" without revising the Gospel in 
order to do so. 
One vicar attacked Robinson's methods: "Addressing 
agnostics with agnostici,3m will never convert them". Another 
accused the bishop of. "capitulating to the modern outlook of 
today"; he wrote: 
It needs far more intelligence and courage these days to 
stick to the Faith than to shout with the crowd and to 
echo the platitudes of the ignorant and the irreligious, 
We may term the issue here the choice between a stance of 
adaptation or of confrontation towards the processes of 
modernity. The most vitriolic critics of Robinson were those 
who favoured only the latter and saw him as having gone 
overboard for the former. 
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An illustration of the issue in less polarized form 
occurred in a radio broadcast, in the same series as the one 
featuring the Robinsons and the Pelzes referred to earlier6 • In 
it Max Vlarren and James Packer, both orthodox churchmen but on 
the broader and much more conservative wings of evangelicalism 
respectively, engaged in a discus:3ion of "recent controversial 
books". Packer was prepared to agree with Robinson's intentions 
insofar as the Church "cut vet-y little ice in the modern 
world". Little of what he called "pulpit talk" had much "cash 
value" today, but nonetheless Robinson bad "thrown out the baby 
with the bath-water". 
Vlarren 's response to thi:3 was to say that Robinson was 
trying to build a bridge across a "void of incomprehension". He 
pointed out that men are not wholly responsible for what they 
can and cannot readily respond to in terms of belief: there are 
social, cultural and historical factors which affect the manner 
in which the same Gospel words that are preached will be 
received. If we believe that this age no less than any other 
lies under the control of God, then we must accept that the 
ways in to faith through the particular perplexities and 
constraints of the age will differ from what we have come to 
regard as normal. 
But Packer was not convinced. He felt that Robinson's 
"bridge" would not do if it attempted to put the message in 
wholly secular terms. The Gospel must show "secular man" that 
he is "out of step with God" before it can present to him the 
way of salvation. The fact that people fail to respond to this 
is not, and never has been, a function merely of cultural 
difficulties. The Church's first duty is patiently to tell the 
whole New Testament story: it is for God to "quicken hearts". 
It is plain that a discussion of this sort will degenerate 
into a dialogue de sourds without some agreed and adequate 
approach to the whole question of secularization. 
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iii. "It's upsetting to simple believers". 
The third area of critic ism of Honest to God centres upon 
the alleged impropriety of unleashing radical theological ideas 
upon an unsuspecting religiou:; public. 
sides to the issue: firstly, whether 
In fact there are two 
faith admits of a 
radically critical and que:;tioning attitude towards its 
traditions at all, and secondly, even if it does, whether the 
simple faith of ordinary folk should be exposed to this. Bound 
up with all of this, of course, is the question of whether a 
bishop, of all people, should be the one to be doing the 
questioning, but we have already looked at this from a slightly 
different point of view. 
Within a generally critical judgment upon Robin:;on, 
attitudes varied. One disillusioned clergyman wrote to Prism in 
June 1963 to complain that Honest to God had made matters 
worse for him. He already felt his ministry to be an 
irrelevance to an apathetic population, and now even some of 
his small congregation were being driven away. Others, however, 
saw Robinson as doing harm to an otherwise potentially 
thriving ministry. 
Nicholas Mosley sparked off a debate in the pages of 
Prism by arguing in an article in June 1964 that the constant 
concern of the Church to avoid upsetting the "faithful few", 
which it rationalized theologically as "not offending the 
weaker brethren"7 , was bogus. It merely served to surrender the 
sharp edge of the Gospel into the hands of a powerful, 
reactionary minority. But in the present situation, the Parable 
of the Lost Sheep had effectively been reversed- the ninety-
and-nine had gone astray, and it was indefensible for the 
Church to devote all its energies to the protection of the one 
left safely in the fold. 
Reactions were immediate and mixed. Giles Hunt, for 
example, maintained that there remained a distinction between 
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what could and ought to be said freely in a parish sermon and 
"in the Cambridge S.C.R." 
On the other hand, Roger Tennant invoked the example of 
Je:3us himself in support of readiness to give offence where 
ne•:::essary (Prism, August 1964). 
A year later still, a clergyman who had been responsible 
for an early experiment in putting the liturgy into modern 
English, Guy Daniel, wrote bluntly of the need to expose the 
Church's "sacred cows". The average congregation, he said, 
betrayed a "terrible conservativism and sheer closed-
mindedness". They needed to be introduced to the issues of 
radical theology and Biblical criticism, even if it meant 
emptying the pews to make way for a new, open and committed 
congregation CPris1n, July 1965). 
"The Church", Paul Ferris had remarked, "is full of people 
saying 'Sh-h-h!'" <Ferris, op.cit:262). There was, it seemed, an 
"ordinary, simple Christian" who was evidently living out n 
pure and uncomplicated faith very effectively, but would have 
this fai tl1 destroyed by exposure to critical ideas. Monica 
Furlong suspected that this Christian was a myth: 
He had had his faith shattered by reading Dr,Robinson's 
adicle in The Observer, it seemed, (lf he was that 
simple, though, one wonders that he read The Observer at 
all.) [He] had discovered that his Mum and Dad had not 
gone to heaven when they died, that heaven was not 'up 
there', that prayers were no ·~ood, that fornication ~·as 
all right (Furlon·~, op,cit;30), 
If the simple Christian does exist in this way, we have 
to ask how far it is in the interests of the religious 
establishment that he should continue to do so. The furore over 
the dangerous ideas made public by Robinson raises crucial 
questions about the nature of the operation of faith in its 
cultural context, and especially whether it can be effective in 
the world on a secure basis without ruling out openness to the 
new and keeping believers in an immabJrP dependence on 
authority and tradition. 
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The issues we have tried to exhibit as they emerged from 
the Honest to God debate recur in a variety of ways throughout 
the episodes involved in the radicalism of the sixties. In the 
rest of this chapter, we pick out a number of items for 
particular study, each of which played a significant role in 
the radical constituency within the churches. Our four samples 
are taken in the pastoral experiments in the Diocese of 
Soutbwark, the Paul Report <The DPployment and PaymPnt of the 
Clergy), the influence of the thinking of the World Council of 
Churches, and the content:::; of the journal New Christian. 
4. Contributions to a "New Reformation". 
i. The Stacey Affair. 
A distressed bishop wrote in 1966, "Much evidence 
suggests that there is a deep-seated and widely-spread death-
wish in the Church of England" <R.R.Williams, 1966:10). He went 
on: 
An obvious element in the si iuaiion is what m1·~ht be 
called 'failure propaganda'- widely publicised statements 
to the effect that in this way or that the mission of the 
Chu1·ch 'has failed' (ibid), 
One such "widely publicised statement" of failure was the 
article "A Mission's Failure: The Story of One Church in Pagan 
Britain", published in The Observer colour supplement on 
December 6th 1964, and written by Nicholas Stacey, the former 
Rector of Woolwich in the diocese of Southwark. While the 
Bishop of Woolwich was refusing to allow radical theology to 
remain a talking point for dons and deans alone, clergy of the 
dioce:::;e in v1hich he was a suffragan were likewi:::;e attempting 
to apply radical ideas to parochial ministry, and a 
traditionalist bishop like Williams of Leicester found the 
whole affair bewildering. 
The large urban parish of Woolwich had become the focal 
point of experimental ministry in Southwark diocese, encouraged 
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by the bishop, Mervyn Stockwood. He had put Nick Stacey, one 
of the young Oxford Catholic reform-minded priests referred to 
earlier, in charge of a team of curates, together with 
ministers of other denominations and some engaged in secular 
occupations, with the mandate: "Build up a team of clergy and 
for God's sake do anything to show the people of Woolwich that 
the Church exists" Ccf. Mehta, 1966:83-97; Bentley, 1978:40-45). 
A number of unusual measures had been taken by Stacey at 
Woolwich. One redundant church had been demolished and another 
converted into a bingo hall, of which Stacey wrote that it had 
"done more to create a community spirit in a slum corner of 
the parish than anything else we have done". Unused aisles in 
the parish church were sealed off to provide a coffee-bar for 
teenagers, and a discotheque wa::; run in the crypt. There was 
office accommodation and a Citizens' Advice Bureau on the 
premises. Lunches were provided for local shop and office 
workers, and a branch of The Samaritans wa::; set up. Stacey 
wrote of "a great hive of compassion and love and social 
concern and worship and fellowship operating from that 
building". 
Yet the experiment ended with Stacey's resignation, not 
only from the parish, but from the parochial ministry 
altogether, in a blaze of publicity. Treating the Woolwich 
mission as a failure, Stacey went into a career with the Social 
Services, and much later reiterated the pessimism about the 
institutional church which had led to his decision to resign: 
The structur~s as we have them of full-time clergymen and 
lots of bui l•jin·~s and a lat··~e numbe1· of o1·ganizations, 
and the Church's role as a sort of Third Estate of the 
land, with the bishops in the H•)USe of Lords and the 
status of the hierarchy, all that has massively declined 
and will continue to de(line reentley, op,cit:40l, 
Stacey felt that there was little support or understanding from 
the Church at large for what he was trying to do at Woolwich; 
moreover the actual congregation there stubbornly refused to 
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grow much larger despite all the experimental measures. Out of 
the episode, we wish to focus on two unresolved questions, in 
line with our overall analysis of the period. 
The first arises out of Stacey's disappointment that 
attendances at organized worship remained so low. His friend 
and colleague Eric James, then the Director of Parish and 
People and rector of another urban parish in Southwark, was 
surprised that Stacey had even been thinking in terms of 
pos,:;ible numerical success. In an article in Prism in February 
1965, he asked whether Stacey could have forgotten that 
, , ,adhet·ence to the Body of Christ- if the Church is to 
set've and penetrate the world as it is- will necessitate 
a breakdown of the old stt·uctures of Church 1 i fe and the 
development of far more unstructured patterns, 
Stacey, it seemed, had retained certain unexamined assumptions 
about "religion" and churchgoing which had jeopardized his 
capacity to judge the success or otherwise of what he was 
doing. 
An attempt was made to bring to light the hidden agenda 
concerning the meaning and priority of formal religious 
practice in the Church's missionary aims in an edition of BBC 
Television's Meeting Point in which Stacey, James and Stockwood 
took part in a studio discussion following a film report on 
the Woolwich experiments. The programme's chairman, Robert 
McKenzie, tried to focus attention on getting a "straight 
answer" to the question whether success was ultimately 
dependent upon getting people to religious worship in Church. 
While Stockwood prevaricated, Stacey insisted that "the 
Church has traditionally taught that man is a worshipping 
animal; the Church is structured on the basis that worship is 
important". But James broadened the issue into wanting "to see 
the Church to helping live at depth ... to help 
people to be human and to live in community". The precise 
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meaning and place of religion remained unresolved and largely 
unexamined. 
The second question is clearly seen in Stacey's apparent 
readiness to speak of the parish around him as "pagan". 
Theologically, he approached the situation with a model of a 
clearly defined and separated Church, set as a witnessing 
community in the midst of an unbeli.:~ving world. Yet, he was 
prepared in pastoral work to go to immense lengths to meet 
people on their own ground. He sought to minister to the 
perceived needs of the community as though the proper 
application of the Gospel were the enrichment of people's lives 
at that level. 
But a community which saw itself as already in some 
sense Christian, by contrast with Stacey's evaluation of it as 
pagan, was quite happy to accept the Church's ministrations at 
the level at which the Church was proffering them. Stacey's 
frustration arose out of the mis-match between the results of 
a chosen pastoral strategy and his own underlying theological 
preferences. 
The Woolwich experiment, then, betrays an insufficient 
grasp of the complexity of the situation vis-a-vis "secular 
society". Stacey wanted to believe in a unique and specialised 
religious mission for the Church. He also wanted to pursue a 
policy of broad and generalized community involvement as a 
conception of mission in tandem with secular social agencies. 
Such a position generates severe tensions, which Stacey himself 
was only able to resolve by opting unambiguously for a single 
alternative, i.e. that of secular social work. 
To these dilemmas might be added the point which recurs 
throughout the episodes covered in this chapter, to the effect 
that attempts at radical thinking and practice were widely 
misunderstood in the Church. There was, in the Stacey affair, 
the familiar polarization between ideas about radical change 
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and creative faith on the one hand, and assumptions about 
simple believers and traditional continuities on the ather, 
with tao little understanding between supporters of either 
side. 
ii. The Paul Report. 
In his Report on The Deployment and Payment of the 
Clergy, Leslie Paul deliberately set aside the more theoretical 
and theological questions in order to observe his brief of 
giving absolute priority to practical organizational questions. 
He was, however. well aware of the inseparability of theology 
from practice (see especially Paul, 1968 & 1973), and the range 
of critical responses to his Report indicate that the crucial 
questions remained implicit in it. Two elements in the response 
will serve to make this clear. 
Paul intended to lay bare the structural problems brought 
about by the Church of England's organizational life being 
geared to a social pattern, i.e. medi·~val feudalism, which had 
long since passed away. Nevertheless, his Report was attacked 
for the "bureaucratic rationalization" it seemed to envisage. 
Archdeacon Guy Mayfield, the author of sociographic and 
statistical studies of the Church, wrote to the Church Times 
deploring the "failure" of the Report to acknowledge that the 
Church and its clergy could not simply be treated as any 
"organization", but cansti tuted something sui generis, not to be 
understood without taking account of the Hal y Spirit. 
The criticisms of Bryan Wilson in Theology (1965> lent a 
somewhat back-handed support to this view, by maintaining that 
professional rationalization would lead to internal 
secularization and loss of "distinctive religious contents" in 
the Church. Since Wilson also believed that these contents 
themse l ve,:; 
us", his 
were "geared to a society that is no longer with 
strictures scarcely held out much hope to 
conservatives who wanted to appeal to such arguments as 
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grounds for keeping things as they were, but the underlying 
point remains. 
It is the idea that there is something about the 
distinctively religious which might easily be damaged by 
forcible adaptation of the Church to modernity. A need is 
sensed, but not fully articulated, for the preservation of some 
shift into otherness, some break with prevailing structures and 
meanings, as a condition for the effective operation of 
religion. As another Church Times correspondent put it sharply, 
''[We are told that] a reorganization of the Church will enable 
it to speak more clearly to the modern world. Is it permissible 
to ask what the Church of England is to say?' 
Among the practicaJ. issues tackled by Paul concerning the 
training, deployment and payment of the clergy, the use and 
location of church buildings, and the legal setting-up of 
parishes, with patronage and parson's freehold, it was around 
the latter that most debate crystallised. This is the second 
element to which we wish to draw attention. Those who 
addressed themselves to the defence of the freehold did so for 
quite different reasons, which serve to point up yet again the 
unresolved issues we are examining here. 
Firstly, a country vicar wrote to the Church Times in 
February 1964 in the following terms: 
[Counhy people] like to have their own priest livin·~ 
among them- a father-in-God whom they know and who knows 
and trusts them, 
Institutional church life is here seen very much in terms of 
the religion of the people, of "blood and soil", holding 
together the local community in a Durkheimian bond of moral 
consen:3us and sacred symbolism. All this is focussed in the 
uniquely representative figure of the parish priest, tied by 
his freehold to the very land in which his church and horne are 
planted. 
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Faith itself, on such an understanding, will nourish and 
sustain participation in the continuities of ongoing, 
traditional community life. It will have little room for the 
disturbing of certainties or the exploration of the new. 
By contrast, the same freehold was defended in a letter 
to The Times by Norman St.John Stevas, admittedly an outsider 
to the :c;ystem, on the grounds that it encouraged freedom of 
thought and independence of m:ind. A parish priest could "speak 
out" without fear of dL:;missal; Emd moreover, any system which 
could promote "a little eccentricity" in an increasingly 
monochrome society must be a good thing. 
What we have here is the very different picture of the 
maverick figure of the priest, responsible to no-one but God 
and with his living guaranteed in a manner which makes him 
financially free from manipulation by any single power-group. 
As such, the priest can come to embody the Church as the 
"institutionalization of criticism" (cf.Metz, 1969:115ff.; Kerr, 
1968), and the living denial by faith of any and every "party 
line". 
Where one curiosity of organization can be defended for 
such opposing reasons, there is cause for investigating the 
underlying conceptions of faith's working in the world and its 
institutional forms. 
iii. The World Council of Churches. 
Our third sample of the radical mood highlights all the 
confusions brought about by the introduction of new ideas into 
a church situation which had not yet come to terms with the 
basic underlying questions. In an early article, William 
Hamil ton distinguished the "ecclesiastical radicals" as a sub-
group within the mrerall movement of radical theology 
(H8mil1:cm, 1968:21-2>. As a typical example uf Lh'= thinking of 
this group, he cited the address given by the Dutch theologian 
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J .C.Hoekendijk to 
1960. Hoekendijk 
the 
had 
World Student Christian Federation in 
proposed an ecclesiology demoting the 
Church from the privileged position of the focal point of God's 
action in the world, and substituting the mission order God-
World-Church, '"'ith a self-effacing Church as the servant of 
the world. 
The Student Movement represented here by Hoekendijk was 
from its inception closely linked with the young World Council 
of Churches, '"'hich resolved at its third Assembly in Delhi in 
1961 to initiate studies on "The Missionary Structure of the 
Congregation". Working groups were set up all over the world, 
and quickly produced study material which was published in the 
periodical of the Council's Department of Studies in 
Evangelism, Concept (see C.Williams, 1965 (a) :ix-xv; 1966:12-16). 
In Britain, the Youth Department of the British Council of 
Churches devoted its 1964 New Year Conference to these 
studies, with the W.C.C.'s director of studies in evangelism, 
Han:3 Margull, as visiting speaker. Almost at the same time, the 
Student Christian Movement held a conference at Swanwick, 
Derbyshire, under the title The Death of the Church, where the 
speakers were Albert van den Heuvel, then the W .C.C.'s Youth 
Secretary, James Mark, and <oddly enough) David Martin."'' 
such 
These studies, 
writers as 
together with contributions in America of 
Harvey Cox, Gibson Winter and William 
Stringfellow, evidenced a concern to combine forms of secular 
theology, conceptualizing the mission of the Church in inner-
worldly terms, with a recourse to sociological models to enable 
the Church to structure itself for such a mission. The 
theologians in question appealed to sociological work in such 
areas as the study of communities, organizations, work and the 
family, rather than to the :3ociology of religion, for their 
diagnoses of contemporary life. 
Consequently they tended to accept without question the 
inevitable decline and outmodedness of traditional religion, 
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and to assume that the Church's task was somehow to "engage 
with the emerging structures". The movement lacked a more 
detailed attention to the ambiguities of the secularization 
issue as sociology has dealt with it. (VIe shall undertake a 
closer examination of the theology involved in Chapter XI.) 
John Robinson found much to stimulate his thinking in 
this early wtxk of the V/.C.C. <Robinson, 1965:88-100). He 
perceived a clear- link between the emerging "servant" 
ecclesiolo8y of the Council and recent moves toward a more 
adequate theology of the laity, and indeed a "lay theology", 
associated with the work of the Christian Frontier Council 
since the 1940s <Robinson, 1963 (b); Bliss, 1963). The Servant 
Church was to be the Church of the people, every member 
actively in service in his or her secular calling, while the 
Church's traditional 
only in order to 
responsibilities. 
religious 
equip 
activities 
the laity 
remained necessary 
to fulfil these 
The:::;e ideas were fully expounded in the eventual Vl.C.C. 
Report, The Church for Others, published in 1967. The British 
Council of Churches produced an ecumenical programme for the 
use of local study groups, The People Next Door, based on the 
'vl.C.C. Report, but it was here that bewilderment be8an to set 
in Oanes, 1967). 
The programme combined a mood of welcome to the "secular 
world" with one of critical uncertainty about the religious 
interpretation of the Gospel. It emphasised the world as the 
arena of God's saving activity, and called for the Church to 
develop "go" rather than "come" structures, in order to put 
itself in touch with God's ongoing mission, rather than being 
concerned to enlarge its own borders. But all of this was open 
to total misunderstanding by the average congregation, without 
a very substantial programme of adult education to precede it. 
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The contrast comes out starkly in a number of 
independently produced pieces of work dating from the same 
period as the li/.C.C. studies. For example, the William Temple 
College at Rugby published a Report, Mainstream Religion, based 
upon an analysis of the contents of all broadcast religious 
services, and those taking place in 23 churches, during June 
1963 <see in The .Modern Churchman for June 1965). The findings 
lent support to the picture of churches preoccupied with their 
own affairs, with little of note to say, vaguely attacking the 
"materialism of the modern age", and so on. 
In May 1966, The Times published a series of articles 
entitled "Christians Asleep", which took a pessimistic view of 
the Church's current position with regard to the parish system, 
finance, clergy training, mission and the assimilation of 
radical thinking. It was claimed that Honest to God had 
produced a neo-conservative backlash in the theological 
colleges among ordinands in training. Progressive thinking was 
to be found chiefly in "para-church" agencies such as the 
Church of England's Board for Social Responsibility, and rarely 
in the mainstream. 
The printed reactions to these articles were familiar: 
some deplored their "cynical tone", others pleaded for "a more 
definite lead from the top". One blamed the Church's plight on 
"lack of belief in the Church's creeds by those who were 
supposed to teach them"; another, on a loss of "the essential 
simplicity of the faith". 
Items like these offer glimpses of the real situation, 
which make it clear why great difficulty was experienced in 
trying to get the ideas of the W .C.C. to "take root" in English 
church congregations. As long as little attempt was made to 
penetrate thP actually experienced forms and modes of religion 
and faith, and to understand their significance for those who 
practised them within the life of the churches, it was likely 
that the recommended programmes would only achieve the 
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creation of an elite as potentially divisive as the "clerical 
caste"- the keen, intelligent, committed "frontiersman" among 
the laity. 
iv. New Christian. 
The journal Prism ended its eight-year run in September 
1965, and was replaced by the fortnightly New Christian, which 
capitalized on the image Prism had more or less 
unintentionally acquired, by setting itself up as very self-
consciously radical, irreverent and outspoken. The quality of 
articles, however, never justified the doubled frequency of 
publication.·=- Despite this, a number of the controversies 
pursued by New Christian will serve us well in summing up the 
undercurrents of opinion and interests which consistently 
characterised Christian Radicalism. 
The question of the purpose and continuing possibility cf 
organized religion as a vehicle for disclosing the meaning of 
God under contemporary conditions was raised provocatively by 
Methodist minister Ray Billington in a set of proposals for 
what he called a "non-Church", in an article in 1966. Rejecting 
all the trappings of traditional religious practice as 
fundamentally alienating and irrelevant, Billington offered a 
blueprint of small and fluid ad hoc gatherings of like-minded 
Christians, coming together as the mood took them, to work out 
"how to express love in their secular social contexts". Even 
The Times printed an article by Billington on the subject on 
November 19th, 1966. 
Some of the responses, such as that of Alison Adcock 
<"Non-Church is Nonsense" in New Christian for June 1966), 
treated the issue as a joke. Others, like that of H.D.Lewis in 
The Times, were more serious. But each of these two queried to 
what extent what Billington was looking for was not already 
provided in the Society of Friends; and this, in itself, poses 
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very clearly the problem 
through secular channels 
organizational structure 
of whether an approach to faith 
and with little public and ritual 
can avoid the evaporation of 
distinctive religious content. 
Billington himself showed that he was now uncertain about 
any such content when he argued in a later article, "The 
Tediou::; Church Reformers", in New Christian in May 1968, that 
the "Christian task" of "providing creative possibilities for 
human living, making sense of existence and discovering human 
value::;" had no longer anything to do with the possible 
preservation of any sort of Church. The controversy over 
Billington, trivial in itself though it may have been, forces us 
back upon the question of why the removal of the religious 
trappings which have seemed to stifle the vital Gospel content 
of Cltri::;tian faith should lead, disappointingly, to the 
disappearance of anything which makes such faith distinctively 
Christian at all. 
The second i tern we wish to extract from New Christian 
concerned the visit of Billy Graham to Britain for evangelistic 
crusades in 1966. The relevant New Christian leader criticised 
Graham's methods for offering "instant mission" which neither 
took account of the concrete social context nor attempted to 
provide a long-term pastoral-evangelistic strategy capable of 
responding to over a century of Church failure to cope with 
social change. Graham plainly did not see any necessity of 
adapting the Gospel to cultural circumstances, nor of trying to 
conceive what "salvation" and other Gospel terms might mean 
within a thoroughly secular context. The editorial took a dim 
view of the value of any "success" Graham's methods might 
appear to achieve. 
Whereas some respondents argued in Graham's defence that, 
whatever his shortcomings, he was at least getting the Gospel 
18:3 
heard by many who would never enter a church in order to hear 
it, others denied that what he was preaching was really "the 
Gospel" for today at all. All that we wish to comment on this 
debate is that it displays in nuce the potential confusions in 
the whole issue of whether the Church should adapt to 
secularization or confront it. 
For the Church does not have a free and unfettered choice 
in the matter. But one thing is .:;lear: secularization cannot 
possibly be welcomed as gain be·=:ause it frees the Church to 
concentrate on its proper, specific mission, if there is as 
much dispute about what that "specific mission" is as the 
argument over Billy Graham suggests. 
Lastly, we single out the interest of New Christian in the 
much-publicised resignation of Charles Davis from his Roman 
Catholic orders in 1968 (cf.Bentley, op.cit:39-42). The journal 
even invited Davis to contribute articles, as one who had 
experienced and fought the tensions and frustrations imposed 
upon creative, critical faith by a traditional institutional 
system <Davi:::o, 1968). Davis wrote in New Christian that, for 
committed Christians, the Church "is not the source of the 
values they cherish and promote. On the contrary, they live and 
work in contrast and opposition to it." 
The journal itself linked its coverage of the Davis affair 
with criticism of the controversial encyclical of Pope Paul VI, 
Humanae Vitae, published that year. Neil Middleton argued in an 
article <August 1968) that, as usual, it was the so-called 
"simple believers" who would suffer. For they were bound to 
uncritical acceptance of whatever the Pope said, and uncritical 
assent to any kind of dogmatic formulae could, he argued, only 
produce illusory consensus and prolong personal immaturity. 
New Christian saw that the issues raised by the 
encyclical and by Davis in particularly polemical form in the 
very officially authoritarian context of the Church of Rome 
184 
were not, after all, confined to that Church. For throughout its 
short life it tried to do battle, often too frivolously, against 
all forms of uncritical, backward-looking, immature religious 
faith. In a secular culture which no longer permits the 
imposition of official vwrld-views "from the top", what sort of 
institutional arrangements would enable the growth of a mature 
faith, leading to a viable religiously-based world-view, from 
below? The journal saw the problem; but rarely were its 
contributors sufficiently in touch with the people it wanted to 
help to be able to produce realistic proposals. 
5. Retrospect and Prospect: Whither Christian Radicalism? 
At the Annual Conference of the Modern Churchmen's Union 
in July 1969, David Edwards, the original proponent of the term 
"Chri,3tian Radicalism", looked back over the course taken by 
the movement during the decade which was shortly to end. 
Despite regretting some of the more "outlandish" developments, 
he remained "cautiously optimistic". Important, if 
unspectacular, Church r-eform:3 and theological reconstructions 
were under way, and Edwards wondered whether the time might 
now be ripe for the churches to compile a new, short 
confession of faith. 
Edwards envisaged such a confession beginning from the 
style and meaning of actual religious practice and Christian 
living, and proceeding from there to the Church as a real 
hi::;torical institution, then on to Christology, and only lastly 
to the doctrine of God. This would be the order of a moderately 
secular dogmatics. However, although ma.ny reforms have 
proceeded, in a rather piecemeal way, the harvest of the 
sixties in terms of the systematic reconstruction hoped for by 
Edwards has not been reaped. The mood at the end of the decade 
wa.s permeated by disillusionment among the radicals and relief 
among their opponents. 
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In the Foreword to the New Christian Reader, published by 
the SCM Press in 1974, Trevor Beeson wrote: 
The late 1950s and early 1960s were a time of new hope in 
most of the British chu1·ches, Parish and People, the 
Keble Conference G1·oup, the Renewal Group in Methodism, 
and similar bodies, attracted into their membership large 
numbers of the most able clergy and there was an 
abundance of ideas about the reform of the Church and the 
reintei'PI'etation of traditional theolO•]Y, ~;orne of this 
found e:<:pression in the e:<:plosion of pape1·back the•)lO•JY, 
and it was in this ueative atmosphere that Neu• Christian 
was planned and launched, But by the time the magHine 
was established the situation was changing: hope was 
giving way to despail', and it. lllas being suggested that 
the institutional life of the Church was beyond reform. 10 
New Christian came to an end with the de·::ade. The Farish and 
People Movement, having shifted its emphasis increasingly from 
liturgical issues to the secular-social a:3pects of the Church's 
mission (its 1966 conference borrowed from the Vl.C.C. the title 
"The W' or ld is the Agenda") , was eventually swallowed up in 19'7 0 
in a short-lived ecumenical coalition called One for Christian 
Renewal. Robinson returned to Cambridge and devoted much of 
his academic work to earlier field of Uew Testament 
Studies. 
Some, like Edward Norman <1977 & 1979) regard the whole 
episode as the beginning of the capitulation of the Church to 
secular humanism, in a desperate and mi:3guided bid to be up-
to-date. Others, such as Holloway <19'72), are rather more 
charitably, though decisively, critical. Bowden <197'7), on the 
other hand, regrets the failure of the Church at large to grasp 
the opportunities of those radical years, flimsy though some of 
the ideas were theologically. 
In still other places, direct continuities of the radical 
tradition are to be found into the seventies: Salvation Army 
officer Fred Brown <1970 & 1973) risked reprimand and 
expulsion for publishing his own brand of "secular theology", 
while John Vincent has continued his pursuit of an "alternative 
church" <the title of a 1977 booklet; cf. Vincent, 1980) to the 
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present time. And Alistair Kee's The 'Way of Transcendence, a 
late <1970) contribution to the literature of "Christian 
atheism", has recently been reissued by the SCM Press <1985). 
The recent works of Don Cupitt may also be cited in support of 
the continuance of the theological side of the radical 
tradition. 
'What this chapter has tried to do is to provide a Si tz im 
Leben for the theological discussions which follow. This was in 
accordance with our model of theological activity a,:; taking 
place at the empirically graspable interface between between 
Gaspe l tradition and social context. The radicals intended to 
produce a theology sensitive to and interpretive of the secular 
situation, and to focus their reconstructions on the tangible 
life of the churche,:;. Therefore, we have attempted to show, 
underneath the more explicit theological proposals and rather 
in the interstices of debate about them, how the problematic 
issues were emerging, often unnoticed. 
'We have done this by paying attention to a good deal of 
ephemeral, non-scholarly and only quasi-theological material. 
'We maintain, and hopefully have shown, that seemingly trivial 
churchly wrangles can really not be disregarded in the 
theological enterprise, but contain the seeds of crucial issues 
for theology. In particular, we have pursued throughout the 
chapter, though not with absolute rigidity, the three clusters 
of questions we have already argued are particularly important 
for Christian Radicalism: the place and function of religious 
practice as traditionally understood, the interpretation of 
secularization and the Church's response to it, and the 
possibility of a creative and critically reflective faith. 
Sociological tools for a greater critical penetration of 
these questions were set out in Part Two of the t.hPsis. The 
remainder of Part Three brings these perspectives to bear upon 
the major theological themes of Christian Radicalism, and our 
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attention now turns to the more substantial writings of the 
period. 
NOTES, 
I, Previous Anglican symposia include the controversial Essays and Reviews (1860), 
Charles Gore's symposium Lux Myndi ( 1889), and the 11ore liberal Oxford collections 
fQyndations (1912) and Essays Catholic and Critical (1926), The latter strongly 
influenced the Report of the Doctrine Commission, Doctrine jn the Chyrch of England 
(1938), The occasion of the 1958 Lambeth Conference produced the volume of Essays in 
Anglican Self-criticism, while in 1964 Alan Richardson headed a small team responding 
to issues in the Honest to God debate, foyr Anchors from the Stern, 
2, I owe the retrospective evaluation given here to Trevor Beeson, in conversati•)n, 
3, David Ed1r1ards, Vidler's successor as Dean of King's, Cambridge, concluded that the 
Church Ti111es' heavily slanted report was more responsible for the strength of feeling 
against Vidler than the original broadcast, which many correspondents had probably 
not seen (see Prism, February 1963), 
4, For documentary background and commentarb upon the episode, inclu,jing its media 
coverage, we relJ up•)n The Honest to God ebate, edited by Edwards and Robinson, 
1963; ch.7 of R, ,Page, Nf Directions in An~ican Theoll)gy, 1967; ch.11 of Ferris( 
The Chyrch of En·~land, 1 64; the whole of be May 1963 issue of Prism; cb,2 o 
FurlQng) With LovQ .to thf C~~~chW. 1965; cb, 1 of V,Mebta, The New Iheologan, 1966; 
ch,2 or Bowden oues n !lderneSS' and ch,5 of 611l Theology and Soqal 
Structyre, The latest sociological account 'is R, Towler, The Need for Certainty, 1984, 
which examines the enormous correspondence received by Robinson in the wake of the 
book's publication in an attempt to classify types of religious orientation shown by 
the writers, 
5, Thus Roger Tennant remarks vis-a-vis Honest to God in Prism for May 1963: "Just as 
you are beginning to wrestle in the dar': with the unkno1r1n angel, Dr,Robinson will 
switch on the light and intone a few words in a familiar clerical voice.• 
6, Thanks are due for references to the text of radio broadcasts on the Home Service, 
29,12,63 and 12,1 ,64, to the BBC Written Archives Centre at Caversham Park, Reading, 
7, See Romans 14 and 1 Corinthians 8, 
B, The texts of the conference addresses are printed in an unpublished bQoklet of the 
SCM Theological Colleges' Department, The Death of the Chyr~b· Five Talks Given at 
Svanwick, which I have by courtes~ of~ David ~?rtin, Revised versions of van den 
Heuvel's talks are available as cbs,t & ~ Qf ThP Hym!l!ation of the Chyrch, 
9, References from New Christian are taken fr•)m A New Christian Reader, 
ed,T,Beaumont, 1974, At the same time as be was editor of Nett Christian, Trevor 
Beeson (now a Canon of Westminster Abbey and Chaplain to the House of Commons) also 
edited a parish magazine inset, Outlook, TiMthy, Lord Beaumont, the architect of 
both publicationsd Intended it as an alternative to the "cosy• image of other insets 
like The Sign an Home #lords, Hence, OutltJOk was once in trouble because its "fi!AI 
correspondent• used the word *lesbian• freely in a reviewl 
10, Ne11 Christian printed two documents, in satirical style, which offer excellent 
summaries of the mood of radical theology, An early edition featured the "95 Theses 
for the New Reformation", containing propositions about all the theological points we 
shall be discussing in the next six chapters; and late 1969 saw the twelve "New 
Decade's Resolutions", The tone of these was har.jer,~ more edgy, and much more 
oriented to1r1ards the socio-political engagements of the Lhurcb, 
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CHAPTER VIII: RELIGION, TRANSCENDENCE AND GOD, 
This chapter is the first of six which will analyse in 
detail the theology of Christian Radicalism, as outlined in the 
Introduction. The first topic is the attempt to develop a 
secular Ci.e.non-religious) approach to the understanding of 
God. As we have already made clear, we regard the underlying 
issue her-e a::; the problem of traditional religion in 
contemporary cultural circumstances, since it is through 
religion that people have gen~rally considered themselves to be 
put in touch with God. Therefore, our discussion will be 
stimulated by the sociological understanding of religion set 
out in Chapter IV. 
We shall focus the discussion, as will be our practice in 
each of these six chapters, by concentrating first upon one 
representative work, in this case Robinson's Honest. to God. We 
shall examine Robinson's proposed reworking of Christian 
theism in conjunction with his view of the place of religion, 
following up our exposition with a number of criticisms which 
set the tone for what follows. We shall then devote space to 
analyses of other proposal:::; of radical theology, firstly for 
secular-based approaches to the question of God, then for 
models of transcendence, and finally for attitudes to religion. 
Our cumulative conclusions will be stimulated and informed 
throughout by our deployment of the sociological ideas 
advanced in Chapter IV. 
1. Robinson and Honest to God. 
i. General Observations. 
We aim to deal with Honest to God on its own terms, 
namely as an apologetic e:,ercise, dire<.;Led towards those who, 
in a "secular age", no longer find traditional Christian 
formulations either relevant or intelligible.' This is the whole 
thrust of the book's opening chapter, in which Robinson 
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confesses himself a man divided: on the one hand, very much an 
insider, more or less set apart for the Church since birth and 
thoroughly at home with orthodox doctrine and traditional 
liturgy, but on the other hand, as bishop of a tough and 
declining urban area, increasingly aware of the alienation of 
ordinary people from all that his "goodly heritage" stood for 
<see McBrien, 1966:4--15 and Robinson, 1980:10-26). 
More than this, as Robinson analyses his situation, he 
admits that even fm- him:=;elf, certain areas of orthodoxy do 
not really "strike home". They do not infuse life and faith 
with vision and purpose, but merely exist as part of the 
lumber of tradition. Conversely, a handful of less orthodox, 
exploratory writings do seem to "ring bells", and Robinson 
begins to wonder whether they might also do :=;o for those 
bewildered outsiders who have more or less given up on 
religion and the Church. Out of just this sort of felt sense of 
an urgent need for reformulation and reconstruction sprang the 
whole of the radicalism of the :=;ixties; and as a response to 
such a sensed need ought Robinson's book also to be judged. 
His three stimuli to fresh thinking were Tillich's sermon, 
"The Depth of Existence", found in his collection The Shaking 
of the Foundations (1949), Bultmann's seminal essay on "New 
Testament and Mythology" in Kerygma and Myth Ced.H.W .Bartsch, 
1955) and the "religion less Christianity" passages in 
Bonhoeffer's Letters and Papers from Prison. Honest to God is 
ostensibly organized around the three questions which Robinson 
felt these brief writings posed most acutely: 
From Tillich he derives the qw~stion, "Must Chri:=;tianity 
be 'supranaturalist'?" This he works out specifically in 
relation to the doctrine of God, which is really the 
controlling theme for the whole book. 
From Bultmann comes the question whether 
must be "mythological", which relates most 
Chr i:=;tology. 
Christianity 
plainly to 
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From Bonhoeffer Robinson takes the question whether 
Christianity must be "religious", which is especially relevant 
to matters concerning the Church, spirituality and liturgy. 
However, Robin:=.ml not: maintain kind of 
symmetrical pattern in his use of the three theologians. 
Rather, h•" take:o; fir-st of all th.-" basi<:: terms of the problem 
from Bultmann. The Gosoel is traditionally expressed in thought 
forms and ima;se:o; whi·-;h are unintelligible to modern man, and. 
ll'J:3+= b~~ +.ra.rt::=.lrJ.-te(L itd:.o categorie~. ae can ~rasp- or r~~th~r, 
which call t~r.::J:=>p him. But Robinson doe:o; not follow J:'.ultmann':.; 
programme, I'Jhi.=:h .-:;ontinues to n~ly heavily on the assumption 
that a Vord from beyond, is:3ued in the critical event of 
prea .. :::hing, •::an penetrate a man':3 e:<i:o;tential o;ituation, 
•::hallenge h"L:o; questionableness and summon him to the decision 
of faith. 
Ir::=.tead. Robinson accepts f'.onhoeffer 's critique of 
Bultreann. to the effect that you cannot demythologize the 
Lmgua.ge of the redemption story but leave intact the concept 
of a tran:3cendent God who "acts" and ":3peaks" in the 
kerygmatic event. For it is precisely the loss of the dimension 
of vertical transcendence in the actual mental con:sti tution of 
secular mar~ that lh:!c:. at the root of l:he problem. Bonhoeffer 
thought i:ha.t Bultmann, coming from an earlier generation, had 
failed to see this, and Robinson agrees with him. 
N.::~verthele:o;:s, Robin:3on still dDe:::. not adopt t:onhoeffer's 
propo:::,al, ,,:hich i:o; e:c;sentia.lly to n~pla.:;e a v•e>rtkal with n 
horizontal projection, aiming to discover the dimension of 
tran:o;cenden·=e in the :o;e·::ular concept of "man for ot:hers". He 
opt·3, instead, fairly una.mbiguou:=>ly for what he believes to be 
Tillich's ::;olution, con3tructed around the language of "depth". 
Robinson's reliance on Tillich reflects his conviction, 
expresse~ at the very beginning of Henes+ to God, that the 
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central problem of traditional theism is that it posits a God 
who is "a Being" located, if not literally "up there", at least 
metaphysically "out there". For it is Tillich who mounts the 
most concerted campaign against this way of thinking God. Even 
so, although the problem of objectifying language about God is 
a familiar one in academic 
concerned to work out a 
theology, Robinson is 
highly sophisticated 
not really 
theological 
position which can protect the transcendent otherness of God 
without falling into the philosophical trap of objectification. 
Rather, he is anxious that all such language of otherness, 
however refined, creates at the level of popular pre-reflective 
awareness an impression that God is "not here". He is detached, 
reigning in splendid isolation, incompatible with the modern 
world. This is v1hy Robinson's text is peppered with tho::;e 
much-criticised "caricatures": "above the bright blue sky", "a 
visitor from outer space", "the Old Man in the sky", " a super-
Being beyond this vmrld" <Robinson, 1963(a):13,15,17,49). 
Theological caricatures they may be, but there is little doubt 
that they are what transcendental theism amounts to for many 
people, not a few of whom will be regularly in the churches. 
This, then, is in our view what Robin~on is trying to do 
in his alternative proposal for theism. We turn now in greater 
detail to an exposition of how he does it, beginning with his 
adaptation of Tillich 's "depth" model in chapter 3 of Honest to 
God. 
ii. Exposition. 
There are at least four constituents to Robinson's 
argument for the Tillichian projection. Firstly, Robinson 
commends depth imagery as intrinsically "richer" and more 
suggestive than height. For depth relates to both concern ctnd 
suffering, both of which may be described as "deep". It covers 
intensely human, and humane, experiences; and, as "deep" is 
opposed to "shallow", depth imagery speaks of the truth of how 
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things are, not just in everyday, superficial terms, but 
"beneath the surface", under profound examination, at bottom. 
Secondly, this nation of digging down to the depths 
indicates the alternative projection for theism, downward to 
the Ground of Being: 
When Tillich speaks 
of another Being at 
and ine:<haustible 
(op,cit:46l, 
of God in 'depth', he is not speakin•J 
all, He is speaking of 'the infinite 
depth and ground of all bein•J' 
Robinson interprets this to mean that "the word 'God' denotes 
the ultimate depth of a.ll our being, the creative ground and 
meaning of all our existence" (ibid:47). He intends this to 
mean that there is a manner of living "at depth", a kind of 
thoroughgoing immersion in secular realities, whereupon the 
divine ground discloses itself. 
Thirdly, and closely related to the fo~egoing, Robinson 
links depth imagery to Tillich's notion of "ultimate concern": 
If that w!Jrd [i,e,GodJ does not have much meaning for 
you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your 1 i fe, 
of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of 
what you take seriously without any reservati!Jn (Tillich, 
op,cit:S7; Robinson, !Jp,cit:22l, 
This Tillichian "exercise" for identifying God in secular 
experience is meant, as Robinson employs it, to add an 
empirically available element to the possibly elusive "Ground 
of Being". 
Fourthly, Robinson asks what happens when someone does 
take secular life in utmost earnest and pur:::;ues an ultimate 
concern to the limits, with what he now calls "openness to the 
holy" (ibid:48). His answer is that such a person discovers the 
ground of being to be both personal and characterized, indeed 
structured and informed, by love. Robinson contends that we 
shall di:::;cover the ultimate in selfles:::; and :::;elf-3iving, open 
and unconditional personal relationships with one another, and 
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that the purest form of relationship is undoubtedly that of 
love: 
To believe in God as love means to believe that in pure 
personal relationship we encounter, not merely what ought 
to be, but what is, the deepest, veriest t1·uth about. t.r1e 
structul'e of l'eality libid;49), 2 
Robinson :3pend:3 much time in the rest of this pivotal 
chapter attempting to defend his position from the accusation 
of naturalism, and of having completely collapsed any genuine 
divine transcendence into the immanence of human 
intersubjectivity. He chooses to define his position more 
clo:3ely by indh::ating what he approves and what he rejects in 
the personalist philosophy of John Macmurray and the 
anthropological theology of John Wren-Lewis. 
Macmurray had written, in The Structure of Religious 
E~rience, that "the task of religion is the maintenance and 
extension of human community" <quoted Robinson, op.cit:51-2). 
Such community, he had argued, is founded upon a unique quality 
of human personhood consisting in the union of transcendence 
and immanence in actual, experienced reality. But Robinson 
wants to hold that the perception of any such quality in 
ordinary human experience- "in depth"- is entirely dependent 
upon the prior givenness of God as "divine Ground". He cites 
Bonhoeffer's bon mot, "God is the 'beyond' in the midst" 
(ibid:53) in support of this, although Bonhoeffer's formula 
reflects a horizontal projection outward into collective society 
rather than the depth projection Robinson prefers. 
In the case of Wren-Lewis, Robinson approves his 
statement: 
It is hard to see why the projections made by the human 
race should have a numinous, transcendental character 
unless there is something numinous and hanscendental in 
the e:<perience of personal l'elationships themselves 
libid:.S4), 
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But despite this, he fears that Wren-Lewis fails to guard 
himself adequately against the charge that he is really 
expounding the thesis "Love is God". Robinson struggles to 
specify precisely where the element of transcendence comes in 
to the model for conceiving of the divine he has advanced. He 
reverts to the terminology of Tillich: 
The1·e are depths of revelation, intimations of eternity, 
jtJdgments •)f the ho 1 y and sacred, aw:ll'enesses of the 
unconditional, the numinous and the ecstatic, which 
cannot be explained 1n purely naturalistic categories 
without being reduced to something else (ibid:SSJ. 
But on what grounds is secular experience said to be like 
th~3? And through what sorts of activities is the transcendent 
quality per-ceived in it? On his own premises, Robinson has to 
try to answer thesr~ questions without resorting to categories 
and resources supplied by religion. After a brief excursus in 
search of Biblical support for his position, he writes: 
Oul' contention has been that God is not to be met by a 
'religious' tu1·nin•.:J away from the wol'ld but in 
uncondi t.ional concern f•)r 'the other' seen through to its 
ultimate depths libid;61), 
He rejects the idea that the opportunity of knowing God should 
be made to depend upon the individual's capacity for "religious 
experience", a capacity which varies as a purely natural 
ability from one person to another. 
He prefers the testimony of Wren-Lewis, who described how 
a particular Christian minister had enabled hL3 congregation to 
see "the common experience of the creative character of 
personal relat ion:3h ips" as "an encounter with the 
transcendent". It was "actually an entirely different mode of 
living-in-relationship from anything known in the world, a 
redeemed mode of relationship" Cibid:63). Robinson stresses 
that just because liren- Lewi:3 encountered this in a Christian 
community, "it was not for that rea:3on any the more religious, 
ba.sed upon ~3ome new kind of esoteric or pietistic experience". 
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But he still fails to resolve the ambiguity over whether 
there is a depth-dimension in all personal relationship which 
the Christian Creligious) input helps to make explicit, or 
whether that input actually creates a mode of relationship 
"different from anything known in the world".~'' He has not yet 
convincingly argued the case for an analysis of secular 
experience which can lead to the affirmation of a divine 
transcendence within it, and which can stand on its own merits 
without further support by religious considerations. 
The religious considerations are found, however, later in 
the book, when Robinson tries to show how religious worship 
can itself be fitted into the f!a.mework of his "depth" 
analysis. The popular idea of religion, he thinks, is this: 
It relates to that department of life which is contrasted 
with • the 11/0I' ld •; and in its pop1Jlar non-technical sense 
it inc lwjes all those activities which go o)n llli thin n,e 
circle of the sanctuary,,, It is a pal'ticular area of 
e)<perience or actlvity into ~r.•hich a man n·,ay 'tu1·n aside' 
o1· '•]O apart' (ibid;84-5), 
But such a view, he thinks, is not compatible with his proposed 
restatement of theism, for which "the holy is the 'd;:>pth' of 
the common". God is to be found in opening oneself in 
unconditional personal relationship to others, in self-giving 
love; and hence 
, .. the purpose of worship,,, is to open oneself to the 
rneetin•J of Christ in the common ... to) make us more 
sensitive to these depths; to foct.1s, sharpen and deepen 
our response to the world and to other people beyond the 
point of p1·oximate concern, .. to that of ultimate concern 
(ibid:87l' 
So, the Eucharh3t, precisely because it is the "Holy 
Communion", is concerned with the disclosure of the sacred in 
the depth dimension of what is "common", in the double sense 
of "ordinary, everyday" and "shared, communal". In this way, 
Robinson can link the sacrament with both his emphases, that 
the transcendent i:3 to be found in the secular, and that it i:3 
supremely disclosed in inter-personal relations: 
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Holy Communion is communion, community-life, in sacris, 
in depth, at the level at which we a1·e not me1•ely in 
human fellowship but 'in Christ', not merely in love but 
1n Love, united with the ground and restorer of our whole 
being libid:86; cf, Robinson, 19£0:58-71 fo1' his eal'lier 
understanding of th1s issuel. 
This is as far as we need to take our basic exposition of 
Robin:::;on's proposals, firstly for- a secular approach to the 
for retaining the dimensio::1 of 
tran·:o·=endence within such an approach, and finally for 
under-,:otanding religious practic·e within such a framework. We 
have obviously not been able to avoid hinting at criticism at 
various points along the way, but now we shall gather up our 
1;.1. Critique. 
Fil-·:ot of all and at greatest length, we have to expre:::;s 
doubt about the suitability of Tillich's concepts of "ground of 
being" and "ultimate concern" for the job Robinson vmnts them 
to do for him. Robinson says: 
A statement is 1 theological 1 not because it !'elates to a 
particular Bein•;~ called 'G•Jd 1 , bi.Jt beca1Jse it asks 
•.Ji timate questions about the meaning of e;<:istence: it 
asks what, at the level of theo51 at the level of its 
deepest mystery, is the reality and si·~n1ficance of oul' 
life libid:49), 
This is to misunderstand the philosophical position taken by 
Tillich in his Systema,tic Theology, <lhich owes much to his 
background in German idealism and even mysticism, through the 
. .f 1 ln.._.._uence of Schelling. Admittedly Tillich is not entirely 
consistent, and in the sermon upon which Robinson relies he 
does imply that an ultimate concern might be some empirical 
concern, and that the "depth" is a potential depth of 
experience. But elsewhere thi:::; is not so. 
For Tilli,:h maiuLalns that to :3ay tha.t God is "ultimate 
reality, be ins itself, ground of being, pow~=>r of bein2;" is the 
only univocal, non-symbolic assertion we can make about him 
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lcf .Tillich, ~logy of Cultur~:61>. This assertion cannot 
include the attribution of the logical categor~y "existence" to 
God, '=;ince t:hi·=; category belong,::; only to the contingent order. 
So Tillich writes: 
~:\nr.e G·::d is the •JI'ound of bein•], he is the •;J!'O•.md of the 
strtJdiJI'e of bein•;J. He is not subJect to this struct>.ne; 
~he str•J•: tut·e is •;JI't:•unded in him .. , 1 t is impossible t•) 
spedk ab•:::..d him e~<:cept in tei'O\S •)f this stt·ucb.Ji'e, God 
must be approached cognitively through the structural 
elements of being-itself, These elements make him a 
livin•;; God, a God •11h•) can be man's concrete concel'll 
fTlllJCr•, ;:xstematic Tb»ol•lQY, Vol,1:264), 
Simi la.rly. when Tillich '=;ays that "the object of theology 
io:,; what concerns us ultimately", he emphatically rule,=; out any 
·~Gn.:::eivable empi.ri•::al object of human concern: "Our ultimate 
·=·on•::ern is that which determinto~s our being or non-being" 
(Tilli·::h, op.cit: 14,17). Pobinson 's usage ~10uld make "a matter of 
being or non-being'' into the same thing as "a matter of life 
and death", but vd th Tilli·~h this is not the case. 
Rather, Tillich's categories of "beins", "ground of being", 
"u::_tima.te r~·on·~:ern'', are in th·~ nature of logico-sramma.tica.l 
delineatiom:; of the possibility of any legitimate talk of God 
at all. The notion of "being-itself" formulate,=; the enveloping 
and etnbracing structures within which any ontology must be 
ere•=ted. "llltimate concern" is the non-objectified limit or 
horizon to which we needs must be subject in the articulation 
of any con•.::ern. These are thor-oughly non-empirical r::;ategories 
vJllkh prescribe the rules for any kind of dL:;course which may 
ju=;tify it::o •:::la.im to be about God. They are not suitable for 
use BS the basis of ct restatement of the content of theism in 
:::,,~cular, empirical terms. 
This ra. ther lengthy excursus in to wh . .ot t T i llich meant by 
th·=- ideas Hobinson borrm,rs from him has hP•"n nP.-:pc:.,:oory in 
or~der to •::: l•~o.r the ·;rround 
0 
for D·::Y;itive statement. For 
Tillich, in the aspe•:::t of his ~mrk which L3 not taken up by 
Robinson, argues that once we have laid out the rules of what 
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can and must be said non-symbolically about God, a great deal 
more can be said through the medium of religious symbolism. 
It is here that Tillich embarks upon his celebrated 
"method of correlation": the Christian symbols must be 
interpreted in such a way as to illuminate and answer the 
questions being implied in contemporary human existence. In 
other words, Tillich i:::; sensitive to precisely the .:::oncept of 
religion as a cultural system whi<:::h we have tried to expound, 
and which Robinson ignores. 
This, of course, is why in the end Tillich is such a 
"religious" thinker, as Bonhoeffer recognised. Robinson has 
seized upon the most austere philosophical prolegomenon to a 
"secular theology", as found in Tillich, and treated it as 
though it were itself the substance of such a theology. He has, 
in effect, domesticated it and reduced it in scope to an 
empirical exploration of personal relationships. Thus he is 
inclined to speak of "the ground of our being", "our (or your) 
ultimate concern", where Tillich would hesitate over the 
possessive adjectives. 4 
On the other hand, while what he has taken from Tillich 
is unsuited to the task he intend:3 for it, he has not taken 
what might have served him better. Robinson's eagerness to 
redirect religious worship outward to the world makes him lack 
the sensitivity to the great store of image and symbol carried 
by the tradition, all of which Tillich is concerned to utilize. 
It is ironk that, almost at the end of the book, Robinson 
admits that 
The1·e a1·e whole areas of response where the myth sti 11 
occasions little difficulty. In pr•)phecy and prayer, in 
liturgy and wo1·ship, the traditional imagery retains its 
luminous power (Robinson, op,cit:132l. 
But he never acknowledges how vital this i:3: apart from the 
liturgical context, we face only "intellectual difficulties". 
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There is an early glimpse of a better way on page 13, 
when Robinson revealingly says that "whatever we may accept 
with the top of our minds, most of us still retain deep down 
the mental image of 'an old man in the sky'". But Robinson is 
telling w; that "deep down" is precisely where the truth lies! 
This observation leads us into our second line of 
criticism, which that Robinson's decision to regard the 
sround of being as love, disclosed in the depths of personal 
relationships, lies under suspicion of being, not the fruit of 
secular experience, but either an arbitrary imposition or else 
a commitment made upon some other, undeclared basis. 
For there are obviously grave difficulties facing the 
thesis that, if you examine the quality of human relationships 
in depth, you must conclude that love, so to speak, is what 
makes the world go round. To argue that "theological 
:3tatements ... are an analysis of the depths of all experience 
'interpreted by love"' Ubid:49) simply begs the question, why 
interpret by love, rather than anything else? 
Robinson claims to be interpreting the Gospel, not 
constructing a new natural theology. Christian theological 
statements seek to explicate thematically elements of the 
Chri:3tian tradition as they encounter actual social contexts, 
including "secular experience". But Robinson's chosen method 
does not allow him to admit that the givenness of the 
tradition in which he lives and moves is the rationale for 
what he says- i.e.it is the tradition which declares, God is a 
God of love, which is why experience is to be interpreted by 
love. 
This "hidden agenda" cxpla1ns _ _ 1 1' I' UU.Uli..~Leb in 
Robinson's text: for example, why Love suddenly gets a capital 
L on page 49, and Ground a capital G four pages later. Also on 
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page 49, Robinson surprisingly says, about the idea of "pure 
personal relationship" being the ultimate truth of reality, 
"This, in face of all the evidence, is a tremendous act of 
faith". But if it is "in face of all the evidence", what is left 
of the claim simply to be analysing secular experience? 
Clearly, Robinson comes to his analysis armed with a lively 
religious tradition, while claiming to be standing religionle:3s 
on the side of secular man. 
A further critic ism touches the large claims made for 
"depth" imagery in itself, quite apart from the "ground of 
being" metaphysic. For the association with "depth psychology" 
may well encourage an unhealthily introspective construal of 
the dimension of transcendence, even to the point of 
emphasising the "inner life" as the religious arena, precisely 
as both Bonhoeffer and Robinson were so anxious to avoid. 
Bonhoeffer reserved his harshest words for "existentialist 
philosophy and the psychotherapists", who forced man to face 
"existential depth:3" they truly did not feel, and detracted from 
the need to discover "horizontal transcendence" in the 
experiences of outgoing, secular living. 
Robinson typically approves the "westward position" of 
the priest at the Eucharist on the grounds that it encourages 
the discovery of "transcendence in the midst". This may be so; 
but there is also the danger that the inward-turned 
congregation becomes a kind of spiritual psychotherapeutic 
group, perpetually exercised over the quality of its own 
koinonia. The trends in pastoral theology encouraged by 
Christian Radicali:3m have perhaps owed too much to psychology 
at the expense of sociology. 
Lastly, Robinson's approach tends strongly towards 
affirming that "everyone is religious really." Religion is 
firstly rejected, as far as common-sense social perceptions of 
the religious are concern•:=!d. But later on it is redefined, as 
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"true religion", in terms of a particular function held to be 
essential for human social well-being. Although Robinson 
departs from the sociological consensus by treating the 
building up of human community through authentic, self-giving, 
"deep" personal relationships as his key function, his position 
is still subject to the critic isms of religious functionalism 
advanced earlier Csupra:82-85). 
To sum up, Robinson's proposed means of conveying the 
meaning of God to those outside the churches runs into several 
crucial problems. It attempts to establish a "secular" starting 
point which is not actually the one Robin:3on possesses. It: has 
the utmost difficulty in preserving, and then accounting 
adequately for, the dimension of transcendence in secular 
experience which makes the confession of God possible within 
it. And its relationship with traditional patterns of religious 
culture remains ambiguous and obscure. We shall now proceed to 
see whether other contributors to radical thought about God, 
transcendence and religion have helped to overcome these 
problems. 
2. Radical Theologians in Search of God. 
Christian Radicalism generally accepted that modern 
cultural conditions were making it increasingly difficult for 
people to conceive God either as a separate being existing in a 
manner at least analogous to, though quite independently of, 
all known existences in the world, or as in any way the 
necessary conclusion of a logically compelling argument. The 
theologians were agreed that what could be termed the 
"Schleiermacher tradition" offered the only hope of advance on 
the question of God: that is, it would be necessary to 
undertake an analysis of secular experience in order to 
P.stF~hl i.sh nt least whBt ti'llk nf God mieht possibly m~.an OIJitP 
"l - -- - -
apart from whether or not it was true.'"; 
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i. John Wren-Lewis: Experimental Creativity. 
Anglican layman and scientist Wren- Lewis puts the case 
against traditional objectifying theism in its starkest form in 
his 1964 Cambridge Divinity Faculty Open Lecture, "Does Science 
Destroy Belief?" Theology, in his view, has still not fully 
accepted the philosophical challenge of the present era, 
arising out of the refusal to treat this world of empirical 
objects, the world that lies open to scientific enquiry, as in 
any sense a mere "appearance", a superficial veil, a symbol of 
an ens realissimum lying invisibly beyond it. The ultimate 
nature of things is no longer conceived to reside in an order 
of ideHl forms, beyond the flux and imperfection of this 
temporal moment of sense-bound experience. Rather, it is what 
lies to hand, what is given in and with the empirical world, 
that forms the material of all the reality there is, and over 
which it is mankind's especial duty and privilege to exercise 
that rule and governorship which will turn those materials to 
their most humanly beneficial and fulfilling, creative use.b 
Wren-Lewis gives 
position a fresh turn 
this very 
by importing 
familiar 
into it 
philosophical 
a model of 
scientific activity. For science is pre-eminently practical: it 
is not concerned to discover the "truth" of an "order" lying 
beyond mere appearances, but to propose provisional hypotheses 
about how to understand, and thus to handle the world, and 
these are continually tested by discovering whether they work-
whether they produce results. This procedure, typified by 
science, is for Wren-Lewis the true spirit of Christian faith, 
which he sees as a matter of creative experimental living in 
love in a community of persons, such that "results" accrue in a 
new and better kind of society, the quality of which can only 
be described as "transcendent" in relation to what we are 
tamiliar with. 
Thus for Wren-Lewis, "God" is confessed in the changing 
patterns of creative, experimental living insofar as they bring 
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into being new and more desirable forms of society. He is 
prepared to describe the traditional religious outlook, on the 
other hand, as a "paranoid" state, in which a man is fixated 
upon a belief in "occult powers". This stifles all creativity by 
holding him in thrall to "another", which he believes to be 
more real than what lies before him. As a result, religion, 
which is ostensibly all about ultimate unities and harmony, in 
fact often incites bitter division and conflict born of fear, 
whereas science, despite being concerned with analysis and 
diversity, seems to create '3ome kind of international, trans-
cultural human communion (the scientific "fraternity"; Wren-
Lewis, 1964 (b)). 
The most attractive part of Wren-Lewis' position is his 
recognition that the concept of God is bound up with the 
summons to bring into being a situation for the world which 
surpasses what currently prevails, an idea which is in keeping 
with our account of transcendence. But he expresses it via a 
most idealistic and optimistic view of science, which offers 
little hope of coping with the dark and discouraging side of 
experience. Further, he gives few indications of how the 
disposition to creative, experimental living is to be sustained. 
He is one of those whose past experience of traditional 
religion has apparently blinded him to any deeper appraisal of 
what the resources of the tradition might hold. 
ii. Schubert Ogden: Ultimate Worthwhileness. 
Ogden is the first of two theologians we shall mention 
here who express some sympathy with the radical position 
without being thoroughly identifiable with it. His collection of 
essays, The Reality of God, and in particular the long piece 
which gives the book its title <1967:1-70), makes the main 
outlines of his position clear. In his previous work, Christ 
Without Myth (1961), Ogden tried to reaffirm Bultmann's concept 
of demythologization while detaching it from Bul tmann 's 
insistence upon the kerygmatic event of Christ as the sole 
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source of the possibility of actualizing authentic existence. 
The Reality of God pursues his quest for a more general 
grounding of faith in an "appropriate philosophical analysis", 
and as such falls into the category of works which seek a 
basis in secular experience for talk of God. 
Ogden agrees, firstly, that traditional supernaturalistic 
theism cannot respond to modern man's increasing secularity, 
by which he mean:o; his assertion of a creative autonomy vis-a-
vis the vwrld. This i:3 because such a theism cannot conceive 
of any genuine relational involvement of God with the world. It 
has become powerless to halt the slide from a healthy 
secularity into a one-dimensional and uncreative secularism. 
But secondly, Ogden sets out to demonstrate that, not only 
is pure secular empiricism an untenable option, but in fact 
belief in God is ultimately unavoidable. Religious language, he 
says, following Stephen Toulmin, seeks to answer the "limiting 
questions" which are always encountered if one pushes back and 
back the rational explication of, for example, scientific or 
ethical questions. Thus, why do we assume there is an "order" 
about the wodd which science is able to discover, or why do 
we think we should be "good" anyway? 
Ogden argues that we can only think that such questions 
mean anything because we already possess a pre-reflective, 
pre-thematic conviction about the ultimate worthwhileness of 
existence. We are only able to operate at all as if life were 
not meaningless; and God may be defined as the objective 
ground in reality of this subjective confidence. In Ogden's 
terms, ·~ven the arguments deployed by atheists on behalf of 
"engagement" in the world support this view of God's reality 
(cf.Ogden, op.cit:120-43, on Sartre). 
The third stage in Ogden's argument is that the God in 
whom belief is unavoidable is not the God of trarlitional 
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metaphysics, but of what he calls "neo-classical metaphysics", 
by which he means the God of process philosophy. It is here 
that Ogden finds room for a genuine relatedness of God to 
everything that happens in the world. "Relation", "process" and 
"becoming" replace "substance" and "being" as the fundamental 
structural properties of reality. God can be said to be 
eminently relative, as to his actualized forms of being, while 
retaining an objective absolute independence as to his identity 
in abstracto. This model, Ogden thinks, does ju::3tice to the 
distinctively Christian 
transcendental otherness 
dialectical 
than the 
incarnational involvement in it. 
conception 
world and 
of God's 
his real 
The detailed exposition of a "proce:3s" model for God lies 
well outside our scope <Robinson himself went on to favour 
such a model in his Exploration into God {1967}), but Ogden's 
approach leads us to make two comments here. Firstly, we 
affirm his very clear perception of the issue which Christian 
Radicalism struggled to articulate: that the conditions of 
modern secularity require a way of thinking God which relates 
him genuinely to the events and interests of this world, while 
preserving a "critical distance" which avoids the slide into 
forms of naturalism. 
But secondly, we raise a serious question mark against 
any apologia that makes belief in God inevitable. Ogden's talk 
of "ultimate worthwhileness" represents, at the crucial point, a 
flight from reality which puts the claim to be offering a 
notion of God fully compatible with modern secularity under 
severe strain. If it is true that religious people operate on 
the basis of Ogden's "ineradicable confidence in the final 
worth of things", is it also the case that the Gospel has 
nothing to say to those whose lot in life makes such serenity 
harder to come by? The struggle to believe seems lacking from 
Ogden ':3 account. 
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iii. Langdon Gilkey: Contingency, Relativity, Temporality. 
A second interested observer of the radical scene, Gilkey 
in his large work Naming the Whirlwind:the Renewal of God-
Language <1969) attempts to provide for the dimensions of 
experience Ogden seems to leave out. Gilkey intends his book to 
be a philosophical prolegomenon to a contemporary Christian 
theology. He takes as his point of departure the efforts of 
Altizer, Hamilton, van Buren and the Jewish scholar Richard 
Rubenstein to develop in their various ways a theological 
method which can do without talk of God. His argument is that 
the genuine insights of radical theology do eventually demand 
the use of God-language if they are to be forged into a 
coherent system. 
A basis for such language may be found, Gilkey suggests, 
if we meet the "secular mood" on its mm ground and ask 
whether there are features of the :3ecular 'vmy of thinking and 
perceiving the world <the "mind-set" or unthematized "frame" of 
thought which is usually held to render God-talk problematic) 
which might invite the use of religious categories to thematize 
them. The bulk of the book undertakes a long investigation into 
the characteristic modern attitudes or dispositions of 
contingency, relativity, temporality and autonomy. The first 
three an~ experienced as negative, potentially threatening 
constraints upon men, but the latter as the source of hope and 
liberation (Gilkey, 1969 (b) offers a summary>. 
Gilkey's main argument is that the way in which each of 
the elements is experienced as a feature of pre-reflective 
"antic awareness" by modern people, regardless of how they may 
be intellectually rationalized or "contained" at more reflective 
levels, creates a pressure towards questions which the mental 
frame set up by those elements alone is powerless to 
comprehend. Sometimes, we feel compelled to ask about the 
source and ground of our condi tionedne:3s, in the sense that 
who we are and what we mean seems to be given to us. Or, we 
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experience the threat of our own limitations; or wonder about 
the whence of our values; or become aware that all our 
rationalizing finally runs out on us, into mystery. In this way 
talk of God may arise as the source of a disturbance in our 
perceptions, as the Subject exerting the pressure we receive as 
Objects, as the calling- into-question of the rudiments of our-
secularity. <Gilkey, 1969 (a) :313; Gregor Smith, 1969 :ch. 7 >. 
These moments of questioning, Gilkey says, may become the 
occasions of "hier-ophany", when the dimension of ultimacy 
breaks into common experience. This is a more comprehensive 
position than Ogden's, because it includes as a real 
possibility the experience of meaninglessne:3s, the collapse of 
the ultimate context of meaning into confrontation wi tb the 
"void", as yet another occasion for the manifestation of the 
sacred. It is undoubtedly more adequate than Robinson's narrow 
concentration upon personal relationship as the locus for the 
disclosure of the divine. It attempts to :3eize upon both the 
positive and negative moments of secularity in a way which 
comes closer to acknowledging the dialectical elements in the 
Christian way of talking of God. But it is still subject to the 
general criticisms we now wish to bring against all these 
attempts to by-pass the representations of religion in 
bringing home the reality of God to modern people. 
iv. Critique. 
The first of three major criticism:3 of these attempts to 
construct a kind of religious phenomenology of secular 
experience suggests that they are unrealistically culture-bound. 
In the word:3 of van Buren <1963 :68 >, "one wonders where the 
left wing existentialist theologians have found their 'modern 
man"'. Van Buren's criticism relates specifically to Ogden's 
Chrt3t without Myth, where language about the Cross as a 
"constantly present eschatological event" r;omses va.n Buren to 
wonder whether a man who habitually thinks in such term:3 will 
be likely to analyse "secular experience" in a manner 
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corre:3ponding to the experience of ordinary people. The 
criticism is of wider application: the evidence is simply not 
present that the "pre-reflective antic awareness" of modern man 
is as Ogden and Gilkey <and Robinson, more superficially) make 
it out. 
Cox 0968: 91-4, 261-3) advances a similar criticism by 
arguing that both Bultmann and Tillich belong essentially to an 
earlier generation, an intellectual ~lite with roots in the 
liberal nineteenth-century Bildungsschicht. This generation 
lived through the major convulsions of the crumbling of 
Christendom and the decay of liberal theological idealism. It 
is they, and not pragmatic modern man, who suffer the "cultural 
flleltschmerl' neces:3ary to bolster up a theology of "ultimate 
questions". But the emerging geneJ-ations do not have to clear a 
space for religious awareness in a secular experience from 
which God seems to have departed. Instead, they look outward, 
expecting that if God is to be confessed at all the basis for 
doing so will come through practical and dynamic involvement 
together in the events of history Ccf.van Peursen, 1967). 
Both van Buren and Cox over-estimate the purposive 
practical-mindedness of modern people, and ignore the evidence 
for the persistence of a manifold confusion of religious ideas 
and the fragmentation of cultural life at mass levels. But the 
point stands that there will have to be a far greater 
everydayishness about the contemporary confession of God than 
most of the radicals allowed <although this idea was present 
in Bonhodfer). To put it another way, the kindling of the 
religious imagination can only be achieved on the basis of a 
fairly unglamorous and cool appraisal of the contemporary 
social facts: this is what secularity properly demands. 
Secondly, as ~'>'(~ have already indicated in our treatment 
of Ogden, it will not do to set about proving to the unbeliever 
that he believes in God malsn~ lui. For it is never necessary 
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to interpret any experience in a religious manner, since the 
classification of something as religious depends upon its 
incorporation within a particular cultural system which is 
oriented to the transcendent; and it is always open to any 
individual to choose not to place his experience in such a 
context. 
Furthermore, even if it ~>lere agreed that certain 
experiences did seem to point to a dimension of ultimacy or 
transcendence, thi:3 would still not necessitate speaking of 
"God" simply on that account. Ogden, for example, approache:3 
God's reality along lines far removed from the Biblical 
categories which traditionally shape the confession of God in 
personal terms within the Christian tradition. But, at a 
particular point in the text, he suddenly begins to refer to 
God as "he", without explicit justification (on this see Kee, 
1970:42f.) Belief in God is only made inevitable if you define 
God in a way which makes him more or less analytic in the 
concept of experience itself. 
But God has meaning within the framework of particular 
religious traditions, and not as an extraction from experience 
of any kind. And so our third criticism of "secular" approaches 
to theism is that all the theologians who propose them are 
Christians, who for the purposes of the exercise pretend not to 
be. The analyses of Robinson, Ogden and Gilkey all proceed from 
faith. 
Since it is explicitly admitted by Gilkey, at least, that 
the "experience" under analysis 
unthematized antic condition, it can 
is a pre-reflective, 
only be the analysis of 
the "secular experience" of a man of faith which is offered, 
which i:3 thm-efore not universal./ 
and 
are 
There i:3 a "hidden agenda" 
interpret the world in the 
doing it "non-religiously", 
involved: the theologians see 
way they do, even when they 
because they are participant:3 in a religious tradition which 
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inescapably shapes the way they think, precisely because it 
moulds their pre-reflective mental frame.'~' 
The point we are making is this: God is confessed in a 
certain way in, through and with everyday "secular" experience 
by certain persons because of the religious tradition which 
predisposes them to do so. By birth or by conversion <as we 
might say, by being once or twice-born believers), they have 
become socialized, acculturated, acclimatized: the tradition is 
the air they breathe, or the ocean in which they swim. They are 
"in their element". This understanding ca_n embrace both the 
strictest neo-Orthodox insistence upon the objective givenness 
of God and Revelation and the largely unreflective and habitual 
religious observance of those who have been brought up within, 
or indeed only on the fringes of, a particular tradition. In the 
words of John Macquarrie: 
We believe in the midst of this ambiguous world because 
1.11e have found in it a t1·adition of faith ... which has made 
'5ense of some of its puzzles, and has offe!'ed a way of 
life that is both laid upon us as a demand and is at the 
same time supported and empowered by a ~~race that comes 
from beyond our little human resources (1967:109; 
i!Mf'Aas;is; Mil~e-1, 
The analysis of secular experience will not yield any 
generalized or universal indicators of the reality of God, but 
only such as form part of the antic awareness of the person 
conducting the analysis. But this is not a cause for dismay. 
For what we have is a wide range of particular instances of 
religious orientation, from the austere demands of Barthianism 
to the confused and tentative half-belief of the occasional 
churchgoer or folk-religionist, all socially objectified and 
made visible through the medium of religious practice. Together 
these provide the basis for a possible programme of "faith 
seeking understanding" under contemporary conditions, the goal 
of which would be a thematized, i.e.theologically formulated, 
statement of the doctrine of the God who is thu:3 confessed 
<cf.Lindheck, 1980:38ff, 114; Ward, 1977). 
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Religious traditions express an orientation to 
transcendence, which always stands in a double relation of 
affirmation and denial toward the prevailing order. The secular 
theologies we have looked at so far have striven with 
considerable difficulty to define the transcendent element in 
an analysis which tr-ies to treat secular experience as in a 
more or less undifferentiated way the arena of God's 
disclosure. In the next section, we turn to investigate a 
number of attempts to specify just where the crucial, critical 
"break" represented by the transcendent is to be located. 
3. The Quest for Transcendence. 
1. Thomas Altizer: the Coincidentia Dppositorum. 
Altizer's position constitutes a kind of limiting case in 
the discussion of how radical theology sees the transcendent 
being located in a secular doctrine of God, because on the face 
of it his theology claims to be a "Christian athei::=;m" committed 
to the radical denial of transcendence in all forms. Employing 
a heady blend of Hegel, Blake and Nietzsche, Altizer attempts 
to construct a systematic theological rationale for the 
collapse of transcendence, and turn "death of God" from a 
cultural mood, or a subjective experience, into a historical and 
cosmic event forming the linch-pin of a kind of anti-
metaphysic <see Altizer, 1967 and 1968; Ogletree, 1966 :ch.4; 
K.Hamilton, 1966 (b) :64-75; Kee, 1970:81-99). 
The nub of Altizer's contribution can be put in terms less 
calculated to shock than those he normally employs. On the 
basi::=; of a Hegelian notion of the dialectical self-negation of 
Spirit, Altizer invites us to take the kenotic movement of the 
Incarnation with utter seriousness. Here, once and for all, the 
"primordial", transcendent God of religion, who was Spirit, 
emptied himself into flesh; and so, with the Crucifixion of 
Jesus, God literally died. The death of Jesus means for Altizer 
the passage from a particular into a universal incarnation, so 
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that Christians are now called upon to seek an "epiphany of 
the eschatological Christ" in the immediacy, openness and 
profanity of the secular, in "what lies before us", "in every 
human hand and face", a favourite phrase of Altizer's. 
This means that, for Altizer, the secularity of the 
present age, in the extreme sense of being radically without 
religion, unholy, profane, mark:::. th·:: :fi1 st histori•::al instance 
of the full affirmation of the implications of Christianity. He 
calls upon believers to join in embracing and immersing 
themselv.-~s in profane, secular- life. ln a determination to 
carry through the complete dialectical negation of whatever 
vestiges of a "primordial sacred" remain, including those 
preserved in traditional religion, which continues to worship 
the "decaying body" of a God who has long since passed out of 
the spiritual form into the body of humanity. In the end, the 
new form of the sacred emerge in the new humanity, 
through the final "coincidence of the opposites" (a phrase from 
the religious phenomenology of Mircea El iade, another major 
influence upon Altizer). 
Altizer's position, then, is neither conventionally 
atheistic nor entirely lacking in a transcendent perspective. 
For he intends to affirm as forcefully as possible that God is 
here, and nowhere else. Further, he insists upon the immense 
risk involved in letting go the last remnants of the old idea 
of the sacred, and really affirming the war ld as it now is, not 
just for its own sake but for the sake of an eschatological 
form of the sacred whose appearance is a.nticipated. In all of 
this Altizer is very far from being a "secular theologian"; but 
there are still severe difficulties in the way of accepting his 
position as a Christian possibility. 
The prob lPms mos~ly arise out ~.+ L.JJ... Altizer's refu~:::;al to 
specify in either concrete or practical terms what his r-ather 
rhapsodic Christian embracing of the profane actually involves. 
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How, for example, does the Christian Yes-saying to the world 
differ from the world-affirmation of the kind of 
pragmatically-minded, rather unimaginative secular man such as 
van Buren always has in mind? Altizer's stance does seem to 
imply some kind of uncritical quietism towards secular culture, 
in which everything that appears to deny the very substance of 
the Christian hope has to be the more wholeheartedly accepted, 
in order that thi::; acceptance may somehow eventually lead to 
its being transformed into its opposite. 
Vlith Altizer it is a.s though, in the dialectical mov•:>ment 
of faith, the moments of the dialectic were taking place 
:;imultaneously and reciprocally. In rather than successively 
other words, we are now in the phase where God has completed 
his own self-negation as Spirit, and it is now up to man to 
respond in a total affirmation of flesh. But this is precisely 
what faith will not permit us to do univocally and 
unambiguously; for in every act of seeking to grasp and affirm 
the world, its order and meaning and our place in it, faith 
issues a "Yes, but ... " which impels the pursuit of something 
more than what is directly and empirically given. Altizer's 
approach entail:; the complete postponement of any such 
dialectical reversal until the next, and unpredictable, 
eschatological phase comes into being. 
ii. Gordon Kaufman: Limit as Personal. 
Kaufman's influential essay on transcendence <1967) seeks 
to sharpen the kind of per:;pective already found in Ogden and 
Gilkey, by making more room for the essential ca\reat or 
proviso placed by faith upon all analyses of experience as the 
ground of talk about God. Kaufman's proposal is basically this: 
talk of God and of transcendence arises when what ultimately 
limits all human endeavour and possibility is understood by 
means of a personal B.nalogy. That is, religiou:; ideac; are not 
invited by just any experience of human limitation, but only 
when what set::; limits to our powers, our willing and acting, 
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and constricts our horizons, is conceived as similar to our 
being restrained by the conflicting or competing wills or 
actions of others. 
For when we encounter other persons, we recognize we are 
up against something irreducible, non-manipulable, because 
radically other than ourselves. Our world-vie~'>' is invariably 
called into question whenever we permit the thought to enter in 
that we have to share the same world with others. Other selves 
are not available to us to be fitted as constituent parts in 
our construction of reality: they possess constructions of 
their own. A perceptual shift occurs, which is the inbreaking 
of transcendence, when we see that what is true about the 
intrusion of other persons radically qualifies the whole of any 
"sewn-up" world-view we might have, seen as a totality. 
Kaufman's proposal reverts, in a sense, to the terri tory 
of ''personal relationship" marked out by Robinson, but in a 
more suggestive way. For religious faith is lived out not alone 
but corporately; and the processes whereby opinions and ways 
of seeing the world are repeatedly called into question and 
qualified by successive encounters with others, go to nourish 
a.nd build up faith. Out of such experiences springs the 
recognition of God as one who both confirms and criticises the 
believer's present r-esting-place in the world, and grants a 
kind of security which is gratefully received in r-eturn for a 
promise to pursue further possibilities which lie, as yet, 
beyond the~ believer's horizon. 
Other ways have been suggested of incorporating a 
creative disjunction or perception of the extraordinary within 
the ordinary, by escalation of the ordinary towards certain 
non-negotiable limits <van Buren, 1968 (b); Wren-Lewis, 1964 (a); 
Gregor Smith, 1966:124). Neverthf'lless, these wBys only lie 
at the very edges of what the Christian message has to say to 
the contemporary secular situation, and do not yet fulfil the 
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aim of Christian Radicalism of producing a proclamation of the 
Gospel of God which can actually reach secular man where he 
is. 
iii. Alistair Kee: the Alternative 'Way. 
Coming right at the end of our period, Kee's The 'Way of 
Transcendence; Christian Faith without Belief in God surveyed 
most of the previous attempts to express the Gospel in secular 
terms and found them wanting. There are two particular merits 
in Kee's position: firstly, he does not try to present a 
religionless approach, but instead argues that religious 
practice itself will have to incorporate the ideas he is 
proposing. Secondly, he insists that transcendence is the vital 
concept to be retained and given expression, rather than any 
definition of God existing independently of the practice of a 
specific religious way of life. 
Kee argues that "what theology is basically on to", as he 
puts it, is that there is found to be "an insurmountable 
obstacle to man insofar as he pursues his own ends, but 
equally, a never-failing source of power to pursue quite 
different ends" <Kee, op.cit:200). The important difference 
among men today is whether they choose to pursue the "way of 
immanence", meaning, in New Testament terms, "the broa_d way 
that leads to destruction"3 , the uncritically accepted way into 
which they have been socialized, or the alternative "way of 
transcendence" exemplified by Jesus. This way compels a man to 
be critical of given realities: 
In choosing the ~ay of transcendence, ~e make a vah.te 
judgment that things are not as they seem. We are 
disputin•] reality, lie a1•e disputin•] ~hat the nature of 
man really is (ibid:228-9), 
In short, the content of the transcendent is the vision of an 
alternative set of possibilities for the world. To put it 
another way, there is another world, and it is this one, but 
changed. 
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Kee thinks that, in future, some who are committed to the 
way of transcendence in Jesus may want to push through to a 
confession of God as the ontological grounding for such faith 
and for the strikinc; ovei--againstness and self-authenticating 
quality of the life it invites, but most will not. "Belief" will 
cease to be a relevant category for questions about God; God is 
not someone who is believed in, but lived under, acted upon and 
responded to. Kee, in fact, ends his book by shelving the 
ont.ologica 1 question completely: anyone who finds the way of 
transcendence to be valid and rewarding, but then goes on to 
ask why, has missed the point. 
But we do not think this 1::3 so. For, given the forms of 
religious culture, in 1-i tual and image and practice, which can 
carry the orientation to a changed war ld to which Kee refers, 
the commitment he wants to see will lead to the confession of 
God, by way of the worship of God. That is, it is less a case 
of a rational decision to believe, than a discovery that, with 
God, to think him is to know him, in practice. There can be no 
concept, worked out in advance, of a God which a person might 
or might not then come to know. The way in to all that can be 
meant by "believing in" God is through worshipping, praying, 
and trying to pursue the religious way of life. 
What Kee's account does make clear is that there are 
many people who desire to follow the way of Jesus because they 
find in it the pattern of a life and a society which surpasses 
the world that nml is, but who think their following of that 
way will have to be "non-religious" simply because the 
religious culture of the churches available to them fails to 
demonstrate the transcendent quality which attracted them to 
Jesus in the first place. There is, therefore, no escaping the 
fundamental problem of religion as the vehicle for expressing 
and embodying intimations of transcendence and the meaning of 
God. 
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iv. Harvey Cox; The Future. 
One more approach to transcendence within the ambit of 
the radical theology requires our attention. While the debate 
about The Secular City was under way, Cox turned to the work 
of Ernst Bloch for help in articulating the way he saw God 
related to present secular history, in response to critics who 
had accused him of simply dissolving God into the movement of 
social change. For Bloch, in his Frinzip der Hoffnung, man is 
cardinally the creature who hopes; and Bloch attempts to posit 
an objective correlation between the ''Traum nach vorwaerts" in 
which man engages and the actual structural and historical 
possibilities for the world. That is, man's dream is not just 
an empty or arbitrary one. 
Cox suggests that a biblical theism might well provide 
the link sought by Bloch between the persistent dream of the 
ideal and the historical realities. He writes: 
If we can affirm anything which both defines and 
transcends history it will be the iuture as it lives in 
men's imagina.tion, nurtured by his memory and actualized 
by his responsibility (Cox, 1966: 197-203; see also Co;<, 
1967)' 
The relation of the future to the present is rather precisely 
one of transcendence, insofar as temporal continuity is 
combined with unpredictability and un-determinedness. The 
future can be imagined, provisionally planned for, dreamt about, 
and conceived in the mast ideal and perfectly fulfilled terms. 
It is given to us- but it still has to be worked at. The 
future comes out of the unknown, but also develops from the 
present and the past. As a model of the transcendent, the 
future is thoroughly secular, because it is the future of the 
world; but it is inescapably religious, because it promises 
another war ld. 
It is, of course, not to the theology of Christian 
Radicali:3m that we should have to look to find the most 
fruitful lines of development of the concept of futurity.' 0 
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But the idea of a creative vision of what might be, which can 
be assembled from the materials of what already is in such a 
way that there i::; a compulsion to turn what might be into what 
will be, is an important one which was at least incipient in 
some of the contributors to the radical theology Ccf.in popular 
terms Phipps, 1966:171-2; Holloway, 1972:62-9; Woollard, 
1972:66-7). 
'ile have seen, in this section, bow attempts to convey the 
meaning of theism through accounts of secular reality which 
incorporate some means of standing over against t:hat same 
reality and judging it, questioning it or marking it as 
extraordinary even 
which makes them 
in its ordinariness, introduce a dimension 
somewhat more successful than approaches 
which simply aim to find grounds for ta.lk of God in secular 
experience as it is. But this dimension of transcendence still 
requires a cultural vehicle for its expression, which is why we 
still need to focus more explki tly on Christian Radicalism's 
attitude to religion. We have already seen that this was 
problematic in Robinson, whose prior commitment to 
"religionlessness" disabled him from gaining due as:3istance 
from the resources of his own tradition when searching for the 
contemporary meaning of God and transcendence. 
4. Religion, Transcendence and God. 
i. The Dialectical Character of Christianity . 
We begin this section by applying to the specific case of 
Christianity the sociological understanding of religion put 
forward in Chapter IV. The Christian tradition fills out and 
objectifies the orientation to the transcendent with the 
content of a very particular vision, that disclosed in Jesus 
Christ. Out of this is confessed a God who dedarPs .3nd 
demon:strates hi:3 radical relational involvement with and 
affirmation of the world, while at the same time standing 
beyond it and bt:=!ckon ing men and women towards a ~sal V3. t ion 
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which consists of a more perfect, eschatological and hence 
transcendent fulfilment of its potentialities. 
Radical theology wa!3 unable to perceive this dialectical 
pattern. It did nat see that the "ather war ld" posited by 
religion, as a "sacred cosmos" <Berger), "general order of 
existence" <Geertz) or "super-empirical transcendent reality" 
<Robertson), pr-ecisely because it comes to manife!3t a "unique] y 
realistic aura of factuality", cannot in the end leave the world 
be. The main traditions of understanding the social functions 
of religion, in terms of integrating the social group around a 
legitimated concept of social order, and providing constructs 
of meaning in the face of situations which would threaten it, 
do not merely support a socially quietist and uncreative role 
for religion. 
For these unitive and assuring functions are necessary to 
undergird the purposive activity of the religious group within 
their social world, even such activities as are designed to 
change it. To put it another way, the critical and prophetic 
functions of religion are ironically reliant upon those 
mainstream functions which in themselves appear more likely to 
uphold the status quo. Hence a dialectical tension appears, 
which we are saying is typical of all religion, allowing for 
the likelihood of the cate8ary "religion" being one which m1es 
its origin to a Judaea-Christian context of understanding (see 
supra:78). As Barbara Hargrove writes: 
This is the tens ion based on the common tendency, in 
dealing with matters of ultimate concern and sacred 
cha1'acte1', to want to preserve them in theil' e~<act form 
because they are too holy to mantpulate, This is 
cont1·asted with a.n appreciation of the sacred cosmos as 
the repository of unreached ideals and untapped power, 
out of which may come at any time the impetus fol' maJor 
chan•:Je leading t•) a. bettet l'~a.lization ot those ideals 
!Ha1·grove, 1979:59), 
The Christian religion is characterized by a sharpening 
of this tension to the very hi8hest degree. The more the 
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situation of faith within the world becomes precarious, the 
greater the pressures to defend those symbolic constituents of 
the sacred cosmos which hold together the diminishing 
religious group, underline their identity and offer rationales 
for their increasingly threatened status. But, conversely, the 
requirement also becomes the greater for new creative 
initiatives to pose a prophetic challenge to the world. 
It is important to identify this as a tension inherent 
within religion, and eminently so in the Christian religion. It 
does not lie between "religion" and "Christianiti', or ''religion'' 
and "faith", nor even between "good" and "bad" faith, or 
"authentic" and "alienating" religion. This is not to say that 
no such value judgments are possible: an undialectical religion 
may well be alienating and a vehicle of bad faith. But, there 
must be no dismissal of, for example, a religion which 
legitimates as inevitably. opposed to "faith", "true 
Christianity", or any other term implying unqualified approval. 
Radical theology displays a clear tendency to dismiss 
religion as inimical to the spirit of Christian faith, along 
the lines of Bonhoeffer rather than Barth (supra:68). Sometimes 
it distinguishes between "true" and "false11 (idolatrous or 
inauthentic) religion, and then equates "true Christianity" with 
the former. Such a course is doubly removed from social 
realities: firstly, it is faulty in its judgment upon religion 
in general, and secondly, it is unrealistic in supposing that 
what it sees as "true Christianity" could be fully realized in 
socio-cultural form. With these considerations in mind, we may 
now look q~i te briefly at a number of approaches to religion 
in and around the ambit of Christian Radicalism. 
ii. Altizer: Religion as Regression. 
In the case of Altizer, the entire basis for any kind of 
identifiably separate religious culture whatsoever has been 
nullified in the decisive events of Incarnation and Cross. His 
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position emerges as a kind of neo-primitivism in which the 
category "religion" is no longer relevant to the circumstances. 
For Altizer, any religious movement referring to another world, 
an alternative order or a transcendent possibility is a 
disastrous regression to a pre-incarnate form of faith. 
Religion is a backward movement toward spirit, whereas 
Christianity looks forward to a contemporary and hitherto 
unknown epiphany of the sacred through a dialecti•~al 
affirmation of the profane. 
The logic of Altizer's position is self-contained, and its 
practical insufficiencies have already been mentioned. But the 
judgment upon religion 1·.-·=> one-sided, for the analogy of 
backward and forward movements might just as well be applied 
to the perpetual dialectical tension of religion. In New 
Testament terms, faith moves between the poles of he arche and 
ta kaina, or again, to proton and to eschaton <Minear, 1965). 
The rituals of a Remembrance Day, for example, anchor the 
sacrificial deaths of the war-dead in a frame of timele:3snes:3 
which forever affirms the values for which they fought, but 
simultaneously look to a day when wars shall be no more. Only 
the God who has been "our help in ages past" can likewise be 
declared "our hope for years to come". 
iii. Wren-Lewis: Religion as Neurosis. 
The view that religion is a "neurotic" condition is taken 
over by Wren-Lewis C1964 (a)) rather loosely from Freud. 
Without relying very extensively on the details of the Freudian 
understanding, Wren-Lewis argues thai: religion sees mankind as 
needing to bring itself in to line with a "theory", a 
hypothetical co~::;mic order behind the scenes where truth is 
located. A:3 a result, religion paralyses creative endeavour in 
the world and holds its subjects in thrall to supposed "occult 
powers". It fails to create the concH 1:ion:3 love and 
reconciliation for which it is suppo:=.ed to stand, because it is 
not experimental, pragmatic and open. It predetermines the game 
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and then prevents people from playing it for fear of breaking 
the rules. 
Thi:3 does not mean that Wren- Lewis sees no need for the 
activities of worship: 
l.le need a Church, a practical religion ... [but] the 
traditional forms of worship, from t.he Quake!' t,J the 
Catholic, a1·e too loaded with the neurotic associations 
of the past to be of any use at all (art,cit;44l. 
His own experience of the Church was doubtless a damaging one; 
but, unfortunately, what he calls "neurotic associations" are 
part of the very fibre of the reli,3ious enterprise. Yo 1J cannot 
hav•:e experiment, pragmatism and openness without "theory", 
continuities and givenness. Some of the uncreative, uncritically 
accepted "occult powers" of today's religion are, after all, the 
still live embers of yesterday's experimental religious 
openness. The church Wren-Lewis "needs" will never be found; at 
least, not for long. 
iv. The Pelzes: Religion as Bogus Certainty. 
Wern•~r and Lotte Pelz, whose book God is No More .i_s one 
of the more idiosyncratic products of Christian Radicali:3m in 
Britain, make another wholly negative appraisal of religion. 
They treat it as an easy way out, a means of abdicating 
responsibility for making moral decisions in the novum of the 
moment and for living authentically in relation with one's 
fellows: 
Religion gives us the feeling of ultimate security, 
offers us something definite to believe in, persua•jes us 
.that we know what we believe and convinces us that we 
really believe what we think we believe ... Relig1on also 
gives us the opportunity to experience the 'Joy of 
fellowship' of shared beliefs and convictions on 
comparatively ine~:pensive te1'ms .. ,Religion justifies us 
in all we do- c'est St'n AJetier- for even when it 
admonishes us in our failures, it does so only by letting 
us know what we should have don,o.,. Rel igi::;n , " the 
apotheosts of the 'law' ... (1.1,& L, Pelz, 1%:3;10Sf,l 
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The Pelzes' alternative, a breathless and exotic state of 
being continually captivated by the maddening elusiveness of 
the words of Jesus, is certainly far more exciting, on the face 
of it, than mere workaday religion. But the Pelzes want to cut 
themselves off completely from the existing communities of 
faith, the under-tow of religious subculture and the necessary 
securities of routine and familiar tradition. They assume that 
d·~cisions tak<:>n almo:3t automatically, on the ba:3i:3 of deeply 
ingrained, socialized-in symbols and values, cannot be 
authentic, cannot embody the true "mind of Christ". Such 
assumptions are likely to make the reality of God more, and 
rrot less, remote from the perception::=, of ordinary "secular" 
people. 
Furth•~r reference to the issues ra i:3ed by the Pelzes' 
critique of religion will be found in Chapter XIII infra, on the 
ethics of Christian Radicalism. Here, however, we wish to 
balance the trer.~tment by including two more moderate views by 
sympathetic commentators on aspects of the radical scene. 
v. Daniel Jenkins: Religion and the Crisis of Faith. 
Religion, as man's aspiration after God and as his 
response to him, th1·usts him into a J'ealm be'f•)nd the 
suped ic ial appea1·a.me of ever'f day, It makes hirn aware 
of the c lairns of another woJ·ld than that conditioned by 
space and time and of othe1· purposes than those which 
p1·esent themselves naturally to him in the midst. of his 
secular occasions, It sets a question ma1·k against all 
his buy1ng and selling, his marrying and giv1ng 1n 
rnan1age, and asks hirn, 'What doth it profit a man if he 
•]ain the whole woJ•ld an•:l lose his owr, sotd?' (.Jenkins, 
1962:71)' 
Here is a. contributor who :3hows himself very much more aware 
of the transcendent dimension of religion and the critical 
tensions it introduces into the perception of reality. Indeed, 
this passage of Jenkins somewhat overstates the case; for it 
is manifestly not true, for e:-cample, that thP Christian r-eligion 
"sets a question mark" against marriage for the vast majority 
of those whu seek religious endorsement of the contract. 
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Rather, religion signs, seals and delivers it and bestows upon 
it a quality of sacredness which a civil ceremony alone cannot 
do. This, indeed, is a good illustration of just one phase in 
religion's dialectic. 
But elsewhere, .Jenkins puts it more subtly, in terms of 
the relation between religion and faith: 
The ma1·k of a •Jood church or del' is,,, the extent oi its 
ability to keep thrusting the church's religion into the 
crisis of faith, and to keep doin•J this even while it is 
surrounded by all the precious fruits of faith (ibid:46l, 
Fa] th, .Jenkin:'O hen~ recognL;es, as the originating and 
underlying di:3position involved in the religious life, 
inevitably produces its religious expressions as the cultural 
channels through which it is conveyed. Far from being an 
encumbrance or an obstacle to faith, these embodiments are 
"precious fruits" which are able, in their turn, to produce yet 
man~ faith in those who make use of them. The fruits only go 
bad and lose their value when they no longer serve to enable 
this process of faith-producing-religion, religion-producing-
faith <cf.Morris, 1964:ch.6; Macquarrie, 1967:74£). 
It is the arrangement of the Church's worshipping life 
and activities which is ultimately responsible for seeing to it 
that this continuum occurs, through which the idea and the 
reality of God as both with us and beyond us is kept alive and 
transmitted over time in culture and society. 
vi. Allan Galloway: Cult and Culture. 
Galloway's account of religion, from his 1967 publication 
Faith in a~nging CulturP, illustrates well the resources 
available in the work of Tillich on religion, upon which 
Robin:3on completely failed to draw in Honest to God (see 
espedally Tillich, 1956 & 1'~57). The Christian tradition 
provides the elements for- seeking a dis•:::losure of the holy 
both through what is, and through a vision of what ought to 
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be, which 
forms of 
have historically been 
Catholic sacramentalism 
polarized into the typical 
and Protestant ethical-
prophetic religion. But the polarization is merely a reifying 
and "freezing" of either moment of a dialectic. 
lt is po::3:3ible for religion to become so isomorphic with 
the contours of a culture that it retains no leverage for 
stimulating :c:;ocial change; that is a fami.liar enough danger. 
But it is also possible for a stance of strenuous resistance to 
the contemporary ethos to leave a religion with little more 
than an idolatrou:3 fixation upon past forms, structures and 
dogmas. 
Galloway views the task of the religious cult- all the 
unambiguously and visibly "religious" trappings of the whole 
Christian system- as that of mediating between these 
positions. The cult, in its orientation upon the transcendent 
object, serves to prevent the religious ultimate, the fulfilment 
of the world that is the promise and call of God, from 
becoming totally a:3similated to secular culture. But it is al:=>o 
the only medium for bringing the transcendent into vital 
contact with the culture in which it must seek realization. 
Religion continually negotiates the knife-edge of this dual 
role.' ' 
vii. Conclusions. 
VIe have argued in this chapter that it is unhelpful and 
mbleading to suppose that the way to a repristination of 
theism under secular conditions lies through "religionlessness". 
This applies, not only to the more extreme idea of a faith 
literally without worship or sacred objectifications, as in 
Altizer, but also to the more guarded sense favoured by 
Robinson, which looks to the retention of a form of organized 
religion shorn of its "other-worldly" O!'ier.ta.tion. To return for 
a moment to Robinson's view, he write:s: 
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The purpose of worship is not to retire f!·om the secular 
into the department of the religious, let alone to escape 
fl·om 'this wol'ld' into 'the other wol'ld', but to open 
oneself to the meaning of the Christ in the common, to 
that which has the powe1' to penetrate its superficiality 
and redeem it f1·om its alienation (Robinson, 1%:3a:87; 
emphasis mine), 
Insofar as Robinson is clearly right to disapprove of religion 
as "escape" or "retirement", he fails to see that the 
achievement of the aim we have emphasised in the passage above 
depends upon a proper under,3tanding of thmo;e religious 
representations of "another world" which he 1,3 so keen to 
abolish. 
For the Christian religious tradition carries an extensive 
agenda of double-edged symbols which simultaneously declare 
both that we and the world are affirmed and cared for, rooted 
in a principle of order and structured by meaning, and that 
neither we nor the world can lay claim to ultimacy and static 
is-ness, but are called to change, future fulfilment and final 
transfiguration. 
Bonhoeffer's speculations about religionlessness cannot be 
made into grounds for letting the Church off the hook, when 
its formal provisions for religious activity fail to engage 
with the large majority of the people. We cannot conclude that 
cultural conditions simply make it impossible for people to be 
religious any more; we have to ask wha.t is amiss with our 
li.e.the Church's) religion, and hm1 it might again become the 
·.rehiclf~ and the concrete means for crystallizing, sharpening 
and summoning into action those perceptions which alone can 
both undergird and change the wodd in the way the Gospel 
dem.:tnds .' '" 
The other ramifications of this basic conclusion, that the 
t-eali ty of God comes first and foremost through his being 
confessed, worshipped and (imperfectly) obeyed within the 
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provisions of a living religious tradition, are all matters 
which will receive more extensive comment later on. 
Firstly, we accept the view that a secular society which 
differentiates the specialist sub-system of religion can have 
advantages for the promotion of the healthy and distinctively 
Christian tension we have been discussing (cf. Ling, 1963; 
Gardner, 1965; Casserley, 1965). We need to grasp the religiou:::; 
opportunities relative isola.tion offers, and neit:her to bemoan 
secularization with the conservative Christian, nor to urge 
compliance with its premises after the manner of some les:3 
subtle pronouncements of the radical:3. But this is a 
programmatic i:;:;sue for Chapter X. 
Secondly, our position means taking all manner of "fringe 
practices" around the penumbra of the Church much more 
seriously than Christian Radicali:3m was inclined to do. 
Policies which assume a situation of post-Christian heathenism 
and concentrate exclusively on the "commitment" approach to 
the core religious minority, are wastefu1 in their stewardship 
of the religious resources of the people. Folk religion is far 
too much of a living, chaotic, confused and persistent force 
for the Christian churches to be able to afford not to assume 
responsibility for it. 
For 
embodied 
religion 
in ritual, 
engages in 
symbol and 
sacn~d world-construction, 
social form: and the Church 
cannot hope to promote that construction which is impelled and 
informed by the vision of Jesus, without seeking to disentangle 
and understand the complex and compromised items of its own 
cultural heritage which appear dimly and distortingly reflected 
in the hall of mirrors constituted by 
people actually sustain (see Martin, 
Vidler, 1962; Habgood, 1983:ch.5). 
tbe rel igi.ous universes 
196'7; Hickling, 1968; 
Thirdly, the renewal of liturgy is really not just an in-
group preoccupation of the churches. For the language and 
ritual of liturgy must perform the double function of making 
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the praise of God spring directly from a genuine relatedness 
to the secular concerns of day-to-day living, and opening up 
the critical gap between the ordinary and everyday and the 
constraining vision of the transcendent aut of which God acts 
and speaks. Y/e shall allude further to this in the closing 
chapter of the thesis. 
Finally, this chapter supports a conclusion which is 
general throughout the thesis and will be restated mare fully 
at the end. It is a plea for ecclesiolagical realism. The 
radical theologians tended to envisage ideal congregations 
bfoaring little relation to any existing ones, and to reject the 
existing ones for their cosy ather-worldliness, or dismiss 
them as irrelevant to the task of secular mission. But a 
secular theology cannot 
realities at the very 
retreat from dealing with concrete 
point where the primary tangible, 
historico-cultural embodiment of theological meanings is to be 
found. The ecclesiology of Christian Radicalism was, for the 
most part, sadly out of touch with the churches. 
Throughout our discussion we have spoken freely of the 
specifically Christian content of transcendence which sets up a 
particularly acute tension between the religious legitimation 
of certain world-orders and the critical offer of creative 
alternatives. There is one important approach to a secular 
theology found within Christian Radicalism which we have not 
covered in this chapter, because it merits separate treatment 
in a chapter of its own. 
This approach places 
Christian content" to the 
in centre-stage the "specifically 
exclusion of all other theistic 
pos~3ibilities, by focusing upon the human figure of Jesus of 
~Iazareth as all that is contained in, or could pm;sibly be 
meant by, Christian talk of God. It is to this Jesucentric 
tradition that we turn in the next chapter; and we shall argue 
that it does not provide a convenient way of by-passing the 
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questions which we have maintained in this chapter are raised 
by our sociological understanding of religion. 
NOTES, 
1, There has been no shortage of very able critiques of Robinson exposing the 
shortcomin·~s of his proposals vis-a-vis orthodoxy, or as a piece of systel'latic 
theological scholarship, Among these are the reviews by Herbert McCabe and 
H,E.IJ,Turner, and the article by David Jenkins in The Honest to God Debate: 142-.54; 
165-80; 194-206; Ian Ramsey's strictures on Robinson's understanding of rel i·~ious 
lan~uage, in Christian Discoyrse (1975;61-90) and Hascall's surgical dissection in 
ch,·J of Th<> Secularization Qf Chrjstianitk But we are more concerned with 11hy the 
book fails as an experiment in secular t eology, Since our detailed discussion of 
secularization in theological understanding does not come until Chapter X, 111e are 
using the term "secular• provisionally in this chapter to mean 'pertaining to this 
one, ex~erienced world as the sole substantive reality there is,• 
2, Inonest to God Robinson's interweaving of the discussion 111ith references to 
Martin Buber seems rather abruptly to interrupt the flow of his general reliance on 
Tillich, Ho11ever, Robinson wrote his doctoral thesis on Bubel', and he explains more 
fully Buber's considerable influence on him in the Prologue to Exploration into God, 
under the title "Quest for the Personal", This is why Robinson's "secular" theology 
is so thoroughly (and inade~uate~) only a "personalist" theology, 
3, Even in en, 4 of Honesto Go , where the Mde 1 of union with the Ground of Being 
as Love is "Christologized", the ambiguity re~ains as to whether Robinson is making a 
claim for soa1ething generally true of experience, or saying that Christ actually 
introduces something 1.hat was not there before, Thus he says that Jesus empties 
hi11self of himself as man, in order to disclose the God who is present "at depth": 
'For it is making himself nothing, in his utter self-surrender to others in love, 
that he discloses and lays bare t~e Ground of man's being as Love• 1751, But then he 
generalizes: "For at this point, of love 'to the utter~ost', we encounter God the 
ultimate 'depth' of OW' being, the unconditional in the conditioned" (76; ea1phasis 
mine), It is never clear whether this new n1ode of relationship can be secularly 
disclosed regardless of its beinq present, or not, within the Christian community, or 
whether the explicitly Christian- tnput is required in order to bring it into being, 
David Jenkins (art,cit;203-4) has shown that what Robinson wants to say about Jesus 
requires more wei•jht to be •jiven to traditional conceptions of the transcendence of 
God in order to be coherent, 
4, It may apRear as if all this is a heavier critical treatment than the theological 
flimsiness of Robinson's book is 11orth, But it should be remembered that we are 
interested in the curious disproportion between the immense impact of the book at the 
ti~e and the small significance accorded to the radicalism of the sixties in the 
Church of today, The important theological questions are not confined to an academic 
analysis of what Robinson has put on tf\e page, 
5, The "Schleienacher tradition• originally meant clearin% a srace for religious 
experience as something sui generis, Schleiermacher, in hisn Re igion- Soeecbes to 
its Cultured Despisers (17991, clai11ed that religion "resigns at once all claim on 
anything that belongs either to science or morality•. He meant that while religion is 
unable to pronounce upon what we can know about the material 11orld, and cannot 
prescribe unilaterally what 111e ought to do, nevertheless it has its proper sphere of 
validity in the area of how it feels to exist in the world, By "feeling• (6efueh]) is 
111eant a pre-reflective condition of antic awareness, about wnich rellgion be·~ins to 
reflect; and when it does so, it concludes that the essential nature o! this 
awareness is one of beinQ "absolutely dependent". In relation to any conceivable 
object or circumstance 1n the world man knows himself to be partly free 
<autonommJsl, partly dependent; but in ~piety", the balance tips wholly on to the 
dependent side (see .Jenkinsd 1966:25-.55), The difference between Schleierrnacher and 
the development of his tra ilion in the theologians we are examining here is that 
they sensitised by a century and a half of "projeclionism" sociological and 
psychological reductionism and other theories keen to demolish tf,e claim that there 
is such a thing as religious e~:perience in its own right, prefer to examine 111hat 
aspects of the entire range of normal experience might Justify the use of religioiJs 
ta H about them, 
~ .. To illustrate, Wren-Lewis rontends that the Pt!iigious authorities who opposed 
tial1leo 111ere not merely betng react1onary, They s1mply could not concetve that 
anything as mundane as what )'OU coul•j see through a telescope could be of 1ny 
relevance to the ultimate truth, "how things really are", 
7, Gre·~or Smith has argued that this is the case with Anselm's ontological argwAent 
<Smith, 1%6;59-641, Although the letter of the ar9ument involves the use of pure 
,jiscursive reasoning, Christo remoto, t.J arrive at the concept of God, what the 
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spirit of it amounts to is the recognition that, from within the perspective of 
faith, to think God is to know and encounter him, In the process of fides quaerens 
intellectum, there can be no conceptualization of God (essence) which leaves open the 
question of whether the concept is instantiated <existence), 
e. This is perhaps the only way in which Barth's insistence upon the absolute 
determinative objectivity of revelation and Word can be made sense of, for Barth 
seems to be offering a monumental analysis of how things appear from within the pre-
rational experience of a particularly heightened Protestant type of faith: a being 
•Fasped from beyond, critically apprehended by a co11pelling Word and forcefully 
dislodged fr•)lll the perceptual centre of one's own universe, The Barlhian analoqJa 
iidei would otherwise appear to provi•je us no means of hoisting ourselves on to the 
epistemological platform from which, with Barthd we might survey the world from God's 
point of view; or else, the only way up woul be at the expense of our historical 
earticularityj and hence our proper humanity, 
~, Matthew 7: 3, 
10, See e,g, Moltmann <1979;15-16); "The vision of a qualitatively new future of 
history can become • transcendent horiz•)n which opens up and stimulates the process 
of transcending towards a new historical future,, ,[ThiS vision] already ruts its 
stamp on the way history is experienced and moulded here in the present", Mo tmann of 
course 11sorked out his eschatological understandin·~ (Jheolo~y of Hope, 1967) in 
dialogue with the ~ark of Ernst Bloch, Pannenberg (1969 has constructed a 
t1·anscendental ontology in which futu1·ity replaces categories of substance for talk 
of God 'iho appears as "the oower of the f•Jture", Metz <1969) views the capacity of 
mankind to env1sage and take 'responsibility for the future as a crucial link between 
the Gospel's understanding of th~ 11orld in faith and hope and the process of 
secularization as the world's coming-to-itself in its worldliness, Robert King 
!1974;10Mf,) thinks that the notion of the future is the concept of transcendence 
most likely to make sense to the modern seculu mind. Robinson (1%7: 101ft, l has 
9iven Bibllcal grounds for thinkini God in terms of the one who goes before, the 
~ummons, he that lies always ahead o, us, 
11. Blackham (1966) has given a classification of types of religion designed to show 
the kinds •Jf alliancesh cultural, political, popular and ecclesiastical, into 11hich 
the basic drive of fait enters in changing configurations through historJ, 
12, Activities like informal small-group worshif, house-group study an chaplaincy-
type involvement in factories or hospitals may oak like "religionless Christianity" 
to the clergy, 11ho are inbued with the ethos of ecclesiastical life, but for lay 
people, as Tor our appr•)ach here, they are still very much religion: a chastened 
reli•Jion seeking •)ccasion for its symbls to bud into renewed vitality, Armstrong 
11961) dra11s a parallel between the self-styled "secular Christians" and the Gnostics 
.;f the early Christian centuries, who saw thehlselves the pneumatikoi, as having 
progressed beyond the "merely religious" psl'chikoi, Bulb Armstrong says, it belongs 
to man's humanness as a social being to •)bje'ctify in sym ols and to instttutionalize, 
Without a programme of transcendental religion to accompany it, Robinson's idea of 
the secular Cnristian life would •Jnly evaporate into "living a decent life•. David 
Jenkins wrote in an article in Frontier in 1968, "To whom do we pray?" that our 
proble11 is not ho11 to become l'eligionless but that our existing religion is "neither 
here nor there": neither keyed in to actual concrete concerns, nor really revelatory 
of the compelling power of the transcendent, 
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CHAPTER IX: CHRISTIANS AND THE HUMANITY OF JESUS. 
\lhen the question of an objective, transcendent God is 
judged too problematic, for the time being, to be capable of 
solution, the radical 
person of Jesus of 
theologian has recour::;e instead to the 
Nazareth. For Jesus, despite whatever 
dogmatic conundrums Christian hi::;tory may have erected around 
him, r-:>mains at least a historical individual of a certain 
chan:Kter. The empirica.l availability of Je::;us, while scarcely 
without its difficulties, was an assumption made easier for the 
theologians of the 1960s in virtue of the post-Bultmannite "new 
quest of the historical Jesus", which asserted that some 
continuity between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith 
was essential to the rational integrity of the kerygma.' 
The theologians we are considering largely accepted the 
principles of the "new quest", to the effect that despite being 
Chri::;tologically and keygmatically interpreted through and 
through, the Gospel account::; do yield the portrait of an 
individual possessing certain highly distinctive and striking 
features which account for the kerygma taking the form it did. 
They believed, therefore, that they were justified in appealing 
to the human Jesus as the ground of a secular form of faith. 
1. Van Buren and The Secular Xeaning of the Gospel. 
i. General Observations. 
\le shall begin by discussing Paul van Buren's The Secular 
Meaning of ~QQspe 1 a::; the most sustained attempt to 
col!struct d. "theology" without God but decisively focused upon 
Jesus. We shall concentrate upon the use made of the figure of 
Je:=>us by van Buren and othen; in their Jesu-centric accounts 
of fni_th, and then offer a critique stimulated again by our 
sociological undPr::;tandin8 of religion. To lay the groundwork 
for a more specific attention to Jesus, we need to consider 
cer~ain general problem:=. Df van Buren's work. 
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The heart of the matter concerning .Jesus is found in 
chapters 5 and 6 of The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, and 
especially pages 117-45 (page references being to the 1963 SCM 
"Cheap Edition"). In order to be in a position to approach 
these, we give a summary analysis of the preceding contents. 
Van Buren acknowledges his indebtedness to Bonhoeffer at 
the very beginning of his book. He intends to offer a 
contribution to the quest for a "non-religious interpretation 
of biblical concepts": and the '"ay he intends to do it is by 
means of an analysis of what people mean when they use the 
language of faith. It is an exercise in fides quaerens 
intellectum, where the fides belongs to a "secular man" who is 
himself not a little puzzled about what his religion is really 
all about. This means t1wt van Buren can be exempted from the 
criticism we made of Robinson, Ogden and Gilkey, about 
purporting to be offering an analysis of secular experience 
without recognizing that this is only such experience as it 
appears to a religious ma.n. Van Buren never claims to be doing 
anything other than interpreting faith to those who find 
themselves professing it. 
He illu:3trates the background to his problem from Antony 
Flew's sceptical version of John Wisdom's parable of the 
gardener <which shows how religious assertions which seem at 
first to be about actual state::; of affairs can die "the death 
of a thousand qualifications"), and from Bul tmann 's programme 
of demythologizing (van Buren, op.cit:3-6l. Bultmann's solution 
to the problem of theologi.::al meaning will not do, van Buren 
says, because it can be attacked from both sides. 
Th•::! "right", typified by Barth, claim that it •::!mpties the 
Gospel of all it:3 distinctive revelatory particularity, while 
the "left", repr-esented by Ogden, criticise H. for irrationally 
wanting to hang on to the uniqueness of the Christ-event 
iibi.d:7-12). But van Buren thi.nks that the proposals of right 
and left alike dep<::!nd upon rarefied and Pickwickian uses of 
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language, which only mystify the would-be believer about what 
is actually meant. 
But the philosophical school of (mostly British) 
language-analysts may enable u::;, van Buren contends, to 
understand better what the Christian means when he uses the 
language his religion bequeaths to him. This school 
, , ,challenges the Christian to think clearly, speak 
simply, and say 111hat he means without using wot·ds in 
unusual ways, unless he makes it quite clear what he is 
,join•] (ibid:lSl, 
Any meaning disclosed by this method would be what van Buren 
means by a "secular meaning of the Gospel", for it would be the 
fruit of the believer's self-understanding on the basis of 
"certain empirical attitudes" which the modern culture obliges 
him, willy-nilly, to adopt Cibid:l9-20). 
All of this is laid out in van Buren's careful 
Introduction. Part One of the book proceeds with the ground-
clearing part of the programme. First a resume of patristic 
Christology is provided, with an adept account of the problems 
involved in the categories of Chalcedon and the effort:s of 
"Biblical theology" to deal with them. Van Buren offers his own 
earlier attempt at reconstruction in terms of "a Christology of 
call and response", with Jesus as the one who was seen and 
confessed to be perfectly obedient to the call of Yahweh. 
However, he concludes, thi:s is still "sadly mythological, in 
form if not in content" (ibid:55). 
In chapter 3, therefore, he moves on to consider in det.::li J 
the existentialist offer of a demythologized under::=; tanding, 
largely through Ogden's proposals for improving upon Bultmann. 
He lists five crucial objections. In particular, Ogden insists 
on resorting to quixotic circumlocutions for "God" such as 
"experienced nonobjective reality", which are no more 
comprehen:3ible than the word "God" ib::.elf. Moreover, he parts 
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company more or less finally with the plain historical events 
surrounding Jesus of Nazareth. 
So, in chapter 4, van Buren turns to the linguistic 
analysts. He tells us that attempts to eliminate "objectifying" 
language about God and distinguish properly Chrtstian talk of 
God from mere "religion" will not do, because there is still 
much more in common between "the Gospel" thus interpreted and 
the "religion" that is rejected, than there is between either of 
them and the attitudes of the truly secular man. The question 
is, just how is the word "God" being used, in either 
case"? <ibid:Bl-84). 
To begin to discover an answer, van Buren offers the 
insights of R.M.Hare on faith as a "blik", l.T.Ramsey on models, 
qualifiers and cosmic disclosures, T.R.Miles on "silence 
qualified by parables", and R.B.Braithwaite on the use of 
religious assertions as moral assertions, or declarations of 
intent to behave in a particular way. He informs us that he 
intends, from now on, to adopt a non-cognitive "blik" 
conception of faith, and to see how fruitful this can be in 
elucidating the meaning of theological utterances <ibid:97ff). 
Vhereas the philosophers in question have usually applied 
their method to the problems of "natural theology", van Buren 
intends to bring it to bear upon the distinctively Christian 
statements of faith which concern Jesus of Nazareth: how do 
such statements function in the lives of those who use them"? 
Armed with the,3e tools, van Buren comes to the major part of 
his th•O!si,3. We may omit consideration of chapters 7 and 8, 
which try to show how his approach can do justice to the 
traditional language of dogmatic Christology, and, more 
sketchily, to the whole of systematic theology, and concentrate 
attention upon chaptArs 5 and 6. 
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ii. Exposition. 
Van Buren begins chapter 5 by arguing that to speak of 
discovering meaning in the Jesus of history is not impossible, 
despite the difficulties about empirical evidence, because the 
idea of "meaning" in history is always an expres:co;ion of 
something which is discerned, and to which one is committed, 
from the standpoint of the present. The meaning does not 
reside objectively ~nd undialectically, so to speak, in the 
bruta f:J.L'ta (cf.Gregm, Smith, 1'-"66:125-31). 
Next, van Buren proceeds to to his examination of the 
historical Jesus, paying hi:3 respects on the way to the "new 
quest". His own preferred result of the quest is the 
characterization of Jesus supremely in terms of a radical and 
remarkable kind of freedom: 
Alth•)ugh he is prese1~;ted as a faithful son of his 
parents, he is also shown to be free from familial 
claims, He followed the 1·eligious 1·ites and obli•Jations 
of his people, but he also felt free to disregard them. 
In miracle stories he is even presented mythologically as 
being f1·ee from t.he limitations of natural forces,, ,he 
did not. rest the aut hot• i ty of his teaching on 
tl·aditi•)n,, .he called his hearers to be without anxiety 
for the future concerning clothes, food or shelter, and 
he supported his words with his own conduct .. ,He did not 
leave it to God to forgive men their sins; he did it 
himself,, ,His freedom,,, is evident in his making no 
claims for himself, He seems to have been so free of any 
need for status that he was able to resist all attempts 
by othe1·s to convey status on him,, ,He was free horn 
anxiety and the need to establish his own identity, but. 
he was above all free f>Jr his nei·~hbou1· (van Bu1·en, 
>JP , cit: 121-:3 l , 
The con•:::ept of freedom, van Buren thinks, 1:3 a us·~ful one 
because it is empirically "earthed": "it appears to have '•::ash 
value' in the realm of human conduct" (ibid: 12:3 >. 
However, the identification of the historical Jesu:3 as a 
man of particular freedom does not in itself constitutP f.=d.th. 
In van Buren's view, what stands between the merely historical 
human figure and the confession of faith in him is the event 
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of Easter, which therefore becomes pivotal to the rest of his 
argument. On the face of it, this is an immense challenge to 
the empirical standpoint; but van Buren has to say that 
"something happened", because the entire behaviour of the 
disciples was radically transformed from that which would have 
ensued upon Jesus' death. 
A l tho•Jgh 
"linguistically 
experience is 
Pet~r's <:lai_rr,., 
odd", Peter's :~·la.iru 
inc:ontrovertible 
"He '.-•-=> ri:3t~n", may be 
to have had some kind of 
<ibid:134.). As for the 
interpretation put upon the <=oxperience, its validity may be 
tested by the ensuing life of the one who made it. So, in the 
end, van Buren interprets Easter as a "d is,::;ernmen t situation": 
The history of Jesus, 
failure, took on a ne~;.• 
meaning of history, Out 
commitment to the way of 
(ibid:l32), 
which seemed to have been a 
importance as the key to the 
of this discernment arose a 
life which Jesus had followed 
The most that can be said empirically about the mechanism by 
whi<::;h this transference of the manner and motivation of Jesu:o:;' 
life to his followers took place is to use a metaphor- that of 
"contagion": "It carries the sense of our 'catching' something 
from another person, not by our choice, but as something which 
happens to us" (ibid :133). 
Having thus set out his interpretation of the events 
reported in the Gospels, van Buren goes on to expound what, on 
this basis, the secular meaninr; of the Gospel would be. The 
first part of chapter 6 anrues 
L} that it is basically the 
expression of a historical perspective, one which claims 
universal significance for the particuldr historical individual 
Jesus of Nazareth, by testifying that his is the freedom which 
sets free. A believer who confesse:=., "I ~~ave seen the light", 
means that from his encounter ~1ith the :=.tory about Jesus he 
has acquired a wholly new persp•?•:tive upon himself, hi~; way of 
life and indeed the whole world. A l tbouzh he will express his 
faith in terms of what God hac: ,jane and !,ow God has been 
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disclosed, van Buren suggests that the "empirical anchorage" 
for these claims, firstly in the history of Jesus, and secondly 
in the believer's own actions, is sufficient to account for 
whatever meaning is intended by them Cibid:140). 
Returning to the linguistic philosophers, van Buren shows 
that his interpretation is in line with Hare's conception of a 
"blik", amplified to some extent by Ramsey's stress on the 
crucial moment of discernment which requires commitment 
<Easter), and the ethical dimension underlined by Braithwaite. 
Neither Hat'e nor Braithwaite alone is judged adequate to say 
all that van Buren desires to do about the experience of faith. 
Following an attempt to demonstrate that the concept of 
commitment to a way of life formed and shaped by the freedom 
that was seen in Jesus can deal adequately with all those New 
Testament formulations which use the word "God", van Buren 
ends chapter 6 by summing up his approach in two principles: 
( 1) Statements of faith are to be interprete•j, by means 
of the modified verification principle, as statements 
which express, desCl'ibe or commend a particular way of 
seeing the world, •)t.her men, and oneself, and the way of 
life appropriate to such a perspective,,, 
(2) The norm of the Christian perspective is the series 
of events to which the New Testament documents testify, 
cenhing in the life, death and resurrection of .Jesus of 
Nazareth (ibid:156l, 
These two principles provide points of entry into the 
criticisms of van Buren's thesis we now wish to pursue. 2 
iii. Critique. 
The first of our five criticisms takes its cue from an 
ambiguity already present in the Introduction to The Secular 
Meaning of the Gospel, over what precisely the role of 
linguistic philosophy in this "conversation from faith to 
faith" is meant to be. Van Buren's book can easily be read ns 
!:he attempt of a committed linguistic empiricist to a:3certain 
what n:•mains of traditional Christianity once the 
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verificationist's axe has been wielded upon it (as Mascall, 
1965). But van Buren is most anxious not to commit himself 
explicitly and in advance to the truth of the philosophy he is 
Ec>mploying. The logic of his argument is not intended to be, 
F\iven the truth of a modified logical positivism, what can be 
made of Christianity? 
T!lr> kr'7 to what he intends lies in the rather vague 
i-'bra:3e, "certain empirical attitudes", ·which re•:::urs throughout 
tbe book <xiii-xiv; 20; 83; 102; 106; llO; 127; 1'55-6; 193; 195). 
The explanation is given very late in the day, on p.l95: "We 
!J.:.ve made u:se of the method of •:::ertB.in linguistic analysts 
because their method reflects the em?~rical attitudes which 
appear to us characteristic of :=.ecular thought". 
In other words, what is assumed L; the prevalence among 
modern men and women, believers included, of a largely pre-
n:!flective "mind-set" which only treats what lies concn=tely to 
hand as "really real". Linguistic philosophy is then fastened 
on as that critically reflective intellectual system which most 
nearly thematizes and brings to rational expression the 
di::;tinctive cast of the modern mind-set. Our first criticism, 
then, is simply that this is not made clear enough by van 
Buren at the outset. 
But, secondly, van Buren does not in fact carry out the 
i'l" oject in aE. open-ended a fashion as the vague and 
undoctrinaire idea of "certain empirical attitudes" would le.ad 
us to expect. He intends to conduct an enquiry into how 
theological assertions such as "Jesus ::.s Lord" are used by 
believers. This is in line wth the modified version of the 
·veri.ficati.on principle, which admitted that propositions which 
fell neither into the category of analytic or tautological 
truths, nor into that of synthetic, empirical judgments, might 
~· 
_ney were used 
"Je>nguage game". 
in 
'+ l~ 
their particular 
it could be shown how 
field of discourse, or 
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Van Buren claims, in adopting the "use principle", to be 
following the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations 
(ibid:l4-17). However, when he comes to the detailed discussion 
of theological language, van Buren asserts that 
, , ,the empiricist in us finds the heart of the diffrculty 
11ot in what is said ab01..1t Go•j, but in the very talking 
about Go.j at all, We do not know 'what' God is, and we 
cannot understand how the word 'God' IS being used 
I ibid; 84), 
Now : t, i:=; very odri that van Buren should decide, in advance of 
tb·c: i'lpplication of the "use principle", that he cannot see how 
the '"'ord "God" is used, and therefor'=' vow not to use it!-' 
Ill bat has happened is that van Buren's "empirical 
a_-t~i.tudes" have turned out to be more doctrinaire than they 
look, since they apparently rule out even the possibility that 
talk of God, oriented to the transcendent, may be intelligible. 
It appears that van Buren's underlying sympathies are with the 
"other" Wittgenstein, he of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
who urged that some things lay entirely outside the competence 
of language to deal with intelligibly, and "whereof we cannot 
:=.peak, thereof \1": must remain :=;ilent". 
Van Buren, then, has drastically limited the scope of uses 
which theological assertions are to be permitted to have, 
before he begins his enquiry into the uses he thinks they do 
have. We have had to get clear these rather philosophical 
cr i.t; j_,::: isms of van Buren in order to b<? able to proceed on a 
firm basis to the points which relate much more closely to our 
fundamental :=;tandpoint, that a "secular theology" should take 
proper- account of the available evidence of religion as a 
:=.oc ia 1 reality. 
The third criticism is, therefore, that van Buren's method 
results in a reduced and one-dimensional account of the way 
the figure of Jesu:=; actually fuw:-tions for religious believers. 
Van Buren will allmv no conception of a transcendent "other 
wor id" or sacred order to enter int:o hi:=; "secular" account of 
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Clu-i::::;tianity. As a consequence, he fails to grasp the subtle 
and dialectical relation evidenced in the way this man is 
confessed liturgically as not only friend and brother, but also 
Lord, Judge and Saviour .4 
For both the characteristic form of the Christian's 
telling of the stm-y of Jesus, and the content of the response 
to it, are given through the story's being told as the story of 
¥•hat God has done. Jesus is confessed in a manner which is 
wholly bound up with this confession of God. God is not an 
arbitrary or disposable addition, giving a religious but 
empirically redundant gloss to a story otherwise intelligible 
in purely secular terms. Van Buren's struggle with the nature 
of the "blik" disclosed in Jesus, and with the manner of its 
transmission, labours under self-imposed constraints which 
will not permit him to say what needs to be said. 
The point, which can be explicitly stated as our fourth 
critic ism, is that the "tran:3cendence factor", which implies 
some kind of a metaphysic, i:3 inescapable throughout what van 
Buren is trying to say, and nowhere more so than in the Easter 
metaphor of "contagion". Van Buren writes: 
The man who says, 'Jesus is Lord', is saying that the 
history of Jesus and of what happened on Easter has 
e;(ercised a liberati:1g effect upon him, and that he has 
been so grasped by it that it has become the historical 
norm of his perspective upon life (ibid:l4ll, 
But this begs all the crucial questions. What is the precise 
connection between van Buren's talk of being "grasped" by the 
history of Jesus, rather than just choosing to live by its 
inspiration, and traditional language about "grace"? 
(i•tacquarrie, 196?:22:). Again, unless the perspective drawn from 
Jesus is to be an entirely arbitrary one, which same may 
"catch", and other:s not, the believer is surely forced to ask 
3-bout the ground uf the perspective: why Jesus, in particular? 
<cf. Baelz, 1964:59-60; Kee, 1970:182; K.Hamilton, 1966 Ca) :54). 
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The fact i:s that the trail that b•:=gins from van Buren's 
"contagiou::; freedom" lea.ds back unmistakeably into the 
religious tradition about Jesus, which in turn insists on 
lLnkin,g every man-:3tatement about Jesus to correlative 
:;t:atements that trans•::end the ?urely human. This means that, 
a::; a fifth and vrc_·ry im?ortant c:ri ti_ci::;m ~ we have to say that 
van Buren's :3ecular theology, constru.:ted on strictly empirical 
Chr i::;tian 
Thi::; ' \1ean.:ne::;s we 
filling out by van Buren of the content of this crucial 
"freedom'' in term:3 of a.n a.c:tual quality cf :=.ocial ~ite in the 
world. Van Buren says little more than this: 
He 1.11ho ·:;ays, 'Jesus is Lord', :;ays that Jesus' freedom 
has been (1)ntagious and has becoxe the criterion for his 
life, ~;:..l::::lc a:1d privat.e, As Jesus ·~'a.s lelj 1 becat:.se ·Jf 
~~s f;·eed·Jn. in~o the midst of social an1j polit~cal 
C•)nflict, S•} it. is wl.t.h •Jn•: who sh.ues his f1·eedom i"var: 
Buren, op,cit;142J, 
In terms of what van Buren has actually given us, this 
"•:::onflict" is highly problematic. For he has not allowed for a 
religious tension between the upholding and legitimating of the 
pr•?vaili.n~ order as undergirded and cherished by divine grace, 
and i t3 cha"Llen;sing and underminin,;r in the name of a vi:=:. ion of 
th•? di"Jiae future. He ha::; not drawn the pi•:::ture of a world that 
both loved and affirmed by God, and hence also by the 
Christ ian, but at the ::;ame t i.me judged and •::a lled to 
Te·:;u::;, ·;:ho i.n embr-acin::\ the needine::;·:; of the world aL;o died 
V':lrl programme viOirlrl to unly 
po::;::;ibility o1 a 3•?l•::>•=:ti.ve imitatio Christi, embodied i.n •:er-ta.in 
ethic~l prescript:~ons, and with a vaguely optimistic ho~e cf 
their successful fulfilment by suitably enlightened secular 
believers. But Christian ethical programmes must never be 
identified wholly and without remainder with the will of God. 
"If there is no sense of the transcendenu:~ of God's will over-
our particular ethical decisions, then there is no escape from 
the self-righteousness which ends up by identifying my cause 
with God's will and my opponent's with the devil" <Newbigin, 
1966:71-2). 
Gregor Smith's judgment upon van Buren was that "we are 
offered here a piece of liberal cake, somewhat stale, indeed, 
but freshened up by the sauce of empirical verification" 
<1966:190). The avoidance of this fate by a self-styled secular 
theology, including one focused upon the human figure of Je::;u::;, 
lies in making room for tra.nscendence, even within the ::;<~cular 
categories. In the next section of this chapter, we examine 
three further contributions to radical theology whi•:::h uphold 
such a focus, in order to see whether and where the 
transcendent component in the orientation of the Christian 
community upon Jesus is maintained. 
2. Radical Theology and the Person of Jesus. 
i. W-illiam Hamilton: a Form of Lordship and a Style of 
Life. 
Hamilton's sensitive little book, The New Essen~e of 
Chri::;tianity, first appeared in America in 1961, before the 
"death of God" controversy broke. At this stage, Hamilton 
employed the term "death of God" to expt-es:3 the ''felt ::oen:=,e of 
God':::; absence" which was the experience of the con temporary 
C1u·i,:;tian. He registered his unease about the a•-:knowJedgernent 
of an objectively present, transcendent deity le::;:::; on a.ccount 
of the onward march of science and technology, or any supposed 
"empirical attitudes", than in the face of the p:oblem of 
suffering."· He describes the contemporary experience of faith 
in th i::; way: 
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Our experience of God is deeply dissatisfying to us, even 
\jhen we a1·e believers, In one sense God seems to have 
\jithdl'all'n from the world and its sufferinf;JS, and this 
leads us to accuse him of either irrelevance or Cl'uelty, 
But in another sense, he is experienced as a pressure and 
a wounding from which we would love to be free. For many 
of us who call ourselves Christians, therefore, believing 
in the time of the 'death •)f God' means that he is there 
111hen we do not want 
he is not there 
op. c it : 63) , 
him, in ways we do not want him, and 
when we d•:• want him IHami l t•)n, 
This is the background against which Hamil ton's approach to 
Jesus is worked out, which he presents in chapter 3 of the 
book, entitled "J,~sus the Lord". 
HamiJton appeals to th·~ Christian's peculiar understanding 
of the Lordship of Jesus in the attempt to find answers to 
three sorts of questions arising out of this ambiguous 
experience of God. The first is the epistemological question of 
God, corresponding roughly to vr.n Buren's formulation of it: if 
you want to know about God, all you can do is point to Jesus. 
The second i:::o the quest for :::oalvation, which Hamilton 
interprets as the desire for meaning: "the New Testament story 
of God acting in Jesus is primarily a. story of your life, in 
which forgiveness and freedom are offered to you" <ibid:70). 
The third is the question about what we should do, which 
is answered not in abstract terms but by indicating the 
concrete person of Jesus Christ who is the will of God (in 
line with Bonhoeffer's Ethics). 
Hamilton embarks upon a study of the various titles 
attributed to Jesus in the New Testament, focusing in the end 
upon Kyrios, the major confessional form of th·~ early Church. 
He highlights two important tensions in the ascription of the 
title "Lord" to Jesus. The first lies b·~tween exaltation and 
lowlin•!s:::o, a:::o the one who was "in the form of God" emptied 
himself ot power and divinity, and the Master became identical 
with the Servant. 
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The second is that between presence and absence: the 
victorious Lord who reigns in glory now, over against the one 
who has gone away, but will return in triumph. Only by 
absorbing and meditating upon the dialectical meaning of 
Lord~:;hip as present humiliation, Hamilton says, can the 
Christian make sen;o.e of his expf~rience and fashion a faith 
which is responsive to the circumstances of the time. 
T•J say that. Jesus 1s Lord is to say that humi !lation, 
pati;,nce and st..dfering are the ways G•J•::l has dealt with 
the worl•j, and thus are also the ways the Ch1·istian ... is 
to deal \l•i th the wol'ld (ibid: 102-:3; cont1·ast van E:uren's 
parallel statements of what is meant by the one who says, 
'.Jesus !S L•Jrd', supra), 
The present form of Jesus' Lordship is that of suffering, 
service and hiddenness: the form to come will be victory and 
power. Only the recognition of this truth can prevent us from 
lapsing into either of two eztremes: a "pietistic 
otherworldliness", which gives up on the world for the sake of 
a retreat into the ark of per::;onal sa.l vat ion, or a "crypto-
secularism", which repre::;ents premature foolish 
celebration of a maturity not yet attained, nor attainable 
<ibid:llO>. 
Hamilton completes his study by suggesting that what this 
orientation upon the strange Lordship of Jesus produces is a 
"Christian style of life", which is rather less than a 
complete catalogue of ethical principle::;, but more than a 
theologically abstract manner of spealting. It is "a way of 
standing before God and the world, a posture ... that is priqr 
to ... and basic to, any and all actions and decisions" 
(ibid:ll5-6). 
He goes on to offer a sketch of the features of such a 
mode of being-in-the-world. It involves a certain reticence or 
reserve in dealings with others, granting the other the right 
OWl! "personal space". It requires a 
combination of tolerance and anger, forebearing with human 
fa.iling and fla.w, yet hating ::Ill th.::.t falsifies, spoils and 
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degrades. It renounces the desire for anything more than 
toleration for ourselves from the world; and it defends 
"goodness"- gentleness and sensitivity, humility and self-
effacement, and all opposition to coercion, pompousness and 
injustice. 
Finally, at the end of the book, Hamilton explores further 
the polarity bet·..,reen r-t-"signation and rebellion, including that 
betv1een the conformist and the "beat" styles f' o~ life. He 
defends the possibility of a "concealed break with culture" as 
an alternative to both of these styles. The Christian, in 
particular, i:3 in many respects a conformist rather than a 
rebel, because he acknowledges the extent to which he is 
indebted to the :3ecular culture which ha:::; made him who he is, 
and the extent to which that same culture owes its forms to 
past Christian influence. But as such he can also make the 
concealed break, which entail:3 the refusal to "give his heart 
to" the culture in which he is immersed, because he knows there 
remains a provisionality and an incompleteness about it. 
Although mu~h of this is neither new nor worked out in 
detail by Hamilton, it does offer more promise of a secular 
understanding of the Christian's orientation upon the figure of 
Je:3us than does van Buren's model. For it emphasises how faith 
operates in the perceived gap between the brute realities of 
experience of the world and an initially vague and unfocused 
sense that things should be otherwise (cf.VIeber, supra:98ff). It 
then analyses the Lordship of Jesus in strongly dialectical 
terms, particularly in relation to the vocation of the 
Christian to be in and with the world in its present 
sufferings, while committed to actions calculated to alleviate 
them. 
However, there r;re ·:otill limitaticm:co: Hamilton's case is 
put in individualistic terms, with little exploration of what it 
might mean for~ the whole Chdstian community to express a 
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style of life congruent with the Lordship of Jesus it 
confesses. There is little opportunity of regarding all the 
manifold and marginal evidences of Christian interest pre:3ent 
in society in this light. 
For Hamilton can make little sen:3e of the Church, its 
preaching, worship and sacraments, being even disposed to 
regard Bonhoeffer's late writings as "the beginning of a 
systematic attempt to face the theological task by doing 
without a special doctrine of the church" (Hamil ton, 
op.cit:102). Our own discussion of Bonhoeffer <Chapter 3, supra! 
indicates that we do not consider Hamilton to be right; and 
later in the chapter, we shall try to apply a dialectical 
understcr;.ding of the Christian orientation to Jesus to the 
social reality "church" as it is presented to us. 
ii. The Pelzes: the Compelling W'm-ds of Jesus. 
Werner and Lotte Pelz's God is No More can certainly not 
be described aE: an essay in scholarly theology. Its publishers 
called it "a prophetic, passionate, tempestuous book, which will 
infuriate some, delight others, and leave everyone in some way 
affected". The work is well-nigh unreadable en masse, but an 
effort of the imagination may appreciate it a:3 a poetic or 
visionary exercise, or perhaps a devotional experiment. It is 
an attempt to by-pass all dogmatic debate and all traditional 
authority concerning the understanding of Christ':3 person, in 
favour of opening one's life imaginatively and existentially to 
the impact of the words of Jesus as reported in the Gospels.'· 
The words of Jesus are found by the Pelzes to be 
baffling, compelling and radically disturbing: 
The 111ords of 
unde1·s tood, 
unde1·stood, 
cornplt>t.e 
l)p ' c it : 14 ·.1 ' 
Jesus a1't> a.l111ays 'before us' 1 nevt>r •]rasped 1 
fulf1lled; al111ays to be grasped, to be 
to be fulfilled, Jesus did not 
sy~tem _, •J I 
leave a 
(Pelzes, 
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They are not meant to answer intellectual problems, but to fire 
the imagination and challenge the heart to embrace the 
possibilities of living life to the full. 
lie respond to his WOI'ds when ~·e be•.:J in to live as people 
~·ho hope that they shall live, who believe quite simply 
that life 1s WOI'th living, that de:lth dQes not devalue it 
(ibid: 16). 
The Gospel is about incredible human possibilities, about 
breaking through the ::;uperficial and woefully limited mode in 
whkb life is ordinarily lived: 
~'hat the \IIOI'ds of Jesus promise us is, in the st1·ict 
sense of tt·1e word, incredible. We <:an not believe it. On 
the other hand, they promise ~·hc.t, ab•)Ve all else, we 
1•ould like to believe: 'He that bei ieves in me shall 
live, even though he die' (ibid:20l, 
T ec.us' word::; demand response, decision and commitment: it 
lS an urgent matter whether a man r·emains upon a broad and 
attractive way that will destroy his potential and uniqueness, 
or oDts for the dangerous adventure of the ~my commended by 
Jesu:3. "No other man has insi:::;ted like Jesus on the 
absoluteness of decision. None has dared, as he dared, to tie 
up our decision with hi::; person" \ibid:22). 
Most of the book applies the overall approach to various 
aspect·:; of traditional Christian teaching drawn from the life 
and ~.ayings of Jesus: justification, salvation <wholene::;s), love 
for neighbour, forgiveness, freedom from Law, the Kingdom. It 
would be possible to uphold a relatively orthodox theism and 
Chri::::.tology, and to read God is No !•1ore merely as a summons 
and stimulus to deeper commitmen~ :ntd more radical per::;onal 
engazement with the implication:3 o£ Jesus' teachings. But what 
the book, in its curious way, doe·3 a•::hieve i.::; the recognition 
that a faith conceived in secular terms and oriented upon Jesus 
as a human individual cannot, on that account, be simply a one-
rlimensional and moderately liL~ral ethical programme. 
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For the Pelzes' vision is riven through and through with 
paradox and creative disjunction. Jesus is presented, for 
example, as an artist, who in the very act of representing the 
world and its familiar objects, turns out to be drawing an 
altogether strange and extraordinary landscape in which the 
angles of vision are unfamiliar and the contours curiously 
unrecognizable (ibid:54-60). In this, despite their negative 
evaluation of "religion" (see previou:=, chapt<:;r), the Pelzes 
offer a distinc:tively religious analysis, for the sacred cosmo::3 
is precisely one which, wbile o:::;tensibly beginning from the 
objects and representations uf this world and offering them 
transcendent sanction, ends by turning upon the world and 
exercising constraint and discomfiting influence upon it. 
Needles:=; to say, however, whatever the value of these 
insights on the theoretical level, the practical value of the 
Pelzes' programme is almost negligible, because the call to 
radical reorientation upon the words of Je:::;u::3 i:::; in no way 
related to the concrete social realities which condition the 
way people, including Christian believers, ha·Je to live their 
lives. Our third example of a Jesu-centric theology in this 
section seeks to apply itself quite explicitly to these 
conditions. 
iii. John Vincent: the Search for a Secular Christ. 
Vincent, the radical Methodist and one-time follower of 
Karl Barth, displays a reaction against both of his major past 
influences in his search for a secular theology of strongly 
socio-political orientation. He argues, in Secular Christ <1968; 
see also Vincent, 1964 & 1965) that traditional theology has 
been much too fixated upon the merits of Jesus' death in 
effecting our individual deliverance from a condition of 
personal sinfulness, into a state of regeneration and readiness 
for the world to come. But Jesus also lived a significant, 
secular life: secular in the sense of being lived thoroughly in 
and amidst and for the world and its everyday 
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people, and 
stripped of 
involving teachings and actions which, when 
the theological mystifications of a developing 
ecclesial context, do yield specific secular, indeed political, 
content. 
According to Vincent, this "secular Christ" is a more 
appropriate guide to contemporary Christian living than 
"se·::ular m.:::..n". Here Vincent part:::; company v1i th other radical 
theologL01ns, who want to be "secular" without remaining 
:;trictly "Christian": ''tlwc:3h Robinson talkE; of 'the holy' as 
"the depth" of the common', this still needs to be 
'Christologized' <an•3wering the question, 'What depth?')" 
\Vincent, 1964::304). It is not just a case of embracing the 
secular, but of discovering Christ in it, taking care that he 
remain•=> t-ecogniz.'lbly the n~al Christ and not, for example, 
dL;mantling the concrete Gospel into existentiali•:ot 
abstractions. 
For theology, says Vincent, must start from secular 
Chri•3tology, which is predicated on the assumption that "if 
Chri::;t is now what he was in the days of his flesh, it is by 
his deeds not his 'spirit' that he may be expected to reveal 
himself to us" <Vincent, 1965:25). Neither "knowing God" nor 
"meeting Christ" should be understood primarily as the fruit of 
a devotional programme. The issue is whether, if "God was in 
Christ n~·:::onci ling the world to himself", there are not "certain 
lines of action, techniques and methodologies" manifest in 
secular history, which demonstrate the truth of this 
theological st~ternent Cibid:25-6). 
The appropr-iate model for the relationship of the 
Christian to Christ, Vincent argues in Secular Christ, must be 
the dynamic one of "discipleship". The "moments" of Christian 
disclph~::;!np, derived from the 1eatures o1 Jesus' "secular 
Lordship" displayed in hi:3 whole ministry, are ::;ervice, healing, 
the discernment of God at work in others, and lastly suffering. 
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This theology of discipl~ship was being worked out by 
Vincent in tandem with a radical pastoral and missionary 
programme in the Rochdale Hethodist Mission, and bears the 
marks of fragmentary, contextual thinking, allowing ontological 
questions to remain, for the pr-esent, in abeyance. But the 
interpretive way of doing theology in the concrete context is 
what we have also been arguing for; and Vincent's attempt is 
strildng for its insistence upon corning to grips with real 
situations, and telling the story of the whole Christ in such a 
fashion that the vivid details of the man are not lost amid 
the :3upposed "timeless truths". 
Nevertheless, certain reservations remain. Vincent 
envisages a smaller, more committed "core" congregation 
involving itself corporately and officially as the Church in 
the :::,ocial programmes he recommends. He remains ambiguous 
about the status of actually existing congregations which are 
usually far from clear-cut in this way, as wel1 as about the 
situation of those who "profess and call themselves Christians" 
without regularly attending corporate and official worshipping 
activities at all. The Christ he discovers in the secular world 
is perhaps one who is too one-sidedly to be discerned in the 
endeavours of political radicalism, and too little in the 
inconspicuous permeation of all culture with the self-effacing 
values of the Gospel. 
But we must now go on to sum up our critic isms of these 
attempts of radical theology to bring to the fore of 
th•=>ological refle•:tion the orientation of the believer upon the 
human figure of Jesus, and to propose some suggestions for an 
alternative approach. 
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3. Conclusions: The Church and the Twofold Presence of Christ. 
i. "Christ existing as the Church". 
Our main criticism of the materials we have examined in 
this ·:::hapl:er- i:c; that they fail to take seriously the givennes:c; 
and actuality of Christian presence in society as it lies 
h·~fore u:c; in, and around the peripheries of, the Church's life. 
For the Christian cult is always and everywhere centrally 
conc<:!rned wi_th J,~sus. In the case of the most pu~ci::;ely and 
fully arti•:::ulated ritual expres:c;ion of a Catholic Mass, it may 
be Jesu::o the bleeding sacrificial victim; in the folk-religious 
intimation::; of a parent sending a child to Sunday :3,:;hool, Jesus 
the Friend of little children. But whatev•:::r- the les:::; 
enlightening a:::;per:;t:::; of each of these, neither can be said to 
have nothing >'fhatever to do with the Jesus of the Gospels. 
These, along with much else, form part of the secular evideno::::e 
for the meaning of the Christian's confession of Jesus in the 
context of his confession of God. 
Van Bur-en wrote an article entitled "\Vhat do we mean by 
an 'empirical investigation of the Church'?" <1968 (a)) in which 
he a:::;ked \1hat would be empirically available to the complete 
out:::;ider who wished to be shown the meaning of the various 
theological designations of the Church. He argued that we 
should ask 11hat it i::::; about the concrete social experience of 
the individual:::; who collectively make up the Church that has 
made it fea:::;ible for them to speak of it theologically in the 
way th,=y do. This is in line with Bonhoeffer 's chosen 
de:::;isnation of the Church as "Christ existing as the Church" 
(see supra:60f). That is, if Christians :::;peak of the Church a:::; 
in some way representing the continuing modalitites and 
tension'; of the presence and activity of Jesu:::; in the world, 
what is it about the social reality "Church" which might 
justify such talk? 
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What is presented, first of all, to the casual observer is 
an institutional body, an organization within society, staffed 
and serviced by a. professionally-trained ministry, and a more 
or less (often less) clearly defined clientele of lay per::=;ons 
who avail th•=-=mselves of the services of the institution, and 
al:::;o, in some cases at least, offer their own services to it. 
Some of them consider their service still to be in operation 
throughout the tim•=-= 1-1her, they are not directly involved 1-1 i th 
the institution, i.<~.probably from !1onday to Saturday. 
If, then, we are to speak theologically of this socia.l 
phenomenon as that which has evolved over time as the form of 
the community which considers itself to be carrying on a 
continuity of response to Jesus, and indeed to be the 
prolongation of his work in the world, we ought to seek 
patterns of congruence between the modes and forms of being in 
the world exhibited by this community, and those depicted of 
Jesus by the evangelists. 
Jesus' ministry displays a tension between continuity and 
radical change (C.Williams, 1969:102-116). Jesus may be 
interpreted as the wandering rabbi, charismatic tea_cher, 
exorcist and healer, in continuity with Jewish tradition, a 
product of his cultural environment 
except in the context of his time. 
conc::eive itself as isomorphous with 
and incomprehensible 
The Church, too, may 
its cultural setting, 
seeking as its mode of confessing Christ to continue to work 
hi::; works a.nd to ":::;tain" society with the particular attitude::=; 
and ethical stances for which he stood. 
But thi:3 same Jesus set himself very sharply apart fron: 
the contemporary religious establishment, so muc::h so that his 
increasingly shocking remarks and actions led to hostility and 
eventual execution on charges of subversion. Moreover, the 
Church escalates from acknowled8ement of attachment to this 
great teacl:H~r and hi.:::; proposals for a way to live, into the 
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confession that this man, in his dreadful dying as much as in 
his living, bodies forth the very ways and nature of God, pro 
nobis and for the world. Even the orientation upon Jesus' 
humanity cannot rest content with a humanity that remains 
undifferentiated and fully self-evident and self-explanatory. 
So the Church moves between two poles. At the one end, 
Christian pre::;ence met-ges 
until social historians 
imperceptibly with society at large, 
find it a taxing task to locate 
precisely where "Chri::;tian influence" ha:=:; or has not been at 
work. 
At the other, the highest degree of institutional over-
again::;tne::;::; appears, in which the Church perpetually divides 
itself off from the taken-for-granted order and assumes the 
role of irritant towards it, urging it to self-criticism in the 
light of the transcendent. 
If the Church is not simultaneously shading off into the 
immanence of a culturally ambiguous form of Christian presence, 
and reaching up to a point of transcendent separation, it is 
not embodying an adequate congruence with the mode of being in 
the world of the Jesus it confesses. 
But all reference to "the Church" in the foregoing reduces 
to ::;o much gaseous talk devoid of contact with reality, unless 
we go on to ask just who in the Chut-·:::h gives expression to 
these manifold aspects of Christ. It i::; here that the polarity 
between a thoroughly secular laity that sees its task chiefly 
as the more or less silent witness of being Christian amidst a 
secular occupation, and a professional clergy acting as a kind 
of ":=:;ervice industry" to the religious institution, comes into 
its own. For a wholly undifferentiated Church could not do 
justice to the full scope and creative tension of the way 
Christ is confessed by the Christian community.'l 
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ii. Jesus, the Clergy and the Laity. 
Christian Radicalism was much concerned about the 
clerically-dominated image of the Church. The members of the 
Keble Conference Group, for example, with John Robinson among 
their~ number, believed that a genuine, visible and credible 
response to the human figure of Jesus today would have to look 
to a rejection of any essential distinction between clerical 
and lay statuse:3 CRobinson, l963b; 1965;54-60). 
The analysis we have given suggests that Robinson's 
eagerne::;s to a!Jolish the "clergy line" was insufficiently 
thought out. For although the calling of the whole Church to 
represent and reproduce the presence and activity of Christ in 
the world is clearly inhibited by the boguE. elitism which i:s 
encouraged by the maintenance of a clerical "in-group", the 
answer cannot simply lie in pretending that the clergy have no 
specific or different function to perform, other than to 
exercise representatively the ministries which are potentially 
the calling of all Christians. 
Robinson's desire for a "levelling" of the whole Church 
into a one-dimensional reality indiscriminately constituting 
"Christ's Body" is not really upheld by the arguments he 
advances. For example, he affirms the words of Hans-Ruedi 
Weber of the W.C.C., that "the clergy are the helpers of the 
whole people of God, so that the laity can be the Church". He 
even cites the view of Yves Congar that the laity are tho:3e 
for whom the secular arena exists and is valued for its own 
sake, while the clergy view it specifically in the light of a 
religious idea and vocation. But these conceptions imply 
different roles for the two parties making up the Church <for 
a similar confusion, see the Reports of the 1968 Lambeth 
Conference, which were clearly influenced by the radical 
theology of the decade). 
The matter is liable to be confused by the exi:3tence of 
certain highly clericalized lay persons who conceive of their 
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Christian obligations largely in terms of the service of the 
sanctuary (or, in a different tradition, attendance at endless 
prayer-and-praise meetings), together with clergy who like to 
seize every opportunity to dismiss their "religious" functions 
as really the least essential part of their job (cf.Robinson, 
1963Cb):l9-20; Phipps, 196'1:51-54; Morton and Gibbs, 1964:20). 
But the specifically clerical role is to attend in the 
widest sense to the nurture and provision for "true religion" 
among the congregation and the community. This should include 
the liberty for the minister, as a servant of the institution 
not beholden to other authorities in the war ld, to express a 
mind which insi:3ts on the priority of the transcendent in the 
pursuit of what is good, true and desirable. 
This means that the situation in which the clergy are 
accused of being ''out of step" with the laity by being more 
radical, more critical or more open to change than the latter 
are is basically a sound one. For the clergy's position 
involve:3 being more openly and explicitly Christian spokesmen 
than it is often open to lay people to be. While the presence 
of Christ under "secular incognitos" <Munby, 1963:86-9) is a 
crucial mode of influence of the Gospel in the world, it is all 
the more important that there should also be those who 
represent a presence which is not incognito. A specialized 
clergy should be ready to assume this role. 8 
To put this in the perspective of what has gone before in 
thi:3 chapter, ·ile may sum up the position in this way. The 
in:3titutionally visible Church, with its servants and services, 
which i:3 conceivable in detachment from its body of members, 
has grown up in such a way as to hold together, in rite, 
symbol and cultural form, the two poles of the Church's 
confession of Jesus. 
The immanent pole alone, at which the Christian layman 
does his best to live out the demands of faith in the context 
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of unfaith, cannot suffice to achieve the whole presentation of 
the dual thrust of Jesus' mini:3try, i.e.its hiddenness in and 
continuity with the world, and its radical opposition to it. 
The transcendent pole typically both grants hope and 
gives offence: hope of an ultimate grounding of all things in 
the will and purpose of Jesus' heavenly Father, and offence 
because it reveals to the world that its deeds are evil, and 
summons it to repentance. 
The social presentation of "Church" as institution and 
memb•~rs, clergy and laity, serves to express these intrinsic 
dualities of the presence of Chri:3t and the secular meaning of 
the Gospel. Some further reference to the concrete problems 
facing the clergy on this understanding will be made in our 
concluding chapter. 
In this chapter, however, we have examined attempts to 
construct a secular theology around the focal point of the 
human figure of Jesus, and have found them wanting with 
re::;pect to the dialectical way 
functions within the Christian 
in which that figure actually 
religious tradition. We have 
worked out our criticisms in relation to our sociological 
understanding of religion as the cultural expression of an 
orientation to transcendence. 
Far from by-passing the problem of the "other world" and 
supplying the basis for a one-dimensional form of secular 
understanding of the 
the person of Jesus 
Gospel, the Christian's orientation upon 
contains all the dialectical force of 
world-affirmation and denial we expounded earlier in more 
general terms. We concluded this chapter with some suggestions 
about how a secular-based theology might try to understand the 
presence of the Church as a social reality in terms of the 
presence of Jesus, embodying a dialectical message of 
tr an:3cendence. 
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All of what we have said so far is either qualified or 
called into question by the particular problems for faith and 
Christian life attendant upon contempm'ary social and cultural 
circumstances: i.e. the problems of secularization. It is 
therefore to the proposals of radical theology for coping with 
these that we turn in the next two chapters. 
NOTES, 
I, In brief, Bultmann's erstwhile pupils became dissatisfied with his refusal to 
consider anythin·~ but the bare "that" of Jesus to be relevant to the Ch1·istological 
proclamation, The transference of the kerygma of Jesus, i,e, what Jesus preached to 
the keryQma about Jesus, i ,e, the preache•j Christ, must necessitate an inte1·est in 
the "who' and the "how" oi the historical Jesus, as jiJsti tying the remarkable 
transition which occurred, See e,g, Gerhard Ebe:ing's "conversation" with Bultmann in 
Theolo~y and Proclao~ation, 1%1; G,Bornk~:nm, Jesus of ~ua~etr;, 1960; an•j 
J,N,Ro 1nson, A Ne~ Ouest of th~ Historical J~su~. 1959, 
2, Oetai l,ed cri tica_l discussions of the book are found in Mascall 1 T~~ Secy!anzatjon n Chrlft6~~· 40-105; Richard~-. SeculariZation Theolo~, 39-44, 7b-121j· Ogletree, 
T e 'De t f ~od' Controv~rsy, :3~-59; and Kee Th~ Wa¥ o, Transcendence, 74-84, Van 
Buren gives an account of his position to Ved Mehta in The New T!teolo~jao, 50-56, 
3, This is where van Bu1·en's use of Ian Ramsey, bracketing him to9et er with Hare and 
Braithwaite, is so tendentious, since Ra11sey de\'otes so much of hts work to anal(sin·~ 
precisely the "logically odd" functions of the word "God" and other items o the 
theistic vocabulary, 
A, Kee, op,cit,, notes van Buren's similarity to Braith~aite in thts connection, For 
Braithwaite, in his much over-exposed lecture on "An Empiricist's View of the Nature 
of Reli•Jious Belief", also claims adherence ~o the use principle, but proposes to 
treat religious assertions as moral assertions on the basis of the old verification 
principle,~.. viz, religi•liJS assertions are meaningless if treated as in son1e ~ay sui 
genens, ::.ince the only difference between the two types of assertion, on this score, 
1s that religious assertions are associated ir. the mind :Jf the asserter with a 
particular set of st•Jries, Braithwaite is completely at a loss what to say about 
reli•JioiJS worship, in which the stories certainly appear to take on 111idi!r and more 
coraplex forms of significance (cf, Mehta, op,cit:59-60 for a report on the unusual 
circumstances of Braith~aite's reception into the Church), 
.5, Han1ilton raakes telling use of Carous' alleqorical novel La Peste in order to make 
his point, Father Paneloux, faced ~ith the suffering and death of innocent children 
in plague-stricken Oran, preaches two sermons, In the first the disaster is 
t1·aditionally interp1·eted as a judgment and a call to repentance, 81Jt the second is 
much more chastened and pe1·plexed1 and does not dare to assert easy, Ol' indeed any, 
answers but holds fast solely to the tortured body of Christ on the Cross, 
6, The ~elzes are aware of the historical-critical problems of authenticity, but feel 
that the unique qualit~ of the sayings overwhelmin~ly irapiv a single, remarkable and 
sefllinal mind: op,cit:L, The taste f•Jr Werner Pelz s rhaps•)dic style may be acquired 
from his two short articles in Prism fo1· Apl'll 196:3 and The Listener for October 
lOth, 196:3, 
7, Behind these remarks may be disce1·ned the forrdal Roman Catholic doctrine of the 
Church as hierai'Cby and as fellowship: 11hile the ulti11ate reality of the Church is 
fellowship, the _sanctorum cOAII!IUnio of men and women with God and with one another in 
•;hnst, the e~nst.ence of such fellowshiP 1s dependent on, and forme•j by, the 
intecedently existing hierarchical institution ~o~h1ch is "Mother Church", We are not 
accepting bert! any ontological priority of "the Church" (hierarchy) aver the 
'faithful" (particular persons), but endorsin·~ 1t as an inevitable distinction to be 
recognized in any attempt at a realistic secular-based understandin•] of the Church, 
See Congar, Lay p~ople 1n the Chyrrh, 1957, 
8, There are grounds here for lookin•J afresh at the ideas striven for by Coleridge 
and El1ot :n their respect1ve "cler1sy" and "community of Christ1ans", Nun5y 
1196:3;65-61 rightly observes that these ideals are not workable in contemporary 
society in the sense of a culturally directive and recognizi!d central role for such a 
"clerisy", But our point is that there is a need for specialized expertise to help 
the community at large to perceive, and ·~ro\11 to practice, 11hat the Christian 
religious vision involves, Th1s also means tn~t the clergy should be C•)mp.otent. ~11d 
Interested tn crttical theological thinking, som~thing 111hich 1s probleMatic in 
contemporary theological colleges, ~here many ordinands downqrade or distrust 
critical theological scholarship, -
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CHAPTER TEN: THE AFFIRMATION OF THE MODERN WORLD. 
Thi:3 chapter deals with the attempt of Christian 
Radicalism to construct a theology which can be affirmative 
rather than hostile towards the world, even to the point of 
interpreting contemporary social and cultural change as a 
continuing outworking of the implications of the Gospel. Our 
critice.l analysis applies the perspective upon secularization 
established in Chapter Fiw:! above: in particular, the twofold 
distinct ion of socio-structural and cultural pror:;es:3es. In the 
former, the differentiation of successive institutional spheres 
of life, each with its autonomous area of expertise and 
lt~aves the r<C'ligious sector as one such 
specialised sphere 
authority over the 
among many, with no 
others. In the latter, 
claim to special 
the decline of an 
overarchinz religiou:3 framework 
might understand the whole 
by which the whole of society 
of life leads to cultural 
fragmentation amid a free market of religious options. 
The bulk of the discussion will be devoted to Harvey 
Cox's ambitious attempt to claim the processes of modernity as 
gain for the Gospel in The Secular City. Following our critique 
of Cox's thesis, we shall examine more material which displays 
the range of theological attitudes to secularization within the 
ambit of Christian Radicalism, before going on to extract the 
issues requiring clearer critical attention if a more viable 
stance towards modernity on the part of the churches is to be 
achieved. 
1. Cox a.nd The Secular City. 
i. General Observations. 
The Secular City, subtitled Secularization and 
Urbanization in Theological Per2f?PCtive, wa:3 written as a study 
resource for a series of student conferences held in the U.S.A. 
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in 1965 (according to the Preface of the Revised Penguin 
Edition of 1968, from which all citations are taken). This fact 
does much to account for the brisk, popular style of the book, 
and its proliferation of neat sloganc=. and sweeping 
generalizations, features of v1hicb Cox was well aware. De:3pite 
this, the •rmrk does offer a quite elaborate and in its time 
original theological argument, which aroused a great deal of 
controver:sial attention when fir::=;t published.' 
It is, of course, an intensely American book, buoyant with 
the heady optimism of the American Dream, whi·-::h even managed 
to survive the assassination of Kennedy and only faltered 
seriously witl1 the growing di:3affection over Vietnam and the 
eventual debacle of Watergate. As such it is undoubtedly very 
dated; and yet, beneath the frothy enthusiasm it does manage to 
present almost every significant aspect of the quest for a 
theology of secularization, and therefore a fairly detailed 
exposition here will serve us well in laying out the issues 
requiring critical treatment in such a theology. 
Cox's procedure is best understood ac an attempt to 
de:3cribe the modern world and its culture, and then to 
interpret it theologically to itself in a manner diametrically 
opposed to the more commonplace theologkal denunciations of 
"secularism" <Richard, 1967:58ffl. That is, Cox does not come 
with a prior theological position and pre::;crib·~ to the world, 
on that basis, how it ought to be. Rather, he i:3 concerned 
about how the world already is: for it is in danger of leaving 
theology and the Church behind. so that 1m effort is required 
on the theologian's part to comprehend wha.t i:3 going on, and 
to formulate a response before it is too late. 
For Cox, this response mu::;t involve demonstrating that 
the categories of the Gospel do provide adequate tools for 
understanding contemporary society. That 1:::-, he refuses to 
ac•:::ept that this e:-a i:=, somehow fundamentally a.lienated from 
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the Christian message in ways that ear-lier ages were not. 
Influenced by a neo-Orthodox belief in the essential gi venness 
of the Gospel and the Biblical revebtion, Cox is convinced 
that these must in the end ov·~rri.de mere cultural relativities. 
The "offence" of the Gospel cannot pos:3ibl y r,eside either in 
its unintelligibility, or in the resistance to it occas:ioned by 
socio-cultural factors alone. 
Cox, then, intends to •3how that then~ lS a "radical 
sameness of direction" in both the evolution of cultural 
history and the implications of the Judaeo-Christian revelation 
<Richard, op.cit:l53). It not facile monocausal 
relationship, but the Biblical tradition supplied the impetus 
for certain "enabling conditions" necessary for the crucial 
changes to occur. In this way Co:-: is offering a kind of 
W'eberian analysis of the relation of Christian ideas to 
material interests in the propagation of social change. 
The tradition of theological and ecclesiastical resistance 
to the processes of modernity, which Cox sets out to overthrow, 
is of course one with a very long pedigree, dating from long 
before the secularizing influences ot the post- Medieval era 
began to make themselves felt. This can be very briefly 
indicated from three pieces of evidence. To begin with, the 
saeculum, or this pre:3en t age Ol' generation, was from thf.O 
earlie:3t Christian centuries contra:; ted unfa_vourably with the 
escbaton, or the age to come. c::'oncei ved. 3.S radically 
discontinuous with the present world. The "s•~cular" came to 
refer to "that which pertains to +:hi3 world .3lone", this world 
which is passing away, and hence something inferior to the 
sacred or spiritual.·' 
The term "secularization" i ts•~lf was first used to refer 
to the expropriation of Church-own~j land 
newly-emerging nation states ir: the post-Refor-mation period. 
Here too, then, the Church had reason to regard the advance of 
<-.: 
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the secular as being against its interests. The gradual 
outworking of the secular state principle would deprive it of a 
direct controlling interest in numerous areas of social life, 
a.nd thL; would be interpreted a:co the abandonment of those 
areas to "the world", and hence to corruption and decay.'' 
Finally, during the nineteenth century, those who promoted 
the systematic exc·lusion of religious ·~onsiderations tram zdl 
policies governing public affairs and institutional structures 
did so out of openly anti-religious commitments. The Victorian 
"se•:::ular ists", of whom Charles Brad laugh and G .J .Hal yoake were 
the most famous, urged the practical irrelevance of all 
theological ideas to matters of empi:io=al importance. The real 
concerns of this life, they held, were immediate, pragmatic and 
aimed at thi:co-worldly fulfilments, both bodily and intellectual. 
This demanded that each sphere of :coecular expertise should be 
free to develop and pursue its particular practical ends 
without fear of religious interference-'' 
Cumulatively, then, the tradition of Church opposition, 
first to the "secular" as a theological concept, and then to 
"secularization" as a socio-cultural process, was very 
substantial. Cox needed to establish a very compelling basis in 
both sociological analysis and theological hermeneutics in 
order to challenge it. 
ii. Exposition. 
In 
charactet~ of 
Introduction, 
contemporary 
Cox formally 
society in 
summarizes 
of 
the 
the 
complementary processes of secularization and urbanization. The 
questioning of traditional world-views as a phase of 
intellectual hi:cotory <since the Renaissance) is clearly bound 
up, Cox wants to show, with the rise of science and the 
rational polity of the modern state. These latter have in their 
turn encouraged the growth of cities, and the experience of 
~ity-dwelling reciprocally influences the world-view of the 
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people in an increasingly secular direction. The social and 
intellectual processes mutually react upon each other. 
Thus Cox's definition of secular-ization runs as follows: 
Secularization is,,. the loosing oi the world fl·om 
reli•Jious and quasi-religious understandings of itself, 
the dispelling of all closed world-views, the breaking of 
all supernatural myths and sacred symbols,, ,the discovery 
by man that he has been left with the world on his hands, 
that he can no lon•Jel' blame fortune or the furies fo1· 
what he does with it reo~, op,cit:lS-16l. 
He expresses the interdependent relationship with urbanization 
i_n this way: 
[Secularization) occurred only when the cosmopolitan 
conf1·ontations of city living exposed the relativity of 
the myths men once thought were unquestionable (Cox, 
op, cit: 1.S), 
But also, 
[Urbanization) became possible in its contemporary form 
only with the scientific and technological advances which 
sprang from the wreckage of traditional world-views 
(ibid), 
Putting together the two phenomena gives Cox his 
controlling image for under::3tanding modern society, "secular 
city". As secular, :=oociety does not look to religion to 
sacralize and stabilize the social order, and so traditional 
religious representations of reality become confined to the 
options of private life. A:3 city, it encompasses a plurality of 
traditions and emphasises short-term, pragmatic ends, such .3.s 
technological and bureaucratic means can achieve. Cox proposes 
to characterize the secular city in terms of what he calls its 
maniere d'@tre, a largely unreflective or intuitive orientation 
t;o the world, shared by a generation. <ibid:l9>. 
The age of the secular city is dubbed by Cox the 
"technopolitan" era, which ensues upon the earlier "tribal" and 
"tov1n;; epoch:3. Remnant:::. of each of -t:hese earlier forms of 
c-=.ociety persist in the mid:::;t of tec:hnopolis, but are destined 
to disappear. ln particular, religiou:::, life ha:=; be~n closely 
wedded to "town" culture, for which a more familiar word is of 
course "bourgeois" (ibid:26). 
But the emerging technopol i tan culture demands an 
alternative understanding of religion and the implication:=. oJ 
the Gospel; and thL:; i:o:, what Cox, having established his 
sociological analysis of contemporary life, now ::;ets out to 
provide. Hi::; thesi:e=. follow:3 the aq:;ument of Fri,:;dri•:·h Gogarten, 
to the effect that secular-i:2:at ion is "th,:; legitimate con::;ec;uence 
of the impact of biblir:al faith on history" <'ibid:31 l ." Hco 
begins by suppocting distinction 
"secularization" and "se~:ularism": 
Seculal'ization irnplies a historical process, almost 
certainly irreversible, in which society and culture are 
delive1'ed fi'Orn tutelage to l'eli·~ious cont1·ol and closed 
metaphysical ~·orld-views,, ,SeculHism, on the othe:' han•j, 
is the nanh~ fo1' a.n ideolo•JY, a new closed W•Jrld-view 
which functions very much ltke a new religion (ibid:34l, 
beh;een 
A proper theological understand ins of secularization is 
necessary in order to prevent it being misconceived and 
di::;torted into secularism. Cox outlines three "dimensions" of 
secularization, each with its source and justification in 
Biblical faith. 
The first interprets the doctrine of Creation as the 
"Disenchantment of Nature". In radically separating God from 
that whkh he crea.te:3 ex nihilo, and in granting to mankind in 
the imago dei a. cardina 1 position of responsible dominion in 
the world, the doctrine of Creation evacuates th•~ stage o! 
nature of all divinitie:::; and mystical totemic liaison:::; with 
humanity, an~ in principle supplies the enabling conditions for 
th•~ growth of :3cience and technology. The created world is 
subjected to the rational control of man. 
Cox's second dimension treats the Fxnrlt1·3 thr::; 
"De:3acralization of Politics". It is not so much the Exodus as 
such, as the whole Old Testament tradition of prophetic 
opposition to sacral kingship that Cox has in mind. Christians 
have carried on this tradition by their refusal to confess the 
Lordship of anyone but Jesus. This desacralization of political 
authorities frees the political arena and the State of 
potentially totalitarian sacral claims: politics and state 
powers become properly limited to the practical achievement of 
proximate, instrumental ends for the good of the communities 
they serve. 
In his third piece of 3n-'ilysi:o;, Cox refers to th·~ Sinai 
covenant as the "De<:::onsecra.tion of Value::;". This seems hitjhly 
i~appropriate on the face of it. but Cox means that the 
Drobi0i+.ion of image:c; introduces a ~:;pirit of perpetual pr-otest 
a.gains.t, and relati?iza.tion of, a.ll hurna.n constructs of meaning 
and value-systems, insofar as they lay claim to ultimate 
status. The idea of a consensual world-view providing the 
sou~-ce of cohesion and identity for a social group, even an 
er:t:ire nation, is challenged !.Jy the Gospel, according to Cox. 
Fm- any such sys.tem depend:,; for- its effectiveness upon it::; 
pow•?r to 'h 1 ' H0.L0. the group in thrall to a tribalism which defines 
it over against some alien 2;roup. But Christian faith demand::; 
that man must rise above such tribalisms and break down the 
barriers they erect, a process which is hastened by the 
cosmopolitan culture of the secular city <ibid :35-50; cf .van 
Leeuwen, 1964) . 
Having laid out the ~C~lements of his theological 
interpretation of :=:,ecularity, (;ox pursu•3s his imaginative 
effort of descr-ibing modern ::;or.:;iety and culture through the 
:::. tenc i l of ":3ecular city", in terms of its socio-structural 
"shape" and cultural "style". The shape compri::;es anonymity and 
mobility, suggested by the images of the telephone switchboard 
and the cloverleaf interchange respectively. The style involves 
pragmatism and profanity (perhaps~ h~t-t~r-, "prola.nene:3s"), 
i;ypified by the figures of John F.Kennedy and Albert Camu::; 
(ibid:chs.2 & J). 
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Cox proceeds to find grounds for defending each of these 
characteristics of modernity usually regarded as inimical to 
Christianity. He argues that much religious denunciation of the 
so-called "faceless anonymity" of the lifestyle of the city is 
based upon a misguided no::;talgia for a communitarian past, 
which confuses the property of Christian koinonia with the 
social structure of Gemeinschaft. 
On the contrary, Cox 
the 
says, a 
mulbple 
carefully 
purely 
preserved 
functional anonymous distancing in 
relationships of urban life is essential in order to permit a 
person to develop the more intimate "I-Thou relationships'' of 
hi::::; choice within the private sphere. The freedom to choose 
where one's true personal commitments lie represents, Cox 
suggests, a triumph of Gospel over law, "a liberation from some 
of the cloying bandages of pre-urban society" <ibid :60), such 
as being doomed to have one's identity defined solely in 
familial terms. 
Cox is a little more guarded about the merits of mobility. 
However, he implies that high social mobility as a concomitant 
of an increased pace of social change 1 ikewise represents an 
enlargement of human possibilities, a broadening of horizons. 
Although this can be highly damaging to traditional, 
"socialized-in" religious orientations, it is in keeping with 
the Biblical notion of a pilgrim people and a non-localized 
deity. Wherever the Christian religion "puts down roots", Cox 
argue::;, as in the grand medieval synthesis of Christendom, it 
loses its distinctive genius and becomes needful of reform and 
renewal. 
In the cultural features of pragmatism and profanity lie 
the real reason fm- undertaking the whole exercise of secular 
theology. For here secularization really bite::;, and hPgins to 
form its own pre-reflective mind-set or intuitive mode of 
perceiving the war ld. Here, it really does present a crucial 
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challenge to traditional forms of religious representation. Cox 
wx-i te::;: 
E:y pra•]matism we mean secuL~.r man's concet'n with the 
question ·~·ill it 11.'0\'~?' ... The wol'ld is viewed not as a 
•Jni f i e•~ rnetaphysi cal system but as a ser tes •Jf problems 
~.nc! pt'OJects, E:y profanitv ~·e t'eier ~o the sec•Jl~.r roan's 
wholly terrestrtal hortzon, the disappearance of any 
supl':._nl•;nd~.ne t•ealitv defti1lll•.:J hts ii.fe (tbtd;73), 
For· c ... ox turn 3 to 
'=.A.van Peur::;~n {196'/J 
of tun;-:·tional 
mvtholo~ical ~nd ontological oerlorls. This functional aporoach, 
to " ' n~orew or 
truth C'emeth> residing in the consistency and dependability of 
'd hCi t does. Christia.n faith, too, to do the 
tru tl1, or to walk in it, r a t:her th.:m to look towo.rds :3ome 
How~ver-, <=:ox 1.~3 also conc-erned tc warn again·:::.t the ner---..rer::=.ion 
of functiona.li::;m into ''operationali·::;m~', a world-"v"iew v..rhi·-:.h 
lor in terms of quantifiable usefu~ness. 
Cox's endorsement of p~agmatism provides him with a 
vii tb w!Jich to beat th<:> existentialists, whose 
"ultimate clue~; t ion·=.'' he o,:::l ieve'=- to 
morbj_d bankering af-ter a. tim•::! wh~n the erudite 
philosopher his grandio::;~ metaphysical speculations 
·:::oEJrD-:'>.nGec: more n~:=;pect and inf!.uew:e th.3n he cio<:>s todoy. This 
1::= ·,;h'l he enn·:c. ·::ha.pter ::3 by ~Jr>::~f<:>rring the theology of Barth 
·=~!Oi·~·r:; of Camu·=:. as the typir:::a.l "profane~ man" a little l:wrd to 
. +' W'.. -.:J no tim<:> for traditi.ona.l th~ol~.Jzical a way of 
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man is compelled to be an atheist if belief in God amounts to 
a get-out, an abdication of human responsibility and maturity 
in the world." 
Apart from chapter 4, which seeks to show by means of 
thumb-nail sketches of four cities worldwide that 
secularization is not just an American or a Western phenomenon, 
this concludes Cox's main exposition of the theology of 
secularization. It is our view that the general thesis of the 
"sameness of direction" of the implications of at least a 
Protestant unden;tanding of Christia11ity and the social and 
cultural development of the Christian West has been 
substantially proven in sociology from Weber onward. To some 
degree, therefore, as Berger <1973:132) put it. "Christianity 
has been its own gravedigger". 
There l'c ~. moreover, a wealth of individually suggestive 
ideas in ThP Secular City that we should not wish to 
undervalue: for example, the possible positive function of 
anonymity and the warning against identifying Cbri:3tian 
fellow:3bip with pre-modern communitarianism. But we have to 
direct our criticisms at Cox's the:3i:3 a:3 a complete package, 
and a recommendation to the churches for a better way of 
responding to the challenges of modernity; and when we do 
this, a number of questionable points emerge. 
iii. Critique. 
Fir:3tly, then, there is an apparent absolutization of the 
present in Cox's argument. He is concerned to approve 
historical relativism as a fruit of Biblical faith, but rela:<es 
this perspective noticeably where modernity is concerned. In 
the past, Christian faith has had a culturally creative and 
influential role, which ha::o not bf'!Pn .:;_dequately theologically 
Cox wants to contribute to the present 
understanding of it, hut without lea_ving open the possibility 
that a future culturally influential role for faith may once 
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again bring about unforeseen departures from the present state 
of affairs. 
lt is important to notice that Cox's view relies heavily 
upon a negative •C!valuation of the "Christendom era" as a false 
road temporarily trodden by Christianity in its as.sumption of 
socio-cultural form. He regards Christendom, with its zenith in 
the High MiddlP Ages, as a fat.::tl resacralizing proo'!ss, runnin;.<. 
counter to the P.iblical trend. The dL:;mantling of the medie·.;al 
sacral society, right down to its present-day vestiges in such 
phenomena as the dual r-ole of the English Sovereigll as Head of 
Church and State, has been a wekome return to the true path. 
Cox's statement that these vestige:3 "amuse Britons vastly", but 
that "no-one takes them the l•C!ast bit seriously" (op.cit:43) 
betray in him an insensitivity to the power of historical 
religious imagery, however {and cf .on "Christendom" Rir::hardson, 
1966:42-3; Casserley, 1965; Barry, 1969:ch.2; Newbigin, 1966:17-
18, 124ff; Cupitt, i977). 
Here we have a reading of history which depends upon the 
rejection of Christendom as un-Christian, even as Wilson's 
secula.rization thesis turns upon the myth of a "golden age" of 
religion. But the processes that brou,sht Christendom into being 
were the conditions for the survival of Christianity at all 
during the Dark Ages. What Cox ignores is that the Gospel will 
be engaged in a. perpetual pro•:::ess of seeking what social 
embodiment it can, given the conditions obtaining round about. 
Whatever embodiment it achieves, it will equally be compelled. 
to judge, distancing itself from it and seeking to aftirm the 
transcendent perspective atresh. Christian faith is ever in 
danger, in assuming concrete hi:::;torical form, of becoming i t=o 
own dialectical opposite; but this inherent tension cannot be 
resolved unilaterally by affirming one form in toto and 
Thus, the medieval Christian society may be judged now to 
be a premature and proleptic realization in highly imperfect 
terms of what in fulfilled form belongs only to the eschaton; 
but it cannot be judged an "aberration". The open, pluralistic, 
differentiated secular society may 1 ikewise be judged as an 
experiment in realizing the human freedom and fulfilment 
promised in the Gospel, but it cannot be treated as the 
"arrival" Cadventus.l of what is yet to come (adventuruw l. 
Secondly, ther8 L:; an ambiguity a.bout Cox's ea:serne::;s to 
offer to secular man a theological explanation of hi::; 
secularity. For this the one thing the truly secular, 
pragmatic man will have no :-~e>ed of <K.Hamilton, 1966C::):CJ7-102; 
1966(b):53). Cox never really commits himself to the position 
of the secular man as his starting point: rather, he think::; he 
has something to offer him, without which his secularity 
remains incomplete (cf.Segundo, 1977:10-13). ln this way, 
although covertly, Cox admits that a total theological 
justification of utter secularity cannot be made. 
The problem of the "secular interpretation of Biblical 
concepts" cannot be solved as readily as would appear by 
simply translating them without remainder into a non-religiou::o 
context. There has to be some residual meaning or "overspill of 
promise" (Mol tmann, 1967) in the religious terms which 
prevents their being exhausted as they are emptied into secular 
contexts of application. Otherwise, we should be left with a 
specialised religiou:3 institution with no conceivable use for 
its particular speciali::om; in the words of Alasdair Macintyre, 
"a religious language, v~hich sur-vives even though we do not 
know what to say in it" CEdward::; and Robin:3on, 196:3:226>. 
Thirdly, Cox does not acknowledge sufficiently 
pruGlemb uf tL~ adaptationist stance toward contemporary 
culture which he advocates. For people's religion is already to 
a considerable extent a ~ultural artefact, even if it is one 
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wrlich pr-escribes opposition to the prevailing culture as its 
proper mode. Where Christian faith is being confessed, and an 
attempt is in progress to practise it, within a secular culture, 
however imperfectly understood by the believer, the flourishing 
of that faith is unlikely to be fur-thered by :o;eculad=:ing it: it 
is more likely to wither away altogether. 
the r~~taill within its 
symbolical apparatus and theological rationale the stimulus for 
that "cri ti•::a l gap" or break with culture" 
l'vi.Hamilton, 196b:1:39ff), if faith is tCJ retain its capacity 
both b::J affirm as meanin8ful, and to ·~riticis<e>, the order in 
which it find:=o it must operate. Despite Cox's desire to see 
theology and Church life move out into the culture of 
technopoljs, there l .. -·=> a strange isomorphism with bourgeois 
culture about his position which makes it difficult to envisage 
where, a.nd how, in his Church a word of God could be heard 
which would not be identical with a word from man. 
Fourthly, and following from thi:3, the question poses 
itself rather sharply, whose faith is this secular faith, which 
is free from provincial tribalisms and faces the world in 
mature personal responsibility? For when Gogarten's essentially 
dogmatic theological position is made into the basis of an 
ostensible analysis of sociological realities, it cannot but 
appear incurably utopian, or even ~lit.ist, contrary to Cox's 
intentions. For who are the secular city-dwellers who are 
fn~ely able to enjoy this level of anonymity and mobility, and 
to rejoice in it all a~. gain for the Gaspe 1? Are they not the 
few who can afford to live in the secular city while feathering 
at the same time a rather less secular nest to which to escape 
in their leisure time? Or those with the educational 
achievements which enable them to make fair game of the city's 
impersonal d.einands, and to 1Je.::.tL Lh~Hl ~11tu LlH:.:ir uwll c;ervice::· 
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It would be ea:3y to argue, for example, that the vast 
inner-city housing areas of the present time are ten times as 
much the hives of a particularly vicious form of tribalism a:3 
ever the close-knit rural village communitites were. 
Again, the cities are the main locus of working-class 
(~ulture. and this cultur-e retains more strongly than any other 
the old communal patterns of relationship (or the instinct for 
them). whUe rejecting the religious participatjon \vhich ow;e 
accompanied them. But Cox's analysis requires us to believe 
that this kind of religiously-based community life was a 
misconception of the true application of faith, even though its 
breakdown has been immeasurably damaging to urban life. 
All of this suggests, finally, that it is over-optimistic 
of Cox to :3uppose that "secularization" can be so readily 
welcomed while "secul.:l.l-ism" is denied. Gogarten's position 
operates on the basis of a radical distinction between the 
proper realms of faith and the secular respectively: just a.s 
Bultmann's theology emphasised the radical eschatological 
::Jther-wm-ldliness of faith, so Gogarten brought out the 
corresponding truth that faith allows the world to be itself in 
all its secularity. Man's works in the world do not have 
religious value, since justification is by faith alone, but can 
stand in their own right as expressions of the rational 
dominion in the world to which man is called CSchrey, 1981:21-
27). Gi·.ren the inali8nable right of each domain to its own 
proper rationality, the two realms are :3een to belor.g 
inseparably together, each relying on the other for its 
completion. In this way, true secularity depends upon the 
presen•::e of true faith. and vice versa. 
Hut Cox wants to have only one domain, giving a who.lly 
secular meaning to faith itself. Thei-efore, he should accept the 
----~...:-1--.!--l 
.-=..u•.~.1U1.UG 1..\.JO. 1 ·--- l -! ..L.! - .-1 t:=a 1. .1 !JJ..•.::: .. -. 
1·.~ ·=> undouhtedl:r 
v-;~~ ich CCJ1ftt~ wi t1. such - - .L - - - - l~- - - .L~ 0 ::::>l_,Clll1_;e. UlH:! Ul. 
that the spread of secularism 
concomitant of the pt-o,:;<j:3se:o, of r:::.eo:-;ularization, and what Co:{ 
272 
has left himself unable to supply is a sufficient basis upon 
which to combat secularism, even though he theoretically wishes 
to do so. He wants to speak positively of the gradual assertion 
of the autonomy of the secular (secularization), while 
criticizing the compartmentalization of religion and the waning 
influence, or irrelevance, of the churches and religious 
thinking in other areas of social life (secularism). But this 
cannot be done on his terms. 
What is required Lo. a stance whid1, fir::=.tly, is prepared 
to acc•~pt and look in the face the fact of diff•~rentiation, 
which as the fruit of a process which itself has its roots in 
the outworking of Christ ian faith, now leaves the Church 
appearing as that institution which repre:3ents the religious 
division of life. 
Secondly, this stance needs to capitalize upon this 
separated, specialized and increasingly marginal position in 
order to call into question certain developments within the 
secularization process, by 
origins. In brief, Cox 
measuring 
wants to 
them against 
affirm the 
their Gospel 
:3ecu lar iz ing 
processes but challenge their marginalizing effect on religion 
by urging the Church to reclaim them for its own theology; we 
think the more feasible option lies in accepting marginality 
but criticising the processes. 
In the next section, we shall follow up the issues of the 
structural marginalization of the Church and the effects of 
cultural :3ecularization in relation to some other writings of 
our period tackling the same questions as Cox from different 
points of view. 
2. Religion and Secularization: Ideals and Ideologies. 
-'-· Munby and The Idea. of ~ 8Pruln.r Snc:i_Ptv. 
Another work which lay at the positive pole of a radical 
i;heological respon:3e to se•:::ulaxization was D.L.Munby':3 ~Idea 
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of a Secular Society. Munby did not claim that the fully 
secular society had already been achieved, but he did present 
the idea as something desirable, and attempted, like Cox, to 
give theological justification for such a judgment. He also 
sought to tackle directly the problem of a specialized 
religious institution in such a society. 
For !•tunby, a seculac- society i::o one which "explicitly 
refuses to commit itself as a whole to any particular view of 
the nature of the universe and the place of man in it" (Mt.:nb:f. 
op.cit:l4). lt is pluralist and tolerant, not seeking to impose 
a uniform vmrld-view or va.lue-system, and respecting the right 
of individuals to whatever private beliefs they choose, subject 
to no harm being done either to others or to collective 
interests. Its official institutions have carefully 
circumscribed, practical aims, which they achieve by rational 
means, such as the scientific collection and analysis of data, 
and dispa::;sionate team-work free from "vested interests". The 
society projects no "official image::;" of its•~lf. 
Munby's account does not try to applaud secularization 
while deploring secularism. Rather, he accepts that the open, 
pluralistic, in no way religiously legitimated society will not 
display much interest in locating God in particular 
circumstances or values. "We are not to look for the hand of 
God in any particular fields of experience. He is in all or 
none. Providence is universal or nowhere" Obid:71). Munby 
points out that the hiddenness of God, or the dialectical 
tension of his presence-in-absence, has been a common theme of 
devotiona 1 literature through the centuries. Today, more than 
ever: 
There is no separate sphere of 'l'el i9ion' where God is to 
be found, If there is 110 such separate sphere, if God is 
the •)l'dinary, everyday \IIOI'ld (ibid;7S; cf,supra, on 
8onhoef f e1': 69 l. 
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Thus far, then, Munby's position is rigorous in its 
insistence upon a thoroughgoing secularity. The Church has no 
right at all to try to "clear a space" for religion, or to 
suggest that any of the autonomous institutional spheres 
requires religious interpretation or ju::c;tification in order to 
function aright. God neither favours some quarter of the social 
system at the expense of another, nor adds anything materially 
to any of them in such a way that they can be said to "need ... 
him. Giv•~n this very ::;trict understanding of the se·~·ularity of 
th•:> secular society, Munby ha:c, c~eared the ground for asking 
1vhat the po::;sible role of a separate and specialised religious 
in::;titution might be. Fm- obviously it is not somewhere "where 
God is to be found" in a way he is not found elsewhere. 
Jl'iunby has laid bare the constituents of the problem very 
uncompromisingly, but finds great difficulty in solving it 
because he is so determined to treat the secular society he has 
describ·:c~d as unequivocally a good thin8. So, he is less than 
expansivp about the purpose of the Church. He wants to see it 
"redin"cting l t::; effort::;" towards "lay institutes and centres 
where ordinary people can discuss their everyday problems" 
(ibid:8B). Meanwhile, the job of Christians is to work out what 
"is the proper pattern of sanctity in the world of politics and 
people" (ibid:89): this, presumably, becau::;e Christians are 
those who are committed to seeing thi::; secular and seemingly 
godless society as being God's, and existing in, with and 
before God. But why, on Munby's term::=., should such a 
perspective be desirable at all? 
Trt•? problem is that Mulloy was deliber-ately re:3ponding to 
Eliot's Idea of a Christian Society, and behind it Coleridge's 
Church and State, by disputing Eliot's claim, from the waste-
land of the inter-war year::;, that a so-called "neutral society" 
must relapse into paganism unles::; it be Chri:=:.i:i3.nizec!. 
liberal distaste for elitism caused him to ::;hun Eliot's concept 
of a "community of Christians" made up ot those intellectually 
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and spiritually gifted leaders, clerical and lay, who would 
shape and inform the national culture. Nevertheless, Munby 
hazarded the suggestion that all practising Christians, in 
their everyday lives, might "guide other-s a:::, a 'clerisy', 
because others copy them, whether knowing it or not" (ibid). 
Munby was here recognizing that something needs to be 
done about secular culture, but his determination to welcome 
the ::-:,ecular society in all respects made it . 'l-.1 liDpOSSlu.J._e for him 
to make this recognition explicit and plain. Today, we may feel 
a greater kinsl:1ip with Eliot's inter--war waste-land than with 
Munby's post-war optimism. One fact is inescapable: if there is 
any importance at all in maintaining the Chri::;tian cultural 
perspective, then where practising religious commitment is 
reduced to a small minority of the population, this small group 
inevitably have the responsibility laid upon them to become the 
informed, alert and critical front-line of Christian socio-
cultural presence- ~litism or not. 
To :=>um up, Munby desires both to c:;elebr-a te the 
sufficiency of a secular society and to assert the continuing 
importance of religion within it. VIe should say that, if one 
aspect of Munby's ideal society is that religion is no longer 
required to bol:3ter it up, then religion may in::; head 
periodically emerge from its corner in order to call the 
society's assumptions into question Ccf.Jarrett-Kerr, 1964:24!. 
Newbigin <1966:126-37) has listed at least three such 
cherished a.s:3umptions of J-1:unby's which religion cannot leave 
untouched. 
Munby says that a secular state "deflate:::, the pretensions" 
of such potentially "sacral" authority-figur-es a.s judges. But 
Newbigin asks wheth1~r the exalted symbolic statu:::, a.nd respect 
accorded to such figures (notwithstanding the po::-:,si bi.li ty of 
corruption and abuse) does not express society's belief that 
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law is not merely a matter of arbitrary expediency, but of 
vital consensual convictions about right and wrong. 
Munby is hostile to "ideologies" as unreflectingly 
accepted overarching rationales shaping attitudes and 
behaviour. But Newbigi_n, quoting Andr4 Dumas, suggests that 
ideologies "have been, and still E;re, the great moral for-ce of 
the contemporary masse,3" <Newbigin, op.ci t: 134). 
Munby shares in thQ radical theologian's distast~ for 
"pietisti,:;" religion. But that an 
personal rlirnension of religion can offer a strong defence 
against the collapse of rP]ig-ion 
- ·u into culture, a_nd thus 
pres•=,r ve a critical di:3tance from secular society for one who 
remains fully involved in it. 
These, of course, are exces,3ively brief suggestions 
bordering on extremely large issues. We employ them here 
simply to illustrate how the assertion of a continuing role for 
explicit and visible religous pra.ctice in a thoroushly secular 
society involves being prepared to accept that aspects of that 
society and it'3 culture raise critical questions. Then, only 
religion offers the potentially independent standpoint from 
which to face them honestly. 
ii. Adolfs and the Ideology of a Secular Culture. 
Both Cox and Munby approach secularization through a 
description of certain key features of social change in post-
medieval western societies. They empha,:;ise particularly the 
withdrawal of successive areas of institutional life from 
ecclesiastical control, the rise of the modern secular ~3tate 
and the de·.relopment of :3cience a.nd technology, all interpreted 
as the fruit of Biblical faith. 
But they negl•=,ct those culturally-based approaches which 
always make the que:3tion of secularization much more 
problema.tic for the theologian. The preci,3e delineation of the 
extent of secularization in a 5iven society become:; far more 
difficult, a.s the wm-k of David M:.:l.l-tin shows, and the 
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possibility of an unambiguously positive theological respon:o3e 
is also greatly reduced <see Shiner, 1965>. 
Justice cannot be done to the secularization que::;tion by 
looking solely at the public, socio-structural level of the 
'=·pee ia l iza t ion of institutional functions ond their 
emancipation from religious control. A theology which attempts 
t:o capitalize on the::;e processe:=; runs into difficulties 
precisely at the point where it has t:o reconstruct the role of 
religion in the secula:- society. Th i:; i::; becaus<:~ t:!:e ·::laim to 
be doing theology in tandem with secular social realitie:3 all 
too often fails to face honestly the highly problematic reality 
of religious life produced by such a type of society. 
Some theologians, l . .1owever, were interested in depicting 
what they ·=:,aw as the developing cultural ethos of the time. 
That is, they thought that the f.::~ature:3 of "modernity" w•"re 
gradually producing, at a more or les:; sub1 iminaJ, t.:nr-eflect:ive 
level of mass awareness, a secular mind-set or orientation upon 
tbe world whidl would e:.;:clude those di:;position:=:. toward tbe 
sacred or the tran::;cendent with which religion tra.di tionally 
had to do (C.'w'illiams, 1966:40-41; Barry, 1969:12; Lloyd, 
1964:17-20). 
One such analysis was provided by the Dutch Catholic 
theologian Robert Adolfs, who combined the influence of 
Protestant radical theology with commentary upon Vatican II in 
hi:3 books The ChJl.D~.lL _ _lli___Di.Lterent <1966> and The Grovr;;,_Qf_<:i_QQ 
Cl967). Adolfs describes the phenomena of what he calls 
"rapidation" iT: recent world development, giving some substance 
to the frequent claims of radical theology that this was a 
time of "r.apid social change" (Adolfs, 1967:44-61). He cites the 
development of urban life in areas of the non-Western world 
Hhere this had previously not occurred, the ri::::.e of computer-
technology, the growing economic interdependence of nations 
and the spread of the communications medio. 
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Adolfs then goes on to set out, in the form of a list of 
brief popular aphorism::; and mottoes, the content of the 
"dominant ideology" which is encouraged by factors of 
modernity such a::; these. For whereas the secular society, as 
M.unby argued, may be one which espouses no official ideology 
or philosophical rationale for its aims and structures, it 
neverthel•')s::; embraces, or causes people unsystematically and 
to embrace, wide range "p,:;eudo-myths" 
about what is true, desirable of pos:;ible. 
assumptions noted by Adolfs are such things as these: 
~lith the help of work, sc 1ence and technol•)gy, mank 1nd 
makes pi'O•jl'eSS; 
progress is greater welfare; 
1.11elfa1'e is the consequence of satisfying our material 
needs; 
man's spiritual needs (culture and religion) must be 
looked after 1n the private sectors of society.,, 
success (financial, political or in one's careerl means 
happiness .. , 
all uncedainties must be eliminated,., 
e·<•2rythin•;:; owst be so arrange•j that it can be requlated 
or c ;J n t r •J 11 e ,j , , . 
anythin•] that cannot be mea·~ured •)i' calculated 1s 
val•.Jel.~ss,,, 
questions that cannot be answered rnust be avoided ... 
people who don't fit into our society ue anti-social or 
inferiot',,. 
1.11hat cannot be discussed !the ineffable, the mysteri•Jus, 
the symbolical l must not be discussed.,, (Ad•)l fs, 
op, cit: 79-80), 
Now Adolfs is as eager as any radical theologian to 
affirm that elem•=mt of secularization which achieves the 
liberation of mankind from the bondage of sacral systems which 
hold people in thra.ll to "principalities and power::;" believed 
to dominate the world, and stifle h~man creative action. But he 
p·~rcei ve:c; tilf~ Lhrea t of a renewed bondage to a patent hidden 
ideology, capable of even greater dehumanizing effect. 
Today, of course, it has become almost as fa::;hionable to 
denounce the danRers of modernity as it was to celebrate 
::;•"cular i ty tw8nty years ago among the Churd1 's :;elf-styled 
aYant-8-arcie. But it will not help u::; to swing un•:r-itically from 
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celebration to denunciation: either way, the reality of the 
Christian's dialectical involvement and implication in both 
positive and negative facets of secularization is not faced. 
Adolfs has. offl';r-ed us a cl•?ar, characteristic portrayal of 
the distinctive mentality of a secular culture, which must be 
allowed to qualify the attempts of Cox and !1unby to reclaim 
secularity for theology and the Gospel. In the concluding 
section of this ·:::bapter, we examine three crucial areas in 
which this qualification must occur. 
:5. Hatters Arising: The Limits of the Secular? 
i. Secularization and the Misrepresentation of Mass-
Cultural Attitudes. 
Cultural analysi:3 undertaken fr-om a one-sidedly educated, 
urbane and professional point of view can easily distort the 
pattern of actual rnass-cultural attitudes. Cox, for example, 
writes as follows: 
Pre-seculal' man lives in an enchanted forest, Its •:;)lens 
and >Jroves swal'fn with spi1·its. Its rocks and streams are 
alive with friendly or fiendish demons. Reality is 
chal'•jed with a magical powe1' (Co;<:, 1%8;35), 
In similar vein, Colin Williams writes of the "period of myth" 
proposed by van Peursen: 
[It sees the world as] rathel' like an encha.nted forest, 
alive with ma,~iccd and f1·ightening forces, and in ~·hich 
primitive man makes no clear distinctton between his life 
and the life-fo!'Ces peneti':J.ting the wo!'ld IC,Willia.ms, 
1966:22)' 
Both writr~rs a_ccept that mythical and tribal attitude,; 
are not a thing of the past. They are not ;o naive as to 
suppose that all modern, we:; tern men and women a.re :;ecular, 
technopolitan, functional thinkers. But they fashion their 
descriptions tendentiously, so as to highlight the alien, 
irrational, primitive cha.rctc Lei r UJ. L 1. -l,.,llf:: :30 
mythical culture. Reading them, we are mado:> to feel that sue!! 
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attitudes must be merely archaic survivals among the less 
enlightened sectors of the population. 
However, a less tendentious reading might produce a 
different effect. For example, secularization has made no 
::;ign i fic.:mt .inro.:;.ds at all upon the expectation of religiou::; 
officiation on the occasion of death (cf .Bowker, 1973 :ch.4). A 
fully consi::;tent secular theolOE:Y could really ha\'e '-'ery little 
patiPnce with the ta.king up of the Church's time in performing 
buria.ls and cr,~mations; for these doubtless r-eflect at a folk-
religious level a profound attachment to a mythical view of the 
soul, hc~aven and hell, of the powers of life and death and all 
the paraphernalia of a residually sacred universe. 
But there i::; absolutely no avoiding the fact that every 
person at a funeral, brought into contact with what 
otherwise the ::;ecular culture's greatest tabu, is faced with the 
disturbing truth: tomorrow, it could be me. In the secular age, 
that statement i::; no le::;s true than ever it was. The example 
serves to illustrate that the intimations underlying the 
conf;y;ed and confusing mish-mash of residual religious 
practices need not be so "primitive" or immature as the secular 
theologians are apt to represent them to be. 
For the mo::;t part, secular-ization has led neither to the 
demise of religious orientations, nor to their transformation 
into a mode of creative world-affirmation and responsible 
secularity, but to sheer religious confusion. Nowhere in the 
radi<=:al theologies do we find a simple admission of this fact, 
still less any attempt to come to terms with it and urge the 
churches to take responsibility for it. 
Alasdair Macintyre wrote of the attempt to welcome 
secularization in the name of "true Christianity", "it is al::;o a 
matt•-:,r of the gap between the churches and the rest of the 
population in respect of the intelligibility of religious 
uttet-ance and teha'Jiour" <M.acintyre, 1968). We should perhaps 
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rephrase thi:::;, "between the radical theologians and the rest of 
the population inside and outside the churches". As Macintyre 
went on to say, theological rationales for the existing state 
of affairs might constitute an ideological concealment of the 
social facts. 
ii. Secularization and the Disappearance of Ultimate 
Que::;tions. 
we have Sl~en that Cox, together 11ith in their var-ious 
van Buren, van Peursen and wren-Lewis, took up 
Bonhoeffer's rema.rk about so-called "ultimate questions" no 
longer carr-ying existential conviction with modern man. A:::; a 
result, they argued, religion and faith could not be made to 
depend upon them. we 
disappearance of a 
have to raise the 
particular form 
que:::;tion whether the 
of such questions 
necessarily implies that they will not recur in some other 
guise. 
A:=. an example, we may take Lesslie Newbigin'::; critici:3m 
of A.T .van Leeuwen's Christianity in 'irlorld Hi:3tory. Van Leeuwen 
argued that the spirit of Christian faith was invariably one of 
prophetic protest against "autocracy", by which he meant an 
understanding of the world-order in terms of sacral 
authorities, values and meanings structured into permanent 
givenness. Christian faith broke the pattern of autocratic 
society, and refused the claim to absoluteness advanced by any 
system of ultimate meaning. 
But Newbigin asked whether such a continual repudiation 
of ultimates, however theologically justifiable, was possible in 
practice: could actual societies sustain such a position 
structurally? "Question:::; about personal destiny, about the 
meaning and purpose of human life, will ah1ays be asked" 
<Newbigin, 1966:39). 
Nev1bigin 's point was that every culture must have some 
kind of philosophical fall-back or assumed indefectible bedrock 
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to which it will point when every empirically testable answer 
to such questions fails to meet expectations. It may be 
necessary, in a secular society, to look beneath the surface of 
the public structures in order to discover where those non-
negotiable limits of argument reside for individuals and 
groups. Does the outline of a secular mentality given by 
Adolfs, above, support Bonhoeffer against New big in's confidence 
that the questions will continue to be asked? 
Bonhoeffer, obviously enough in view of his personal 
circumstances, was not writing as an optimistic secular man 
with over-rosy expectations about human possibilities and an 
underestimation of the limits set by human fallibility and sin. 
He was simply aiming at matter-ot-factness: of course the 
onward march of technology and scientific knowledge makes 
people resonate less deeply to questions of the form, "what is 
the meaning of life?" "what is authentic existence?" "how can I 
overcome my f:inHude?" and so on. Many ordinary people today 
will respond v;ith a shrug of the shoulders: "I take life as it 
comes", "leave that to the philosophers", "it's all beyond me!" 
But the questions may be put in a different form: "'ihy is the 
world in such a mess?" "Can things get any better-?" "'ihat sort 
of a life will there be for our children when they grow up?" 
The reactions to such que::;tions may be less non-committal. 
Religious categories, however, are just as necessary in 
the end to articulate any answers. Christianity is very much to 
do with the hope of a better world, even where, in popular and 
traditional religious practice, this has been projected a::; a 
different world, "heaven", to be entered individually after 
death. A secular culture which is pragmatic and instrumentally-
oriented may well not ask 1ts ultimate questions in the 
habitually abstract philosophical way, but it will flounder if 
it is supplied with no means of a::;king or answering them at 
all. And these me<ta~ e.ro inus.ris-bly rsligim.1€ m'i!aB€ 
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iii. Secularization and the Rebound of the Sacred. 
A cultural understanding of secularization conceives of 
the advance of secular categories of understanding, 
conventions, mores and mentality a:=> heine; at the expense of 
sacred one:3. 7 It is not, as we have seen, that the secular 
simply squeezes out the sacred, as though the two were 
mututally exclusive ways of approaching the world. Rather, the 
health of the relationship between the two ?Oles of the sacred-
se.:::ul.;;u- continuum is damaged. Imotead oi a creative tension, 
there is a dangerous imbalance. 
To use a crude analogy, the :3acred and secular poles rna y 
be regarded as the opposite ends of a flexible or elastic cord. 
If one end, the secular, is stretched further and further, the 
cord will eventually snap unless a counter-pull is being 
exercised by the sacred. If this is activated, a rebo)Jnd will 
occur which, although traumatic at the time, ultimately has the 
effect of restoring the original healthy tension. The question 
at issue is whether the continuing advance of secularization is 
to result in further fragmentation as the sacred-secular 
continuum in society and culture breaks entirely, or whether 
the churches can marshal the resources of religion in order to 
restore the proper dialectic. 
The presence of the sacred, or of a set of sacred 
representations, within a. secular culture serves to maintain a 
healthy tension in a number of ro:=spects. Firstly, it mediates 
between the prevailing culture <by its use of culturally 
familiar forms) and notions of what is finally true, good and 
perfect. It refuses to let the culture rest satisfied with 
present conditions and prevents the dec lin·~ of ultimate ideals 
into culturally immanent, and thus idolatrous forms 
<cf .Galloway, 1967). 
Secondly, it stands as a permanent 
society that, whih~ the desacralizing of 
State and social order is indeed 
rP.m i nder to secular 
the world of nature, 
congrU<~n t with the 
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implications of the Gospel, the eschatological condition of the 
full dislosure of the holiness of the secular- the kaine ktisis, 
the new creation- has not yet been achieved (cf .Davi~=;, 
1966:11-20, 54ff). 
Thirdly, it prevents any human programme from being 
id_en t ified wholly and without r-emainder with the work of God 
<cf.Lasl1, 1973). It insists that th•c> highest and best of human 
;)r-OjPcts is nevel- enough to achieve the vision whi·::h ins;:oired 
it. Moreover, every such project will fall prey to some 
corruption from within, in the very process of pa_ssinz from 
vision to concrete reality. 
iv. Conclusions. 
ln this chapter, we have at tended to the pr-oposal:=; of 
:3ecular theology for understanding contemporary socio-cultural 
change as a legitimate outcome of the Gospel, and thus enabling 
the churches to welcome it. We have explored the difL<:::ulties 
set in the way of these proposals two particular aspects of 
the secularization process: the differentiation and 
;narzinalization of the religiow; institution it:::;elf, 'Hd the 
confusion and fragmentation exhibited by the secular culture. 
We perceive in Cox and and those >iho broadly support him a 
de:; ire to affirm the secularizing processes wholeheartedly on 
theologkal grounds, while still finding room 
the churches which effectively denies their marginality. ~e 
think it more realistic to face up to this marginality, but to 
seek to make use of it to mount a critique of certain aspects 
of the secular culture. 
In our view, Christians do well not to forget the ori3inal 
locus of the word "secular-". It referred to the pre:=;ent world-
order qualified by the fact that it is, in relation to God':=; 
promised future, never final, never fulfilled in itself. never 
beyond question. There wa:s a quite proper foundation for the 
Church's reluctance to rid the idea of "secularizatL:m" of 
c•,rtain pejorati?e connotations. This was not alway=- :-;imply 
evidence (though sometimes it was and i~:) of an entrenched 
stance towards what was assumo~d to be the rise of irreligion, 
and as such the Church's sworn enemy. 
The fully secular soci•?ty is, to use the accurate phr-ase 
of von Weiszaecker \1964), a kind of "Chri:=,tian heresy". It 
emphasises and freezes into false permanence one side only of 
the ·~omplex tnJi:h of th•~ ·=,ocia1 impli·~atiom; of the r;ospel. It 
remains the responsibility of contemporary Christianity to 
retain an ambiguous, critically-dista_n.:;ed c:.t:ance towar-ds its 
own socio-cultural fruits. Such a dL=,tance is actually provided 
to the Churdl by the problcmati·= fa,=i: of the unwilled 
institutional rlifferentiation which has led it into marginality. 
Our position, therefore, differs from the radicals' typical 
judgment that secularization is good and must be affirmed, but 
secularism is bad and must be rejected. A:=, to the affirmation 
of secularization as a fruit of the Gospe"L) we cone lude as 
follows: insofar .3,:=, this is true, it ref;uires the acceptance 
that a:=,pects of :c;o-called :=,ecula.r-ism are inevitable 
"fruits" tied into the process. This alerts u-= to the fact that 
the Gospel's fruit:=, in concrete socio-cul tur.';tl term:=> can never 
be unambiguously judged to be sound and proper. There is 
always a fresh process of reviewing, criticising and even 
rejecting fruits in the light of the :3elf:=,ame Gospel. This does 
not mean attempting in the proce:3s to deny that the:3e were 
really "true" fruit:=, at all. 
As for the denial of se•:ulari:.=;m, W•'! comment thus: this 
denia.l is only n:a.li:=,tic if it is nuanced to :c;ingle out t:hose 
components of the prevailing ideology which are developing in 
a line radically inimical to the Gospel. This involves the 
Church in recognizing its own ine:3<:.::apable complicity in th':> 
production of them. Therefore, an attitude of humil.ity and 
compassion, not just hostility and denunciation, is called for. 
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Further, the Church cannot begin to combat or criticise 
anything that belongs to the secular unless it heightens, 
maximises and makes effective all that symbolism of the sacred 
and transcendent which is the distinctive propet-ty of its own 
institutional life. 
The theoretical position attained in this chapter has not 
directly .3.ddr.=o:o;::oed the problem of specific, concrete .3Ction by 
the churches designed to make visible in a secular context the 
real meaning C.Jf t:he Gospel, C.Ji ta.lk of sin and salvation, gract': 
and fellowship. For Harvey Cox, for example, B theology of 
social change was intended to precede a theology of the Church: 
and all we have said in this chapter invites the question, what 
should the Church do? 
Christian Radicalism paid much attention to this question, 
whic::h is treated eldensively not only in The Secular City and 
Robin:30n 's The Ne\'i__.,~eformation'?, to name two leading 
contributions, but e:::;pecially in the doc1Jments stemming from 
the studies on "P1e Missionary Structure of the Congregation" 
emanating from the world Council of Churches. Thi:::, "secular 
mission of the Church" is the topic of our next Chapter. 
NOTES 
1. Ho~ever dated, the book is a great deal more lively and stimulating to read today 
than Honest To God, the naivety of some parts being compensated for by the sug~estive 
insi•Jhts of others, The most cogent immediate responses are gathered in The ._.erular 
~;~~ febateG edite,j by Daniel Callahan (1966), in a deliberate imitati9n of Edwards' 
~: s to ,,d O»bate. A good extended d1scuss1on 1s 1n RIChard, :;;eculauzatlnn 
tneology, 132-64; a trenchant revtew article IS P,J,Lee, "Whose Ctty?" In the 
ScottJsh Journal af Thet1loqy for 1966:328-40, Co:<: is discussed as part of the 
si:<ties' ferraent in K,Hamilton, Wbat's N»w in Reli·~ion?, 93-106; ch.3 of Woollar•j, 
Progr»ss· a Chr1stian Doctr1nP?; and ch, 1 of A,M,Ramsey, God, Christ and the War!~. · 
2, Saeculufll ·~as a temporal term, cf, French si~cle century, However the contrast 
between "this age/world" and "the age/world to corned served to blur the •jistinction 
fron1 the spatial term .wundus, The lew Testament use of Greek aion and kos!llos is 
comparable, See J,i\,T,Robinson, "The Christian Society and This Yorl•j"_, in On Being 
1he Ch~rcp in th, \lol'ldJ 9-22; A.Loen, Secularization, 150-5.5· Gregor ':!mi th, ~
Chostla01ty, 141-49; RIChardson,. Rellg1on [jj Coiiieii~orary Debate, 40ff; Macquame, 
God and Seculanty, Of, The radical distinction be ween the t111o a~~es 1s of course 
followed through classically in theology in Augustine's conception of the two 
'cities" and the LuthHan doctrine of the tli•l "Kingdoms", both of 111hich as a result 
show an immensely conteMporary interest in the relataonship between faith and this 
world, See Charles Davis, Theology and Political Societ~~ 32-35, 
3, These statements about expropriation are of course1ghly generalized, In England, 
the peculiar political nature of the Reformation, which eventually led to a 
Revolution involving conservative and radical religious parties, followed by a 
restoration of a moderately reformed ecclesiastical system and a monarchy still 
closely allied to 1t, "i'St.i!ted in the p,jJitical proces·:; oi seculortzation bein•] 
halted at an intermediary staqe. In France, by contrast, the eventual Revolution very 
decisivtd'f involved a confroncation of religious and s,w;larist parties, and a fully 
secular sta~e 1·esulted tn which even t'ld~.y anti-clerical ism is rnore .,j,jespread than 
:n England, See Marttn, A G~neral Ih»ary af Secular1:at:on. 
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4, For example, Holyoake believed that the masses required education and the material 
Means of living a properly hun\an life 1 not dogma and supernatural palliatives, Good hospitals could do more for the sick than priestly ministrations, A Davy lamp would 
protect a miner ~here prayers would not, Where the ~orld renained unexplained, 
science 111ould continue to work upon it, In the meantime, no matter\ for there was 
plenty to be gettin'j on with, and to enjoy, without troubling aboul mysteries, On 
Holyoake and Bradlaughb see Susan Budd, Varieties of Unbelief. Nineteenth-centurv 
secularisrft became the asis fo1' the t'llentieth-century Humanist Movement; see Colin 
Campbell "Humanism in Britain", in A SociolOQHal Yearbook of Reli~ion in Britain 
yol 2, 1~69, an_d the same author's Towards a ;,ocioloQy of Irreli~Jon, 1971; also i_n 
the context ot the s1xttes, W,Strawson 1 Teachers and the New •heoln,~v, ch.:3: 8lackhaa\, ReliQion in Modern Society and tn Objections to Humanism, 196£;,He!,burn 
111 Religion and Hymaoisrn 1 published by the 8BC in 1964; and popularly, F,.,rown, ~1v1n~ Before You Dte, 197~. 
?·.On Goga1·ten see GrehJr Smith, S"c,ular c:rjst.iaotty. 150-56; S,P,Sch_illi.;''i 
~ont~>mporary Continental LPolog1aos ch,o- H,H,':,chr~y, )aPkuL~nsmuog, 21-L7. tt·,e 
r~liance of Co:' and othe1·s upon Go,)arten's' Verhaen~nis und H•1tfnun~ .j~r Neuzeit· di, 
SaekylarismunQ als theolo·~iscbes Problem ( l953i is soilewhat ec.ectic and o•1t of 
context, Go•)arten, like Bultmann, started out as a dialectical theo!o,:Jiar. but parted 
theological company with Barth in the thirties. His t;nderst.an•Jin,~ of seculanzat,:on 
as the "histor~cization" ( Vergeschichtlichung.l of human e):ist~.nce, ait.houqh taken.up 
accurately by ure,:Jor Sm1th (see 1nfra, Ch,XIIi, d•Jes not reaLy ag1·ee w1th what (O;': 
is t1·ying to say, Fo1' Goga1·ten it is faith as a creative mode Jf historical betng-i~-the-world that overcomes lhe dichotomy betw~en (e~piricist: objectivity and 
le\ist.entialistl subjectivity, Only in faith can man ~!low the ob:ecti<:? ~»•Jrid to be 
freely itself in its full historical secularity, because faith as the •)ift of 6o,j 
frees nlan to be himself in the 111orld, liberating hirn fl·om dorntnatton by it and for 
responsible action in it, Gogarten's p,osition dep2r.::!s upon au.:~'.an[2 of a radical 
version of the L'Jtheran "T'IIo King_doflls' ,joctrine, .>nd seeks to un·j~rstand h•JIII faith 
avo1ds e1ther confus1ng or false1y separating the ~~~~o real:ns, '"~ God and o! tr12 
world, On these terms, Co:o:'s theology is actually a case of their deliberate 
L')nfusion. See H,H,Schrey, Reich Gottes ynd Welt, 1%9:!0H, 
6, Cox is not blind to the irony of choosing Kennedy and Camus as his representatives 
of the secular spirit: two men who both met death prematurel·r, violently and in 
seemingly meaningless fashion, In the very midst of pragma~t: secularity, the 
existential predicament raises its head! 
7, The phenomenolo,:Jical aspect of this sacred-se£ula.r continu,Jnl D•)lr.t oi view o111es 
~<JCh to the hi~t(Jry-o~-re1i9.ions SChool , represent_e,j, ea:tic~larl'{ b·( the lll•)rk •}f 
r.ll'cea Eltade. ':!ee WICKer, 1.:ylt11re and ToeolQ·~~· ~~ :-~21, A1t1zer aiso belonqs to 
this tradition, having been strongly influenced ~;i Eliade; but he 11ants to force the 
swing of the pendulum wholly on to the "secular" side of the continuum, in orojer to 
bring about a catastrophic shift in which the eschatological sacred ~iil aopear, This 
deliberately reverses Eliade's perspective of an eternal return of the sacred, 
Altizer, then, demands that Christians take a fearful risk in ']iving uo everythin'] t•) 
the onslaught of total, profane secularity, an,j just ~~itin9 to see ~r.at happens, 
This position is very much bound up with a sort of optrnistiC A!llerican Messianisfll, 
~hich has had a sorry fate since Altizer's day: see R.L.Shinn. M~n· rha N~w Humanism. 
i !9, !57' . . 
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CHAPTER XI: THE SECULAR MISSION OF THE CHURCH. 
This chapter seeks to evaluate those radical programmes 
which applied the overall theological affirmation of the 
modern, secular society to the under:3tanding of the Church's 
mis:3ionary task. The aim of such was to 
reconceptualize that mission, and the salvation which it sought 
to bring, in secular-:3ocia l terms. and to con:3id•o.r the 
institutional structures necessary for th~ Church to accomplish 
a mission reinterpreted in this way On the basis of the 
double~edged stance towards secularity recommended in the 
preceding chapter, we raise a number of questions against both 
the desirability and the feasibility of this reconstruction, and 
suggest factors which need to be take1' into consideration if 
the Church is to have any hope of fulfilling its mission under 
the constraining conditions of contemporary social reality. 
1. Colin Williams and th-2 "C-:hurch for Othe>rs". 
i. General Observations. 
The main ecumenical debate about tha meaning of salvation 
and the nature of the Church's mission, and the relationship of 
evanz;elism to :3ocial justice, did not d.c;v~lop until the 1970s 
and came to a head at the Nairobi Assembly of the World 
Council of Churches in 1975. As such, the debate falls outside 
the scope of this thesis. However, the precursors of these 
increasingly politically-oriented <';Curnenical statements lie 
clearly to hand in the secular theologies of the previous 
decade. Here, certain theoretical foundations were laid 
concerning the regeneration of the Church's social presence and 
proclamation in order to :=>peal\ to, and be effective in, a 
global society construed as increasingly and irreversibly 
seculaT. 1 
The worldwide studies of the Wor-ld Council of Churches on 
"The M is~::; ionary ;3tructure of th~~ Cong:-~ga tion 1 ', initiated at the 
Delhi Assembly of 1961, culminated in the 1967 Report, ~ 
~h_Eor Others. This in turn stongly influenced the thinking 
of the Fourth Assembly of the VJ .C.C. at Uppsala in Sweden in 
1968. The Council also sponsored an important Conference on 
Church and Society in Geneva in 1966. which was notable for 
its espousal of a form of Chri~.:;tian humanism as the proper 
formulation of the nature of God's mission in the world.~ 
For a body of writings the theolo~y 
promulgated through these councils ctnd studies we turn to the 
work of the Austra_lian ~1ethodist theologian, Colin 'williams. He 
joined the National Council of Churches of the U.S.A. in 191')3 
as Director 
oversee and 
"Missionary 
of the Department 
co-ordinate the 
of Evangeli:3m, in 
emerging findings 
groups. The immediate Structure" study 
order to 
of the 
fruit of 
William::;' work in this area was the two study book:.:;, Where in 
the World]_ and 'What in the 'World?. The later paperback Faith 
in_,a __ ))erula.r Ag,-=. sought to relate the studies more e}:plicitly 
to the theology of :3ecularization. In 1969, William:=! study of 
Th.=. Church in Lutterworth 's "New Direct ion::; in Th·~ologv" ser ie:.:; 
tooh: a broader view in setting the developing W .C.C. 
ecclesiology against the background of more traditional models. 
ii. Exposition. 
The first major- featut-e of the theology of the VJ .C.C. is 
that the term "mission" refers in the first place to what God 
is doing in the world at large, and not to something the 
Church is sent to do, as it were, to the world on God'::; behalf. 
This position differs from the theological affirmation of 
secularizatl.on we :.:;aw in Coz, who wnnted to retain lsomewhat 
problematkally, as we .:1rgued in the 
that the secular world was somehow 
theological rationale, still seen in 
last chapter) the idea 
incomplete without its 
a fairly neo-Orthodox 
manner as given to the world. Williams ::;ees a "radical shift in 
focus" to a posi ticm Hhere "the v1orld ::;et:.:; the agenda!' quite 
unambiguou:.:;ly CWiEiam:3, 1969:ch.l.1. 
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This is because God's mission is before all else one of 
"humanization". It is a matter of bringing about the conditions 
in the world whereby mankind can come to enjoy the full 
potentialities of their creation and calling. "The vision of the 
ultimate reconciliation and unity of the whole of creation in 
Christ" <'Williams, 1965 (a) :27) interpreted chiefly as the 
breaking down of all those walls of partition which do harm to 
the prospect:3 of a manifestation of the family of man. The 
mission of God is therefore thoroughly secular, and also 
political, in the sense that it concerns public, social-
structural and material issues and not merely private and 
interior dispositions <cf.Metz, 1969:114>. 
Having established the priority of mission as God's work 
in the secular field, the Council's theology goes on to conceive 
of the Church's role as participation. M . M. Thomas, a 
Asian theologian, writes: 
The work of Christ in his Kingdom is discernible ill the 
secular and political revolutions of C"Ji' time, and ... the 
~hurch's function is to discet•n it and ~~itness to it 
and, .. 'to participate in God's work in a changing world' 
( Th•)mas, 1968) . 
The Uppsala Assembly of 1968 put it this way: 
Do missionary priori ties place the church alongside the 
defenceless, the abused, the forgotten, the bored? Do 
they allow Christians to enter the concerns of others, to 
accept theit' issues and their structut'es as vehicles of 
involvement? Are they the best situations for discerning 
11ith other men the si•jllS of the times, an•j for moving 
11ith history towards the coming of the new humanity? 
Passages like this, which abound in the published documents of 
the 'W.C.C., exhibit certain frequently recurring r-hetorical 
turns of phrase. The mission of Christ is characterized in 
terms of "struggle". The Church is called upon to "discern what 
God is doing in the secular". It is to be wherever the new age 
is "emerging". It must allow its forms to "develop around the 
shapes of thA wor-ld's need". 
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The model for the Church which fits this theology of 
participation is that of the servant of the world. The Church 
pos,3esses no independent or specialized status of its own, but 
must simply be prepared to adjust and adapt to changing 
situations as the need requires. For example, wherever 
organized action is occurring designed to gi V(• a dis privileged 
or oppressed group an opportunity for creative responsibility 
for their destiny for the first time, m- a movement is under 
to reconcile two previou,;l y warrinE, a.nd mutually 
C'.u:::.piciou:c; • 1 SOC1.3 . .c groups, there one should to find a 
group of Chri:stian:=o organizing it::;elf into an effective agency 
for offering the resources of Christ to the new situation. 
Williams writes characteristically: 
It 11/•)Ul•j seen, that if the church is to be the servant of 
God's mission, it must (like Christ) be sensitive to the 
points of disjunction in the ~'·=·dd, 3.nd be so st!·uctul·ed 
that it focuses the obedience •)f the Christian community 
:1+. these points •Jf need (Williams, 1%5(a):::1J, 
In contrast to the traditional, static definitions of the 
Cbun:h in term:=> of certain "marks" or "notes", or a:=o the 
community where the \tlord is preached and the :3acraments duly 
administered, in this theology the Church only become:3, 
properly, Church "where the people of God are taking :3ervant 
shape around the needs and hopes cf the world- as servants of 
Chri,=ot and therefore as servant of men" 1\tlilliams, 1969:31>. 
This Servant Church may simply have to "be there" before 
it can decide or dare to speak a word. It mu:3t be free for the 
mis,3ion of "Christian presence in the new ::;hape:3 of human 
exi:=otence in the :3tructures of o•ll- tim<=>" (\lilliams, 1961):114; 
cf. on "being ibid:12, ') n.<-.i, and Cox, 1969:104'. This 
silent presence is itself a form of secular engagement, because 
it is directed towards understanding: 
~le O\I.JSt be the listenin•J d!'l''ch bef•)''e ~·e <:~.n be the 
speak in•:J church. We must discern the shapes oi need a.nd 
hope before we can take the shape of se!'Va.nt love and 
before we can point with any accuracy to the hidden wor~ 
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of Christ as he conLinues to work in history now 
(Williams, 1%'3::3"2!, 
Further, the Church h; in no way to be concerned about 
its own numerical increase. The ancient dictum, extra ecclesiam 
nulla salus, must be reformulated in a secular age to express 
the truth thot, in the? Chur·ch, God has given to the world B 
community whose task is to spell out to it, and in its own life 
embody before it, the true nature of the salvation which is 
even now being manifested in the world at large. 
Hence the mode of the Church's witness is invariably one 
of pars pro toto, in which the size of the "pars" in relation 
to the whole of a society is a historical and cultural 
variable, and in no way relevant to the essence of the mission. 
Neither the medieval corpus Christianorum nor the pr-esent-day 
diaspora situation is to be taken as a norm. Neither, after all, 
is a function of the proe;res::; of God's secular mis:3ion, nor of 
the extent of th,::, dissemination of salvation. The purpose of 
the fe1·;, if it be a fev1, being elect is solely that the many 
may be saved, which is by no means the same thing as joining 
the Church (H.R.Weber, 196:3; Williams, 1966:101-3). 
In view of these considerations, it is not surprising that 
Williams prefers the New Testament images of the Church as 
light, yeast and salt, to those speaking of aliens and exiles, a 
pilgrim people on a passage to a different world. For the 
"separated" life of the Church, represented in its traditional 
forms, is only secondar-y and preparatory to its life of 
servanthood and engagement CWilliams, 1965 <b) :38ff). 
ln addition, he gives more weight to the "yeast" image, 
which is to do with change and hidden transformation, than to 
"salt", which concerns rather the preservation sound and 
wholesome of vfhat already is <Williams, 1969:142-6). The 
preservation of past forms after they have become almost 
wholly dysfunctional has done :3erious damage to the Church's 
ability to engage ·~onstructively with the secular mission of 
God. Foe 
2~3 
The church is the church as it is renewed day by day, 
dying to the limited forms of the world's past and rising 
to the freedom of serving Christ as he opens up the 
world's future (ibid;49), 
The emphasis on dysfunctional structures clearly relates 
to the background of all the World Council's thinking in the 
ecumenical movement.' However, the feature most prominent in 
williams' analysis is a :::.trong ::;tatement of the inadequacy of 
the locally-based re:.;idential congn~gation f<Jr the fulfilment 
of the Gospel mission, as :::.ecularly understood, in the 
contemporary social situation. There are at least three reasons 
for this inadequacy. 
Firstly, it 1:::. 3rgued that the geographical parish no 
longer reflects in any meaningful way the actual clusters and 
configur-ations of communal and associative attachments within 
which people live their daily lives." This is the reason for 
the development of a range of "para-church" agencies such as 
Boards fm- Social Re::;ponsibility or Mission and Unity, 
industrial, ho:3pital, prison and other •::haplaincies, and 
institutions and academies for the provision of study and 
discussion resources in the new specialized areas confronting 
the Church. Nevertheless, say::; Williams, "the real church is 
still looko~d upon as the local church" <1965(a):8), a situation 
which will not do. 
For secondly, local residence congregations are 
increasingly divided along class, racial or other cultural 
lines. They testify in their segregated lifestyle and mentality 
to precisely those worldly "separations" which it is the claim 
of the Gospel to destroy: 
Does not a chw·ch pattern which st1·uctures Christians 
within residence communities tend to deepen those worldly 
separations rather than bring the uniting reconciling 
po~er of Christ to bear in such a way that these worldly 
baniers collapse and Chl'ist's ultimate pu1·pose is 
revealed? (ibid;2S; cf,3-12), 
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A third ground for distrust of the residentially-based 
structure is that it highlights the isolation and privatization 
of the nuclear religious community brought about by structural 
diffen'.=ntiation. Fm- the religious group, feeling itself 
threatened by marginal status and the encroachments of a 
:=.ecular culture, r-eacts by preserving its distinctivem~s::c; by 
means of an increasingly strict, if implicit, set of criteria 
for belonging tMatthes, 1966). 
For example, it may be that certain groups in society are 
subject to a greater degree of marginality than others in terms 
of their exclusion from the secular, material and economic 
prou~:3::::.es which make up the "heart" of society- the elderly, 
married women, young children, members of unprestigious, old-
fashioned middle-class occupations. Such marginal groups, being 
strongly reprf~sente.d in church congregations, will be 
classified by society at large as "more likely to be religious". 
ThP c:ongresation which is thus composed will then perpetuate 
this state of affairs by the way in which it unintentionally 
defines the requirements for "being a good Christian". 
Th•"re is, then, in the theological position we have been 
examining here a far-reaching "follow-through" from 
of mis:::.iolot;ical 
organizational 
a::;ainst four 
cri.tical impact 
of t-eligion and 
n=:.~onstruction into the reordering 
church life. Our task now is to raise questions 
areas of this analysis, arising out of the 
of our sociological understanding of the nature 
the processes of secularization. 
Critique. 
'vJe begin by questioning the wholesale reinterpretation in 
secular-::;ocial terms of the salvation offered in the Go::;pel, 
whkh stem::; from the Council's decision to define mission at 
the outset a.:=. God'::; humanizing work in the ::;ecular arena.. The 
New Testament presents salvation in terms of a tension between 
cK<:.:8;np"Li::O:ned. fact and yet-to-be-consummated reality.'' There i::; 
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a persistent polarity between the present confrontation of 
individual persons with the Gospel in a summons to repentance, 
and the eschatological dimension of the salvation of the whole 
creation, issuing in the "new heavens and new earth". Th Lo 
polarity provides no precise place for salvation achieved 
through secular structures, although of course this is fRr from 
saying that the salvation of persons does not entail a 
commitment to the criticism 3.nd alteration of 
structuJ.-es. 
Williams i:o; not unaware of this problem. He warn:o; of two 
danger:o; inherent in J:~is secular missiolosy: the Church may 
simply be defined as wher.:::<.'et God's redeeming work L=. being 
done, regardless of the presence or otherwise of explicit 
Chri:3tian faith, and the "equivocal character" of the o;igns of 
Chri:3t's presence in the world ..-rill fai.l to be noticed. We cc-.n, 
he says, misuse Christ's gift, turning the opportunity into 
"demonic direr::tion:o;" (V!illia;n:3, 1965(b):41-2). However, Williams 
does not develop thLo; point. On his own previously esbblish•=·d 
terms he cannot do so: for the underl:ring commitment to 
"religionlessness" and approval of secularizatiou would have to 
be modified by such a development. 
But we would argue that the Christian perspective insists 
that we not only can but will misuse the gift-=, offered by 
Chri:3t via the medium of secular progress, Every movement to 
realize salvation in present, this-worldly term5 1:3 "end-
stopped" at some point by the rebarbative insufficiencies of 
humanity spoken of in religious language as "sin". It make5 no 
difference if the causes of such imperfections of behaviour are 
them:3elve::3 held to be structural rather than :o;omehow "innate 
in human nature". For alternative, "les:o; :3inful" strw-:tural 
arrangements must still be mainta.ined by some appa.ratus of 
authority, entailing the risk that the cycle of exploitation and 
injusti•-=:e will begin again: "La revolution devore ses enfctnts". 
These dilemmas of a secular-,=-;ocial interpretation of 
salvation lead us to raise questions in a second area, which is 
that of what precisely it is for which the Church is 
specialized. What contribution do Christians bring, in their 
activities of participation in the secular mission of God, 
which ne·~es:=-;ito.te•=· "';peakin?, of thein=· as a distinctive 
influence at all? The World Council of Churches' Division of 
World Mi,:-:;sion and Evangelism, meeting in Mexico in 196:3, 
confessed its difficulty with just this issue: 
lf the rest•}J·ati•)ll and 1'econc1liation of human life is 
be1ng achieved by the action of God through secular 
agenc1es, ~·hat is the place and si•]nif1ca.nce of faith? If 
lhe church is to be wholly Involved in the world, and its 
histoi'Y, 111h~.t is the true natul'e •)f its sepuateness7 We 
11•ere able to state thesis and antithesis in this debate, 
but we could not see our way through to the truth we feel 
lies beyond this dialectic (quoted Williams, 1965(bl:34l, 
The unpopular "way thr-cugh", which the radical theologians 
were unabl'" to :=-;ee because of their prior theolosical 
•::ommitment:3, mu:::ot be that in a secular ,:-:;ociety the Church is 
primarily special h·~d fnr religion. But once this is properly 
under,::;tood, a.::; we have argued the radical::; did not understand 
it, the reasons for rejecting such an answer begin to fade. For 
the Church, by its d tual pl-ovision, its sacred symbolism, its 
teaching mini,3try and, 
re•3ponsibl•:' for guarding, 
indeed, its 
fostering 
mere 
and 
presence, 
inculcating 
is 
a 
distinctive orientation to the world which it believes to be 
essential for creative human thriving. 
This puts the Church's incursions into the realm of direct 
social action into rather a different light. They are entirely 
justified in t:enn:=o of the re:::;ponse of the Gosp•-::1 to perceived 
need. But they ought to be conceived as temporary, emergency 
projects, designed to fill the breach until the secular society 
assumes its proper responsibility of providing a 
prof•?S•3ionally ,:-:;pe•:::ialized .c,_nd adequate asency to supply the 
need in question. This is by no means a defence of shoddy work 
and dil:c:t!:a.ntishn·~'"'s in th•? Church',=-; engagement with soci.al 
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is:;ues (cf. Anderson, 1984). lt simply says something about the 
theological spirit in which projects should be undertaken. 
For example, a church-sponsm·ed local community 
programme to help the unemployed might quite properly be 
dubbed "amateur" in a sense devoid of the (-:on notations of 
"amateurisbnes::;". For such a project to assume an air oi 
pc:~rmrH1enc<? and prof<":'s:=; ional a 11-'~uffi·~ien•-;v .-::ou ld <?n•: •:Jut·.3ge the 
:=;ecular authorities to abdicate responsibility for ~::1•:• material 
roots of the problem. They could "l•?ave it to tl"J'C' voluntary 
bodie:=;, ::;ince they're doing such a good job". ln that ·~ase, the 
Church would forfeit its right to go on criticising the secular 
i'Owers in th>'! nome of the tran::;cendent vi=oicm of the Goo:c.pel. 
Needl•?s::; to :313.Y, thi::; point of view doe::; not envisage o. 
time when there would no longer be any such emergency projects 
for the Church to undertake. There will alv-1ays be those about 
l'lthom no-one el·:;e care:::: .. Even areao:c: of need one>~ '="Ji"?lied, it 
adequai:elv by :=;ecular 
::=:t=:riou::; sign::; of lar:=-k of provision a~::. -the secula_:- ·-;ociety'·3 
inevitable failings begin to emerge. But we are simply claiming 
that thi:=; kind of attitude to the Church'::; :=;ocial obligations 
surely belong::; to the logic of accepting ::;eculari:~a.;;ion as a. 
fruit of the Gospel. 
Meamd1ile, every local church will have a suificiently 
dr"manding ta,=ok in fulfilling its specifically religious ::;ervi•:::e. 
This involv~s the continual celebration, ·~xplor·ation o.nd 
commenda. t ion of that god ward orientation 
cultural confusion will continue to spread, mo~~ or less 
subliminally, within the community, follow~d by the atrophy of 
buman potential. If the idea of enterint; a church fo:· a service 
of worship is a very alien thing to mo·:;t people in o pari:::;h, 
the Christian re:=opon·=;e should not be to t-etain U::.t for the 
few who have acquired the taste for it, and concentrate instead 
u;:·on '\;e,.::ular" iorm:=; of out.rea(::lt to th•~ r.:est. 
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Radical theology answered thi:=> question mainly in terms 
of the shortcomings of the residence congregation, and it is to 
this that we turn for the third aspect of our critique. We have 
•:::ertainly to grant the charge of inertia and unproductiv•e> in-
;:;r-oup fightin;;'; arnor\~ many :=>uch •:::ongregations. But we cannot 
a•:cepl: 1:h>? ·c;imnle di.3;;o;nosi:=>, that the failun~ of residence 
":o;tructures'' to refl·~·-=t contemporary patterns of social life is 
Willi.":!.nrs, like Ccn, i_:::, keel! to wel·-::mne. 
The forminc; .3.:-ounc. a. 
need whi(::h are ~nv i:=-a.ged by Willi-3_rr..::; Bnd the W .C.C. a.ppear to 
b<C'tray a ::o.till more cuestional::le potential than the :o;tructures 
they ar•? int.en(1ec to reploce. It is that of an eliti::;t, two-
•:;lass Christic.nity, a:=> :o;ome of the "p8rables of missionar7 
::Jbedience'' listed (e ·3 .88-9). 
non-re=~identially 
pre:c"O:=>•.rre group. which i:=> really "where the action i:;". 
Against this, we set the parish arrangements which 
-?ncourage the 1nea1 of a.ll. Chr·i.stian~; in .3_ given geographical 
area worshipping and witnessing together Cat least in the case 
of the Church of England). These arrangements remain in 
principle the basis for a powerful counter-trend to the 
specializ~tion and s~gregation of Christians along other lines. 
majcrity are not. Tht"Jre is room, in fact, for the distinctive 
v1i ~ne:=:=; of 'the mLced lo=al congt-egatioa, whose boundaries are 
fluid, and thc2 profe·:;:o;ionally specialized ministri8~c:. ::;pon·o;ored 
by the antecedent institutional face of the Church. 
For- the Churo:;h b:::J.s ;; dual lev,:l of en8agement, both ·-:ith 
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latter, a strong sense of "membership" is required, giving 
expression to the critical over-against ness of the Gospel. But 
for the former, it is a sense of "the parish" which takes 
priorl.ty: the Church is conceived as being of, for a.nd in the 
community it serves, without clear boundaries with it <Wickham, 
1966). To b·~ sure, every local congregation will have it:co "core" 
of more explkitly, overtly committed people, which ·~auld be 
construed as an inevitabl·~ kind of '?lite. But., unlike the 
action-groups proposed by Williams, in this •:::a:coe the diale•:::t.ic 
between critical commitment and community acculturation is 
upheld within tbe congregation, and not destroyed by the 
eztraction of the "engaged" :3ub-group:s from it. 
These observations encroach upon questions which will 
receive further attention in the next chapter. But for now, our 
final criticism of Williams' position is a rather more general 
one.Throughout the radicals' proposal:3 in this area, we note a 
failur-e to acknowledge the sheer implicatedne::::.s of Church a.nd 
Christian faith in both negative and positive fruits of 
i.ttternpts to embody the Gospel in social term:o;. Willia.m:3 and 
the W.C.C. tend to write as though it w·~re po::;::;ible to 
reconstruct the role of the Church from "scratch'~, or to 
adjudicate upon its past performance from a position of 
present detachment. But this is not so. 
In the case of secularization itself, the same set of co-
ordinates out of which emerged a prodigious programme of 
humanization, !3uch that the modern 'We:3t as:3umes as of right 
standards of living and criteria of humane behaviour undreamed 
of a few centuries earlier, ha:3 also made religious faith so 
problemati•:; that the cult.!n-a l ba·3i·::; of that 'Hhole ?fOiFamme 
now comes under threat. 
What we most value and what we most abhor are so closely 
interwoven .and even interdependent that the Church ought at 
least to think very carefully before remodelling its structures 
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along the lines of some emergent social pattern hastily 
interpreted as an epiphany of the coming Reign of God. This is 
not an argument for always leaving things as U,ey are. The 
Church is very good at that, but it is also inclined to 
conceive of change in terms of adaptation to prevailing social 
trends. Neither way 1s in keeping with the transcendent 
orientation of the Christian message. The Church has a charter 
to care, to unders':and, to cr:iti.cLc;e, to explor-<~ alt"'rnative::;, 
but not neces:;;arily just to be up-to-date. It must retain some 
le·lerage. wi tbjn its insti tutiona.l make-up, fo:- delaying the 
baptism of each new secular candidate for the status of social 
embodiment of the Gospel. 
ln the remainder of this chapter, we look beyond the 
bounds of the writing:;; of Williams and the W.C.C. for further 
thinking about the potentialities and limitations involved in a 
contemporary reconstruction of the Church's mission. 
2. The Possibilities and Constraints of a Secul3r !rfission .. 
1. The Avant-garde of God? 
Harvey Cox outlines the general theoretical ::;tructure of 
an ecclesiology in chapters 5 to 7 of The Secular City. It is 
set in the context of his concern to exhibit the historical 
sweep of secularization as the concretization of the Gospel. 
Therefore, it takes up the problem of the need for a continuing 
religious agency in a society where the desired process- the 
coming of the Secular City of Man- appear::o to be occurring 
anyway. 
That is why Cox :3ays that a theology of :3ocial chan;se 
must precede a theology of the Church. Such a theology is 
required, and so is the Church, in order to avoid two opposite 
errors: the removal of the concerns of religion and the idea of 
God':3 activity entirely out of t:he :;;ocio-polit:ical a_rena on the 
on-=: r1and, a.nd the indi-=ocr-iminate identification of .=dl manner 
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of human projects with the work of God on the other (Cox, 
op.cit;119-120). 
Cox claims that hi:; us·~ of "secular city" as an 
interpretive image for contemporary social change is analogous 
to the way the coming of the Kingdom of God is understood in 
the tradition of sich real isierende Eschatologie. lt is an 
''emer::c;c'ni: reality", the final fulfilment of wbi·::h olw.:tys lie:3 
b·~yora:J an-J t•::>mpor.:d hm·izon, awl ·:::oni:air.s potentialities not 
not entirely with the fully-fledged theological 
affirmatjrm of se•:•Jla!'i::ation -!:hat Cox 1·1as eager- to •:::onvey in 
+he earlier part of his book. 
Against this background, Cox proposes four elements of a 
theology of social change, which together lay out an agenda for 
the •:::hurches: 
actirm fer change i::; nO I·/ neces:::;ary. lt a.chieved by 
preaching into the ''critical gap" between aspects of the 
prevailing ord·~r and that which is promised, a.nd cov<=n nm1 
beginning to appear. In effect, it is a call to repent. 
The interpretation of "catalepsy" means unmasking the 
c-easons v:hy people in fact fail to act in order- to enter upon 
their rightful inher i t.ance in the Gospel. It is a pror:-:es:3 of 
removing the "faL:;e consciou:3ness", or "bad faith" which 
prevent::; them from perceiving the truth (ibid:129-30> .'' 
The "ca. thar::; is" i:3 an interpretation of con ve:·::; ion, 
wherein .:, man "co;nr~s to bims·~lf" and se•~::; ·~h•arly for the 
fir-s~ time, a~:=:::3U1ning hi~, r8:~pou:.=.ibility in the world. 
The "cata:=.trophe" is the coming of the new order which 
results from men and women engaging creatively with their 
a.dul t callinr; undpr- God. 
According to Cox, the Church is now called u~on to 
perform these actions because the process of secularizatio~ h~s 
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set in motion the ongoing social changes which are needed for 
people to be able to change their view of the world (ibid:132). 
In other word:3, the Church must see to it that the great 
opportunity does not pass the world by. It must prevent the 
newly emerging technopolitan clas:3es from falling away from 
the liberty they are beginning to grasp. It must tell the worLj 
what the time is <cf. Wieser, 1968), and interpret the signs, 
so that people are enabled to enter into the freedom and 
fulfilment which modernity offers to them. 
The Church, thet~efore, is "God':3 avant-garde", a term Cox 
borrows tram Hoekendijk. It achi,::ves this calling in three 
wa.ys: 
Kery·g1na means proclaiming, in effect, Cox's ver:3lon of 
Gogarten's secularization theology of the Ga:::;pel-given freedom 
of man. 
Diakonia means working to make whole the character and 
community of the emerging city: for example, the Church must 
involve itself in potentinl problem-areas such as race-
relations and homelessness. 
Koinonia means the Church's demonstration in its own 
common life that the message of the Kingdom is true. 
Additionally, the exercises the ministry of 
"cultural exorcism", which consists in combating the malignant 
persistence or re-emergence of sub-Christian tribal or small-
town mt~ntalitie:3 and structures in the secular city, and easing 
the passage of the people successfully into th•:'! city's 
rewarding new lifestyle. 
Cox's Church i:3 therefore both a sign set up before men 
of what God is bringing to pass in the world at large, and a 
midwife assisting at the birth of the new, and ensuring a safe 
and speedy delivery. Cox is very slightly more equivocal than 
Willia.ms about the interpretation of secular social a<:::tion as 
the prior mi::;::;ion of God in the world. Fot~ he permits to the 
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Church the dual role of simply pointing out and interpreting 
what i:3 going on, and, as the need arises, putting it right 
when it threatens to deviate from God':3 intentions. But there 
is no room in Cox's analysis fm- the Church's dual role to 
extend to resisting aspect:3 of the ad vance of modernity. 
The activites itemised by Cox under the notions of 
catalysis, catastrophe are an 
important c;urnmary of the Church's ::::r-itica_l functions. But Cox 
only s;~e3 them as operating in ord21- ~,o awaken men to their 
destiny in the emerging new age, whereas we should want to sav 
that they •:"ln also operate to tree men from a fal:3e fixation 
upon the supposed merits of that age, treated as absolutes. The 
critical pr-ocess works both ways. 
Moreover, Cox is teo much cf a "cata:3tr-oohist" in 
:3upposing that existing Christian communi ties can be propelle::!. 
abruptly into this new understanding of their role. Fer-, a:::. vie 
have :-=:.aid earlier, the operation of these crit i•:::a l funct io~-= 
remains dependent upon the persistence of certain tra<:li tiono.l 
continuities which grant confidence and stability. 
This deficiency in Cox is symptomatic in the brief fourth 
part of The Se•:::ular City, entitled "To Speak in a Secula:--
Fashion of God": he concludes that fm- the present we may have 
to remain unable to use the word "God" at all, but does not 
consider the possibility that the sacred symbolism .-+i 11 Ov.:-.J....L 
present in the Chu!'ch 's visible life and liturgy- its actual 
religious being- may offer a.ny help. 
We have to luoli elsewhere, theP~fore, for a trea.tm<::;nt of 
the realities the Church must face in any attempt to revitalise 
its missionary activity. 
ii. Th<" Church of the Diasoora'~ 
Cogley draws upon some ideas of Karl Rahner in s~tting out th~ 
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choices facing the churches. We must accept, he argues, that 
the forces of modernity threaten religious faith in such a way 
that we must fight to maintain it. It is simply not possible 
for all that secularization entails to be enlisted by the 
believer as gain. 
Secondly, we must also accept the corning of a specialized 
''dia.::opora" Church, which is to say a. minority of worshippers 
c>:,=,ttered tbroug~1 the community. The clergy can expect no 
:x-- i.vileged statu:3; Church and Stat•o. vii ll agree on some :3ort of 
p•o.-::.c:eful co-exi::;tence which v1i1l inevitably leave the Church 
Pither compromised or limited in its activities to some extent. 
l t i.s necessary for the churches to face and come to terms 
v:i.th these fact::; before they can hope to develop a re:3ponse 
which embodies o dialectical relationship of co-operative 
engagemr~nt with, and critical dista.nce from, the social tasks 
called fm-th by the secular SO<~iety. 
We should note that this aoes not mean a spirit of 
wearied resignation to a.n Rahner 
di:otingui:3hed, in this connection, ,3_ ~~at•~gory of things whi • .:;h 
"ought not to be", yet "must be" (cf.McBrien, 1966:124ff; 
William:3, 1969 :25-<)) . The contemporary Church's diaspora 
situation "ought not to be", in the sense that it appear::o to 
contradict God's ultimate purpose of bringing all men to 
salvation through Christ by allowing many to live out their 
liv,~s with neither contact with living faith nor real interest 
in Christianity. But the historical and sociological causes 
which have led to the pre::oent ::oituation are so compelling that 
we have to conclude that for the limited present purposes of 
the history of salvation, Gort wills that it must be so. 
The "acceptance" that is called for is treated by Adolf:3 
as part of a "keno tic" model of the Church. He believes that 
the r;hur.:;b needs to make a cons•:ious decision to choose the 
b~notic wa.y, which means renouncing all pretensions to social 
pr,~::;tige or exp•?•:tation:c, of the right to dictate to societ:r or-
"lord it over it", as well as all fashionable attempts at 
"adaptation" which may mean the loss of distinctive religious 
content:=>. The kenotic Church may have to be content simply to 
"be there", serving and witnessing and continuing to symbolize 
the transcendent, riding out the storm, so to speak, and 
awaiting the pcx3:3ible \.but not guarant•:oecl) reappearanc·~ of a 
more widespread cultural dissemination of religion at the other 
side of th•~ crisi:=; (Arlolfs, lC)\',7:·~h.4l. 
These proposals offer a temperate analysis of the mood or 
spirit in which contemporary Christian social engagement wi.U 
have to be undertaken. They combine an acknowledgement of The 
need for the s•~cular relevance and ·;erv i:cz; aspe•::i:s of mL3sion 
with an emphasis upon the continuing strength of thCC> Cburc:h ':=; 
in::;titutional resource~:;, its religious culture, in a tim~~ of 
smaller congregations. We would put together tbe:=;e emphases by 
saying that the key to the Church's secular mi:=;::;ion l .. ~ ·~ a 
proper understanding of it:=. religion, a.nd that the :mdertaki:c;:, 
of that mission depends upon a gr3ciou~ acceptance of the very 
n~.:tl constraints under which it labour·s at the pn~:::;•":J.t tim·~: 
constraint:=; which were al:=;o present, but too often not. tak·~n 
into account, in the sixties. 
iii. Conclusions: the Rejuvenation of Religion? 
The contemporary situation of the Church, as som<:othing 
that "must be" although it "ought not to be", qualifi•:>s th•:o wav 
in which the Church pursues the "ought to be" which 1::; the3 
ultimate goal of its rni:3sion. For the :=;ecular a.nd r·eli;;ious 
elements belong inseparably together in the '= 'Jncept of 
salvation which the Church proclaims. However, 
circumstances, certain ways of expending the Church's energies-
for example, undialectica.lly political ones- would be ultimately 
wasteful. 
This mean::; that, when we argue that the Chur·ch 's 
obligation is squarely to do with the promotion of religion, we 
a claim can seem to imply. We have to be prepared to meet the 
cry of John Vincent about the effect of the typical "religious" 
sermon upon its habitual hearers: 
The congre•Jation dispet·ses with a sense of uselessness, 
of the futility of d•)ing anything, 'Salvation' must be 
somethin•J completely utll'elated to the ordinary business 
of livin•J. I have decisions to make, responsibilities to 
fulfil, kindnesses to show; I have my wt·etched temper to 
control, my kids t.o try to do the best for. the man ne;d 
doo1· to try to tt•eat as a. nei•JhboUI'. And none of it 
t'eally r.1atters basically, None of it has anythin•:; to do 
\llith 'salvation'.,. It seems to be about nothing, And I 
can't do anything about it, Have faith? But that isn't 
easy, For me to have faith would be hard work- and we are 
not supposed to rely on 'works', .. 
Thus has many a congregation 
unchangeable mass that conf r•)nts 
196S: 28-9) , 
become the stol:d, 
the prea.cher (Vincent, 
Later, Vincent suggests that one reason, at least, for 
declining congregations is sheer boredom: churchgoing just 
give:3 people nothing to do, no real challenge to take up, and 
is somehow not expected to make any difference to anything 
el::;e (ibid:33-4). Obviou::oly this i:::; not the v1hole ::=;tor-y about 
the contemporary decline in official religious participation, 
but it is important at least from one point of view. 
For in an age with no coherently Christian milieu and 
fewer and fewer "socialized", habitual Christians, the more 
"evangelical" variety of conversion is likely to become, in one 
form or another, increasingly tht=> mode of individua.ls' entry 
into active church life. This mode of conversion induces, 
inevi ta.bly, high expectations that religious practice will 
change things, will be worthwhile, will present a task and a 
challenge. We end this chapter, then, with an attempt to 
describe the substance and the style of the action to which 
the Christian's religion must call him. 
Thi:3 ta::ok, beginning from its religious heart, which is 
emphaticall:f pnma.r y, involves the depiction, display and 
oroc tamation of a compelling world-view, oriented to the 
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tram3cendent and given it:=; shape by the radical alternative 
possibility for the world disclosed in Jesus Christ. Only a 
coherently thought out n~ligiou:=; world-view of this kind can 
combat the deleterious effects of a cultural secularization 
which is reducing persona.l and private sy:=;tem:=; of meaning and 
value to a range of fragmentary and ineffective soft option:=;, 
and eroding the pos:=oibility of many people attaining to any 
world-view or per::;onal ;:>l,Llosopby whatsoever. This wav there 
lies no prospect of salvation. 
The re::;ource::; of the Christian tradition are there to ::,e 
drawn upon by believers as a living reality through the cycles 
a.nd symbol::; of their practi·:::e of faith, in hm1ever uncertain 
and compromised a fashion they do this. 
But the ::;arne believ·~rs also live in the midst of the 
world, about v1hich they are called to be unremittingly and 
co1npassionately realisti~:. The Christian vision, with its 
dialectical pattern of transcendence, offers the opportunity of 
such a combination of invol·Jement with distancing, compassion 
with clear-::;ightedne:3s. The Chri'=;tian'::; mis:=;ion vdll ah.,ray=· 
move between the polarities of the religious and secular (for 
one example of thi::; in practice, see Phipps, 1967 :64ff; 92ff). 
Great oatience and discrimination is required for the 
Chri:3tian to move betv1een these two poles, for the Christian 
way in the ::;ecular si tua.+:ion is 3.lways diffuse and indirect. 
But sometimes such sw:;ular involvement will lead to others 
coming to see how the Christian's vision of the redeemed world 
he sees in Chri:=;t really does make a practical difference to 
the way he ,::;onducts hi::; affairs, anrl to the possibilities h~ 
sees for persons in society. Then, a small step ha:3 been taken 
towards reversing the cultural debilitation in whkh cheapjack 
world-vi·~ws jo~-3tle in a mark8t free-for-all and critical truth 
counts for little or nothing. 
This twofold mission of direct witness to the saving 
vision which alone can transform human history, and indirect 
involvement through secular channels, has been termed by 
Charles Davis (1966 :70) the "two-pronged advance of grace". The 
ne>ligiou::; advance, involving explicit proclamaion of Christ .:md 
the summow:.; of men and women to personal faith, tak("::; 
priority. But the ::;ecular, involving the Christian in working 
tozethe:- \.,ri th all thos1=: o•' L good-Hill who desire to see E,:r-ea ter-
justice and human fulfi.lment, may well precede, a_s well as 
following frcrm, the rt~li3iou~~ movement of the mis:3ion. 
Only in this way can the Church face up to the reality of 
its own social marginality as a fruit of secularization, 
without resigning itself to a stance of undialectical 
confrontation and denunciation of the wor~ld. Only i.n thi:::: way 
can it begin to present a cogent critique of the faL:;e and 
harmful effects of secularization, rather than seeking to 
regain spuriou::; relevance by adapting to change a.t +' .. ne 
expense of the critical edge of its message. 
But we ~:;till need to relate all of thi::; to the faith of 
a•:::tual Christian believers moving in their social context, if 
talk of "critical edge" is to have any practical meaning. VI<> 
must therefore go on, in the next chapter, to an examination of 
the character and modality of faith which the Christian 
li'adical::; believed would be demanded by the requirement::; of 
maintaining Christian commitment in a secular context. 
NOTES 
l. on' these late1' developments, see the W,C,C.Ban·~kok Consultation of 1973, Salvation 
~. a~·j the commentary of the same title by Pauline Webb; on Nairobi~ Kepneth 
~~~. _Na1rob1 Narrat1yPA 1975i and for a summary of the 1ssues, n.J.b1der, 
'vangel1srn Salyat1on and ~PC!al Justlce, (Grove Books) 1977, 
2. In addition to Williams' books, this discussion has also dra111n upon Shinn t1a.n..:.. 
The Ne~ Humanism; Thung~ Jha Precarious Organization; 64-68; and the follollling 
uticles: R,Jeffl·ey, "No rrontier", in Frontier, 1967; .J,Matthes, "The Mi.ssion of the 
Congre9ation", Frontier4 1966: M.M.Thomas, "Issues C•)ncerning the Life·and liork of the Cnurch 1n a Revo1utionary World", The Ewmenical Review 1968; L.Newbigin, 
'Recent Thinkino on Christian Beliefs: Mission and Missions", fhe Expo5itary Time5, 
1977. -
3. The W,C,C, 's commitment to ecumenical advance means that in its think ina caroorale 
rhurch ir.·:olverne~t in secuLH evan•Jeiistic lniti.'ltJves assumes a vita! -111portance 
(l.hlliams, 1%6;105-6), It is the same world which is faced by all the churcr,es with 
all their cherished theological differences; and hence a fresh realtzation of the 
proper secular arena of mission cannot but aavance the cause of unity, Van den Heuvel 
even distinguishes the "secul~r· as a separate understanding of ecu~enicity 
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ll967;ch,6): unity arises out of the common task of serving God's secular mission of 
the Gospel, and will emerge as diverse groups of Christians seek together the 
appropriate sl1'uctures for accomplishing this, Unity comes through doin·~, and not 
primarily discussing, -
4, This is in keepin•] ll'ith the work of the French "l'eligious sociologists" in 
developing the concept. of the ":one humaine'' lBoulard, 1960), 
5, By grace we have been saved, yet 'lie still a'llait our redemption: ci, Ephesians 2:8 
and Romans 13:11; 2 Cortnthrans 6;2 and 1 Peter 1;9, 
6, Co~:'s insight here lrnks together the Marxian notl•)n of "bad fa;+.h' and the need 
for "conscienti:ation" to remove it, with the Biblical motifs of 'blindness", 
'deafness" and "hardnes;:; •Jf heart" as causes. of peofle's failure t.o:· re;~on•j to the 
Gospel when they hear it: Isaiah 6:9-10 and Mark 4:1 -1:3 et par; !s'lt:ih 29:10-11 and 
Romans 11 :8; .John 12:40; Acts 28:2.5-27, Cox's dialo•]ue with Mar:< wavers between the 
discipleship of a "libel'ationist" position, as he;·e, and something rather at odds 
with that, b11t much ~ore American, whHh is the commendation of a ki:;c d 1.mivers=l! 
entrepreneurialism as the oroper form of the Christian's sec11lar maturitv, 
CHAPTER XII: £FITICAL FAITH AND TRADITIONAL CONTINUITY. 
This chapter on the desir-e of Christian 
Radicalism for a more critical, open and creative e~pression of 
faith vii\:hin the ~hun=he·=;, in c"iCCordance with the I!IOOd of 8. 
~·· 1 Ot~ rnu·=h ·=on temporary r•"l i?;iou::; life 
c.:~. an unbeaJ.thy denial of t:hL; mood. Faith wa:=; con·:eived in 
Chri=;tiarE> in .o, ·-=;ta.t•C' of 
beca.ust~ they could not fuifil the strin3en-i: 
c:undi.tion:~ of belir~_f requir~d for memb~~rship. Ther~:::.fcre, there 
W3.:3 a desire to r.=.+:hink the nature of f.3i t:h and i 1::=:. opeL'ltion 
.,,::_thin the believin;:: community, in order to work out a. form of 
vrh ich could with the cultural 
conditions of the time. 
secularization this invites for the churches comes down to its 
fundamental sphere of application. That is, it relates to actual 
ChrL;ti.an belhO!ver::; seekin3 to live as Christians within the 
1 if8 of the Church a.nd their secular- •-::ommuni ty. The discus:::;. ion 
of-plies our so·=iological understanding of the distinctive 
feature::; of <::hur•::b-type and sect-type religious in:=;titution:3, 
ond of communal and z,:=;sociational styles of religio:c;ity, to the 
·:riti.-:::31 .3.ttempt J:r] put into a concrete, living conte::t whnt 
Li_oii•:a.l theology w.'i.nted to :c;11y about faith. 
focus ~n th~s c:hapter Nill o~=' upon l:he 
of Hon.3ld Gregor :~mith, offer·c; Chr-L;tian 
R.oriica.li:=rn's mo:=;t detailed anr. sub:;tantia.l attempt to e:q)ound 
the nature of foith and how it is lived within a secular 
=::ontczt. 
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1. Gresor Smith, Seqi],.1..[ Christianity and the Workins of Faith. 
i. General Observations. 
In bi:o; Introduction to Smith's posthumously edited and 
publLo,bed The Do•:::tri~ of God, Allan Galloway wrote that 
ttRonald Gregor :3rni tb m .. ~y well be the mo:3t important Enb·lish-
:=.peaking theolo3ian of this generation" <Smith, l9'70:'J). A 
As early as 19:37, he mad·~ the first English t~-.:mslation 
of Martin Buber's and Thou, a work who:o;e per:o;onali:o;t 
approach to the doctrine of God found wide influence, including 
of ~ourse as a sub-theme of HonPst to God. 
At :3CM Pres:3, he publi:c:>hed the EnglL3h ed:tion of 
Bonhoeffer's Letters and Paper:=. from Prison, and l''ent on to 
propose Bonhoeffet- as the clue to the formulation of a "this-
vtorldly tranSC('!nden.:::e" i.n his own book, The New Man, in 1956. 
Hi:=. 1960 work J .G.Hamann: a Sh.:dy in Christiar; ~:·:iste::J.C"" 
found in this neglected 18th century German phi!osopher ~ 
precursor of the contemporary reaction against pure empiricist 
rationalism in favour of an emphasis upon the existential 
reality of faith as lived out within the stream of history. 
As translator of some of the later works of KierkegaArd, 
Smith was also acutely aware of the need to preserve an 
inwardly unconditional, dynamic and critical faith without 
falling thereby into an ultimately unhealthy isolation from the 
objects of the tradition <as the Dane did in his hatred fo:-
"Christendom"). 
Smith was perhaps the only theologian associated with the 
radkal movement:3 of the sL{ties to benefit from a thorough 
immersion in the work of Bultmann, Gogarten and the whole 
anteced•:>nt traditions of dialectical and existentialist theology 
in Germany. Hi:3 'i'IOrk never lost the spirit of restle:3s 
·=.earching after the adequat•-'! ·~xpo:=.ition of the inner nature of 
L1ith a·c, e:cper ienced by the one who i:o; gripped "-1-- 1 . _l 1~ ... , wJ.11•....:n 
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already characterized his early work of Chri:;;tian spiri tua li ty, 
Still Point 094:3 > . ' 
A word is needed here in justification of the inclusion of 
Smith within the camp of Christian Radicali:;;m, :3in·=e a::; a 
highly sophisticated and serious theologian witl1 profound 
attachments to Continental thought he would appear to stand 
::;omewhat aport from those we have considered in detail up to 
now. Galloway i:.o. willing to de:;;r:;ribe him a:=. "the pathfinder of 
that movement in theolo11;y which culminated in the Hon~::ot tQ 
God debate" (Smith, 1970:10), but he hesitates to B8=·oci.3.te 
Smith too clo:sely with what lHe> Galls "a. b~-ash and rather :self-
satisfied tendency in much re,:;ent theolDgY" \ibid). He appear::; 
to have in mind the American deatb-Df-God episode, and 
possibly also Cox and the radical secularizers, s!nce he 
suggests that Smith's n.:tme became vlrongl y linked vli th theirs 
in virtue of the "accident" of the title of his SeculB.r 
Christianity.:· 
Neverthele::o:=., the subjects of Sm::.th'·::, es::oays and lect,Jre:=:., 
especially tho::;e collected in The Free Man (1969), :;ugge::;t 
Cwhen one looks also at the various occasions upon which they 
were delivered) that Smith was not unwilling to "move in tl1e 
circles" with which this thesis is concerned. 
He acknowledges these links in the Preface to Secular 
Christianity, and again toward::; the end of the boor~ where he 
criticises van Buren's The SPcular Meaning of the Gospel. He 
refers in Jhe UQctrine oL.G.Qri <123-4) to a radio dL':>.logue in 
which he took part with van Buren in 1966. He alludes to 
recent indi·::otions that the problems he is addre:;;s in 8 have 
been widely felt, and r'::'fers in pa.rtkular to Robin:;;on and 
\Villiam Hamilton (Smith, 1966:207). And he explicitly draw; 
attention in The Doctrine of God <37) to the relevance of his 
own reflections to "certain confused stirrings within Uu~ 
churches today". 
The threefold structure of Secular Christianity most 
neatly sums up Smith's abiding theological interest: the parts 
are entitled "Faith", "History" and "Secularism". We do not 
claim here to be offering a complete study of Smith's theology, 
but intend to focus our attention upon the first of these 
divisions. Smith'::; exploration of the stnJ•:::ture, content and 
ezperience of faith supplies a stimulating contribution to the 
debBtes of r.3.dical theolo::;y anci to their- cont'._nuin; relevance. 
Yle sha.ll noi: limit our di.scussion to the .Jrgumer.t :Jf Secular 
Chr-Lstianitv, bt.:t. :c:,hall dr.3.w upon Smitb':=o other wor-ks, 11ith 
particular reter<=>nce to his prog:-ammatic summary of his 
om;ition in I'he Fr.=..=. M.an 0:3'/-5'5). "Faith in a :3e·::-ular World". 
and to chapter- ~ of Th•'" Doctrine of God, "Faith and Do·:::trine". 
ii. Exposition. 
Smith's po:3ition may be put quite 
to the effect that faith is neither primarily an object, 
doctrine or -tra.dition, nor merely a :3ubjt=:ctive e:<p~rien<>~, but 
is thr-ough and f:h:-oush histor-ical. '.Vhat does thiE. mean? 
Smith make::; it clear that he is speaking of Christian 
f.J.ith, and that he considers it justified that the Christian 
faith soon cam~ to be referred to as simply "faith", or as "the 
faith"; that i=. to :3ay, it has a claim to be regarded as faith 
par excellence (Smith, 1966:25). He ::;ummarizes thus: 
What I am '5W:J•jesti.ng is that w= try to unde1·stand i~ith 
•)11 its o:;,•n terms, that is, in terms •)f how it has really 
come to be, how it has a1·isen. And a.bo• .. d. the basic nat•~re 
of this comtng-to-be I sr.Jg']est the1·e can be no d•:.:;bt: 
faith has always a1·isen ~s the response to historical 
event·,; \~:r,lith, 1%9;142), 
Thi::; relaUon of faith to historical events has to b.c: 
expounded in two ways. Firstly, faith only arises at all as the 
direct consequence of certain events in history, the historical 
message of God in Christ. This revelatory act of God in 
lli::;tory doe:=- not lie there a::; an object awa.iting di::;co'!ery, 
which might be under-stood and may or may not projrJce faith. 
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Rather, faith is what it enacts and generate::::;, so that the 
encounter with the histm-y as a. revealed message is already 
faith. ' 
Secondly, the ongoing form and content of faith continue 
to be taken from the same hi::::;torical event::;. The shape of 
faith'::::; outward life, the natun" of it:"; commitm•C"nts, the 
decisions it makes, are all ·=-on::::;t ituted by the originating 
historical reality (1966:26-81. 
Tlli::c; :~t==~=cnd ::c;ense :!.n 11hL:h f.:t.t tl1 i:::; historical 
hett:er under-stood j f we look more clo:=;ely at 
und<"r-:=;tdnding of "historicity". He i:•c-l.l:::; us that: 
History may be described as the fi~ld of human decisions, 
or m•1t'e precisely as my personal a.cting in makin·~ my 
world into the world which God desires of me,,, 
Hist•1ry is whod- men decide in the light d theit' self-
un•jet·standing (1969;143; 196&;126.1, 
may be 
Smith's 
It is peculiarly constitutive of man that he is a historical 
bein3, because he alone realize:::; him:;elf, con:::,truc;ts his v1orld, 
interprets his experience, through perpetual processes of 
choice and decision born of encounter witll other persons, 
reflection upon the past and projection of possible futures. 
History, for Gregor Smith, is not something going on "out 
there", into which a. man may or may not launch him:3elf. "Real 
history" is not a kind of meta-history independent of 
particular individuals, which can provide a mesh through which 
to sift the chaos of discrete events so that only the 
definitive meaningful pattern emerg•:;::; and what first appear:; 
unplanned and sha.p·~le:3::o rea:::.:=:;urlngly turns into a "grand 
design". "Rr~al history" 1s what happens to us, "as a per::;onal 
taslc which is to be reali:ced ever anew, in the multiple 
deci:3ions of our individual life and in the changing 
circumstances of our public and :;ocial exi:3tence" <1970:119, 
and :3ee the whole of ch.4;.. 
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In other words, the "happening" is not merely ::;omething 
imposed from without, about which we can do nothing: 
For the happening to you of a historical event happens as 
a p~rt of a continuing dialogue between your p1·esent and 
the whole of a past which is accessible to you. It is 
this dialogical element, the dialo•]ic of history, which 
is paramount 11%6;86-7; cf. Altizer, 1%8(,fJ:13f.l, 
Happening, encounter, interpretation, decision: history really 
is, Smith iw-:ist·:;, entirely open a.nd undetermined, and OtJr own 
r·~:3ponsibility. We are in hi·3tory, and make hi::;h:n·v, and are 
hi:c:tory: for there is no-one •?l::;e. This 1s by no mear,:3 to put 
i~mith in the death-of-God camp; rather, faith's ni::;toricity 
becomes the matrix for all talk of God, so that God cannot be 
conceptualized in isolation as an object, an impo:c:ition or 
addition to the human universe. 
It is the contribution of Christianity to have laid ban? 
and interpreted for man the proper meaning of his historicity: 
Man in his historicity is properly disclosed in Chris~1~n 
faith. It 1s the un1que and signal achievement 01 
Chr1stian theology to affirm man in h1s authentic l:fe as 
a free and responsible person (1970:141). 
Following Gogarten, Smith argues that justificatio::-t by fait~> 
means that man':3 being, so to speak, left with the world on his 
lLC>.nds L; turned from a potential nightmare into a vision of 
opportunity and hope. In Chr-ist God has set !orth th•~ 
pos:3ibility and promise of a new man, who lives without fear 
in the upt3.ke of his respon·:;ibilitie:3, ready to reco;sn::.ze that 
the war ld and it::; hi:3tory are hi::;. In this way secula.rization 
ma.y be :3eer: as a .fruit of the Gospel, though not ne:.~es::;arily 
individual instances of modernity <1966:15lff). 
For f:iith clings to its originating paradigm in Chri:3t, a 
jJaradigm whi·:::h include:; the Cross. Faith can never discard it:; 
h i::;torici ty by l·~apin;s ahead to a ::;upposed over-a.ll an:3wer· 
.l - - L : - -- - - ...J L.l~=:~ 1_. 1 u y a..uu what Hill inevitably come tc be. F3ith 
must operate on what it has to go on in the present moment, 
making its decisions for the now, dealing with the personal 
encounters. the demands and social. realities, which presently 
ris0 up before it. Faith meets those situations on the basis of 
~:h"' •:::ontinuing "di;:,logic of hL;tory", the "unity in relation" 
r or;;;•"d in the bel1ev·~r 's e:{perienc•" between th~:! material:3 of 
~r:·~ orisinai:ing traditic:!t ·">nd t:hro ·:::ontinuallv repeated and 
C•?newed commitment and trust (1966:44-46>. The power of those 
In pnnu~le, yes; thi' en•:J f"13s c•Jme 111 Chnst. 8•Jt als•J, 
pal·a~~,:~-·i[~~:.y, thi~ efl·j :·~ not ·~'ej~, we live :~·)UJ in the 
t i f;i e ·.~, ~ G ::; ;j I ~ p .~ ~. : ~ :-. c ·~ ·~! : t. h ~~ t;-? . ..,, ~~ r l d ! in \.1.1 hi c h by f :i i t. h 
~e ~J·: c:Jnt_ll~3!ly 've1·~:0~e ~he o!~ ~o,·ld 3nd live 
t•JUi.F•j; the new In tJ,Js sense then~ ~sa real futun~, 
111hich 1s POW •·ec•:O(~,,;z2•:1 by faith a:; the future which God 
offers, ir t.he con,olere humaniiv ll'hlCh he has already 
offer~j ;n Chri·;t \l9f.9:.'t:3.l, 
What umr~lusion:=: at-.o•J': the woridn8 of faith does Smith 
·:!13.W from t:1i::; under:=:.tar:di.~tg 01: it::; historicity? \tle wish to 
mak•" five point::;. Firstly, Smith treat:3 faith as a mode of 
e:zistence, a v.;e;_·.; of oelli~ i.n t~1e · . ..;orld, and 1~)!.-e-eminen-tly a.s 
fides qua ,_--:reditur. Hi~~ F~~·:::,pe,.:=-ti"'.re is that o£ one who finds 
."ind defin"~ what he has without objectifying it away into a 
ste~ile and alien thing. He quotes Carl Michalson, the American 
e:ci:3tentiaL:c:.t theologian: "Chri::;tian faith l::; not a teaching 
3bout but e:<:istence'' (Smith, 1970:76; 
cf.Michal:son. 1964:141. 
We ~eca!l tha~ Smith is concerned by hie notion of 
hi::;torical fa.ith to resctJe f.3.ith from being dichotomized into 
either' ex+er-na.li.zed a:c;sent: to an obJective corpus, or rlholly 
subjective 'lnd indiviriucHi::;tic f,~elin;s. In tlh" terms of thr~ 
traditional subdivision of faith into notitia, assensus and 
f'iducia, Sm i tb Le1.ieve::; that then~ ha::; been a damaging over-
upon assensu:=:, compounded by a m i::; leading 
I:?.!Tlf_'j_r·ica.1 i.-1·,_ -t. 
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At the Renaissance, the time of the sreat dis,:;overy of 
human autonomy, the power of reason and the beginnings of a 
historical understanding of existence, the Church made a 
disastrous mistake in responding with a massive reassertion of 
hetP.ronomous authority, st!-es:3in.~ the immutabl•'" givenness of 
dogma and the u:3e of c;ri teria of doctrinal as:3ent fm- judging 
the genuineness of faith <Smith, 1956:51ff). The Church and 
ci·;ilization~ as Smith put:~ ; + 
'· ~ ' 
not decisively altered by the Seformation. despite th>::> 
rediscovery of a radical doctrine of justification by faith. 
The resu] t. has been ever-increasing strains and tensions 
between what appear to be the public, official requirements of 
faith and the quality of faith-experience as a historical 
n'"ality available to would-be believen3. For many, the tension 
is resolved in the direction of a dama8·'"-limi ting exercise of 
"assent" whkh effectively seals off the compartment of faith 
from the intrw;iDn of a modern, critical reason, le::ot it wither 
a1·1ay under the as:3ault. S;nith •::all:3 this "fundamentali:3m", but. 
he is not thinking only of the extr~mt: conservati?·~ wing of 
Smith therefore insists, ::=;econdly, that d.octrine i:::. 
:s•c:condary to faith: "I rezard doctrine as ha.vinc; a real but 
limited function in the life of Christian faith" 09'70:25). The 
Christian should make every effort to acquaint him:o;elf with. 
and to comprehend, the documents, creeds and doctrinal formulae 
which go to make up his tradition. Without them the hi~:3toricity 
of his faith could po::o::3e:o;s neither- ·:ourJst.3.nce nm- any clear 
But the obedience of faith, and the demand with which it 
inexorably confronts the believer, is not firstly towards 
doctrines but towards a Lord who is encountered only under the 
shifting and non-negotiabl•'" patterns of !;istorkal ~xistence. 
The que:o;tion i::;, "How am l, how are you, r<':lat<=d to such pa::3t 
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events of th•~ Christian tradition? ... How am I related to past 
events for my eternal salvation?" (ibid:26). 
The traditions in themselves do not answer these vital 
que,c;tions. Put simply, we mc;y say that although they may be 
true, they are not yet the truth. To claim that they are would 
be once more to drive a theoretical wedge between the objective 
existence o1: certain ,c;o-called h istm-ical aci:uali ties or fa,~ts 
possessing an intt-insi.::: :c;alvific :cc;ignificaw:;e, and faith':::; 
interpretative appropriation of them. But today thi:3 i:=> 
preci,::;ely th•3 dichotomy that will rtot dr_c (cf. on thi:c; Smith's 
attitude to the Resurrection in 1966:97-106). 
It is bound to fall into either an alienated religion of 
uncritical assent to propm:;itions adduced to be somehow 
independent of evidence, on the one hand, or a desperate resort 
to a variety of modern cults and mysticism:c;, mercifully shorn 
of hi:c;torical particularity, on the other. A living faith that 
stands in critical relation towards the tradition out of which 
it live:3 .and upo:1 which it feeds, is in Smith's view the only 
viable option for the present time. 
Such a. faith, in the third place, cannot help but be a 
"faith seeking understanding". Thi:3 is because it i:c; pre-
eminently a historical event, in which the past history and the 
glimpsed future come together in personal acts of obedience 
and decision. The one who ha:::, faith knows that he lives, acts 
and thinks under the constraint of a paradigmatic set of 
events which drive him to understand himself, his historical 
cont,~xt and hi:s world in the light of them; and the object of 
such a proces:3 of understanding extend,c; to the traditional 
forms themselves in which the faith is ex~ressed: 
Faith is recognized as both illuminating man's pre-
reflexive self-understanding and as guiding man's 
reflection upon his new ec<istence in faith, Faith, 1n 
b1·id, becomes material for ri'1an's 1·eason to wod~ upon and 
can be regarded as the substance by which man's essential 
rationality is displayed 11970:73), 
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Whereas the retreat into subjectivism represents the 
embrace of irrationality, those types of orthodoxy for which 
propositional assent is primary partake of the wrong lcind of 
rationality. It is a heteronomous kind, based upon the 
a:3:3irnilation of the truth of faith to a by now outmoded model 
of the truth of science, namely that of a complete and coherent 
order or system, out there awaiting discovery and l•?av ing a 
man no choi<::;e but to :=--ubmi t to it once discovered (cf .Ban-, 
1980). 
But insofar as secularization means the bringing into 
conscious and operative acceptance of the hi,3torical nature of 
human existence, the view to which Smith is commii:ted, a faith 
that does not seek its understanding critically in the stream 
of history, but tries to get it ready-made from some given and 
changeless source, cannot be authentic. 
Faith then, and fourthly, possesses its mm rationality, 
which is intrinsically reflective and .:::r1 t1cal. In ?a.rticular, 
Smith illustrates how faith stands in a critical relation 
towards three modes of concrete embodiment with whi•:h it is 
inevitably bound up, namely religion, seculari:~m and 
"Christendom", by which is meant "the effects or deposits of 
Christian faith in historical structures, experiences a.nd ideas" 
(Smith, 1966:194). Such forms and structures are 
... the inevitable pa1·tners of faith ... and JUSt a.s there 
can be no 'pu1·e' theology, and no absolute Ol' permanent 
fom of faith, separated from the untidy, ambl•]UOI.JS and 
distorting forms of man's historical existence, in all 
its vicissitudes, so faith is bound to be exp1·essed, and 
thus communicated, in these same forms (ibidl, 
The parts of this argument are subtly interdependent. 
Smith is saying that even the radical secularity of the modern 
world requires the understanding and the critique of faith to 
keep it true to itself. "It is only by an acknowledgement of 
faith in God that the historical reality ot man can be 
authentically forwarded" (1969:148). 
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But where in the modern world is the explicit social 
expression of such faith to be found? Only in the forms of 
religious life- but these, too, come under the critical scrutiny 
of faith, lest they fail, after all, to serve the cause of true 
secularity, and merely succeed in calling men out into an 
ecclesiastical heteronomy. Precisely because of the historicity 
of faith, there is no way to be free from these dilemmas: they 
are the theological equivalent of the sociological dilemmas of 
in:3titutionalization <cf .Davis, 1980 :122ff. for the Hegelian 
background to this problem of criticism). 
Smith's position is summed up in a striking paragraph 
worth quoting in full: 
Fot' the forms and stt·uctures of t•eligion and secularism 
and Christendom at·e nevet' able to e;<press directly the 
historical freedom which is the heart of the existence of 
faith, For they pal'take of n.ecessity, of fate, and of a 
constant temptation to misunderstand their own place and 
possibilities. They contain within themselves the 
movement leading to their self-destruction, and the 
destt·uction of all that is joined to them: the m•wement 
into a false and premature autonomy, away from freedom, 
ft·om the possibility of huly personal life, ft·om the 
world of Thou to the worl•j of It, from the decision for 
the open future to the decision for a closed and self-
contained existence <Smith, 1966:2041, 
If this were the last word, then this clash between "the Spirit 
and the historical products of the Spirit", as Smith puts it in 
The Doctrine of God, would leave us no alternative but to 
resign ourselves to the authoritarianism of tradition, or else 
to await the coming of the Spirit "out in the wilderness", with 
no expectation that his coming could have any relevance to our 
concrete existence in the real world <197 0:45). But it is not 
the last word, because (and this is our fifth point> faith can 
be master in its own house: 
It is the nature of faith to be supremely personal and 
self-conscious; but at the same tiMe C•)nsc ious of its 
source, of its history and of its goal,,,everything that 
comes to us ojl..it of tt'H: tfaditi!Jn must come under the 
sCl'utiny of the responsible, ft•ee and faithful enquiring 
mind,,,nothing in the tt•adition is the mastet', but 
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everythin•;J is the servant of faith, And faith in turn is 
a gift, the gift, of the Spirit (ibid;45-6), 
So Smith comes back to the essential priority of faith, 
which, in the inescapable fact of one's having it and 
confe:3sing it, and in its ineluctable presentness to the pre-
r-eflective awareness, and in the demand it makes, always lies 
before us as the fundamental matter of all theological 
discussion. This faith in the knowledge that '+ lv is 
unfinished, its po:3:3ibilii:ies not foreclosed, the promise from 
whi,=h it venture:3 forth :3till conte:dning undjsclosed horizons 
of newness for the world. 
Faith is both anamnesis and prolepsis, always living out 
of what bas accumulated before it and towards what is promised 
ahead of it. It recognizes "not that God is swallowed up in 
human history, but that human hi:3tory ends in God" (ibid:179). 
Finally: 
The theology of faith is a theology of the Cross, and 
thus a theoh,gia viatorum,,, The fol'fn d Chnst in the 
world is the way the man of faith goes- in the society of 
faith, certainly, that i~, in company with others- but 
not knowing ~·hither he goes: e:-:cept f:Jr this one 
ce1·tainty, th<.lt the w~.y is the way of God ~.nd to God 
<:l%E.;204J. 
Before we end this exposition, we should draw attention 
to the fe1v hints Smith gives about the form of the believing 
community, and the :::;tructural supports he considers necessary 
for maintaining a faith understood in this way. For he admits 
that practical considerations have taken very much of a back 
seat in his overall account of the working of faith. 
He accepts the term "prophetic fellowship", proposed by 
Gibson Winter, for the front-line of any vital and viable 
chun;b presence in the contemporary secular context. Neither 
the "cultic body" nor the "confessional assembly" <the typical 
Catholic and Protestant forms respectively) will possess much 
relevance in the world without the prophetic fellowship. 
HT"" ___ . L.! _ , , --
.C,:~:~f=J.ll_,l_Ql..J.'j they reflection in the 
context of a call for action" (1966:198). 
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Smith finds examples of such fellowships in the Frontier 
movement of lay Christians, in various factory and business 
fellowships and chaplaincies, and in the European Evangelical 
Academies. They "bear the burden and the hope for faith today" 
(ibid:199). 
As far ac the suburban residence-church is concerned, 
Smith sees a need for "pastoral counselling" directed at the 
release of local people from what he calls their "illusory 
world". <He refers in particular to "the women who dominate the 
styh:~::; of :3uburban life".)'' 
To ::=erve these changes, Smith wants education for the 
ministry to be remodelled. H would be preferable for the 
training of ordinands to be undertaken in a university ra.ther 
than e. separate seminary context. Best of all would be for 
there •:o be no distinctive colleges or faculties devoted to 
such training at all: instead, ministers might be trained 
within the much more open interdisciplinary atmosphere of 
somethin(!; like a "religious studies" department. 
Finally, Smith expects to see the Church in its 
institutional presence become mm-e humble, less assertive, less 
inclined to lay claim to all the answers or to proselytize: 
Faith., ,canies no equipment, and pe,jdles no wares, which 
it may offer to the passer-by, Its only way is to ca.rry 
in the body, that is, in the historical existence in the 
liOl'ld which it both maintains and endu1'es, the marks of 
Jesus (ibid;200l, 
So Smith is attracted to Bonhoeffer's disciplina arcani as the 
private and unostentatious observance which nourishes and 
sustains faith. Outwardly, before the world, Christians have 
only themselves and their earnest, critical engagement to offer 
as a witness. 
iii. Critique. 
Our critique of Smith's analysis nf fnif:h will be bri•:>fer 
than some of the critical sections of previous chapters, 
because we believe there is much that is penetrating and 
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indispensable in the way in which he tries to convey the 
texture, the "feel" of faith's historicity. 
We welcome his sustained attempt to provide a robust 
theological framework which is constructed around the heart of 
the matter, i.e.that there is faith, that people confess it, try 
to live it and practise its religious expression in 
increasingly unpromising circumstances. 
We affirm hi:c; analysis of the· "dialogic" or dialectic by 
v.•hich faith mediates between past and future in the historical 
present. We agree with his conception of the double relation of 
fait~ to its traditions in living from them and seeking 
expression through them, while at the same time standing 
critically over against them. 
Nevertheless. we have to register certain criticisms, 
which are substantially variation"'. upon a single theme. When 
we consider Smith's analysis as a blueprint for a secular form 
and understaruiing of faith which might become the basis of the 
.'lctual mode of life of exi:c;ting religious collectivities, we 
notice a significant retreat from the concrete in his account 
which means that we cannot accept it as it stands. 
Smith's definition of history solely in terms of the field 
of human decision and personal action is, ironically, 
insufficiently "historical". It gives too little room to non-
human or material factors experienced as confronting or 
constraining individuals and radically qualifying or limiting 
their powers of decision or action. Such factors are not 
miraculously removed when a person begins to act in the power 
of faith. To say that faith is historical must include, 
therefore, the notion that faith struggles with a recalcitrant 
or oppressive material environment which threatens, at every 
turn, to annul its own force and deny its vision. 
This is not to say that Smith's account of the 
achievement of a contemporary secular faith lacks a sense of 
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struggle. But it is largely an intellectual struggle, whereas 
for many today <as we said in the previous chapter when 
discussing "ultimate questions") the issues are couched in 
quite other terms. Smith's taking over of Gogarten 's idea of 
faith setting a man free for responsible action in the world 
bear'3 too many marks of a privileged intellectual environment. 
It conceals a similarly premature approval of the technocraic 
era to that found in Cox, only put in much more abstract terms 
<cf. re. Gogarten, Davis, 1980:36-9). 
Smith retains, in common with John Robinson, the 
personalistic bias they both learned from Buber. This over-
emphasis upon the category of the personal <which Smith also 
sees as the locus of a secular form of transcendence, 
c£.1966:121-4) can lead to a blindness to other social 
realities. When Smith says that faith simply operates with 
what it has to go em in the present moment, in response to 
successive personal en•:ounters, he may be offering an adequate 
account of the behaviour of individuals, but falls short of a 
feasible programme for churches. 
In sum, there is a shortage of concrete social context in 
Smith's analysis. Even when he does turn to the question of 
church structures, however briefly, it is only to emphasise 
aspects which are at present highly periph'eral to the 
mainstream of religious life. This is not to deny their 
importance; it is merely to say that Smith's understanding of 
faith scarcely addresses itself directly to the spectrum of 
existing religious social reality, as anything that claims to 
be a secular approach to faith must surely do. 
What we have therefore to go on to do in this chapter is 
to look for an analytical structure which can throw light upon 
the ways in which faith works and. is brought to expression 
. • .: ..L.l. _! ~ 
~l.t_.U_l_H the forms and 
o::ommi tment. 
~+ ... 1 - .. - ....... + ~Vjl.t:::o UJ.. membership and 
Smith's dialectical understanding of faith involves the 
idea of two poles between which faith moves, that of its past 
and its traditions, and that of openness and futurity. In 
practice, the concrete realizations of faith may well not 
embody the whole of this complex understanding. Rather, 
different modes and styles of faith give expression separately 
to one moment or- the other of Smith's dialectic. In the next 
section, we look at some attempts of Christian Radicalism to 
devise twofold modeL3 of the Church's life which can contain 
these alternative modes of faith. 
2. Faith an,J the Believing Community. 
i. Leslie Paul: Natural Group/Pressure Group. 
In his: Report on The Deployment and Payment of t.he 
ClPrgy, Leslie Paul observed that the Church exists in a double 
reality of "natural group" and "pre,:;::;ure group". 'Where there i':C 
religious decline within a_ culture, he argued, a polarization is 
likely to occur. The natural group is in danger of degenerating 
into a weak and inarticulate vehicle of social custom, whereas 
the pressure group assumes an increasingly sectarian stance. 
Paul evidently regard,:; this latter development without 
further examination as a bad thing; he believes, pre,:;umably, 
that a sectarian Church will become turned in upon itself and 
shed, with a sigh of relief, any burden of responsibility for 
the health of the wider community. But we believe that the 
matter has to be treated with greater subtlety: a more 
sectarian type of institutional form may well be quite 
inevitable, but this need not mean that the membership adopt a 
wholly exclusivist style of religious association. 
The faith of Paul':=;, natural group is certainly historical, 
in the sense that it lives out of its traditions and operate:c; 
in close, indeed mostly unconscious relation with th<:> rhythms 
and decision:; or daily life. It i::; not there to be talked about, 
ver-ba.ll y "•,vi tne::;:c;ed to" or argued over. 
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It is not primarily dogmatic or confessional, although 
within the cycle of regular worship it tacitly and uncritically 
accepts the doctrinal standards and credal beliefs which are 
therein preached or set forth in ritual and symbol. It performs 
as the unreflective grounding for a way of life which i:::; only 
likely to be articulated, if at all, in unglamorous and vague 
term:3 of "decency", "right living", "trying to be good", and so 
on. 
For the natural zroup, the "tradition" which nourishes 
hith i=; th•c, l:i=.t:ork Christian tradition as it lw.s snov<balled 
along through t~1e ·=enturie~. of cultural contextualization, 
picking up :=oundry extraneous materials a_ long the way. But for 
the pre:3surF> group the tradition is very definitely conceived 
a:=;. 3 kind of pristine "New '1'e:3tament Chri:c;tianity", persisting, 
'-f l~ sometimes well-nigh 
centuries of change. 
swamped by culture, throughout the 
The faith of the pressure group is conscious of itself as 
3 ::;pecitic religious commodity, categorically nat shared by 
all. It is historical in the sense that it strains towards the 
futu:'e vlith +:he e::-:pectation that something new is just around 
the corner. It 1·.-·=> prepared to risk past certainties in 
re:::;ponding to what it perceives to be the present call for 
decision. 
Such faith always sets up healthy tensions within a 
religious body which, by natural institutional conservati:::;m, 
leans more to the "natura 1 group" style. It is the irritant 
within the system which mounts a perpetual protest against the 
ossification of faith which the nece:::;sary processes of 
institutionalization threaten to produce. 
ii. Colin Williams: Institution/Event. 
Tn his study, The Church C27), Williams borrows from 
F.J.Leenhardt's Old Testament :=otudh"s the "Moses motif" of 
institution and the "Abraham motif" of event, and applie:::; them 
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to the Church. For Williams, the Church as "institution" speaks 
of continuity, stability and orientation to the past. It 
represents the horizontal dimension of what is meant by 
speaking of the Church as kept by God's grace and indwelt by 
the Spirit. 
The "event" motif speaks of change and crisis, of 
pressing ahead into a future fulfilment, of the vertical 
dimension of the Chur·ch 's perpetual answerability to the call 
of the Spirit who holds it in being. 
The meaning of this -theological langu.3ge is disclosed in 
the actual modes of faith whi<::;b are vi:::;ible for all to see. 
\VilHams believes that contemporary socio-cultural change 
demand::; above all the prioritization of the "event" character 
of the Church. He looks, therefore, to the self-conscious, 
informed and critical faith of small special-interest groups to 
achieve this; and he is even prepared to accept that 
contradictory and conflkting structures may have to be 
present in the one Church at one and the same time, in order· 
to maintain an adequate expression of the Gospel <Williams, 
1969:151-6; on "event" cf. Barth, a.nd 
"in:3ti tution", cf .Brunner, 195:3). 
'itlilliams' endorsement of pluriform structures is in our 
view quite correct; but his use of the term "instit_ution" to 
denote the expression of just one side of the dialectic of 
faith is problematic, since there can be no faith which does 
not require institutional expression if it is to continue 
through time and possess any kind of lasting socio-cultural 
influence. Moreover, Williams does not tackle the quec:;tion of 
how these distinctive modes of faith relate to the dividing-
line between those who do and do not worship regularly in 
churches: he simply appears to regard the distinction as 
e;dsting within or pos:=ibly betwPP.n congregations. 
'J')Q 
-' '-' (J 
iii. Robinson: Latent Church/Manifest Church. 
Robinson want:=; to take an optimistic view both of the 
possibility of an explicit and critical faith-commitment 
existing in the ordinary congregation, and of the presence of 
"incognito" faith outside it. His terms, "latent" and "manifest" 
Church, are taken over from Tillich, but Robinson gives them a 
rather more directly empirical application than Tillich. 
The manifest Chu:·ch is "the dedicated nucleu<e. o£ those 
who actively acknowled~e Je:=;us as Lord and have committed 
themselves to membership and mission within the visible 
sacramental fellow=;hip of the Spirit" <Robinson, 1965:4t\). B•Jt 
the latent Church is an indefinite historical group: it has 
neither distinct boundaries nor organization, ministry and 
sacrament::;, but nevert!:leless expresses the genuine spirit of 
commitment to Chris.t: ir1 its style of life. In Tillichian terms, 
it "actualize::; the Ne·.-• Being" Cibid:4 7). 
In Robin:3on ':-; -..· ~;:· . .._~; ~ + i-:=. not the task of :_t_,~ ~anifc::;t 
Church to "seek out" the "fringer::;'' and the potentio.l me~ber·:=., 
and bring them in. Its ta::;k is to enable them to encounter 
Christ and express their faith by their manner of life, 
wherever they are. However, earlier in the same chapter 
Robinson has also :=.aid that the Church (i.e.the manifest 
Church) erects too many doctrinal barriers, which prevent 
people from coming in <ibid:38ff) .This view would seem 
incompatible with the contention that it is no business of the 
Church to be concerned about whether people come in or not. 
Robinson's way of putting the is::;ue in fact reveals a 
confusion about what the real alternatives are. If the 
congregation is conceived wholly in term::; of commitment to 
service in the world, motivated by a strongly associative type 
of faith, then it will require strict demarcations and vigorous 
internal discipline::;, in order to sustain :=;uch faith. But it 
will be immaterial whether this faith proves attractive to 
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outsiders, since its purpose is not to spread the faith but to 
serve the war ld. 
But if the Church is concerned that others should share 
in the perspective upon life bestowed in the tradition centred 
on Jesus and brought to expression in worship and service, it 
cannot settle for this solution. It will have to live, rather, 
with "fuzzy ed8es" and an unsatisfactory level of ambiguity 
about the faith of some of its members. It will ho.ve to :=>eek 
means of holding together the forward-looking, experimental 
faith of the committed with the surrounding, much less 
articulate community religion, without idealizing either. 
iv. Newbigin: Congregation/Segregation. 
From withi.n the very different experience of the 
Christian community as a small missionary body within an alien 
culture, Newbigin <1966:109ff.) points out that every 
con3regation is by its very nature at the same time a 
segregation. WhaL was already apparent in a Hindu context is 
of value in analy~.ing the Western situation where Christendom 
continues to be dismantled. 
For those 1vho choose to attend Sunday worship with any 
regularity are a small minority, often heavily self-selecting 
alon3 lines of class, age and sex. All the indications are that, 
allowing for the complications introduced by the Christendom 
situation and by short-lived attempts to make religious 
attendance compulsory, a really vital, practising religious 
commitment has always been the preserve of a few. 
In other words, there is really no need to take special 
measures to mark out or separate the religious congregation, by 
means of strict criteria of membei-ship or any other policy. 
The congn~gation segregates itself, draws apart, not by strict 
doctrine or confessional exclusivism in the first place, but by 
meeting a.t all, by worshipping, by being "church" visibly 
b•~fore the rest of the world. This Newbigin could see through 
the greater clarity brought about by extraction from the 
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ambiguous liestern context. In the modern society, the purely 
sociological status of the Christian congregation as a "sect" 
is more or less a fait accompli, regardles:; of the fact that 
some regular worshippers exhibit greater levels of critical 
commitment than others. 
The question, therefore, is what the sect-like body is 
for. It should not meet lin the way a simple religiou:s society 
might be content to do, though obviously this i:; not true of 
all :;uch societie:;) for fun or for its own sake, but for the 
world ana, more tangibly. for the immediately surrounding 
cCJinmunity. For the congregation will know these people, meet 
them and have dealings with them; they will be mutually 
constitutive of one another's history. 
There is no getting away from the basic duality of 
separation and involvement, gathering and scattering, "come" 
and "go", in the given forms of religious participation. But 
this duality is not the same thing as a division between those 
who are and are not interested in the Gospel, nor between 
those who do and do not have faith. Self-confessed atheists 
and unbelievers remain comparatively few. 
v. From Twofold to Threefold Model. 
Vhat is the contemporary position, as the Christian 
Radicals perceived it, in the light of these twofold model:;? 
First of all, the radical::; once again attempted to (;ope with 
what they saw in co;ociologicall y unrealistic ways. Sometimes 
they wanted to •::a;t a.ll Christians in the role of religious 
"virtuosi", to use Max Weber's term for the committed elite. 
Sometimes they conceived of the surrounding society as 
having become almost wholly de-Christianized, in the interests 
of a renewed aggressive role for the churches; at other times, 
they denied the distinction between Church and society as the 
re:3iduc of a pa~.sing, .::tr..d unlarr.ent~~d, nf "the 
world. 
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Their understanding of the structural embodiments of 
faith did not solve the dilemma of how it might avoid, on the 
one hand, evaporation into the historical movement of an 
ultimately ambiguous secularity, or on the other, alienation 
from the real world in a fixation upon utopian ideals. 
Ve need to look again at the socio-culturally given forms 
and patterns with which the present Church must come to terms. 
In the case of the Church of England, these include a 
persisting, symbolically rich but in actuality very loose 
allia.nce with the very highest levels of the nationa.l public 
structure:=, a small and increasingly sect- I i.ke body of 
committed worshipping members, and a large pool of •·a.dberents" 
shading off into the masses who still vaguely put "C.of E." 
against "Religion" on official forms. This is the situation 
which t~e Church has to marshal in order to organize the 
several levels and modalities of its witness. 
Thi:=; pattern suggests that a threefold understa.nding of 
the overall cultura.l and institutional matrix o! faith is 
necessary in order to do justice to what is there. It is, in 
paTti•::ular, the contribution of the antecedently institutional 
face of the Church, as a professional and specialist religious 
body offering its "goods and services" to a public clientele, 
which fills out the twofold analyses we have just examined. The 
Cr!Urch as a concrete social 
regulates the relationship 
unreflective, and its more 
organization mediates between and 
of faith in its communal and 
associatively explicit modalities 
(cf. the threefold model of Gibson \linter in L.Paul, 1968 :80ff). 
Ve take up, therefore, the three levels of the public and 
visible institution known to all as "the Church", the "core" 
congregation, and the "fringe" of nominal adherents, a:::; the 
basis for an outline of the sn~iRl and cultural presentation of 
faith with which to conclude this chapter. 
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L·'· Conclusions: Community, Congregation and Institution. 
i. The Faith of the Community. 
When we speak of "the faith of the community", we mean 
the faith that is exercised as a result of the dissemination of 
Christian influence culturally. It is the faith which comes of 
the sheer fact that the Church is present, locally, socially 
and culturally, and continues to promulgate a ::;et of values, a 
way of looking at the world, an account of life's mysteries, 
born of the fact of the presence of Jesus of Nazareth in 
hi:3tory. 
The faith of the community is not in the first plac•C! a 
matter of going to church, but of drav:ing upon the spiritual 
capital invested in the culture by the Christian religion. The 
;xocess of secularization has been stripping the culture of 
these asset:3 in a damaging way, which is one reason why 
sterile polarization in matters of conflict, and widespread 
rnas:3 apathy anu cynicism over political •::.hoices, are so 
characteristic of the present time. 
To speak of the faith of the community is to raise, in a 
sense, the question of the perfectibility of folk religion, of 
salvaging essential Christian values and perspectives from it. 
There are, to be sure, severe difficulties about this, to the 
extent that some consider it a vain hope <Wylie, 1965; Reed, 
1978:94,112; cf.Segundo, 1977:ch.8). 
But folk-religionists at times prove capable of great 
steadfastness and courage, visionary dedication to altruistic 
ideals and pastorally sensitive counsel. The young mother 
nursing a child with leukaemia; the disabled man who 
undertakes a gruelling long-distance run to raise money for 
famine relief; the widow who is known by the whole 
neighbourhood as the person to go to in time of bereavement: 
all these will provide rationales for their actions and 
attitudes which plainly bear the mark of Christian 
"acculturation". 
It is the faith of the community that provides the means 
of coping to the woman whose mother dies suddenly without 
warning, and who interprets the comforts of the funeral in 
continuity with those offered by a cup of tea with a friend. 
Similar faith gives some expression to the confused grief and 
ang•~r and numbness of a whole town stricken by some natural 
disaster, when the Bishop is expected to preach at a special 
:",,c.rvice. Men, who are LJ:::>uall7 ·:::.o m:Jch more alienated from 
reli3ion than are women, suffer greatly from their inability to 
find any frame of reference within which to dea.l vii th the 
emotions, fears ~nd questions r~ised bv such occasions. 
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But does such faith have ar,ythi-:-;g at all to do vrith a 
secular Christian faith as Gregor Smith expounds it? 
Positively, we can say this.: such f.:'<ith is, a:3 all faith must 
be, pn~-reflexively operative in connec·:ion with o given, 
subjective way of life. It is practical and personal, but not 
doctrinal and articulate. in continuity with 
own traditions, and the::;e, though scarcely pure, arc 
n.~v·~rtheless U:oroug!:J.ly inten1oven 'rlith the images, ritual and 
symbol of professing Christianity. When this faith comes unde~ 
threat of extinction, as it now does, the fabric of social life 
is severely ruotured. 
But this 1:3 not the whole story. Quite apart from the 
many points at which community faith runs out into the 
bolstering of restrictive tribalisms, it possesses its own 
::;hortcomings. Broadly, it cannot be critical: lacking in 
propositional, dogmatic content, it wants the basis for self-
n~flection. It offer::; means for coping and acquiescing in the 
world, but leaves things precisely as they are, having no 
resource::; out of which to seek change. It relies heavily upon 
its dialogue with the past, but has little sense of a 
compelling '-'i:.=;ion fm- i:be f11t.1Jre to ::;pur it on to greater 
efforts. Christianity cannot do without the faith of the 
c::ommunity, but it •:::an never rest content with it. 
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ii. The Faith of the Congregation. 
The faith of the congregation is continually summoned to 
transcend these limitations: it is called to become a critical 
faith (cf.Davis, 1980:74). About this there are four points to 
be mad•~. Firstly, we are not splitting apart congregation and 
community faith into two conflicting alternatives. The 
committed Christian in the congregation possesses, at bottom, a 
sympathetic attunement to, and familiarity with, the faith of 
the community, because he is also a part of it and has h i':o 
share in its faith. There are times when the Chri,:;tia.n find':o 
himself falling back upon community faith as a kind of 
'subliminal horizon of faith, because all criti•-::al and dynamic 
resources seem to be failing him. 
At other times, the stimulus to vmrship and to pray may 
co.:n•:" to hiJ"!l from 'some profound ::c;ense of brotherhood with his 
neig~bours or his workmates, the expression of whose community 
faitl-~ at a particular moment of ct-isis or of joy comes to him 
wi !:h the freshness of the Gm3pel. The faith of the community 
is fully present in the congregation also: but problems occur 
insofa.r a_s only a form of community faith is to be found 
there. 
For secondly, the faith of the congregation needs to be a 
critica_l faith precisely in that it is able to recognize and 
value fully its mm indebtedness to its traditions, and at the 
same time to stand apart from them in critical distance. A'3 
far as the Christian tradition is concerned, in its credal, 
doctrinal and ecclesiological forms, the congregation should be 
both well-informed, knowledgeable and respectful, and open-
minded and questioning. 
Insofar as the future lies with more and more uniformly 
committed, "converted" rather than "socialized" Christians 
making up the congregations, the structural 
ftrmnpss Rnrl ~l~rity about traditions will be 
necessary. But to affirm the central importance 
supports of 
particularly 
of dogmas, 
creeds and confessions, and the history of theology and Church, 
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all the orthodox traditions, is not at all the same thing as 
the demand for uncritical assent to them (cf .Lindbeck, 1971; 
Kaesemann, 1969) . 
Thirdly, to admit the critical principle is not to pre-
empt the fruits of the critical process. The faith of the 
congregation should support the existence of some who are more 
conservative, and :3om·~ more progressive, than others. This i:=. 
what we should expect, given a range of temperaments and 
cultural backgrounds. The peaceful and, better still, the 
oroductive co-existence of such groups is a vital iss~e. 
Without an admission of the principle of a critical faith, 
however, there is no hope of a creative relationship here. Such 
a faith steps into the tension between religion as the 
l~gitimation of order and provider of meaning, and religiDn a:3 
the promise of the new and disturber of what is. and seeks to 
maximise the contribution of each. 
The faith of the congregation, then, has to value and 
understand what it has received, and not be c;.fraid to 
experiment beyond it. In this way it exercises Smith's 
''C.ia.logic of history" in its exploration:;:; and commitments. It 
recognizes that the Church does not provide its final resting-
pla.ce, but conserves the resources of a tradition which offers 
the possibility of fresh ventures for imprinting the pattern of 
Christ upon the world. It supports and invites (fourthly) 
flexible and plural structures for the Church. 
The,;:;e are seen, for example, in the small groups or 
ecclesiolae formed within larger congregations for fellowship 
or study and discussion, or for the fulfilment of some project 
of service to the community. These may need to reproduce a 
sacramental structure, in order to indicate that what they are 
doinz is "~htHYh" not just a functional cubdivision - ~ ''-'- 1... -Ul- l,llt= 
Church" <"cf.'Jillio_ms, 1965Ca>:64ff; Rahner, 1974:108-18>. 
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Then there are the alternative provisions for worship 
which can cater for the latent need or desire to express 
religious faith whicl1 may be in process of coming to birth in 
members of the community. The centralized, Sunday liturgical 
forms may not be appropriate to express this, especially where 
the persons concerned have been highly alienated from the 
historical traditions of the Church. A Church which engages in 
critical talk but retains an entirely monolithic appearance 1s 
easily capable of drawing the sting of its own critical 
perceptions and merely finding a "niche" for them within the 
spectrum of its institutional being (Cox, 1968:241). 
iii. The Faith of the Institution. 
All that we have said here cannot hold together without 
::=.orne concept of an 
recommended earlier 
"antecedently 
<Chapter IX) 
existing 
that a 
Church". VIe 
secular-based 
understanding of the Church should accept that what is 
presented, in terms of social reality, is a distinction betw.'"en 
"iw:;ti tution" and "members". To put it another way, "church" 
means, popularly, a certain building, religious officials, a 
hierarchy of appointed ministers, the religious subdivision of 
the institutions of state, services, ceremonies, good works- as 
well as a rather ill-defined group of religious people. 
The faith that is given expression through this 
institutional face of the Church is of crucial importance, 
because the institution is there for the community at large, 
and there for the congregation as well. 
It is ther-e for the community, because it offers the 
religious provisions and services which ca~er for the need of 
the population for religious expression through a variety of 
ritual performances and symbolic presences. 
It is there for the congregation, because it supplies the 
re:::;ources of both tradition and theolop;ical expertise which go 
towards enabling the committed believers to accomplish their 
critical task. 
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The faith of the institution is visibly wedded to 
traditions and conventions which threaten to drain away its 
vital force into the cultural background. But it is also 
possessed of the ability to mount critical and reflective 
campaigns from within itself which can bring it into conflict 
with the world and rea:::;sert, sometimes surprisingly, its 
dependence upon the transcendent. Neither community nor 
congregation-faith can attain to its proper form without it. 
We shall give just two indications of what is practically 
required for the maintenance of the faith of the institution in 
creative inter-nal tension and in integrity towards community 
and congregation alike. Firstly, just because the in:::;titution 
guards and administers the tradition in its received "deposit" 
form, but does not close 1ts doors to those for whom 
propositional belief is less than comple-t:e or certain, public 
worship is very important to it. This i:::; because worship, 
which 1s predicated very largely upon ritual activity and 
symbolic expres::;ion rather than purely intellectual doctrin.:;.l 
precision, offers the possibility of an assent to the tradition 
which is not merely assensus but [iducia too, an act of the 
whole self towards Christ in which the articulation of dogma 
is not primary, and therefore avoids being intrusive <cf. 
Panikkar, 1973:83; Robinson, 1965:44; Vidler, 1962; Sykes, 
1984:285, 246). 
Secondly, the institution makes available the resources 
for the building up of a critical faith within the 
congregation. This means the provision of educational 
materials, study aids and specialist teaching ministries, but 
also more than this. The presence and support of the 
institution can guarantee the stability and continuity of faith 
necessary to enable a small and potentially defensive, 
beleaguered congregation to treasure and cherish its tradition, 
not with a protective and reactionary attitude, but as a 
partner in the critical dialogue which accompanies action. 
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\/here the small congregation's options for action seem 
paralyzed by the material obstacles resulting from a relatively 
di:::;pri vileged social situation, institutional backing should be 
available to help overcome them: for the Church as an 
organization in society shares a certain privileged place in 
the authority-structures of the social fabric with an 
independence enabling it to side with those who do not share 
thF~ privilege. 
Ve have argued that the full expre:::;sion of Chri:::;tian 
fa.i th a.~:; a_ hi~3torical mode of existence requires the creative 
holding together of the communal attachment to familiar 
traditions, persons and interpretations of the world, with the 
critical detachment born of being gathered apart by 
a"'.:::;ociaticm with others possessed of faith, and sharing \ii Ut 
them in religious worship and fellowship. This faith will 
accept that ib; adherents remain in a minority, but will not 
rest content, seeking to persuade other:::; through the .3ct.ivity 
of its own critical perspectives. 
Some people will claim that this is asking too much: for 
"human kind cannot bear very much reality". But the way of 
faith is not easy, and perhaps the Church's greatest sin is 
when it permits it to appear as though it is. Issues in 
contemporary church life relevant to the possibility of 
implementing the normative position argued for here will be 
indicated in the closing chapter of the thesis. 
During the sixties' ferment, the most potent practical 
illu:::;tration of this problem was afforded by the debate about 
Christian ethics, or the so-called "new morality". As a mode of 
life, faith in the concrete context inevitably implies ethical 
demands. Here, the relative value of inherited traditions and 
critical alternatives becomes a particularly acute problem for 
Christians. It is to this that we now turn as the final 
theological topic of Christian Radicalism. 
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NOTES, 
1, On Smith's wot'k see further Ray S,Anderson.; Historical Transcendence and the 
u~~~~! e: #:~ 1975; A,Munro's un~ublished Ph,u Thesis, The Concept of the Wholly 
• ~ £ = ~e.mla; The_olo~ies, 1970; and.the essay collectio~ edited by E,T,Long( 
ca,tton ndHlstory, 1974, In th1s latter, see espeoally Long s essay o 
the same title for a ·~eneral account; W,McKane on "Tradition as a Theolog1eal 
Concept", which relates ~mith on tradition to the Old Testament "tradition history" 
and the, theolog~. of von Rad· and I ,Nic•Jl on "History and Transcendence~, which 
relates ~m1th on history to R,~.Coll1ngwood's theory of h1stor1cal understanding, 
2, In the Bibliography on radical theology compiled for the British edition of their 
Radical Theology and the Oo:>ath of God, Altizer and Hartilton call Smith's s.wtill. 
Christianit~ "a disappointing book", This may be due to Smith's scrupulous refusal to 
engage in t e more shrill kind of polemic, or to the breadth of his sources, which he 
treats with care and jud•JRtent, so that the ovet'all imp1·ession is alwa'fS one of 
tentativeness and caution, despite his ability to be caustic when he feels it 
necessary, 
'::.Munro lop,cit,) chides Smith for not making it sufficiently clear that his use of 
the word "history" is ,jependent up•Jn the German sense of 6e5chichte rather than 
Hfg/l)rie, Smint actually deals 'lith this debate on pp,78-88 of Secular Christianity, 
When he speaks of faith resting on "historical events• he does not mean it is 
dependent upon what "facts" may oe established as a resuft of scientific historical 
research, Thus he can say, "So fa1· as hist,Jricity is concerned~ historische fact, it 
is necessary to be flain: we mav freely say that the bones of Jesus lie somewhere in 
Palestine" (op,cit: 03), This throwaway remark created an uncharacteristic surge of 
theological publicitv for Smith who was, needless to say, accused of "not believing 
in \.he Resurrection"·, ~ithout going into the whoie complex debate amon~ the Bulhann 
school, we simply point out that Smith only appl1es the name "nistory"- i,e, 
6eschir:hte- to siqnificant past events which have been carried into the oresent ir 
virtue of their {ontinuin·~ e:<:istential significance for human agents, Events which 
are "historical'' are such that my world and yours are different now from how they 
would have been if they had not occurred, Thus Smith .approves .the formula of 
Gogarten, "history as the presentness of the past" <Sm1th, op,c1t:BS; 1969:143; 
cl Altizer 196Sfdl·1~61 
' J ' - • 
4, This understano:ng of ~as!,oral co,Jnselling by Smith envisages for 1t a function 
n+.her similar to t~at of C:·itical Theory as pt•opounde•j by the Frankfurt School, That 
is, it involves demonstn~ing that a oerson's worid-view is ideolo•Jicallv false 
beCaUSe j \. haS been fOTf~fjj~te,j IJI1der (Qn,ji tiOnS that 1o10rk against th-at pe'rson 0! 
group's true interests: under conditions of uncoerced rationa1 ft'eedoal, they would 
not accept such a world-view at all, Yhen this false basis is revealed, the person!sl 
concerned will be el'!ancipated into an attitude ~hich enables then to take action t•J 
change their situation (cf, also Cox's "theology of social change", outlined in the 
prev1ous chapter), The application of Christian faith as a critical theory is a large 
issue just beyond the boundaries of the material we are studying, It was introduced 
particularly 1n the thought of Liberation Theology, which in so atany ways carries 
foJrward the concerns of the Christian radicals in a more systenallc manner, See 
Davis, Theology ao.1 PolitHal Societx, ch,4; R,Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, 
19?4; . R,Siebert's. essay. in .Cone ilium for January 1874(· T,Y,Adorno, "Cultural 
CntlClSm and Sooety" 1 :n ~. 1967;19-:34; and a so ar unpublished paper by R,H,Roberts, "Spirit, Structure and'Truth in the Church", 
5, Winter's threef•Jld l'll•Jdel of cultic-confessional-f'ophetic bears similarities with 
a number of others, Daniel .Jenkins in The British· JleH Identity and Their Religion, 
ch,6, suggests the typolo•JY of "chaplaincy, conventicle, cathedral" to indicate the 
specialisf "secular' ministries, the small committed congregation and the 
institutional Church as available for the community, John Tiller in his Report 
A Strategy fq1· the Church's Ministry, p,76, employs the terms "cell, congregation, 
pilgri~age" to indicate the small koinonia group, the larger worshippin~ bo~ and the 
church without clear boundaries dispersed into its mission in the worl~. Stephen Yeo 
in his Ro:>li~iqo and YolyoLary Org~nizatjons in Crisis sees the development of 
voluntarr organizations, including the churches, into lar·~e-scale, centralized 
universa agencies, more exclusive sects putting quality before quantity and outward-l•)oJkln·~ activist pressure groups, None of tnese classifications is qude the 
sane as the analysis we are qiving, which tries particularly to indicate the special 
relatioJnship of the more hig'h-profile visible public institutional for11 to each of 
the other social expressions oJf faith, 
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CHAPTER XIII: ETHICAL MATURITY AND THE FAITH-COMMUNITY. 
Within the entire episode of Christian Radicalism in the 
sixties, the issue of ethics in the form of the so-named "new 
morality" was one of the mast pub lie l y con travers ia l. It farms 
the topic of this last of our six chapters of detailed 
examination of the theological themes of Christian Radicalism. 
The scope of the chapter, however, must be very strictly 
limited indeed, since we are obviously not in a position here 
to take up adequately the crucial theoretical iss~es in 
Christian Ethics in their own right. VIe are concentrating only 
upon the questions which emerged from the radicals' debates 
about morality. This means that the particular context is the 
problem of the rela.tive merits of adherence to inherited and 
familiar traditions and rules, on the one hand, over against 
critical and open thinking in response to the changing demands 
of the moment, on the other, in Christian moral action. 
Because :c:uc!: nct1on occur:3 within the context of overa.ll 
religious parti·~ipation and membership, the ~oc ~olog i[~al 
backdrop to our discussion continues to be that of the 
previous chapter. The structure of this chapter is slightly 
different from that of the previous five, being somewhat 
shorter. Vle deal firstly with the contributions of some 
participants in Christian Radicalism to the moral debate, and 
then advance our criticisms, together with our proposals for a 
more constructive way forward on the issues facing the 
churches perceived by the radicals, in the second part of the 
chapter. 
1. Secularization and Situa.tionism: Profiles of the New 
Jofora.lity. 
i. Robinson and Fletcher. 
VIe begin by turning again to John Robinson, who devoted 
chapter 6 of Honest to God to "The New Morality", as well as 
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writing elsewhere on ethics with a popular eye to the 
contemporary scene. Robinson considers that he scarcely has to 
argue the need for a reformulation such as he is proposing. It 
is simply a matter of the Church catching up with what has 
been going on all around it: 
The wind of change here is a gale, Our only task is to 
l'elate it co1·rectly to the previous revolution we have 
described and to try to discern what should be the 
Christian attitude to it !Robinson, 1963(al:105l, 
The matter is quite ::;imph:~. Just as the modern world 
increasingly has difficulty with the notion of a God conceived 
in objective terms as a being "out there", so too it cannot 
accept the idea of unalterable moral principles, emanating from 
that same "metaphysical beyond". In the public mind. the most 
widespread images of such an approach to ethics would probably 
b·~ firstly, the Ten Commandment::;, in::;cribed on their tablets of 
stone and on the actual stone or woodwork of many churches; 
and secondly, the magnificent edifice of Roman Catholic moral 
teaching, perceived as a monolithic unity rather than as the 
complex and subtle mass of casuistry it has actually become. 
But Robinson declares that "the sanctions of Sinai have 
lost their terrors." For '"why shouldn't I?' or 'what's wrong 
with it?' are questions which in our generation press for an 
answer" (ibid:l09). The "supranaturalist ethic" simply belongs 
to an age which is dead or dying, bound up with the "religious" 
interpretation of the Gospel. Robinson, as before, rules out in 
advance any solution which takes up the given forms of 
religious social reality as a possible clue to how the 
Christian ethic operates in the concrete situation. 
The solution he does propose 1·.-·=> compounded from the 
familiar employment of Tillich in the service of "depth" and 
"ground", and the "situation ethics" of Joseph Fletcher. 
Robinson quotes Tillich ir1 suppt:Jrt of .. theuuunty~~, transferring 
the reference from culture to ethics: 
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,,,a position in 111hich the tt·anscendent,,,is encountered 
in, ~r~ith and under the 'Thou' of all finite relationships 
as their ultimate depth and ground and m~aning, In ethics 
this means accepting as the basis of moral jud•Jments the 
actual concrete relationship in all its particularity 
(ibid: 114). 
Since, as Robinson has ar-gued in earlier chapters, this 
"ultimate depth" is disclosed in Jesus, the "man for- other-s", as 
Love, Robinson is able to recommend "utter openness in love to 
the other for his own sake" as the supreme moral '+- • cr1 .. er1on. 
Love, as he puts it, "has a built-in moral compa:3s, enabling it 
to 'home' intuitively upon the deepest need of the other" 
(ibid:114-5). The pot tern of the argument het-e is familiar, 
being entirely congruent with Robinson's earlier proposals for 
a reconceptualizing of traditional theism ,and as such it comes 
under the same critic isms we have already mounted against 
those (supra, ch.VIIIJ. 
However, what is new here is how Robinson brings together 
hi:3 radical love-ethic with ti1e "casuistry of love" or "agapeic 
ca_lculus" advanced by Fletcher, whose position was c..vailable to 
Robinson at that stage only in summary essay form.' Without 
making his theological dependence upon Tillich as explicit as 
Robinson does, Fletcher argues that "only one thing is 
intrinsically good, namely love: nothing else at all". Hence, 
"the ruling norm of Christia_n decision is love: nothing else" 
<Fletcher, 1966: chs .3 & 4). 
Hi~. position attacks wha.t he calls "intrinsicalism": the 
idea that the "right" and the "good" are qualities or 
commodities which l. ... 1e somehow objectively in the order of 
thing:3, and with which it is our duty to align our actions 
(ibid:64-8). Rather, "love's decisions are made situationally, 
not prescriptively" (ibid: ch.8) :;;,: and thus, a decision made on 
the basis of love, which appears to contravene some supposed 
mor-al law, is not to be treated as "the less·~r of two evils", 
or as a "for-giveable :3in", but positively, as a good, for there 
is no other "good" which it somehow contradicts. 
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This is the position which Robinson embraces more or 
less without qualification: "nothing can of itself always be 
labelled as 'wr-ong'" (Robinson, op.cit:118). He is at pains to 
point out repeatedly how shocking, dangerous and difficult the 
situational approach may seem Cibid:109, 117, 118-9). It is 
shocking, because it differs so sharply from what is taken for 
granted as the Christian ethical position. It is dangerous or 
difficult, because it demands a much greater maturity and 
places a far greater responsibility on the moral agent: 
Love's •Jate is stl'ict and nanow and its requirements 
infinitely deeper and more penetratin•J,, ,what love's 
casuistry requires makes,, .the most searching demands 
both upon the depth and integrity of one's concel'n f:}r 
the other,, ,and upon the calculation of what is truly the 
most loving thin•] in this situation for evei'Y pers•)n 
involved (ibid;l19l, 
Here Robinson hints at a point made more starkly and 
succinctly by Fletcher. Whereas, he says, some critics complain 
that situation ethics is too hard, because many people want and 
aeed better and firmer cer- to. in tie:::,, jw::;t what he is 
fighting against: 
They want the Grand lnquisitor,,But. there is no escape 
for them, To learn love's sensitive tadirs, such peop!e 
are going to have to put away their childish rules 
CFletchet', op,cit:140; cf,van den Heuvel, 1967:147-8). 
The conviction, that in a secular society people ultimately 
have no choice but to embark upon the hard road to an ethic of 
maturity, surfaces in a variety of ways in the work of other 
exponents of the "new morality". 
ii. H.A.'Williams. 
For H.A.'Williams it is above all what he sees as the 
deceitfulness and dishonesty of traditional morality which is 
unacceptable. 'Williams experienced this particularly in 
conjunction with certain Catholic styles of penitential 
devotion, and developed his contrary position under the impact 
of personal submission to Freudian analysis. These influences 
permeate his es,3ays in Soundings, "Theology and Self-
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A ware ness", and in Objections tq Christian Belief, 
"Psychological Objections", and also the sermons in The True 
Wilderness. Williams sees a great capacity for self-deceit 
embedded in the human self; and regards much religious 
activity, especially that based upon strict moral principle, as 
a ::;eries of "artful dodges" calculated to pereptuate the 
concealment of the truth from the agent.::' 
Much of what passes for Christian moral uprightness 
remains, in Williams' view, firmly located this side of the 
crisis of death to the old self and rebirth to new life of 
which the Gospel speaks. For where this is truly occurring, it 
is both morally painful and exhausting, and ultimately 
transformative. It is transfor-mative because it radically 
shifts all the ethical perspectives and priorities: at the 
yonder side of the crisis, for example, the kind, helpful and 
generous behaviour of a recognized Christian may strike a 
false note, lacking a certain personal spontaneity and 
authenticity. But an unpremeditated act of selfL~ssne:3s on the 
part of someone quite immoral in conventional terms can 
inspire a response of praise to God. 
We fail utterly to press on to the transcendent 
perspective just so long as we prefer the notion of a God who 
issues the rules and expects us to keep to them to one who 
penetrates to the farthest recesses of the wrong that is in us 
with a shattering honesty, but then accepts with an overcoming 
love. Williams, then, sees 
self-revelation; and the 
worth of an action lies 
process. 
salvation very much in terms of true 
only final criterion of the moral 
in whether or not it furthers this 
This accounts for the extreme and improbable nature of 
the examples he adduces: for example, both he and Fletcher cite 
the film; N~=>ver nn Sunday, in which a prostitute so manages 
her liaison with a young sailor that he is liberated from the 
self-doubt and instability brought about by hi:3 fear of sexual 
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failure. The transference of such cases into the concrete 
context of normal Christian ethical decision-making as a part 
of the life of faith is, of course, intensely problematic. 
But one who perceived the same questions as Williams, and 
more, without hh:; naive air of one who has just been bowled 
over by a new cause (i.e.psychotherapy) was Monica Furlong, in 
her diatribe against all that was unbending, insensitive and 
complacent in the Church she felt compelled to stay in: With 
Love to the Church. 
iii. Monica Furlong. 
Furlong agrees with Williams that, too often, "Chri:c;tian 
mora_ls appear to represent a safeguard against the force of 
[people's) own desires" <Furlong, op.cit:43). There is a vlhiff of 
dishonesty about the way in which ecclesiastical moral 
pronouncements assume the possibility of a rational, 
dispassionate settlement of all questions: 
Since the clergy rarely admit, either publicly or 
pi'ivately, to having problems of their own, intelligent 
obse1·vers a1·e left with the impression of a body which 
seeks to 01'9anize the mo1·al stakes wi tho1..1t being honest 
enough to declare its own interest (ibid;49l, 
She relates this point particularly to the much-vaunted 
"Christian teaching on marriage'' and its unhappy and 
unsatisfactory counterpart, "the Church's attitude to divorce". 
In sum, traditional morality appears to be too blunt an 
instruinent to handle the delicacies and vulnerabilities of 
flesh-and-blood human predicaments. 
Furlong also draws attention to two other points, which 
complete the catalogue in favour of a new morality, to which we 
shall shortly be re:3ponding. The first of these is the tendency 
of Christian moral judgments always to "err on the side of 
caution", lest potentially dangerous ideas be let loose among 
people unable to handle them. 
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Few would echo explicitly the telling comment of the 
bishop who said, "we must always remember that the ordinary 
man is looking for any excuse to commit fornication" (ibid:32). 
But Furlong is convinced that the underlying implication is 
common enough: never trust the people. Perhaps, . indeed, the 
image of rock-like moral certainty conveyed by the Church 
im:;titutionally and reflected in a paler form by its members, 
who are made to feel that here is something definite and solid 
to hold on to and live up to, does provide a certain personal 
security and a point of reference, something dependable in a 
morally bewildering ·-:orld. But Furlong questions whether this 
is really the Christian faith at all. 
Her doubts support the contention of secular humanists 
that Chri5tian morality is infantile and inconducive to ethical 
maturity (cf. the discussion in Jarrett-Kerr, 1964: ch.4>. The 
allegation i::; serious, for an earlier generation of optimistic 
liberal:=> as::;umed that Christianity would. at least persi::;t 3:::; 3. 
profoundly humanistic ethic, even if metaphysical religion were 
to wither away. Now, on the contrary, it is Christianity'::o 
manifest ethical content, at least as refracted through the 
churches, which comes under attack. Under the conditions of 
secularization, even morality is no longer a department in 
which the Church can lay claim to specific competence and the 
right to be heard. The supposed moral example given by 
Chri:3tian people looks more and more like moral childhood 
persisting in a society grappling with a complicated and 
painful ethical adulthood. 
Furlong's final point is that this is increasingly 
damaging for the Church itself, because it denies the 
compassionate understanding and graciousness for which the 
Go:3pel of Christ is supposed to stand. It contributes to the 
ex.::lu:3ion from the c:hurches of just the persons who need this 
Gospel. 
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It is not enough to claim that judgment, as well as mercy, 
is a constituent of the message. For judgment, in Christian 
terms, implies critical involvement, the facilitation of the 
crisis in the individual and in society, which generates 
change. Judgment "from on high" will not do. As Robinson 
writes, "there can for the Christian be no 'packaged' moral 
judgments- for persons are more important even than standard~' 
\Robinson, l963(a1:120). 
But Furlong sees all too much evidence in the Church at 
large of the priorities being put the other way round. People 
suffer exclusion (exclusion which is felt, even if not offcially 
enacted as church policy) because their marriages have failed, 
or because they are homo::;exual, or becaus·~ they have spent 
time in prison. The voice o:f the Church is louder and more 
united on issues where a clear rule seems to be readil v 
available than it is on the intensely problematic issues thrown 
up by contemporary circumstances. Furlons writes: 
It is customary for the Church and for Christians to fire 
away in a hit and miss manner at contemporary morals and 
attitudes, repeatedly ignoring the way Christians ha.ve 
abrogated their responsibility and by their lack of 
charity, knowledge, culture and compassion, have hastened 
the disintegration of society <Furlong, op,cit:20l. 
A differentiated, secular society will have little use for the 
religious specialism if this is how it looks to the outsider: 
capable of sustaining a cosy "home circle" type of moral 
decency but either naive or in tolerantly rule- bound on wider 
issues. 
So can religious commitment ene;ender ethical maturity at 
all? VIe proceed to this question by way of our critique of the 
situationist position of the radicals, and place it in the 
context of the manner of ethical decision-making contingent 
upon the modes of faith and religious belonging in the 
believing community. 
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2. Critique and Alternatives. 
i. Rules, Traditions and Structural Constraints. 
VIe offer, first of all, a critique based upon the nature 
of three limiting phenomena presenting problems to the 
radicals' proposals for a situationist ethic. The first concerns 
the nature and status of rules: for Robinson himself concedes 
that a radical ethic of love 
... cannot but. rely, in deep humility, upon guiding 1·ules, 
upon the cumulative experience of one's awn and ather 
people's obec!tence, lt is this bank of e:qerience which 
•Jives us ou1' guiding l'ules of 'n·~ht' and 'II'I'Ong', and 
without them we couid not t.ut i iounder (Robins•)n, 
op, cit: 119-20) , 
Similarly, Fletcher asserts that 
. , .the situationist enters 
situation fully armed with 
community and its heritage, 
respect as i lluminat•)rs of 
op,cit;26l, 
into everv decision-making 
the ethical maxims of his 
and he treats them with 
his problems \Fletche1', 
1hese are important concessions ~hich modify the would-be 
ic•Jno::la:3ti•:: tor:e of much ot what is said about the new 
morality. 
For example, the "bank of experience" or "maxims of the 
heritage" clearly tell Robinson that sexual relationships 
outside marriage are wrong. Nevertheless, his ethical theory 
makes it impossible for him to lay this down as a rule. 
Instead, he applies great ingenuity to describing the kind of 
case in which such relations might be right; but the criteria 
he produces are so strict that they would almost certainly 
never be fulfilled <Robinson, op.cit:ll9). 
In a rather similar way, the controversial Report, To11QI:.d§. 
a Quaker View of Sex seeks to outline the conditions which 
would have to prevail in order to justify an unmarried couple's 
sharing in a sexual relationship. It arrives at something very 
close indeed to the content and intention of the marriage vows: 
but where :3u•-::h conditions obtain, ".::ammon law" acce-::>ts this in 
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any case as a de facto marriage. The force of the rule which 
is meant to embody how love works in concrete situations is 
here upheld <P .Ramsey, 1967). 
This much indicates that rules are not so easily escaped. 
But there is a second point: for even with their concession to 
inherited wisdom, neither Robinson nor Fletcher really gives 
full weight to the automatic nature of much moral action. That 
L:;, much of the time "ethical decision-making" is :;:;carcely an 
apt phrase for what actually goes on \Cook, 1983:78ff). In 
practice, the agent confronted with a situation requiring moral 
choice- unless i + is a very unusual and complex one- do-=s not 
deliberate, weigh pro:=> and con:;:;, and con:sider the demands of 
love. Reaction and response come on the basi:;:; of a largely 
pre-reflecive tradition composed of a quite un:;:;ystematic array 
of criteria. Some of these will certainly be derived from the 
Christian Gospel, via its embeddedness in the cultural 
be;ckground. 
i::; parallf~l to the case of "community faith". 
Morality lives off its traditions, the accumulation of 
conventional which has percolated down to so 
subterranean a level of culture that it rarely surfaces in the 
form of conceptual awareness. Such cultural deposits are bound 
to contain a proportion of folklore i terns going back to an 
underlying pagan past, which may or may not be comparable 
with the ethical ideals which Christians see as disclosed and 
embodied in Jesus. 
So far as secularization dissipates and fragments the 
cultural heritage, the Christian input may cease to play any 
overall leavening and enlightening role, and habitual moral 
judgments may become less humane. For only long-term Christian 
influence has allowed certain ideas of "moral decency" to 
become so taken-for-granted. 
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Christians, therefore, cannot afford to ignore or 
disparage that habitual socialized-in level of morality which 
is the fruit of long processes of Christian acculturation. As a 
result, faith recognizes a further set of considerations 
governing moral judgments which the radicals undervalued. 
Moral apprehension is corporate in nature: the individual does 
not simple decide and act alone and unilaterally, but judgments 
are made both out of and toward the community. Moreover, this 
means that moral attitudes operate under structural 
constraint::;. Ethical maturity cannot demand "autonomy", if by 
this is meant a kind of individualistic bid to stand clear of 
all possible determining factors and assess the options in the 
cold light of reason. As Jarrett-Kerr puts it: 
t1an is rAO!'e than a spectator, merely making selections 
f1·om w;,at he sees, on the basis of ~·hich he un act, He 
is also a subject, and that means accepting (freely 
accept in:~) 
fulfilment 
comrni t.rnent 
authority, He 
in fellov.•ship, 
(.Janet t-ften, 
I . .4' ~ 1 n . ..~l ng 
He is also participant, needing 
1JP . c it : l 19) . 
Christian mor-al judgments nee•j to take into account the 
inr,c.ight + +1-0.l. G .• J~ Go::; pel into in vo2. ve1nen t 
in and with one another's circum::;tan•:;es and their causes, and 
into what mutually restrains our choice::; and limits our well-
being: "we are all in it together" (cf. Strawson, 1969:143). A 
healthy and supportive "community ethic" is essential, 
expressed as it may be more in the tangible terms of "good 
neighbourliness" and citizenship than in abstract principles, 
or, indeed, divinely-sanctioned laws. <see e.g. Moore, 1974: ch.4; 
Clark, 1982). But faith equally wants to supply the resources 
for transcending such an ethic, and it 1s here that we turn to 
the more positive part of our discussion. 
ii. The Access of Transcendence. 
Where can the access of the transcendent perspective of 
faith into the ethical stance of the Christian community be 
identified? It is the task of the explicitly confessing 
congregation to ensure that such a perspective is kept alive 
351 
and repeatedly set against the achievements of a cultural 
realization of Christian ethical ideals. The first point of 
entry of the transcendent lies in the surpassing of mere rules 
and conventions. The congregation is called to recognize and 
value its own deep indebtedness to the moral environment which 
surrounds and sustains it, but with the possibility of 
detachment. 
For traditional mor-al codes are capable of very serious 
malfunctions. Good neighbourliness can turn into a parochialism 
d• v1hich charity both begins and ends at home. All toe easily, 
an entirely well-meaning desire to protect, :::;ay, the ideal of 
marriage <which, after all, because it is difficult deserves to 
have its value highlighted) leads to a_n ostracizing of the 
divorced. Deep-seated a_nd otherwise quite j!Jstifiable 
convictions about law and order can produce a reluctance to 
contemplate even the possibility of rehabilitation- even 
redemption, in religious terms- where erstwhile offenders are 
c onC•:'rned. 
But the Church move::; in its ethical thinking between the 
poles of that reliance on traditional givens, communally 
transmitted and oriented to the past, which it has itself been 
responsible for inculcating and must therefore acknowledge, and 
the vision of a future in which such ethical provisions, 
largely aimed at achieving the best possible arrangements in 
an imperfect world, will give way to "the freedom of the sons 
of God". In the liturgical recitation of the stories of Jesu:3, 
in prayer and reflection and fellowship, the congregation 
should be repeatedly brought up against this transcendent 
possibility. Christians will then not rest content with rules 
<cf. Newbigin, 1966:138-45). 
The second 1n the 
excelling of a purely personal and privatized mar-ali ty in the 
direction of the Gospel's universal scope for the world. Here, 
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too, faith takes its cue from existing realities, because there 
is an irreducible inwardness about religious commitment which 
is the province solely of the individual who confesses it. 
Thus, the privatization of religion which is a product of 
secularization repre!3ents to some extent a return to basics. 
Unless individuals choose to worship, pray and serve in 
response to the inner pressure to do so, Christianity has 
become a dead thing. In the same way, Christian ethical 
formation is nothing without its individual per-sonal basis: in 
that sense, the song which runs "Let there be peace on earth, 
and let it begin with me'' proclaims a true insight. 
But because the Christian religion calls together a 
community of believers who have to come to terms with the fact 
that none of them is independent of the rest or absolutely free 
to practise their religion in the way they choose, the 
congregation is driven to ask beyond itself about the 
structural relation~::. of the wider ~~ocit?.t~f 3r~(~. the \"lOrld. Ylhere 
secularization ~~ resulting in an incre~singly assosj_atj_onal 
:=otyle of f-3.i th a.mong the diaspor3 o" believe,-s, it is 
particularly important that communal links with the world 
should be maintained and made the material of discus:=oion and 
witnessing activity by the group. 
\There this does not occur, the congregation becomes just 
another associational group, held together by the sectional 
interest of "religion"; and it is noteworthy how such groups 
lack any global interest in ethical que:=otions. "Fellowship" 
tends to devolve into an ethic of personal "nicenes:3" with no 
earnestness about the predicaments faced by all those who do 
not belong. The congregation needs to be kept abreast of what 
is going on in the world, and helped and encouraged to discuss 
it and support selected causes of action, so that its ethical 
awareness may 
Introversion 
be constantly driven out to fresh challenges. 
is the blight which strikes too many 
congregations with pettiness and tunnel vision. 
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Finally, a living and critical faith seeks to transcend 
the categorical distinction of ethics from religion, but not by 
reducing the latter to the former (van Buren, 1963:197-8), nor 
by playing down the moral content of faith <Gregor Smith, 
1966:34). 
The materials conserved within the religious cultural 
system of Christianity offer the possibility of interpreting 
one's world, and making one's choices, around the orientation 
to a transcendent vision filled out Christologically as a 
perfected and fulfilled version of the world. God, as in this 
s~r~;~e the future of the world, is ~~onfessed a.nd ~,..,orshipped as 
the guarantor and pattern of this ultimate good. The quests of 
religion and of ethics come together at this point: whoever- is 
under obligation to seek and to serve God, i:3 thereby enlisted 
in the ethical cause.~ 
In this way, Christians can respond positively to all 
those for whom religion is pre-eminently a matter of observing 
the decensies of humanly :::;ympathetic li'".Ting, v::1ile celebra.tins 
the hope of that which alone will mark the end- the telos- of 
a!l such efforts. 
The exponents of the new morality correctly perceived the 
need for an ethic of maturity which would not leave Christians 
high and dry in adherence to an outdated and inflexible 
heteronomy, unable to cope constructively with contemporary 
moral problems or compassionately with persons. 
However, they were misled by their determination to 
produce a "non-religious" ethic freed from the dead weight of 
rules into a failure to produce proposals which could ever be 
practicable in terms of the given shapes of Christian faith-
community. We have tried to suggest, in line with our analysis 
of the distinctive styles of religious commitment and 
belonging~ what wnnlrl be r~quired for these def iciencics to be 
made good. 
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'With this discussion we have come to the end of our 
detailed treatment of the major theological themes of Christian 
Radicalism. 'We have dealt with the theological topics according 
to the pattern of three basic issues, namely the nature and 
role of religion, the relationship between Christianity and 
secularization, and the problem of the institutional embodiment 
of faith within the life of the religious community. To each of 
these, we brought the critical stimulus of a sociological 
understanding. In Part Four of the thesis, we sum up the 
theoretical findings of the foregoing chapters, and then give 
some indication of the relevance of these to certain ongoing 
debates within the churches at the present time. 
NOTES, 
~.Fletcher's Situation Ethics (1966) did not appear until after Honest to Gnd, See 
f••rther discussion in P,Ramsey, Deeds and Ryles in Chrjstm Fthics, 1%7; P.Baelz, 
'thics and Belief, 1977: ch,9; O,Cook, The Mnral Maze, 1983:69-73; H,Thielicke, in 
eds, Thielicke and Schrey E Faith and Action, 1970:xlii-xli):; N,H,G,Robinson, ~ 
Groundwork of Christian thjcs, 1971; B,Hebtilethwaite, The AdeQuacy of Christian 
E.ihill., 1981, For R·,binson's view see further his Christian Morals To•jay, 196A; and 
for typical conservative reactions to hiroh .J,M,Morrison, Honesty and God, 19£.6: [h,6; 
<tnd O,F,Clarke, fQr Christ's Sake, 1963: c ,S, 
2. ihe term "situation ethics" was used bv Pooe Pius XII in 1952 in a statement, d..c.J.J. 
4rn.,SfDlitq Sedis denouncing an "existential~'. non-presc;'iptivist ethic ~hich · minht 
be able to "justify" actions contrarv to the teaching of the Chur[h, In 1956 Ehe 
~:upreme Sacre•j Con9regation of the Holy Office dubbed it the "new morality" and 
banned the teaching of it in Catholic seminaries and academies, Thus, from the first, 
situation ethics 111as bound up 11itb the question of the authority of faith 3nd Hn? 
~dmissibility •Jf the critical principle, . . , 
:3, Wtlllams, of course, 1s not a figure to be taken entHely senously as an e~:ponent 
of situationist or any other kind of ethical theory, But the dilemntas of his own 
life, as recounted in his unfortunate autobiography Someday I'll find You1 testify to the relevance of the theological problens he ferceived in the Church's e.hical life-
problems from which he himself, as a child o the ecclesiastical system, was unable 
to find any escape, except into the monastic existence of Mirfield, He is a victim of 
the. state of affairs he criticises, even if his positive proposals are often 
ludtcrous, 
4, Thielicke has criticised the ethic resulting from the Lutheran doctrine of the T11o 
KingdoMs as lacking in precisely this eschat•Jlogical acumen, for this point of vie\!/ 
sees traditional ethics as a necessary co11proruse, an ordinance for the Kin·~dom of 
this world in which sin still infects every human endeavour, But an ethic which is in 
effect a holding-operation against the worst effects of "fallenness" cannot help but 
be, at the same time, the expression of the same condition, There is therefore the 
need for a "not yet" ethic to ·~oad the traditional into dissatisfaction with itself 
IThielicke and Schrey, op,cit; and Schrey, Reich Gottes ynd Welt: IXff), 
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PART FOUR; CONCLUSIONS. 
CHAPTER XIV; RETROSPECTIVE. 
The two chapters which form this concluding part of the 
thesi:; have each a distinctive purpo:::;e and style. The first is 
theoretical, aimed at recapitulating the arguments marshalled 
and positions reached in the foregoing chapters. The second is 
more practical in tone, and indi•::ates areas of contemporary 
church life in which the d•?bates of twenty years ago, and the 
judgments upon them we have made, continue to have relevance. 
ln this first concluding chapter, then, we retra.ce our 
stepE ove~ the body of the thesis thus far. The sections of the 
cbaptc>r a~<=> p;-c>fc·:>'·.~ by the number::o of the succe:3sive earlier 
chapters as a guide to how the argument was developed. 
Part One of the thesis constructed the frame within which 
t~e i~vestigations which followed were to be carr1ec on. 
I. The point of departure of the thesis was an interest in 
" ·:;eri<J·; of th•:>clogical enL:;odes and controversies in the life 
of the churches dur-ing the nineteen-:::;ixties, which we termed 
"Christian Radicalism". These related debates and events are of 
particular fascination because of the high level of public 
attention to theological issues and church affairs they 
attracted. The phenomenon of Christian Radicalism was 
characterized by a simultaneous concern for theological 
reformulation and for reform and renewal in the life and 
structures of the Church, and by a sense of the •:lose inter-
relatedness of the two. 
The overarching interest of the Christian radicals was in 
"secularity". They wanted to find a presentation of Christian 
theology and the Gospel which would be intelligible and 
relevant to modern, secular-minded people, and they perceived 
that this would ah:;o entail a fresh, secular understanding of 
the Chu!Th, as the bearer of that Gospel. 
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These interests raised three sets of questions which were 
absolutely fundamental to Christian Radicalism. Firstly the 
nature and functions of religion were queried, in asking 
whether a non-religious interpretation of Christianity could be 
found. Secondly, the proper attitude of Christian theology and 
the Church towards secularization came under review, as to 
whether wholehearted affirmation rather than confronta.tion was 
possible. Thirdly, there was a search for an operational form 
of undogmatic faith which might engage constructively and 
critically with secular realities. 
The radical theologians were concerned to express an 
under:c;tandiag of theological ideas that would be relevo.nt to 
secular social realities. Further, they wanted to follow this 
through in a restructuring of the Church, as the place par 
excellence theological meanings as::=.ume tangible 
historical and social form. In view of this. we proposed that a 
fitting critical perspective on the rarlicals' work l' COU..L.Q be 
found in the discipline of the :=m::iology of :·eligion, wn::..c;t is 
particularly concerned with the concrete social fer~~ in which 
religious meaning comes to expression. 
II. To draw upon sociology for the critical perspective of 
a theological thesis, it wa:3 necessary to establish a 
theoretical and methodological position on the relationship 
between . 1 SOClD~ogy and theology. Rejecting approaches which 
would allow either discipline to dominate the other, or merge 
the two together, or maintain a total mutual immunity of the 
one from the other, we proposed that a \Veberian model of 
sociological activity was most suited to fruitful interaction 
with theology. 
Such a model does not reduce the sociological analysis of 
religious meaning to a matter of social functions. It pays 
attention to the subjective meaning of actions and beliefs for 
the agents, and recognizes the complex dialectical relationship 
between ideas- specifically, religious ideas- and material 
factors in the processes of social change. 
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It was also necessary to adopt a corresponding 
understanding of theological activity. The theologian is 
engaged in a critical, hermeneutical discipline, reflecting upon 
the Christian tradition which is given to him as his basic 
material, as it engages and has engaged with changing social 
and cultural contexts. The theologian himself is the product of 
a tradition and an environment, and so his bringing of the 
resources of the tradition to bear upon a situation in order to 
speak to it of God is only one moment of a dialectic. 
In the other moment, he and his tradition are only 
properly understood in terms of past relationships with the 
context. The theologian is committed, because he is a product 
of the tradition in the past, a present participant in its life 
and one who desires to see it more effective in the future. 
Soc:::iology analyses the complexities of these pa.st and 
present relationships of religious tradition to social and 
cultural context, and indicates the social constraints and 
limitations under which any future, renewed realizations of the 
meaning of the Gospel tradition will have to operate. we 
advanced the recent work of David Martin as a specific example 
of this type of understanding of the relationship between 
sociology and theology. 
III. Given the main theoretical concerns of Christian 
Radicalism and this way of approaching the sociological 
dimensions of a "secular theology", the peculiar attraction of 
the writings of Bonhoeffer for the radicals becomes clear. For 
Bonhoeffer was throughout his career interested in what might 
be termed the "horizontal projection" of theological meanings, 
outward into concrete social relations, and correspondingly in 
the sociological nature of the Church. He recognized, in other 
words, the intimate relationship between abstract theological 
questions and the concrete structures of church life. 
Secondly, BfJnhoP.ffpr's enigmatic prison writings appear in 
this light as the attempt of a theologian who knows himself to 
be the product both of a particular religious tradition and an 
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emerging secular world to reflect upon what this means for the 
Gospel he is charged to expound. He wants to explore the 
projection of theological meaning into the secular, sociological 
dimension, while struggling with how to retain the inalienable 
Gospel content which can still speak to the secular from over 
against it. 
As such, Bonhoeffer's concerns not only foreshadowed 
those of Christian Radicalism but also suggested subtleties 
about the problem of the religious group within the secular 
society, and the dialectical nature of the Christian ':3 relation 
to modernity, which the radicals who followed him did not 
always take up. · VIe set out in Part Two of the thesis to 
develop tools from the sociology of religion to enable us to 
explore these subtleties and deficiencies, in our ensuing 
critical analysis of the radicals' theology. 
IV. VIe argued in favour of treating religion as a cultural 
syst>::m, expressing by means of its beliefs and imagery, rituals 
and conventions and social embodiments, an orientation to the 
tran:3cendent. Such an approach leaves the way open for 
examining all those cultural manifestations which commonly 
count as "religion" vtithin a given society, and only then 
proceeding to ask about the social functions they perform. 
By the "transcendent", we meant a sacred order, in the 
nature of "another world", bearing a double relation to the 
everyday world of empirical reality. Firstly, the transcendent 
provides the basis of order and meaning for the world as 
social groups and individuals experience it. It stabilizes and 
affirms the world, granting metaphysical legitimation and 
sanction to its institutions and offering an ultimate rationale 
for its problems. 
But secondly, because it appears as a fulfilled or 
perfected version of this world, the transcendent <that which 
"surpasses", "excels", "lifts up") gains the power to act back 
upon the world as a constraining influence, summoning religious 
people to action for change. 
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Religion, therefore, presents a dialectical tension between 
the legitimation and the criticism of the world of the 
religious group, which in modern societies is unlikely to 
comprise the society as a whole. The religious believer gains 
from his religion an assurance, an identity and an answer to 
the threat of meaninglessness, deriving from the givenness of 
a metaphysical anchorage for the social order and the cohesive 
stability of his social group. But he also inherits a set of 
values, a vision and an ideal the world which prevent him from 
resting completely content with the status quo. 
V. The sociological debate about secularization is vital 
to the understanding of the effect of contemporary social and 
cultural ·~onditions upon religious life. However, the presence 
of almost diametrically opposed views within sociology forbids 
us to assume that the process is at all simple, unilinear or 
monocausal. We proposed an analysis along two lines, focusing 
upon the socio-structural and cultural processes respectively. 
Vi thin the :3tructural organization of society, a process 
of differentiation, resulting in the autonomous, specialized 
professional competence of institutional spheres, has involved 
the religious as much as any other sub-system of society. The 
Church, deprived of its direct authority over other areas of 
institutional life, is seen increasingly as the organization 
with special professional responsibility for the religiofus 
sector of life. As such, this differentiated role is also a 
rather marginal one, since the functional centre of secular 
society makes little reference to religion in furthering its 
rational, instrumental ends. 
Secondly, at the cultural level, desacralizing processes 
have removed the right of any overall world-view to claim 
ultimate authority for itself. The Christian religion is no 
longer called upon to fulfil the function of sanctioning the 
cohesion of society and legitimating its values. Although this 
potentially liberates religion to fulfil a more creative role, 
cultural secularization also has its damaging and debilitating 
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side. The decline of any strong cultural infrastructure leaves 
many people in ignorance and confusion, devoid of any 
serviceable and constructive world-view at all. 
Secularization, therefore, even to the extent that it 
represents one line of socio-cultural realization of the 
Christian Gospel, cannot but be intensely problematic for 
religion. It is neither simply religious decline nor religious 
fulfilment, but invites religious life into a precarious 
interplay between limitation and opportunity. 
VI. 'What we had :3a.id so far could not be applied without 
reference to the circumstances of actual participants in the 
neligious culture. It was necessary to ask how faith itself, 
as the inner disposition or mode of life which comes to 
expression through religion, is operative in the concrete 
context. For faith has to achieve historical continuity of 
expression by means of institutional form, and there is always 
ambiguity and compromise in the sociological patterns under 
which faith is embodied and lived out. 
Two ba:3ic dualities can be observed. Firstly, a church-
type of religious membership is conceived as available for 
all, with an antecedently existing religious institution 
offering its services to the community at large. But in a sect-
type of membership, only the covenanting together of the 
religiously committed few brings the institution into being at 
all, and thus a high degree of distinctivenes:3 over against the 
world is maintained. 
Secondly, a communal style of religiosity represents the 
religious sub-culture created by every religion in its 
successive stages of socio-cultural embodiment. People are born 
into it and seek to live out what constitutes for them a pre-
reflectively "religious" way of life according to its 
conventions and values. But an assoc ia tiona 1 style of 
religiosity sees religious commitment much more in terms of 
people associating together for very specifically religious 
activities in the pursuit of explicitly religious ideals. 
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There is a clear affinity between the direction of the 
processes of secularization and the sectarian and associational 
options within these dualities. Insofar as a more sectarian 
style of religious membership becomes sociologically 
inevitable, the group needs to take particular responsibility 
for regenerating the communal religious culture in which it is 
E.et. Insofar as religion is practised more and more in an 
associational way, a counter-balance lies in the heightening of 
emphasis upon the church aspect of the continuing religious 
institution, in its antecedent social presence. 
The:se were the :sociological materials v1hich were brought 
to bear as critical stimuli as we moved on in Part Three to 
undertake our main investigation of the theology of Christian 
f(a.d icalis1n. 
VII. The thematic examination was prefaced, however, by an 
attempt to demonstrate how the main sets of questions to which 
the ~.ociologica.l in:=.truJnent=:; were directed were pre:=.ent, 
implicitly or explici-tly, in the debateE., events and 
controversies which largely made up the overall episode of 
ChrL:::;tian Radicalism. This was in support of our view of 
theolo3ical activity as ari::::;ing critically at the points of 
intersection of religious tradition with changing socio-
cultural context. 
For Christian Radicalism was not a fully-fledged theology 
set out in systematic treatises; often it did not even possess 
academic respectability. Yet in a mostly pragmatic, pastoral 
and occasional context, it uncovered large and important is::::;ues 
for the churches; and substantive concerns often underlay the 
passing, unscholarly and even trivial debates. It was only 
against the background of these controversies that the more 
substantially theological investigation was allmred to proceed. 
VIII. Christian Radicalism undertook, fin;tly, a search for 
a non-religious approach to the question of God. Robinson and 
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others attempted to analyse common secular experience in a way 
which would justify theistic talk about it and render this 
meaningful to modern men and women who came equipped with no 
religious predispositions. Recognizing the dangers of an 
immanent naturalism, the theologians then tried to retain a 
foothold for the transcendent within this secular analysis. 
Their overriding concern was that talk of God should be seen 
to be eminently about this world, about concrete realities, and 
not dependent upon speculations about another world, of little 
conceivable relevance to secular men and women. 
These a.ppro-:~che:3 were too quick -l:,o discard the social 
reality of as a cultura_l systen: as basis for 
discovering the secular meaning of talk of God. The theologians 
themselves were only able to make the analyses of se,:::ular 
experience they did because they were themselves Christians 
and participants in a religious tradition out of and through 
which God was confessed, and secular experience interpreted, in 
a particular way. 
In the way in question, the c!.i.'llectic of u:~li3ion as both 
lc?gi timation and critic ism of the world -order of the rel igiou:3 
group reaches a particularly high critical tension. God is 
confessed as one who both upholds and grants value to the 
prevailing order, and yet will not allow the believer to rest 
content with it. For the Christian, religion is already 
profoundly to do with this world- precisely, with a promi:3ed 
future order for the world. 
A "secular" understanding of God and the Gospel should 
therefore not seek to eliminate religion, but rather to pay 
closer attention to the given forms of religious expression as 
an empirically available social reality. It is through these 
forms within the culture that men and women come to that 
security and sense of worth in their present world-situation, 
combined with a commitment to purposive action towards its 
transformation in the hope of a new world, which is peculiarly 
characteristic of the Gospel. 
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So there should be no attempt to reject "religion" as 
alienating and bad, while retaining, say, "faith", or 
"Christianity", as good and creative. For Christianity 
inevitably generates its religious expressions, in and with the 
tensions of which the believer must seek profitably to live. It 
is precisely these which keep him- for better or worse- firmly 
involved and implicated in the world, while unable to be 
satisfied with it. 
IX. Some of the radicals, such as van Buren, judged that 
the way around the problem of theism for the contemporary 
secular mind was to focus all attention instead upon the human 
figure of Jesus of Nazareth as the repository of all that 
theological language might possibly mean. However, this 
approach does not, in fact, succeed in removing from the 
radical the need to grapple with the dialectical tension of 
religion. 
For the ~1ay the figure of Jesu8 functions within 
Christian religious practice partakes of that same te.nsion. The 
same Jesus who is treated as the very embodiment of the 
promised perfected order, the "new creation" and the 11 new man11 , 
also merges obscurely with his own· cultural and historical 
background and dies at the hands of that same social world. 
As an alternative way of trying to understand in a 
concrete way what is meant by the Christian's confession of 
this man as Saviour and Lord, the sociological reality of the 
Church might be examined. For this community is confessed as 
that which embodies and carries on the presence and work of 
Jesus amid the world; and so, within its institutional 
presentation and structures, there should be some indications 
of the same tensions and modalities which characterized the 
way of Jesus in the world. 
X. As well as trying to express the meaning of God in 
terms of secular experience, Christian Radicalism also sought 
to repristinate the Christian proclamation by reversing the 
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prevailing trend of opposition to the processes of modernity 
on the part of theology and the churches. Cox and others 
believed that if contemporary social and cultural changes were 
producing an increasingly secular social system and a secular-
oriented type of man to go with it, the Church should ask 
whether it could affirm, welcome and build upon these processes 
theologically. It should develop a theological standpoint which 
could wholeheartedly affirm secularization while still making 
room for a vital role for the churches in a secular society. 
But the sociological perspective suggests it is unwise to 
attempt to reclaim the entire secularization process as gain 
for the Gospel. No social consequences of the influence of 
Chri::;tianity upon a culture over time can ever be affirmed 
unambiguously, because the Gospel always contains a surplus of 
promise which enables it to criticise its own fruits. 
Structural differentiation and the increasing 
marginalization of the Church• are social facts which it will be 
necessary for the religious institutions to accept "t?efore they 
can consider realistically what a continuing vital role might 
entail. Such a role will certainly involve the maximising of 
specifically religious resources in the interests of combating} 
and not affirming, certain deleterious effects of the 
secularization of culture. 
XI. This critic ism, that the radicals did not face first 
of all the social realities of the situation facing religion and 
Church under the conditions of secularization, applies 
particularly to the proposals, typified by the thinking of the 
World Council of Churches, aimed at recasting the Church's 
mission in secular-social terms and reshaping its structures 
to enable it to accomplish this mission. Present practical 
social constraints urge upon the Church a globally less 
ambitious, but more effectively specialized role, in which the 
involvement in secular social action is always tempered and 
qualified by the context of worship and the religious proviso 
of transcendence. 
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XII. Faced with the question of institutional religious 
life under the conditions of modernity, radical theology 
desired to operationalize the concept of a non-dogmatic, 
critical and open form of faith. Gregor Smith in particular 
tried to comprehend the interior texture of the life of faith 
as thoroughly historical, thriving upon a continual dialogue 
between its inherited traditions and the undetermined future 
into which God calls the believer forth. Chri::;tian faith should 
constitute the inne1~ resource by which a man or- woman could 
meet with mature responsibility the changing challenges of the 
moment, as part of a believing community sustained by a common 
heritage and a common hope. Smith and others gave some 
o..ttt~ntion tc tryi~13 to map out the in~.titutiona~ form:=:. v1hich 
could support and express such an understanding of fait~. 
While the call fm- c critical form of mature, secular 
faith was understandably motivated by the evidence of 
defensiveness, dishonesty and dependence in much of the 
existing faith-life of the chw-ches, the blueprint produced by 
radical theology nevertbeless lacked .3. t tune1nen ~ to the 
exigencie:3 Bnd in~vita.bl~ EJ.mbiguitir~:=> cf institutic1~aJ.ization. 
There can be no univocal social realization of the critical, 
future-oriented arm of faith alone. Rather, a plu::-ali ty of 
institutional forms must embrace both angles of faith's 
dialectic, including that which is largely unreflectively borne 
along by communal tradition. 
For this reason, a threefold pattern of institutional 
presentation of "church" needs to be emphasised. There is not 
only the culturally embedded form of faith which is expressed 
in the best manifestations of folk-religion (which are 
threatened by secularization) and the more reflective faith of 
the increasingly committed "core" congregation, but also the 
presence of the over-arching religious institution, which is 
there with its resources and symbolism for both community and 
congregation alike. The Church needs, for the sa.ke of the 
vitality of faith, to pay close attention to the health and 
interaction of all these three forms. 
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XIII. The concern of Christian Radicalism to promote the 
"new morality" in the form of a situational ethic betrays a 
similar insensitivity to the constraints of institutional 
possibility. For while it becomes the duty of the committed 
religious congregation to discover and express the 
transcendence of traditional and unreflective rule- based 
morality through the vision of the Gospel, these less critical 
forms can never be replaced. Nor, in the end, L; the perfection 
of a pure "ca::;uistry of love" something which 1:"3 fully 
achievable vlithin the social forms of either Church or world, 
e,;::.pe'= i_a ll y if it. seeks to cut Chr i::;t ians off from the 
compromised and ironic consequences of their own past actions. 
Our judgment upon the problems Christian Radicali::;m 
sought to tackle is that they were, and c,re, impo:dani:, urgent 
and relevant. The high level of public controversy of twenty 
years ago showed that difficult theological issues are not only 
the province of academic studies, but are a1so present, 
im?lici+Ly if not exr·Ec:itly, in the problems and concern:3 that 
confront the churches at a popular and pa.stora.l level. The 
radi,=al theologians were committed to the idea that their 
theological labours should bear directly upon the vital 
question of the actual living out of the Christian life within 
concrete social experience under contemporary conditions. As 
such, theological reformulation was not to be divorced from the 
empirical structures of church life. 
All of this we wish to affirm in the episode of Chri:3tian 
Radicalism. But our study has shown how the proposals for 
theology and Church advanced by the radicals suffered 
throughout from a lack of sociological realism: and such a 
deficiency is clearly serious in any theology setting out to be 
self-consciously "secular". In our closing chapter, we indicate 
how the unfinished agenda of Christian Radicalism is closely 
relevant to i:3sues facing the churches today, which likewise 
require close attention from a sociological point of view. 
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CHAPTER XV: TOWARDS AN EMPIRICAL ECCLESIOLOGY? 
In the previous chapter we summarized the theoretical 
positions attained in the body of the thesis, and it is now 
time to turn to 
throughout the 
some practical questions. Vle have maintained 
thesis a model of theological activity as 
arising at the interface between Gospel tradition and concrete 
social and cultural context. Theoretical theological thinkin3 
cannot be divorced from issues facing the empirical life of the 
churches, as thE> bearer:=. of the religious cultural systems in 
and through 1..,hicb theological meanings come to their concrete 
expression. The episode of Cbri:stian Radicalism lent itself 
readily to 3nalysi:::; under thi:::; type of model of theological 
praxis. 
From our vantage point of tv<enty years on and with the 
aid of our critical sociological perspectives, we uncovered 
reasons for the rela.tive failur-e of the ::1ovement to have fa.r-
reaching determinative influence upon the sub:sequent life of 
the chu:-c·he:~, Our conviction rem a. in:=, that, despite the :~eriou:=. 
shortcomings of the movement, Christian Radicalism sought to 
tackle urgent questions which have lost none of their force. In 
the issue of the continuing vitality of religious life and of 
the churches under con temporary cultural conditions, the story 
since the sixtie,::; has not been so encouraging as to justify 
ignoring the attempts of that decade to meet the problems. 
For these rea:::;ons, we end the thesis by indicating areas 
of present church life in which the unfinished agenda of 
Christian Radicalism may be seen to have continuing relevance 
for us. Vle have entitled these conclusions, "Towards an 
Empirical Eccle:3iology?" This brings out the force of our 
contention that any theology that has a real claim to be 
"secular" must undertake its reflections in dialogue with given 
socio-cultural realities, i.e. with what is secularly available. 
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Of all the traditional divisions of systematic theology, 
ecclesiology most obviously stands out as that which refers to 
a concretely existing, historical and social reality. In the 
area of ecclesiology, therefore, theology has a prima facie 
responsibility to be "secular", i.e.to deal in the interpretation 
of this-worldly social realities. 
This thesis is not itself, of course, an ecclesiology, and 
thh; chapter does not elabora.te one in detail. There is no 
exhau:3tive treatment or documentation in the sections which 
follow, since we are here :ootepping out:3ide our main area of 
study in the sixties. All we are suggesting is that the lessons 
we have learnt frorn Christian Radicalism about the 
re<=!_Uirements for a truly ":::oecular" theology should be allowed 
to shed light upon certain vexed questions which still confront 
the churches, and in regard to \"hich, at the present time, an 
unhealthy polarization of opinion seems to be occurring. 
~. L~turgical Renewal. 
'We have argued that "religion" remains indi:::opensable, 
becau:3e 1 t 1s through the resources of the religious cultural 
system that the orientation to the transcendent is transmitted 
and kept alive through time. Only this orientation generates 
the dispositions by which a person can both feel confident and 
at home in the world, and at the same time live in hope of a 
better world and undertake purposive action towards bringing 
it into being. The language used in religious worship is 
therefore of the utmost importance, because as it is used 
repeatedly and becomes familiar it bears the particular 
responsibility for inculcating these dispositions into 
religious persons, ultimately at pre-reflective levels. The 
debate about liturgical language, therefore, should be about 
much more than just "ancient" versus "modern". 
It is unhelpful and confusing when the supporters of 
liturgical renewal appear simply as reckless modernizers, 
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insisting that the language of worship should be as down-to-
earth and functional as contemporary secularity demands. It is 
equally beside the point when the critics of modern liturgies 
are depicted, or present themselves, as traditionalist diehards, 
bent upon incarcerating the Church in the sixteenth or 
seventeenth century and perpetuating its irrelevance in the 
modern world. The matter is too important to be polarized in 
this v.ay, e::;pcially as it is evident that neither traditional 
nor modern liturgie::; are able to make very much headway in 
bringing to life the meaning of religiom::. worship among those 
who are far alienated from the churches. 
The campaign •,.;aged by David Martin against the modern 
liturgies has been almost wilfully misunderstood by some 
contemporary churchmen. Martin does tend not to distinguish 
hard argument from personal r-eligious conservatism 
sufficiently clearly. But the argument itself is plain enough 
<e.g.M:cn-tin, 1981 <b>!: we have ended up with too ru:Jch poor 
quality modern writing. 
contemporary (being just 
A r;reat 
the old 
deal 
language 
neither truly 
"updated") nor 
capable of resonating with the transcendent. For the outsider, 
much of it might just as well still be the traditional liturgy, 
so full is it of theological and ecclesiastical technicalities. 
But for the regular worshipper, it is often too breezily 
unpoetic to enliven the imagination. 
The language of liturgy must neither keep God at a safe 
distance by enveloping him in impenetrable mystification, nor 
encapsulate him neatly in the flat monotone of contemporary 
media-talk. It must be translucent, letting it at all the 
crucial points the light of the transcendent which motivates 
the worshipper to confess both that God is here among us in 
the common secular concern, and that we must join "with the 
whole company of heaven" in worshipping one who is 
immeasurably greater than that concern. 
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Liturgical language and rites should facilitate for the 
participants the heal thy religious mediation between the 
securities of tradition and the summons to change, between 
legitimation and criticism, between familiarity and creative 
disjunction. To recognize this need would be to render 
irrelevant the sterile argument about mere "modernity" of 
language. 
ii. Folk-religion. 
The persistence of folk-religion is becoming the cause of 
ii widening breach of opinion, particularly between the more 
extreme Catholic and Evangelical parties in the Church of 
England on the one band and those of the centre on the other. 
The proce:::.se:::. of cultural secularization mean that the folk-
~eligion h. 1 WJ,J.lC:: .... l does per:3 ist i:3 becoming ever more fragmentary, 
confused and compounded of semi-Christian, semi-pagan or 
superstitious elements. At the same time, the structural 
marginalization of the Church i:3 resulting in smaller and more 
committed core congreg~tions, often composed to a growing 
extent of "converted" rather tha.n ":3ocialized" Christians. 
In these circumstances it is not surprising that many 
clergy are tempted to cut their losses and opt out of the folk-
religious arena. They want an end to infant baptisms, save for 
the children of committed church members, who, ironically, 
increasingly decide to defer their children's baptism because 
they are persuaded of the case for believers' baptism. There is 
a readiness to speak of our "post-Christian" or even "neo-
pagan" society. The Church desires to draw its boundaries much 
more clearly, and to refuse any longer to allow itself to be 
''used" by those who have no commitment to it. The congregation 
is urged to build itself up as a "community", from which base 
it can move out in evangelistic missions into the godless 
world around it. There is an enthusiasm for recapturing the 
spirit of the early Church. 
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Christian Radicalism experienced difficulty in trying to 
redefine a vitally necessary role for the churches amid a 
world whose secularity it wanted to affirm. When it thought in 
terms of an aggressive role for the churches as God's front-
line or avant-garde, it did not know what to do about the 
troublesome residues of fringe and uncommitted members who did 
not really fit that description of the Church . 
Today this problem persists: for understandable though 
the desire is to go all-out for "commitment Christianity~~ and 
to cast off the encumbrances of folk-religion, it is only the 
much more frustrati?-8, messy and unsatisfactory path which 
does justice to the social facts. That is, we are not and could 
not be in either a "post-Christian" or the equivalent of a 
"pre-ChristianH age. Social history cannot be reNritten, and the 
untidy rubble left by the crumbling of Christendom remains the 
responsibility of the churches to administer- for no-one else 
will do it, and real people of flesh and blood are inv.olved. 
Thi:s is why we stressed the importance of the threefold 
pattern of Christian presence within culture and society, 
including as well as the unreflective, traditional patterns of 
community faith and the commitment of the congregation, the. 
visible institutional presence of the Church as the necessary 
mechanism for holding the others together. Where local 
cOngregations are becoming more homogeneously committed, it is 
important that they should see that their membership within 
the antecedently existing institution of the Church requires 
them to employ their critical commitment in taking 
responsibility for the community in which they are set. If they 
do not, even while their own commoh life becomes mare 
religiously well-defined and fulfilling, the culture of their 
local community may be suffering still further dissipation and 
decline. We need to find out how the promotion of a distinct 
"commitment" Christianity can be compatible with taking folk-
religion with the utmost seriousness. 
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iii. The Clergy. 
Christian Radicalism was anxious to get rid of the idea 
of a "clerical caste" within the Church, with a clergy 
possessing special powers denied to ordinary lay Christians. 
What the radicals failed to do was to consider the 
implications of the Church's givenness and social presence as 
an institution, whereby the clergy, in virtue of their office as 
the servants and employees of that institution, inevitably take 
on roles and functions which distinguish them from the body of 
unordained religious believers. In other words, a sociologically 
realistic theology of the Church will accept that, within t"he 
total social and institutional manifestation "churchn, it is the 
tBsk of clergy and laity together to express the wholeness of 
what is meant by speaking of the Church as, for example, 
Christ's Body, or as the instrument of the continuation of his 
presence and work in the world. 
Today's debates about the role of the clergy and the 
meaning of priesthood, \'fhich have been largely stimulated by 
the issue of the ordination of women, could benefit from this 
secular approach. For another unhelpful palariza tion is 
threatened on this question. On the one ha_nd, some clergy are 
eager to deny that their ordained status marks them out as in 
any way different from lay Christians. Their position is 
marked by such symbolic gestures as the refusal to wear a 
clerical collar, or a reluctance to take the chair at meetings. 
They wish to deny the institutional functions which both 
society at large and their congregations ascribe to them, and 
become instead persons who are paid simply to "be there". They 
cannot define their role at all, but simply wait to see what 
demands each day brings to their door. 
But on the other side there is a flourishing movement 
which seeks to reassert tn the strongest posstble terms a 
"charismatic" model of priesthood as an indelible quality which 
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sets a man apart for life and endows him with powers denied 
to others. Such a view attempts to avoid the role-confusion of 
the clergyman by carving out a very definite, unique and 
circumscribed set of competences for the priest, centred upon 
his sacramental qualifications. Als.o, the affectation of 
particular forms of dress and the expectation of being 
addressed as "Father" by the laity serve as external badges of 
this special authority and status, <It is here that the most 
pathological opposition to the ordination of women is found.) 
Whatever the undeniable pastoral care and sacrificial service 
undertaken by prieqts who see their role in this way, the end 
product can still only be a passive and docile laity, for the 
subliminal symbolism of authoritarianism is altogether too 
strong, 
But the present institutional position of the clergy 
offers no such ways out of tension and contradictoriness. The 
clergy are supposed to be professionally specialized,. yet are 
expected by their congregations to be jacks-of-all-trades and 
consequently treated by the war ld as masters of none, They 
occupy the position in the Church 15 spectrum which invites an 
explicit commitment to transcendence and hence a prophetically 
critical stance towards society 1 but most also have a pastoral 
duty towards conservative congregations they may not dare risk 
upsetting. They are resource persons available for all, in a 
society where few desire the resources, except at certain 
limited stages in the life-cycle, 
In the face of these tensions, the clergy's only realistic 
choice appears to be to "stand and allow the waves of 
marginality to break over them" <Towler and Coxon, 1979:54). If 
they do, the strains and tensions inherent in their role could 
just prove to reflect certain features of Jesus' own career in 
the world, which although by no means easy, might well be 
religiously appropriate, 
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Alternatively, the Church will have to make real headway 
in promoting limited-range, specialist ministries as· its norm 
for the paid clergy, while authenticating the ministry of 
indigenous unpaid elders as the pattern of local pastoral 
leadership. But these proposals cannot be pursued in any detail 
within our context here. 
iv. The Church and Politics. 
Theologians may treat it as established that the Gospel 
has political implications and that religion and politics 
cannot be absolutely divorced. But within the churches the 
issue is far from being agreed. The argument that the business 
of the Church is with the spiritual needs of man, and that it 
ought not therefore to "meddle" in politics, is still frequently 
heard. The matter has come to public prominence again recently 
as a consequence of a number of cases of the Church expressing 
critical attitudes towards Government policy, notably over 
nuclear weapons and the plight of the inner cities .. 'Our study 
of the attempts of Christian Radicalism to recast the Church's 
mission in secular-social terms suggests two area.s of 
misunderstanding which will still have to be cleared up if 
clarity in the present debates is to be achieved. 
The first concerns the spirit of the Church's socio-
political engagements and pronouncements. Critics who maintain 
that the business of the Church is with religion are, after all, 
correct in the letter of what they say. Our quarrel with them 
is that they are mistaken about the nature of religion: for 
with its intrinsic concern about the quality of life in the 
world, under the compelling vision of an eschatological state 
of affairs in which every ideal for the world shall be 
fulfilled and every deficiency made good, religion is indeed 
about political- i.e.public and socio-structural- interests. 
But the point is that the spirit of the Church's pursuit 
of these interests must be seen to differ from that of the 
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competent secular institutions involved. The Church must not· 
appear simply to be trying to do somebody else's job without 
the proper professional qualifications. For the Church, through 
its bearing of the resources of the religious culture, must 
accompany all its social engagements with the dimension of 
transcendence which is introduced by worship. This dimension 
will forbid it ever to be without reservation on the side of a 
particular political cause: but it does not prevent it from 
ever taking sides at all. 
The st:=cond misunderstanding concerns the standpoint from 
which the Church issues its judgments and recommendations. For 
a secular society has no interest in prescriptions simply 
handed down on the basis of theological principles. The 
Church's standpoint should rather be that of those ·who 
struggle to implement the Gospel under the constraints, 
ambiguities and ironies of the concrete context. Its 
pronouncements should take the form of the fruits of critical 
reflection upon engaged activity, and not commentciry from a 
point of detached observation. 
All over the country there are Christian groups who o.re 
attempting to do something about a variety of social needs and 
problems in their local communities. It is upon the experiences 
and frustrations of these that reports and analyses issued by 
the centralised institutional Church on current social issues 
should draw. The secular-social commitments of local church 
groups are often not regarded as "political" by those involved, 
whereas the material in official reports seems to ordinary 
Christians to be "out of their reach", dealing with massive 
national and international affairs toward which they feel 
powerless. The existence of this disparity is another instance 
of how the localised small-group and the higher-level visible 
and centralised institutional presentations of ''church" need, 
supplement and correct one another- something which occurs all 
too little at the present time. 
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v. Conservatives and Liberals. 
Everything that has been said above about dispelling 
misunderstanding and avoiding polarization depends upon the 
realization of the committed core congregation as a "critical 
public" within the Church. But probably the liveliest and most 
instructive public controversy in the Church of England since 
Honest to God, that over the Bishop of Durham, David Jenkins, 
indicates that this kind of critically committed group is very 
far from having been formed. For many congregations remain 
woefully ignorant both of the traditions of their Church and 
its theology, and of the implications of contemporary 
theological thinking. Moreover, many clergy are content to 
leave things this way, being convinced themselves that critical 
theology can seriously damage your faith. 
The quality of educational materials designed to train 
Christians in reflection upon, their tradition is actually quite 
high, with a spate of study courses, practical programmes and 
basic learning exercises coming from the Church's various 
educational agencies. But the take-up at parish level is often 
disappointingly low. The most critical and radical thinkers are 
usually located within the specialist areas of ministry, 
whereas parish clergy are much more likely to be 
conservatives. Some prefer their safe manuals of devotion, with 
instructions for the faithful about the meaning of liturgical 
symbolism and the colours, vestments and ceremonial proper to 
various festivals; others keep to bright and breezy practical 
guides on how to evangelize and edifying Bible studies innocent 
of critical questions, full of untroubled certainties and slick 
answers. Diversity in the Church of England ossifies along 
sterile "party lines"; and both · parties join forces in a 
polarization of opinion against all those they class as 
"liberals11 • 
There is in addition to this an uncertainty about the 
proper place of critical theology within the training of 
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ordinands <cf. Sykes, 1978:79-83). Theological college students 
often castigate courses for being "too academic", or swallow 
just enough theology to pass their examinations before heaving 
a sigh of relief at no longer having to be bothered, once they 
get into a parish, with the inconvenient problems theologians 
insist on raising. An anti-intellectual bias continues to affect 
the styles of parish teaching ministry; and this, combined with 
the minister's understandable but unfortunate desire not to 
introduce even more insecurity into an already uncertain social 
role, leads to the dosing of the people with the safest of 
palliatives, and the view that 11 ideas" are dangerous things 
they cannot be trusted to handle. 
It is true that the short-term successes of conservative 
and protectionist policies of this kind are quite encouraging. 
Conservative churches are the ones that grow, and to which 
eclectic congregations flock. But our study suggests that the 
long-term pro!3pects are less promising, for these chUrches are 
being given no substantial resources for comprehending or 
coping with the increasingly secularized cultural conditions 
which surround them. The excitement of conservative revivals 
waxes and wanes, but the eventual burden of the day for the 
Christian faith fa.lls upon the health of those institutional 
and communal continuities and tradi tians by means of which 
some kind of cultural transmission of the influence of the 
Gospel is assured. As long as the Church suffers from . a 
polarization of "conservative11 and 
theological opinion, the in-fighting 
these vital long-term influences. 
"liberal" <or critical) 
causes the neglect of 
Christian Radicalism ventured the hope that the positions 
of mature Christian commitment and critical, open-minded 
thinking were not mutually exclusive. Apart from the over-
zealous desire of the radicals to appear iconoclastic, we think 
that their intuition was correct: to be "radical" can indeed 
mean to be both critical and in a highly positive sense 
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"conservative". To treat the whole of the religious and 
theological tradition, including the whole complex cultural 
system which has resulted from centuries of collusion and 
alliance of Gospel with world, with due respect and 
earnestness, is not a policy giving carte blanche for wildly 
unorthodox conclusions. But a congregation which has become 
willy-nilly sociologically sectarian simply cannot afford the 
theological sectarianism implied by the obstinate exclusion of 
the critical principle. 
vi. Moralism. 
Recent ethical debates in the churches have hinted at a 
new upsurge of misguided moralism among practising Christians, 
suggesting that few lessons have been learned from the mutual 
accusations made twenty years ago by participants in the 
debates about the "new morality". By "moralism!!, we mean a 
cluster of related attitudes ar~sing out of the conviction that 
at bottom things are plain and simple. There is no, question 
what i::; right and what is not, and there are fail-safe criteria 
for judging people's actions accordingly. The moralistic man 
demands straight answers, yes or no, to all strictly meta-
empirical questions. He rests his case upon the inviolability 
of the Either-Or, and is inclined to dismiss the Both-And as 
so much fudging and woolly thinking. 
Today moral issues are becoming painfully complex and 
new ethical questions are being thrown up by secular science 
with frightening regularity. In these circumstances, the 
longing for the old securities is tempting. The most up-to-date 
modernizing movements in the churches often unite with the 
most reactionary in condemning, for example, what they see as 
any "softening" of the Church's stance toward the marriage of 
divorcees, or any 11compromise" of the traditional attitude 
towards homosexuality, or Sunday trading, or indeed the rights 
and social status of women. 
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We have tried to allow for the interaction of the 
basically conservative and unreflective ethical traditions of 
the community with the potential for transcendence represented 
by the worshipping congregation. Participation in a vital 
religious life should lead Christians to eschew the facile 
black-and-white distinctions, the polarization of opinion, 
party sloganeering and glib judgmentalism which vitiate all 
public debate. ~foralism in religion becomes just another 
variety of the evisceration of real, insightful, humane thinking 
which contributes to the wide:opread and d·~adly expansion of 
sheer cynicism in ,::·ontemporar:; culture. Insofar a:3 a moralistic 
Church continues to sive the irr:pression that the an:3wer::=o are 
there in the back of the book if only people would be more 
religious and look them up, it feeds the opposite view of those 
who simply deny that tlu~re are any answers, u. that the 
questions make any sense anyway. 
The socioloe;ica.l persp8cti'" .re 1ishts up what a. mora.listic 
;elision fails to grasp, namely the inevita.bility of ·the 
Christian's, and the Church's. cumplici ty with and i mpli•:;ation 
in the perils and failures of the human project as well as in 
its glories. There is no simple, untainted translation of the 
meaning of the Gospel and its images into socio-cultural 
realities. If contemporary Christianity goes down the 
moralistic road, it will not be able to speak of God, God as he 
is in Jesus, involved and suffering a.nd redeeming through and 
in the midst of all the perplexities of this common human lot. 
The proponents of the "new morality" perceived the nature of 
the problem without finding their way to a feasible answer 
within the constraint:3 of religious social reality. The need is 
incumbent upon us to do better. 
vii. Towards an Empiric:a.l Ecclesiology. 
We r-epeat, finally, the title of this whole chapter, in 
order to draw together briefly some theoretical threads into a 
tentative synthesis. Its status is purely experiment3l, but it 
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may form a fitting end to a thesis which in its very nature 
cannot be rounded off in an altogether neat and conclusive way. 
VIe have repeatedly characterized the Church as a social 
reality in terms of two axes of variation. One represents the 
scale and shape of its social presence, and moves b3tween the 
poles of the centralised and highly visible institution and a 
le::::,::; well-defined local dispersion of Christian influence. The 
represents the modA and . . 1 pr1nc1p.e of the Chur-ch's 
activity, moving between the poles of legitimation, as 
:5uarantor of order and stability, and criticism, a.s bearer of 
the vision of radical alternatives. 
Plotting together these two axes of variation produces 
four "ideal types" of Church presence in society. Each of these 
could be pushed to an extreme at which the Church would cea.se, 
within the terms of this "empirical eccle:=:iology". to be 
"church" at all. But a pr-oper balanc•O! and creative tension 
between the four would constitute a flexible area. of "optimum 
·~burch presence and activity" i:J. v1hich the <:!:i_ale·:::tical 
processes outlined in the thesis could operate. 
The four types would be: 
a. Centralized institutional presence operating to 
legitimize and guarantee social order and stability. At the 
extreme, the Church merely becomes the religious arm of the 
State and loses the ability to criticise, together with any 
contact with the interests and needs of the mass of the people. 
b. Centralized institutional presence operating to 
criticise and offer alternatives. At the extreme, the Church 
may fall victim to the limit to any state's capacity for 
institutionalizing criticism of itself in this way. Further, as 
a centrally organized political pressure group or reform 
movement it may lose the ability to convey the Gospel to those 
more traditonal and conservative than itself. 
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c. Localized dispersion operating to integrate and 
stabilize social order. At the extreme, the Church becomes the 
sacral guardian of the tribalism of a particular group, with 
consequent loss of the Gospel's cosmic dimensions and of the 
promise of a new human maturity. 
d. Localized dispersion operating to cri tici==:-e and offer 
alternatives. At the extreme, the Church devolves into the 
vehicle of a :=;ubversive revolutionary movement, but forfeits 
all hope of wielding influence within. rath<O'r than out:=;id<C!, the 
structures of power. Ag.:1in, it risks having to le.::.ve large 
numbers of people outsid~ the Gospel's scope. 
The analysi:=. embodied in these ideal types, rough and 
ready though they are, summari~es the rStnge of con:=;idenJ.tions 
gov8rn ing tht~ effecti Vf~ c:oncr-ete expres::;ion of Chr i::3tian faith 
unrler contemporary social and cultural conditions, which it was 
the aim of Christian Radicalism to facilitate. This aim could 
not be a.chieved with t.he r-adicals' prior commitments to the 
notion of religionlessness, the un<~ l_:al i fied 
affirmation of secularity and the ideal of a thor-oughly free 
and undogmatic faith in no way bound to tra.dition. These 
commitments, we have argued at length, were sociologically 
unrealistic. 
But the aim remains. The Church still posses:3es in its 
tradition 
essential 
and its institutional the resources 
to achieving it. Further, contemporary social 
realities suggest a rich vein of continued interest in the 
Christian religion, despite the implicit or confused form in 
which this is often brought to light. If the Church can seize 
upon the questions we have discussed with the sense of urgency 
and the commitment to involving the people at a non-academic 
level which the Christian radicals displayed, together with the 
sociological sophistication they lacked, it may yet be able to 
tap the resources for renewal which still lie dormant in the 
culture and in its own life. 
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